







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 





Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
































Between the Hammer and the Anvil:  
The Trade Unions and the 2011 Arab Uprisings  









A thesis submitted to the University of Warwick for the degree of 






Department of Politics and International Studies 
































Introduction: The Quest for Social Justice and Democracy 
 
A Life Without Oppression 
 
North African Labour: Class Analysis and Labour Institutions 
 

















1.1 The Trade Unions: Between the Working Class and the State 
 
1.2 North African Workers’ Mobilisations in the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings 
 


























2.1 Autonomist Marxism and Class Composition Analysis 
 
2.2 A Non-Institutionalist Approach to Labour Institutions 
 
2.3 Working-Class Power, Within and Without the Trade Unions 
 
























3.1 The Origins of Moroccan Trade Unionism and the National 
Movement 
 
3.2 The Post-Independence Phase: Authoritarian Conservative 
Pluralism 
 
3.3 The Transitional Period: The Years of Lead 
 




























4.1 Tunisian Organised Labour in the National Liberation 
Struggle 
 
4.2 The Post-Independence Phase: Authoritarian Populist 
Corporatism 
 
4.3 The Transitional Period: The “Bloody Divorce” 
 
























Chapter 5 – Comparing Trade Unionism and Working-Class Power in 




5.1 Trade Unionism in Morocco and Tunisia on the Eve of the 
Uprisings 
 
5.2 The Trade Unions and Marginalised Workers 
 
5.3 Technical Composition and Working-Class Structural Power 
 



























6.1 The Trade Unions and Social Unrest on the Eve of the 
Uprising 
 
6.2 The Trade Unions and the M20Fev 
 






















7.1 Social Struggles and the Battle for Internal Democracy in the 
UGTT 
 
7.2 The 2011 Uprising Outside and Inside the UGTT 
 

















Conclusion: Broadening Perspectives on Trade Unions 
 
A History of Power 
 










1. Primary Sources 
 




C) Other Primary Sources 
 



















Appendix of Selected Documents 
 
1. Article on the UMT’s Controversies 
 
2. Statement by the UMT’s Expelled Leaders 
 
3. Statement by the RSDM on the UGTT 
 

















Graph 1 – Strike activity in Morocco, 1961-1983 
 
102 
Graph 2 – Private sector strike activity in Morocco, 1984-2008 112 
 








Graph 5 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 1961-1979 
 
142 
Graph 6 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 1976-1983 144 
 
Graph 7 – Real wages and GPD per capita growth (Tunisia, 1961-2013) 147 
 
Graph 8 – Total employment by economic sector (Tunisia, 1961-2014) 
 
151 
Graph 9 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 1986-2005 
 
152 
Graph 10 – Private sector strike activity in Morocco, 2005-2014 
 
192 









Table 1 – Dimensions of labour institutions 
 
68 
Table 2 – Indicators of working-class power 72 
 
Table 3 – Employment by economic sector and milieu (Morocco, 1960) 
 
87 




Table 5 – Employment by economic sector and milieu (Morocco, 1982) 
 
100 




Table 7 – Employment by economic sector (Tunisia, 1961 and 1982) 
 
141 









Table 10 – Working-class structural power 
 
180 
Table 11 – Working-class associational power 
 
186 







Four years of PhD research did not result in the production of this thesis only, they 
were also a significant part in the production of who I am. In the latter case, the 
“authors” were all the old and new people I have been in touch with during this period 
of my life. In different ways, the task of getting by would have been impossible 
without them, and I hope I was able to help others in turn sometimes. The reader is 
asked to excuse the long list of collective and individual names, it is part of my sincere 
– if vain – effort to somehow mention everyone, even if not by their individual names. 
First, during the time of this research, PhD student Giulio Regeni was kidnapped, 
tortured, and assassinated in Cairo while researching Egyptian trade unionism. I add 
my voice, here too, to the many demanding truth and justice for all the victims of the 
human rights abuses committed by the Egyptian regime. 
I will continue by thanking all the participants in the research, who have 
generously given up some of their time and attention for this project. Social change is 
not achieved by writing theses, but I hope this work will somehow constitute a 
contribution – however small – to advancing the goals of social justice and democracy 
that the vast majority of the participants in this research uphold in different ways. I 
also thank my supervisors Nicola Pratt and Oz Hassan for their crucial feedback and 
support. 
This thesis has benefited from the intellectual exchanges I have had with many 
friends and colleagues, inter alia Amin Allal, Rutvica Andrijasevic, David Bailey, 
Stefano Barone, Sarah Barrières, Joel Beinin, Clara Capelli, Alessia Carnevale, 
Lorenzo Cini, Jack Copley, Giulia Daniele, Damiano De Facci, Gianni Del Panta, Elio 
Di Muccio, Rosita Di Peri, Moutaa Amin El Waer, Fátima Fernandez, Antonio Ferraz 
De Oliveira, Alia Gana, Lorenzo Genito, Craig Gent, Joe Hayns, Tereza Jermanova, 
Zep Kalb, Chiara Loschi, Lydia Medland, Alexis Moraitis, Javier Moreno Zacares, 
Aya Nassar, Iain Pirie, Harry Pitts, Stefano Pontiggia, Alessandro Rivera Magos, 
Diane Robert, Devi Sacchetto, Ester Sigillò, Arianna Tassinari, Francesco Vacchiano, 
Lorenzo Vianelli, Hèla Yousfi. Special thanks go to Stefano Gasparri, who has 
patiently guided me through the intricacies of labour studies. 
 9
In Morocco, I was lucky to know many unbelievable people, including the 
large group around the Union des Étudiants pour le Changement du Système Éducatif 
(UECSE) – particularly my friend and flatmate Nabil Belkabir –, as well as 
Mohammed Boutayeb, Soraya El Kahlaoui, Hakim Sikouk, Umberto Vigliani, 
Benedetta Villa, Fayrouz Yousfi, Reda Zaireg, and many more. Ismaïl Manouzi 
provided me with crucial help in the collection of materials for the thesis, I am also 
grateful for the interesting conversations during our meetings. Abdallah Lefnatsa was 
also extremely generous in his support for this project. 
In Tunisia, I have had the chance of meeting a great deal of people that will 
remain important for me, among them, my friends in the Manich Msamah collective, 
the “Italian clan” of Tunis, Khalid Amami, Jihed Brirmi, Amel Bouzayene, Henda 
Chennaoui, Silvia Finzi, Moncef Guebsi, Patrizia Mancini, Marwa Talhaoui, Inel 
Tarfa, Hamadi Zribi, and many others. Salah Hamzaoui was my main point of 
reference in the study of Tunisian trade unionism, and I am grateful for his help and 
for all the long conversations. Monji Ben Chaaben also provided me with important 
support, as well as much humour. 
For the UK, I would like to thank the people in Plan C Birmingham, Warwick 
for Free Education (Coventry), the Clapton Ultras (London) – particularly my old 
friend Luca Rosetti –, and Hydra Books (Bristol), as well as all the friends and 
colleagues in the Politics and International Studies department of the University of 
Warwick, many of whom I have mentioned above. 
Italy is home, and here it is impossible to even try to mention a fraction of the 
people I would like to. Let me start with all my friends, although I can only name the 
lifelong ones – Davide Andreatta, Lorenzo Danesin, Ruggero Sorci, and Stefano 
Trombetta –, you cannot write a thesis or do much else without having grown up. To 
them, I add the comrades from the Django Social Centre (Treviso) – many of whom I 
have known long before the occupations started in 2012 –, the editorial board of the 
social movement website globalproject.info – that has regularly hosted my 
contributions –, and the whole movement in Italy, which is now facing the toughest 
times so far in the lifespan of our generation. 
I owe endless gratitude to my parents, Paolo Feltrin and Renata Gherlenda, for 
their love, their support, and their understanding. At the risk of eliciting national 
stereotypes, I also thank the “extended family”, my aunts, uncles, cousins, and 
 10
grandmother. A loving grazie to Gabriela Julio Medel, my partner, for countless great 
and precious things I will not attempt to list here. 
My brother, Alberto “Dubito” Feltrin, left us two years before I started my life 
as a PhD student. If he could see what is happening today, he probably would not think 
we have been very successful in improving the world he quit. But, as he used to sing, 







This thesis is entirely my own work. The thesis, and no portion of its, has not been 







This thesis investigates the divergent role of the trade unions in the 2011 uprisings of 
Morocco and Tunisia. In Morocco, most labour confederations supported 
constitutional reform that guaranteed the continuity of the incumbent regime. By 
contrast, in Tunisia, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) called 
regional general strikes that contributed to the downfall of President Ben Ali. These 
outcomes appear paradoxical in light of institution-based studies of North African 
trade unions before 2011, in which the trade unions’ mobilising potential was 
underestimated for “single-trade union” Tunisia and overstated for “union pluralist” 
Morocco. 
 This thesis argues that, although labour institutions significantly mediate social 
conflict (or significantly fail to do so), class struggle and class power transcend and 
transform labour institutions in ways that are missed by institution-based research. 
Such dynamics are innovatively interpreted through an expanded conception of the 
working class that goes beyond manual waged workers. In this way, this thesis sheds 
new light on the relations between the subjectivities that came to the fore in the 2011 
uprisings, particularly precarious youths, and long-standing labour confederations. 
The thesis draws on original empirical material, which is interpreted through a 
historical sociology framework, which combines autonomist Marxism with elements 
of historical institutionalism to see working-class power and labour institutions as 
outcomes of previous class struggles. 
 The historical chapters of the thesis show how different systems of labour 
institutions and different levels of working-class power were built in the two countries 
since independence through divergent trajectories of class struggle. The chapters 
focusing on the 2011 uprisings show how such factors contributed to shaping the role 
of the trade unions in the protests. This thesis finds that relatively high levels of 
working-class power facilitated a more active role of the trade unions in protests for 
social change and contributed – among other factors – to a more extensive change in 
a democratic direction. Additionally, workers and trade unions were more likely to 
promote social change in an abrupt and insurrectional manner when they faced a 
relatively rigid system of labour institutions. By showing how historical rounds of 
social and particularly class conflict contributed to shaping the divergent roles of the 
trade unions in the 2011 uprisings of Morocco and Tunisia, this thesis fills a significant 
gap in the published literature and shows the merits of a historical, class-based, and 
struggle-centred approach to studying trade unions. 
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AMDH = Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (Moroccan Human Rights 
Association) 
 
ANDCM = Association Nationale des Diplômés Chômeurs du Maroc (National 
Association of the Unemployed Graduates of Morocco) 
 
ATFD = Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (Tunisian Association of 
Democratic Women) 
 
AwI = Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane (Justice and Spirituality, Moroccan Islamist organisation) 
 
CDT = Confédération Démocratique du Travail (Democratic Labour Confederation, 
Morocco) 
 
CDT-SNP = Confédération Démocratique du Travail – Syndicat National de la Poste 
(Democratic Labour Confederation – National Mail Union) 
 
CFT = Commission des Femmes Travailleuses (Working Women’s Commission, 
Tunisia) 
 
CGEM = Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (General Confederation 
of Morocco’s Enterprises) 
 
CGT = Confédération Générale du Travail (General Labour Confederation, France) 
 
CGTT = Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Confederation 
of the Tunisian Workers) 
 
CNI = Congrès National Ittihadi (National Unionist Congress, Morocco) 
 
CNPR = Conseil National pour la Protection de la Révolution (National Council for 
the Protection of the Revolution, Tunisia) 
 
CNSS = Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (National Social Security Fund, 
Morocco and Tunisia) 
 
COS-ONE = Comité d’Oeuvres Sociales – Office National d’Électricité (Firm-Level 
Welfare – National Electricity Office, Morocco) 
 
CPG = Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa (Gafsa Phosphates Company, Tunisia) 
 
CPR = Congrès pour la République (Congress for the Republic, Tunisian political 
party) 
 
EC = Executive Committee 
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EJC = Enterprise Joint Commission (Tunisia) 
 
ESC = Economic and Social Council (Morocco and Tunisia) 
 
ETUF = Egyptian Trade Union Federation 
 
FCA = Frame Collective Agreement (Tunisia) 
 
FdG = Fédération de Gauche (Left Federation, Moroccan leftist coalition) 
 
FDT = Fédération Démocratique du Travail (Democratic Labour Federation, 
Morocco) 
 
FDT-SNE = Fédération Démocratique du Travail – Syndicat National de 
l’Enseignement (Democratic Federation of Labour – National Teaching Union) 
 
FP = Front Populaire (Popular Front, Tunisian leftist coalition) 
 
HCP = Haut-Commissariat au Plan (Higher Planning Commission, Morocco) 
 
ICFTU = International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
 
IGF = Inspection Générale des Finances (Inspectorate General of Finances, Morocco) 
 
ILO = International Labour Organization 
 
IMF = International Monetary Fund 
 
INS = Institut National de la Statistique (National Statistics Institute, Tunisia) 
 
JCC = Joint Consultative Commission (Tunisia) 
 
LPR = Ligue pour la Protection de la Révolution (League for Protection of the 
Revolution, Tunisia) 
 
LTDH = Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (Tunisian Human Rights League) 
 
M20Fev = Mouvement 20 Février (20 February Movement, Morocco) 
 
MENA = Middle East and North Africa 
 
MGEN = Mutuelle Générale de l’Éducation Nationale (National Teaching General 
Insurance Fund, Morocco) 
 
MTI = Mouvement Tendance Islamique (Islamic Movement Tendency, Tunisia) 
 
NEC = National Executive Committee 
 
OCP = Office Chérifien des Phosphates (Sherifian Office of Phosphates, Morocco) 
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ODT = Organisation Démocratique du Travail (Democratic Organisation of Labour, 
Morocco) 
 
OFPPT = Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail 
(Office for Professional Training and Employment Promotion, Morocco) 
 
ONA = Omnium Nord-Africain (North African Corporation, Moroccan investment 
holding) 
 
ONE = Office National d’Électricité (National Electricity Office, Morocco) 
 
PADS = Parti de l’Avant-garde Démocratique et Socialiste (Party of the Socialist 
Democratic Vanguard, Morocco) 
 
PAM = Parti Authenticité et Modernité (Authenticity and Modernity Party, Morocco) 
 
PCM = Parti Communiste du Maroc (Moroccan Communist Party) 
 
PCOT = Parti Communiste des Ouvriers de Tunisie (Tunisian Workers’ Communist 
Party) 
 
PCT = Parti Communiste Tunisien (Tunisian Communist Party) 
 
PDP = Parti Démocrate Progressiste (Progressive Democratic Party, Tunisia) 
 
PJD = Parti de la Justice et du Développement (Justice and Development Party, 
Morocco) 
 
PPS = Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (Party of Progress and Socialism, Morocco) 
 
PSD = Parti Socialiste Destourien (Socialist Destourian Party, Tunisia) 
 
PSU = Parti Socialiste Unifié (Unified Socialist Party, Morocco) 
 
PTT = Postal, Telegraph and Telephone 
 
RCD = Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (Democratic Constitutional 
Rally, Tunisian political party) 
 
RNI = Rassemblement National des Indépendants (National Rally of the 
Independents, Moroccan political party) 
 
RSDM = Rencontre Syndicale Démocratique Militante (Democratic Militant Trade 
Union Meeting, Tunisia) 
 
SAMIR = Société Anonyme Marocaine de l’Industrie et du Raffinage (Moroccan 
Public Limited Company of Industry and Refinery) 
 
SG = Secretary General 
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SNCPA = Société Nationale de Cellulose et de Papier Alfa (National Company of 
Cellulose and Alfa Paper, Tunisia) 
 
SNESup = Syndicat National de l’Enseignement Supérieur (National Higher 
Education Union, Morocco) 
 
SOE = State-Owned Enterprise 
 
UC = Union Constitutionnelle (Constitutional Union, Moroccan political party) 
 
UDC = Union des Diplômés Chômeurs (Union of the Unemployed Graduates, 
Tunisia) 
 
UGET = Union Générale des Étudiants de Tunisie (General Union of Tunisia’s 
Students) 
 
UGSCM = Union Générale des Syndicats Confédérés du Maroc (General Union of 
the Confederated Syndicates of Morocco) 
 
UGTM = Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc (General Union of the Moroccan 
Workers) 
 
UGTT = Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisian General Labour Union) 
 
UGTT-FGTM = Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail – Fédération Générale des 
Travailleurs des Mines (Tunisian General Labour Union – General Federation of 
Mining Workers) 
 
UGTT-SGEB = Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail – Syndicat Général de 
l’Enseignement de Base (Tunisian General Labour Union – General Union of Primary 
Teaching) 
 
UGTT-SGES = Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail – Syndicat Général de 
l’Enseignement Secondaire (Tunisian General Labour Union – General Union of 
Secondary Teaching) 
 
UMT = Union Marocaine du Travail (Moroccan Labour Union) 
 
UMT-CD = Union Marocaine du Travail – Courant Démocratique (Moroccan Labour 
Union – Democratic Current) 
 
UMT-FNE = Union Marocaine du Travail – Fédération National de l’Enseignement 
(Moroccan Labour Union – National Teaching Federation) 
 
UMT-FNOFCL = Union Marocaine du Travail – Fédération Nationale des Ouvriers 
et Fonctionnaires des Collectivités Locales (Moroccan Labour Union – National 
Federation of the Workers and Clerks of the Local Administrations) 
 
 17
UMT-FNSA = Union Marocaine du Travail – Fédération Nationale du Secteur 
Agricole (Moroccan Labour Union – National Federation of the Agricultural Sector) 
 
UMT-USF = Union Marocaine du Travail – Union Syndicale des Fonctionnaires 
(Moroccan Labour Union – Civil Servants Trade Union) 
 
UMT-USIB = Union Marocaine du Travail – Union Syndicale Inter-Bancaire 
(Moroccan Labour Union – Inter-Bank Trade Union) 
 
UNEM = Union Nationale des Étudiants du Maroc (National Union of Moroccan 
Students) 
 
UNFP = Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of the Popular 
Forces, Morocco) 
 
UNTM = Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc (National Labour Union of Morocco) 
 
USFP = Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of the Popular 
Forces, Morocco) 
 
USTT = Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Tunisie (Trade Union of Tunisia’s 
Workers) 
 
UTICA = Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie du Commerce et de l’Artisanat (Tunisian 
Union of Industry Trade and Handicrafts) 
 
UTT = Union Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisian Labour Union) 
 
UTT = Union des Travailleurs de Tunisie (Union of Tunisia’s Workers) 
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 فماذا نقول وماذا نريد؟
 نريد الحياة بال ظالمين […] 
 عملنا الكثير صنعنا المحال
 وكل الجهود وكل الثمار
 تعود مكاسب للمترفين1
Awled El-Manajem – “Nasheed Esh’aab” (Hymn to the People) 
 
 بطبيعتو الدّورو في جيــبي ما خذاش لهف[…] 
 ما عادش تاكل لوغة ضرب .. بدني مّخي تخّرب
 من ظالم نبيحو كلب .. أدخل لحومنا تي ڤّرب
 من ريحتك لعباد تتهّرب2 





A Life without Oppression 
These lyrics symbolise historical changes and continuities in Maghribi working-class 
culture. In fact, the band Awled El-Manajem started its activities in the 1970s, while 
MCs Hamzaoui Med Amine and Kafon rose to fame in 2013. Both songs call for 
rebellion against injustice, but while Awled El-Manajem (i.e. the sons of the mines) 
stressed exploitation in the workplace, today’s rappers emphasise dispossession in the 
community. By the end of the thesis, it will become clear that these artists’ shift in 
focus is not casual but linked to the broader metamorphosis of the region’s working 
class. It will also emerge how such transformations have had deep impacts on the ways 
in which the trade unions can fulfil their assigned mission of defending workers’ 
interests against – in the words of both songs – “the oppressors”. 
 This thesis, in fact, studies the political role of the Moroccan and Tunisian trade 
unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings by analysing their relations with the working class, 
on the one hand, and the capitalist state, on the other. What role did the trade unions 
                                                 
1 “What do we say, what do we want?/ We want life without oppressors/ […] We worked a lot, we built 
the impossible/ And all the efforts, all the fruits/ All the profits went back to the rich…”. Translated by 
Marwa Talhaoui and the author. 
2 “By their nature, pennies don’t stay long in my pocket/ […] We don’t understand anymore the 
language of violence, my body and brains are ruined/ When the oppressor comes the dogs bark, enter 
our neighbourhood come closer/ The people run away from your smell…”. Translated by Marwa 
Talhaoui and the author. 
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play in Morocco and Tunisia during the 2011 Arab uprisings? How did they contribute 
to shaping the broader outcomes of the uprisings in the two countries? These are the 
core questions that guide the present research. Despite the vast literature analysing the 
2011 Arab uprisings, relatively little attention has been paid to class analysis and to 
the trade unions’ contributions to the successes and failures of such mobilisations in 
achieving social justice and democracy. Even less has been written on how to interpret 
the relations between the trade unions and the precarious youths that were at the 
forefront of the uprisings. 
 The 2011 Arab uprisings were a global watershed, and a deeper comprehension 
of their history is a contribution to a more effective understanding of our present and 
future. In spite of widespread orientalist assumptions about the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), social justice and democracy were the central aspirations of the 
uprisings. However, the revolutionary demands that exploded in 2011, pointing in 
potentially progressive directions, have remained tragically unmet. As trade unions 
have historically been a major organisational vehicle in the quest for social justice and 
democracy, this thesis investigates under what conditions they can still contribute to 
social struggles towards these goals. 
 While “institution-based” approaches have seen the institutional framework as 
the most relevant element in the analysis of the political role of trade unionism, the 
argument advanced here is that, although labour institutions significantly mediate 
social conflict (or significantly fail to do so), class struggle and class power transcend 
and transform labour institutions in ways that are missed by institution-based research. 
Labour institutions should be understood as built through historical rounds of class 
struggle and grounded in a given balance of class power. The findings of this thesis 
show that the role of the trade unions in the 2011 uprisings was shaped primarily by 
the balance of class power and secondarily by the incumbent system of labour 
institutions. In turn, both of these were the outcomes of previous, contingent class 
struggles. 
 Trade unionism has a long history in Morocco and Tunisia, dating back from 
the time of the protectorate. In both countries, the labour movement made a significant 
contribution to the national liberation struggle and, once independence was achieved, 
it attempted to participate in the construction of a socially just and democratic society. 
However, formal national independence fell short of popular aspirations, and thus the 
unions found themselves time and again drawn into fierce struggles for socioeconomic 
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as well as civil rights. 
Morocco and Tunisia are particularly fit for comparison because they are 
relatively similar cases, despite the fact that the former is a monarchy and the latter a 
republic. In fact, they are both Maghribi countries and share the legacies of the French 
protectorate and parallel paths of neoliberal structural adjustment. Both were recently 
affected by a wave of major social mobilisations in which the trade unions were 
involved. However, in Tunisia, the single labour confederation Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) called for regional general strikes in solidarity with the 
protests, contributing to Ben Ali’s downfall despite the compromising line of its 
leadership. In Morocco, against the backdrop of the Mouvement 20 Février’s 
(M20Fev) mobilisations, most labour confederations supported a Palace-led 
constitutional reform that guaranteed the continuity of the incumbent regime. 
 
North African Labour: Class Analysis and Labour Institutions 
The above-described outcomes appear paradoxical in light of those pre-2011 studies 
of Moroccan and Tunisian trade unionism that – while not necessarily working within 
an institutionalist theoretical framework – tended to stress the weight of institutional 
arrangements, leaving issues pertaining to class struggle out of the picture or relegated 
to a secondary role. After independence was achieved in both countries in 1956, 
Tunisia’s UGTT was incorporated as the single trade union associated with the 
populist regime, while Moroccan trade unionism was progressively marginalised from 
the ruling coalition. Starting from the consideration that the UGTT was tied to the 
regime while the Moroccan unions were kept at a distance, some authors – to whom 
this research is in any case indebted – underestimated the mobilising potential of 
Tunisian labour because of their focus on the system of labour-state relations called 
here populist corporatism (e.g. Bellin 2002), while others overstated that of Moroccan 
trade unions because of their focus on trade union pluralism (e.g. Cammett and 
Posusney 2010). 
After the 2011 uprisings, class struggle came back on the agenda, thanks in 
particular to Joel Beinin’s work (2016). Following Hèla Yousfi (2015), Beinin showed 
that, despite the fact that the UGTT’s top leadership adopted a policy of compromise 
with Ben Ali’s regime, workers and rank-and-file union militants were able to pressure 
the union leadership to wield the confederation’s infrastructure in support of the 
mobilisations. This thesis starts from Beinin and Yousfi’s work but expands upon it 
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empirically – bringing “union pluralist” Morocco into the picture – and theoretically 
– using a heterodox conception of the working class that is not limited to manual 
waged workers. 
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis deploys a historical 
sociological approach centred on autonomist Marxism (see Cleaver 2000; Tronti 
1966) and critically appropriating elements of historical institutionalism (see Collier 
and Collier 1979; 1991). A historical approach was chosen not because the events that 
took place, say, during the struggle for independence can explain by themselves the 
outcomes of the 2011 uprisings, but because balances of class power and labour 
institutions are best seen as historically constructed through successive rounds of class 
struggles. History allows one to see how these factors were built organically and 
dynamically in space and time, instead of treating them as discrete and static variables 
that just happened to “be there” on the eve of the 2011 uprisings. In this endeavour, 
autonomist Marxism bears two great advantages: it assigns a constituent role to class 
struggle as a form of contingent collective agency, avoiding the rigidities of traditional 
Marxism; and it features an expanded notion of the working class, escaping a narrow 
focus on the workplace struggles of manual waged workers.3 Following the insights 
first proposed by the autonomist feminist tradition (see Dalla Costa and James 1972), 
the working class is understood here as encompassing both waged and unwaged 
workers. This move opens the analysis of the relationships between trade unions and 
workers to a much richer range of phenomena and subjects, including the community 
struggles of non-unionised precarious workers that were central in the 2011 uprisings. 
These theoretical lenses are applied to three aspects of Moroccan and Tunisian 
society: working-class composition, labour institutions, and working-class power (see 
Chapter 2). In autonomist Marxism, working-class composition refers to the technical 
organisation of the working class as labour-power (e.g. sectors of employment, 
educational levels, wage structures, etc.) and to its political capacity to resist and attack 
its very condition as labour-power (e.g. forms of consciousness, resistance, 
organisation, etc.). Labour institutions, instead, are the systems of established norms 
and organisations that mediate relations between workers and capital (e.g. trade 
unions, collective bargaining, social dialogue, etc.). Finally, working-class power 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that such struggles are unimportant, but simply that they are not the only form of 
struggle relevant to understanding the phenomena under investigation. 
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refers to workers’ capacity to mobilise for their class interests, and it is thus related to 
a given working-class composition.  
 This research holds that the different levels of working-class power existing in 
Morocco and Tunisia on the eve of the 2011 uprisings are the most important factor 
for understanding the divergent roles of the trade unions in those mobilisations. 
Different levels of working-class power also contribute – alongside other factors – to 
explain why the political change obtained by the uprisings was more limited in 
Morocco than in Tunisia. In fact, the Moroccan regime maintained its undemocratic 
character, while Tunisia is, for the moment, a representative democracy. Additionally, 
differences in Morocco and Tunisia’s political institutions – particularly labour 
institutions – facilitated the fact that, in Morocco, the trade unions contributed to 
(limited) change in a gradual and negotiated way, while change in Tunisia took place 
in an abrupt and insurrectional manner. This is because, due to party mediation 
between labour and the state, trade union fragmentation, social dialogue, and the 
absence of a former populist social pact, the Moroccan regime had a more flexible 
system of labour institutions compared to the Tunisian one.  
 The findings of the thesis can thus be schematically summarised as follows: 
 -A relatively high level of working-class power facilitated a more active role 
of the trade unions in workers’ protests for social change and contributed – with other 
factors – to a more extensive increase in democracy (Tunisia). Conversely, a relatively 
low level of working-class power facilitated a more passive role of the trade unions in 
workers’ protests for social change and contributed – along with other factors – to a 
more limited democratic advance (Morocco). 
 -A relatively rigid system of political institutions – particularly labour 
institutions – contributed to the fact that workers and trade unions promoted change 
in an abrupt and insurrectional manner (Tunisia). Conversely, a relatively flexible 
system of political institutions – particularly labour institutions – contributed to the 
fact that workers and trade unions promoted change in a gradual and negotiated 
manner (Morocco).4 
The order of presentation of these two sets of findings indicates a different 
degree of importance. In other words, it was the level of working-class power that had 
an impact on the direction and magnitude of the trade unions’ intervention in the 2011 
                                                 
4 It should be emphasised that these are not universal claims, but only relate to the cases under study. 
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uprisings, while the institutional setting is only relevant to understand some of the 
modalities in which this intervention took place. 
These findings do not idealise Tunisia as a workers’ paradise – far from it. 
Tunisian workers’ power is high relative to the standards of a staunchly labour-
repressive region. The 2011 Arab uprisings’ “modest harvest” in terms of 
democratisation (see Brownlee et al. 2013; 2015) can also be seen as a consequence 
of, among other factors, the high labour-repressiveness of the MENA.5 
This account should not be read in deterministic terms. Working-class power, 
even in its most “structural” elements like the sectorial location of the workers in the 
economy, is historically constructed through successive rounds of contingent class 
struggles and can change through further conflicts. Labour institutions also emerge as 
outcomes of class struggles, but once in place they tend to partially “freeze” and thus 
to reproduce themselves, within limits, regardless of shifts in the existing balance of 
class power. A given balance of class power, in turn, indicates a certain distribution 
of resources between classes, pointing to a range of likelier outcomes for a particular 
social conflict. Yet it should always be kept in mind that actual outcomes and the ways 
in which they occur can in no way be pre-determined, ignoring the agency of social 
actors that mobilise class power through contingent strategies. History is rich in events 
that happened against all odds. 
This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in two principal ways. First, at 
the time of writing, there exists no published comparative study of Moroccan and 
Tunisian trade unionism. The comparison proposed here addresses the puzzle of why 
the radically different systems of labour institutions existing in the two countries did 
not produce the outcomes expected by institution-based approaches. The thesis relies 
largely on original empirical material collected through a lengthy period of fieldwork. 
This includes 94 semi-structured interviews with trade unionists and activists, a 
digitalised press archive on labour-related issues of over 2,500 items, and the analysis 
of labour legislation, socioeconomic statistics, memoirs of labour activists, and other 
documents produced by the state and trade unions. Second, unlike other studies, this 
research includes non-unionised, precarious workers in the analysis of the relations 
between the working class and the trade unions, going beyond mobilisations within 
                                                 
5 As an illustration of this, the ITUC Global Rights Index identifies the MENA as the worst region for 
fundamental rights at work (ITUC 2015). While the ITUC’s methodology cannot be considered 
conclusive, this claim seems very plausible. 
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the workplace or in the framework of labour organisations. This is important given 
that precarious employment is severely widespread and has become a politically 
salient issue. This thesis assesses the role of trade unions not primarily through an 
institutional framework but rather through the lens of workers’ struggles, in this 
expanded conception, over time. In this way, it avoids reducing the working class, 
even heuristically, to its official organisations, and it underlines the potential for 
workers’ collective agency to unsettle institutionalised arrangements. 
 
The Trade Unions in the Uprisings: Between the Hammer and the Anvil 
This thesis features a literature review on workers and trade unions in North Africa 
(Chapter 1), a presentation of the theory and methods used for the research (Chapter 
2), a historical exploration of trajectories of class struggles and their impact on labour 
institutions in Morocco and Tunisia (Chapters 3 and 4), a comparison of levels of 
working-class power in the two countries on the eve of the 2011 uprisings (Chapter 
5), and an in-depth investigation of the strategies of the relevant actors, particularly 
the trade unionists, in the 2011 uprisings (Chapters 6 and 7). All empirical chapters 
are based on data collected during fieldwork, although the two historical chapters also 
benefited significantly from the coding of secondary sources.  
 Chapter 1, the literature review, discusses the existing academic literature on 
workers and trade unions in North Africa. First, the chapter assesses the usefulness of 
the pre-2011 literature for understanding the role of the unions in the 2011 uprisings, 
arguing that “class-based” approaches (e.g. Hamzaoui 2013; Posusney 1997) provide 
a more adequate framework than “institution-based” ones (e.g. Bellin 2002; Cammett 
and Posusney 2010). In fact, the latter minimised the disruptive potential of Tunisian 
labour and overstated the capacity for reform of Moroccan trade unions. Second, the 
discussion of the published works on labour in the 2011 uprisings shows that, while 
recent years have seen a revival of class-based research (e.g. Alexander and Bassiouny 
2014; Beinin 2016), this did not address the puzzle of why labour in “single-trade 
union” Tunisia had a more active role in the 2011 uprisings than labour in “union 
pluralist” Morocco. Third, the review of the conceptualisations of the working class 
deployed so far to study North African workers (e.g. Bourdieu 1963; Fanon 2004) 
points to the fact that such notions are too narrow to grasp the political significance of 
precarious (including unwaged) workers in the 2011 uprisings. 
 Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical and methodological tools deployed to 
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understand working-class composition, labour institutions, and working-class power. 
The thesis uses an autonomist-inspired understanding of the working class, which 
extends the concept to all those dispossessed of significant ownership and control of 
capital, encompassing also all subordinate forms of unwaged labour (see Cleaver 
2000). This thesis shows how the post-independence trend towards rapidly rising 
employment security was suspended in the neoliberal phase, posing a new challenge 
to the trade unions. Precarious workers face severe difficulties in advancing their 
interests through the trade unions, and usually act collectively outside of them, 
recurring to non-institutionalised repertoires of contention. The mobilisations of 
precarious workers, however, also constituted a pressure on the trade unions to act 
upon their grievances. 
 Starting from this expanded conception of the working class, the reduction of 
the class to its official organisations – the trade unions – appears as an excessive 
simplification (Zerowork Collective 1992). This is why this thesis disaggregates 
labour institutions into the institutionalised relations among workers, trade unions, the 
state, and capital. The trade unions are mediators between workers and capital; they 
are perpetually subject to pressures from below from workers (both unionised and 
non-unionised) and pressures from above from the undemocratic tendencies of the 
trade union hierarchy, as well as from the state and capital, which have an interest in 
using them as vehicles to control the workers (Hyman 1975). 
 This thesis analyses the strategies that authoritarian states deploy in their 
attempts to control the trade unions along three dimensions: substantial inducements, 
organisational inducements, and constraints. Substantial inducements are direct 
concessions to the workers, which the regime provides in the hope of securing their 
consent. Organisational inducements are benefits to the trade union as an organisation 
and are thus primarily in the interest of the trade union officials. Constraints are 
sanctions on workers and trade unionists that refuse to comply with the regime’s 
policies despite the inducements provided. Different combinations of constraints and 
inducements give rise to different systems of labour institutions, which can be more 
or less responsive to struggles from below and changes in the balance of class power. 
When they are relatively unresponsive, they are rigid and thus vulnerable to abrupt 
and insurrectional change. When they are more responsive, they have greater 
flexibility and are more amenable to gradual and negotiated change. 
 Finally, this thesis operationalises working-class power as existing both within 
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and without the trade unions. Following Erik Olin Wright, working-class power is 
analysed along the dimensions of structural power – depending on the position of 
workers in the economic system – and associational power – depending on the strength 
of workers’ organisations (Wright 2000). 
 Chapters 3 and 4 provide a historical account of the trajectories of class 
struggles and of the transformations of class compositions and labour institutions in 
Morocco and Tunisia from independence to the eve of the 2011 uprisings. They show 
how divergent trajectories of class struggles led to different systems of labour 
institutions, as well as different levels of working-class power. 
 In Morocco, workers participated in the struggle for national liberation, but 
they did so through a Moroccan trade union confederation only in the later stages of 
the conflict, as the Union Marocain du Travail (UMT) was founded in 1955. After 
independence was achieved in 1956, the National Movement competed with the 
Palace to secure the control of the state, but it was defeated and became increasingly 
fragmented. The system of labour institutions that consequently emerged can be 
designated as “authoritarian conservative pluralism”. “Authoritarian” refers to high 
constraints, “conservative” refers to low substantial inducements, and “pluralism” 
refers to a configuration of organisational inducements that allowed for union 
pluralism. The regime led by Hassan II was based on a conservative social coalition 
led by landlords and rural notables; the trade unions found only a marginal place in 
the new order. 
 During the cycle of struggle of the 1970-80s, the severity of state repression 
prevented the New Left that originated in the universities from building an important 
presence in the trade unions. Harsh protests and crackdowns marked Morocco’s 
transition to neoliberalism. After structural adjustment, however, the Moroccan regime 
slowly changed through a partial political opening engineered by the Palace to contain 
social struggles. It thus became what can be called “semi-authoritarian conservative 
pluralist”. The balance of class power remained relatively unfavourable to workers, 
while the pluralist and semi-authoritarian character of the regime endowed it with 
significant institutional flexibility. Therefore, in the cycle of struggle that reached a 
peak in the 2011 uprisings, the regime faced relatively weak working-class power and 
at the same time its institutions were sufficiently flexible to allow it to successfully 
defuse the grassroots mobilisations. 
 In Tunisia, the UGTT was founded in 1946 and participated in the National 
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Movement from an early stage, in alliance with the nationalist Neo-Destour6 Party. 
The regime that emerged with independence can be described as an instance of 
“authoritarian populist corporatism”. It was characterised by high constraints, 
relatively high substantial inducements, and a configuration of organisational 
inducements based on a single trade union confederation. The post-independence 
regime was thus based on a populist alliance between the state bureaucracy, the “petty 
bourgeois” leadership of the Neo-Destour, and the secure workers organised in the 
UGTT. 
 The significant role the UGTT had played during the struggle for independence 
helped it to secure an important place in the new political system. The UGTT was 
integrated into a triangular state-party-union architecture, in which the bureaucracies 
of each organisation closely interpenetrated one another. However, Tunisia’s system 
of labour institutions differed from typical populist corporatism (e.g. Egypt) in that the 
UGTT always preserved a significant degree of autonomy from the party and the state, 
the scope of which varied depending on the political conjuncture. 
 During the 1970s, a vigorous strike wave developed, finding its main 
strongholds in the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were created as part of 
Tunisia’s former import-substitution industrialisation programme. In this context, a 
new generation of radical activists coming from the student movement entered the 
UGTT. These mobilisations culminated in the 26 January 1978 UGTT national general 
strike, which was violently crushed by the security forces. The state cracked down 
again on the UGTT in 1985, as it was clearing the way for neoliberal structural 
adjustment. However, despite their defeat, these struggles significantly altered the 
triangular state-party-union architecture – an achievement with far-reaching, long-
term consequences that did not obtain in the other Arab populist countries. On the one 
hand, a solid leftist opposition had emerged within the confederation. On the other 
hand, after this bitter conflict, the top union leadership ceased to be a reliable ally of 
the regime. 
 Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, who took power on 7 November 1987, needed a 
social basis to contain the Islamists and his solution was to reconstitute the corporatist 
alliance with the UGTT in a neoliberal “post-populist” form. In the neoliberal phase, 
the Tunisian system of labour institutions can thus be characterised as “authoritarian 
                                                 
6 Destour means “constitution” in Arabic. 
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post-populist corporatist”. Constraints remained high, substantial inducements were 
partially retrenched, and organisational inducements were reorganised in a more 
informal and clientelist fashion. In the 2000s, Tunisia still featured a relatively high 
(for the standards of the region) level of working-class power, but its system of labour 
institutions can be identified as rigid because the single trade union arrangement 
remained in place and the regime allowed for even less civil and political rights 
compared to the Moroccan one. 
 The historical chapters highlight how past struggles contingently construct the 
conditions of the present. Against this background, Chapter 5 analyses working-class 
composition and trade unionism in Morocco and Tunisia on the eve of the 2011 
uprisings to compare the respective levels of working-class power. The comparison 
shows that, on the eve of the 2011 uprisings, working-class power – both structural 
and associational – was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco. This meant that, in Tunisia, 
the trade unions faced stronger pressures from below to mobilise, and at the same time 
had more power to do so, relative to Morocco. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate how different levels of working-class power and 
different types of labour institutions contributed to shape how the Moroccan and 
Tunisian trade unions behaved during the 2011 uprisings. In Morocco, because of 
relatively low working-class power, the trade unions faced weaker pressures to act on 
behalf of the mobilised workers and stronger pressures from the state in the opposite 
direction. The mobilisations remained fragmented, as the protests of precarious and 
secure workers did not merge with the M20Fev. The trade unions, on their part, 
accepted to negotiate a social dialogue agreement with the regime, which featured 
generous socioeconomic concessions, especially for public sector workers. The Palace 
then proposed a constitutional reform, engineered by an unelected commission, that 
offered several concessions but did not alter the undemocratic nature of the regime. 
While the M20Fev boycotted the constitutional referendum, all significant trade union 
confederations endorsed the Yes campaign, contributing to its victory, with the 
exception of the Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT). However, even the 
CDT did not support the M20Fev with radical actions such as national or regional 
general strikes. 
 Strictly speaking, in Morocco there was never a populist social pact, which 
probably lowered the expectations of many Moroccans. Pressures for social change 
from below were weaker in Morocco than in Tunisia. In fact, in the kingdom, a 
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situation of generalised clashes between protesters and police accompanied by 
political general strikes did not materialise. The mobilisations consisted of periodic 
mass demonstrations, isolated clashes, and workplace-level strikes. Due to the 
flexibility of the institutional system, these weaker pressures from below were 
accommodated in a gradual and negotiated manner. Trade union fragmentation, former 
social dialogue, and party mediation between labour and the state facilitated the 
integration of the unions into negotiations with the regime over minor reforms. 
However, the most important point is that – due to the low structural and associational 
power of the Moroccan working class – it was difficult for the trade unions to 
contribute to significant change. This thesis thus gives an interpretation of the 
Moroccan regime discrepant from culturalist narratives that focus on the King’s 
traditional legitimacy and institutionalist accounts that highlight the state’s partial 
political openings. The continuity of the Moroccan regime is in fact also rooted in 
power, and an important aspect of such power is the balance of class power – relatively 
favourable to the economic elites – that the regime managed to enforce in the course 
of successive rounds of class struggles throughout the country’s history. 
 In Tunisia, because of relatively high working-class power, the trade unions 
faced strong pressures to act on behalf of mobilised workers. These pressures initially 
came from the precarious and non-unionised fractions of the working class in the 
marginalised regions, where they revolted for secure employment and local 
development. During the early stages of the uprising, in December 2010 in the region 
of Sidi Bouzid, politicised UGTT militants – mostly employed in public 
administration – mobilised to support the grievances of the precarious workers and to 
spread the protests. When the police fired live bullets at protesters, the opposition trade 
unionists seized the occasion to step up their pressure on the UGTT National Executive 
Committee (NEC), demanding a national general strike. On 11 January 2011, the 
UGTT National Administrative Commission authorised regional general strikes. The 
first mass demonstration of the uprising outside of the marginalised regions was the 
Sfax general strike, which took place on 12 January 2011 and marked a steep 
qualitative change in the uprising. On 14 January 2011, as disorder spread to several 
areas of the country, including the suburbs of Tunis, the Greater Tunis general strike 
took place and its demonstration turned into a series of clashes in the vicinity of the 
Ministry of the Interior. That evening, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. After the downfall 
of the regime, the UGTT – as the largest civil society organisation in the country – 
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took a major role as mediator between the revolutionary movements and the state, and 
as a broker of the political transition that led to democratisation. However, while this 
political process succeeded in the difficult task of expanding civil and political rights, 
it did not manage to address the demands for social justice that were at the heart of the 
uprising. 
 The protagonists of the Tunisian uprising were the precarious workers – the 
main “victims” of the neoliberal suspension of the post-independence populist social 
pact. The developmentalist promise of a steady expansion of secure employment had 
clearly become a mirage by the 2000s. Tunisian precarious workers arguably had more 
resources to mobilise than the Moroccan ones, as indicated by Tunisia’s larger welfare 
spending, higher educational levels, and better performance on human development 
indicators. We can see here an illustration of the contradictory nature of substantial 
inducements: they are supplied by the state to seek consent from the working class, 
but they spark discontent when they are retrenched and at the same time they provide 
workers with resources to act upon that discontent. However, it is unlikely that the 
precarious alone would have succeeded in overthrowing the regime. In this context, 
the politicised UGTT militants managed to mobilise the associational power of the 
trade union in support of the protests, and to extend the latter to the secure workers 
through the regional general strikes. Significantly, this happened despite the fact that 
UGTT Secretary General (SG) Abdessalem Jerad continued to seek a compromise 
with Ben Ali until the final hour. 
 The Conclusion suggests that contemporary research on North African labour 
can benefit from the insights contained within this thesis regarding the significance of 
precarious workers’ struggles and the relations between such mobilisations and the 
trade unions. The unions must manoeuvre between the hammer of a highly diverse 
and fluid working class and the anvil of a state that depends on capital for its 
reproduction. Workers still can and do use the trade unions to advance their interests, 
which is indeed part of what happened in the recent history of Tunisia. However, it is 
never guaranteed that the unions will be more responsive to pressures from below than 
to pressures from above. In the study of such dynamics, future scholarship could 
benefit – as this thesis does – from the autonomist feminists’ theorisations of unwaged 
labour and the community as incorporated into the circuit of capital accumulation. 
 By showing how historical rounds of social and particularly class conflict 
contributed to shaping the divergent roles of the trade unions in the 2011 uprisings of 
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Morocco and Tunisia, the thesis fills a significant gap in the published literature and 
shows the merits of a historical, class-based and struggle-centred approach to studying 
trade unionism. Comparing “union pluralist” Morocco with “single-trade union” 
Tunisia, it addresses the puzzle of why radically different systems of labour 
institutions did not lead to the outcomes expected by the “institution-based” literature. 
Furthermore, by deploying a heterodox, autonomist-inspired conceptualisation of the 
working class, which had never been employed to study North African workers, this 
thesis sheds new light on the relations between the subjectivities that came to the fore 
in the 2011 uprisings and long-standing labour confederations. 
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Chapter 1 – Literature Review: Workers and Trade Unions 





Labour is far from being among the most researched topics in North Africa, as state 
elites or Islamist movements have clearly attracted more attention. However, a 
sizeable bibliography on the topic has been accumulated over the last decades. This 
literature review covers North Africa – rather than the whole Arab world or the MENA 
region – for reasons of limited space but also because the class compositions of other 
Arab countries (particularly the Gulf monarchies) are extremely different from those 
of Morocco and Tunisia, making meaningful comparisons more problematic. 
 This chapter first assesses the adequacy of the pre-2011 literature on North 
African organised labour for understanding the role of the trade unions in the 2011 
uprisings. It argues that, despite their merits, some of the most important works on the 
topic (e.g. Bellin 2002; Cammett and Posusney 2010) overemphasised the significance 
of the institutional framework and underestimated the relevance of class struggles and 
class power as elements that transcend the trade unions themselves and their 
institutionalised relations with the state. As a result, “institution-based” works 
minimised the disruptive potential of Tunisian labour and overstated that of Moroccan 
unions. This thesis is therefore closer to what are called here “class-based” approaches 
(e.g. Hamzaoui 2013; Posusney 1997). 
 The second section shows how the most important academic contributions on 
labour in the 2011 uprisings brought class struggle and class power back in (e.g. 
Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; Beinin 2016), correcting the formalist bias that 
institution-based approaches risk. While this thesis builds on such works, the latter did 
not address the puzzle identified by the first section of the chapter (i.e. why some of 
the former literature minimised the disruptive potential of Tunisian labour and 
overstated that of Moroccan unions). By bringing Morocco into the comparison, this 
thesis breaks the virtual monopoly of post-populist countries (especially Egypt and 
Tunisia) within studies of labour in the 2011 uprisings, and investigates the importance 
of differences in labour institutions versus differences in balances of class power. 
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 Finally, this thesis departs from the relatively narrow conceptions of working 
class deployed by the existing studies on North African labour and adopts one that 
allows the shedding of new light on the relations between the trade unions and the 
“unemployed youth” that kick-started the 2011 Arab uprisings. The third section 
elaborates on this point by presenting the notions of working class adopted by authors 
who researched North African workers. The classic studies on the topic have 
considered precarious and secure workers as belonging to two different social classes, 
and this assumption has gone unchallenged in more recent publications. 
 This overview, while signalling a wide empirical gap in the literature on 
Moroccan trade unionism, also points to the benefits of a class-based, struggle-centred 
approach to understanding the role of the trade unions in the 2011 uprisings. In fact, 
this allows for a clearer grasp of how workers’ power and agency can unsettle 
established institutional arrangements, without renouncing an analysis of how these 
very institutions mediate – or fail to mediate – such struggles. The literature review 
also demonstrates the absence of publications on workers and trade unions in North 
Africa that employ an expanded notion of working class, despite the fact that many of 
the 2011 uprisings’ protagonists cannot be considered workers in the narrow sense 
deployed by most authors. 
 
1.1 The Trade Unions: Between the Working Class and the State 
This section first presents the existing literature on North African trade unions, before 
concentrating on how different pre-2011 approaches on the relations between workers, 
unions, and the state are useful for understanding the 2011 uprisings. For the sake of 
simplicity, two broad approaches are singled out: the “institution-based” approach 
(e.g. Bellin 2002; Cammett and Posusney 2010) and the “class-based” approach (e.g. 
Hamzaoui 2013; Posusney 1997). While “institution-based” approaches tend to 
consider the unions as proxies for the working class – which allows them to focus on 
labour-state relations as trade union-state relations – “class-based” approaches treat 
the working class as analytically autonomous from labour institutions. This thesis 
locates itself within the second camp, in order to take into account the partial 
divergences of interests between workers and trade unionists and the possibility that 
sections of each group use their agency to foster such interests. 
 A sizeable body of literature has developed around North African trade 
unionism during the decades between decolonisation and the 2011 uprisings, although 
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this clearly remains a relatively under-researched topic. Probably because of its 
geopolitical and demographical importance, Egypt is the country that has attracted 
most international research efforts.7 Algerian trade unionism has also been the focus 
of some international and national research, although this remains more 
circumscribed.8 
 For what concerns the cases of this thesis, Tunisia features an extremely rich 
national literature on trade unionism. Trade unionism, and the UGTT in particular, 
have historically held a central position in the country’s politics, which has stimulated 
the attention of many Tunisian scholars.9 This academic literature is complemented by 
several memoirs and analyses by trade union cadres and activists that are of great value 
to researchers.10 International research on Tunisian trade unionism, instead, was 
extremely scant before the 2011 uprisings, with a few exceptions.11 
 Except for Libya, Moroccan trade unionism is probably the least researched in 
North Africa. International research before the 2011 Arab uprisings was just as scarce 
as that on Tunisian labour.12 However, the production of national academic research13 
and of memoirs of trade union cadres14 is less abundant compared to the Tunisian case. 
As the next section confirms, the gap in the literature – especially the English-language 
literature – is extremely wide when it comes to Moroccan trade unionism. 
 After independence, in the North African populist republics (to which Morocco 
was the exception), the political alliance between the trade unions and the nationalist 
parties during the national liberation struggle led to the integration of the trade unions 
into a corporatist triangular state-party-union architecture through a hierarchical and 
centralised single labour confederation.15 Organised labour thus became part of the 
social coalition underlying the populist regimes and, in normal times, it contributed to 
                                                 
7 E.g. Aidi 2009; Alexander 2010; Beinin 2009; 2011; Bianchi 1989; Goldberg 1992; Paczynska 2009; 
Posusney 1997; Pratt 1998; – in English – Couland 1978; Tomiche 1974; – in French. 
8 E.g. Alexander 1996a; 2002; Branine et al. 2008; Chelghoum et al. 2016; – in English – Benallegue 
1981; Benamrouche 2000; Weiss 1970; – in French. 
9 E.g. Zouari 1989; – in English – Belaïd 1989; Ben Hamida 2003; Bessis 1985; Hamza 1992; Hamzaoui 
1984; 1999; 2013; Khiari 2000; Kraiem 1976; 1980; Sraieb 1985; Tlili 1984; Zghal 1998; – in French. 
10 E.g. Achour 1989; Allouche 2016; Amami 2008; Azaiez 1980; Haddad 2013; Kraiem 2013; Zeghidi 
1989; 1997; 2007; – in French. Memoirs are referenced in the “Other Primary Sources”. 
11 E.g. Alexander 1996a; 1996b; Bellin 2002; Liauzu 1996; – in English – Liauzu 1978; – in French. 
12 See Clement and Paul 1984; Forst 1970; 1976; – in English – Ayache 1982; 1990; 1993; Catusse 
2001; – in French. 
13 Abouhani 1995; Ben Seddik 1986; 1990; Benhlal 1985; Bouharrou 1997; El Aoufi and Hollard 2004; 
Menouni 1979; – in French. 
14 E.g. Benjelloun 2002-03; – in Arabic; Bazwi 1993; Ben Bouazza 1992; – in French. 
15 See Ahmad 1966; Ayubi 1995; El-Sabbagh 1988; Gallissot 1990; Moore 1970. 
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their stability by providing them with a base of organised mass support in exchange 
for substantial socioeconomic concessions. 
 Populist nationalism in its Pan-Arabist form was the central cultural element 
of North African organised labour (see Beinin and Lockman 1988). Nationalist 
ideology and strategy allowed the trade union leaderships to claim that they stood for 
the national working class as a whole. This equation, however, happened through two 
rhetorical reductions. First, the whole working class (unionised and non-unionised) 
was reduced to the single labour confederation. Second, the whole trade union 
organisation was reduced to its top leadership. 
 Yet, with the transition to neoliberalism, populist corporatism entered a crisis.16 
Economic liberalisation, with its retrenchment of workers’ socioeconomic rights, 
made it harder for the single labour confederation to control its constituencies and its 
rank-and-file militants, prompting explosions of resistance outside of the trade union 
framework. On the one hand, this slowed down the pace of economic restructuring 
and, on the other, it sowed the seeds of the implosion of authoritarian corporatism in 
its populist form. The top union leaders’ equation of the working class with the single 
labour confederation was thus shown to be false, as the unions were often perceived 
as being closer to the state than to the workers. 
 The problem of the relations between workers, trade unions, and the state has 
been treated in different ways by various authors. A first approach is the “institution-
based” one, deployed by authors that – while not necessarily embracing an 
institutionalist theoretical framework – stress the importance of institutionalised 
relations between the trade unions and the state. A well-known case is Stalled 
Democracy by Eva Bellin (2002). The book investigates the role of capital and labour 
in democratisation processes through the case study of Tunisia. It is a successful and 
rich work, which has influenced the debate on social classes and democracy beyond 
the MENA region (see Mahoney 2003). Bellin claims that, despite the prevailing 
theoretical expectations, labour and capital are unlikely to push for democratisation as 
long as they are dependent on state sponsorship for the protection of their interests. 
This is a common situation in late developing countries like Tunisia, where it is 
necessary for the state to play a leading role in promoting capitalist development. In 
Tunisia, therefore, labour backed Ben Ali’s authoritarian regression because it was 
                                                 
16 See Aidi 2009; Paczynska 2009; Posusney 1997; Pratt 1998. 
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linked to the state by the corporatist arrangement, granting benefits to the UGTT and 
its members. Bellin summarises her argument as follows: 
 
[W]hile state sponsorship nurtures the power of industrialists and labor, it 
continues to undermine their autonomy. Both social forces still find their 
fortunes beholden to the goodwill of the state, and this dependence, 
combined with other factors such as fear, for capitalists, and “aristocratic 
position”, for organized labor, makes them diffident about 
democratization. (Bellin 2002, p. 144)  
 
 However, the important role of workers and of the UGTT in Tunisia’s 2011 
uprisings and the subsequent democratisation process is surprising in light of Bellin’s 
argument. In fact, during the 2000s, the Tunisian state’s sponsorship of organised 
labour did not change significantly. 
 From the beginning of the book, Bellin seems to use the phrases “organised 
labour” and “social class” interchangeably (Ibid., pp. 2-3).17 Furthermore, when 
supplying evidence that labour stood by the regime in the 1990s, Bellin provides a list 
of decisions taken by the UGTT top leadership (endorsement of Ben Ali’s presidential 
campaigns, lack of support for human rights groups, etc.) (Ibid., pp. 147-9). However, 
by doing so, Bellin risks taking at face value the rhetorical double reduction made by 
top union leaders: the leadership stands for the whole organisation, and the 
organisation stands for the whole working class. Therefore, if the union’s top 
leadership supports the regime, the working class supports the regime. 
 Of course, the working class cannot take political decisions in the same manner 
as a formally organised collective actor. However, sections of the working class can 
act in politically significant ways outside of their official organisations. In her 
historical account of the development of Tunisia’s labour-state relations (Ibid., pp. 89-
120), Bellin provides much evidence of rank-and-file action outside of the UGTT or, 
even more, within the UGTT but against the choices of the top leadership (Ibid., p. 
136). However, these phenomena are not theorised, and thus they disappear from her 
conclusions. Arguably, this leads Bellin to underestimate the disruptive potential of 
the internal fractures within the UGTT: 
                                                 
17 The ambiguity of the word “labour”, which can mean both workers and trade unions, does not help. 
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The resurgence of strike activity instigated by the base during the late 
1970s and again in the 1980s suggests a streak of persistent independence 
within labor that the state cannot ignore. […] Working class culture and 
institutions have staying power that prevents the state from entirely 
subjugating labor. But there is no denying that labor’s autonomy has 
suffered for the past two decades, and the future does not look rosier. 
(Ibid., p. 140) 
 
 However, it was precisely the insurrectional pressures of rank-and-file 
workers’ mobilisations both without and within the UGTT that “unstalled” Tunisia’s 
democracy by undermining the UGTT top leadership’s policy of compromise with the 
regime (see Chapter 7). 
 Another example of “institution-based” research is a study by Melani Cammett 
and Marsha Posusney – covering thirteen Arab countries – arguing that there was a 
positive relation between labour-market liberalisation and trade union rights in the 
Middle East, but that progress on both variables was uneven: “[R]esource endowments 
and patterns of state-labor relations, which tend to vary according to authoritarian 
regime type, largely explain these divergent trends” (Cammett and Posusney 2010, p. 
251). 
By giving priority to institutional arrangements (in this case trade union 
pluralism versus single-trade union corporatism), Cammett and Posusney suggested 
that the country where labour had more leverage was in fact Morocco: 
 
General political liberalization should enhance union freedoms, and the 
struggle for organizing rights is intrinsically part of democratization 
movements. Variation in the authoritarian structures of Middle Eastern 
countries, and related differences in union–state relations, suggests arenas 
where progress can be expected, at least in the short term. Thanks to both 
partisan competition and competitive unionism, Morocco is already 
furthest along in freedom of association and appears to provide the best 
environment for additional advancement. […] Thus, this paper lends 
further support to the comparative finding that single party states appear 
to have the most resilient form of authoritarianism and suggests the 
intriguing possibility that some of the historically conservative 
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monarchies of the region may ultimately prove to be the most progressive 
on labor rights. (Ibid., p. 276) 
 
According to the authors: “Moroccan exceptionalism reflects that country’s long 
history of competitive unionism” (Ibid., p. 271). However, this emphasis on the 
institutional arrangement of competitive unionism is partially misleading. The right to 
form alternative trade unions is certainly an asset for workers, but union fragmentation 
is often considered a liability (e.g. Korpi and Shalev 1979). Thus, whether the 
abundance of labour confederations is positive or negative for workers should be 
established through historical analysis of the processes through which they came into 
being, depending on the relative weight of mobilisation from below versus divide-and-
conquer tactics from above (see Chapter 2). Indeed, Cammett and Posusney’s claim 
contrasts with the fact that, with the 2011 Arab uprisings, Tunisia democratised while 
Morocco did not. Furthermore, and despite the presumed effects of the systems of 
labour institutions in place, Tunisian labour played an important role in the 
democratisation process, while most Moroccan trade unions contributed to regime 
continuity. This is a puzzle to which, as shown below, the existing post-2011 uprisings 
literature provides no solution. 
 The class-based approach is exemplified by Marsha Posusney’s earlier work, 
namely Labour and the State in Egypt (1997). This book theorises from the start the 
significance of divergences between workers and the different levels of the trade union 
hierarchy. Posusney’s research combines institutional and cultural analysis to study 
labour-state relations in the context of neoliberal reform. In doing so, she employs E. 
P. Thompson’s concept of “moral economy”, which indicates a cultural understanding 
of certain mutual obligations between subaltern groups and authorities (Thompson 
1971).18 The subaltern rebel when they perceive that those in power are not fulfilling 
such obligations. Posusney thus specifies that Egyptian secure workers’ rebellions 
against neoliberal reforms were restorative in character: they aimed to restore the 
paternalist moral economy of the populist period (Posusney 1997, p. 21). 
 For the purposes of this thesis, the most important features of Posusney’s work 
are the “disaggregation of the categories of ‘state’ and ‘labor’ into the different 
                                                 
18 The concept was first applied to popular mobilisations against neoliberal reform by Walton and 
Seddon (1994), in order to explain the Global South food riots that also affected Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. 
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organisational and individual players” (Ibid., p. 4). As Posusney writes: 
 
[E]gypt’s trade unions have historically excluded large segments of the 
working class […]. By the same token, unionized workers sometimes 
resort to organizing outside of the union structure when it fails to address 
their concerns. (Ibid., p. 14) 
 
 Since its creation in 1957, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) has 
been incorporated into an authoritarian corporatist system of labour institutions and 
its leaders, imposed by the state, were expected to insure the compliance of unionised 
workers with the directives of the regime. Workers, however, were able to rebel against 
those neoliberal reforms which they saw as breaking their moral economy. They took 
action independent of the ETUF or pressured ETUF leaders to support their 
grievances.19 The ETUF’s top leaders were thus caught in a dilemma between 
responding to the regime or to their own constituencies (Ibid., pp. 22-8). 
 This thesis’s most important point of divergence with Posusney is that her 
attention on institutions and culture, while laudable, leaves under-theorised the 
question of working-class power. Posusney conceptualises working-class power 
cursorily and only in terms of “union capacity”, which is considered to be an 
“institutional factor” (Ibid., p. 9). However, the reduction of working-class power to 
union capacity is inconsistent with Posusney’s refusal to collapse workers into trade 
unions. In this respect, Bellin’s multi-dimensional conceptualisation of working-class 
power (Bellin 2002, pp. 123-6) is closer to the one adopted here. An approach centred 
on restorative moral economy, in fact, proved useful in understanding workers’ initial 
reactions to neoliberalism, but it is ill-equipped to grasp the role of workers and trade 
unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
 Another important class-based contribution on North African trade unionism 
that theorises the distinction between workers and unions is Salah Hamzaoui’s 1,500-
page sociology of the UGTT cadres, titled Pratiques syndicales et pouvoir 
                                                 
19 Posusney found that different reforms impacted upon the trade union hierarchy differently depending 
on their scope (Ibid., pp. 244-7). When a reform violating the workers’ moral economy was local (e.g. 
the privatisation of a plant), the affected workers mobilised against it but without being able to get the 
support of the confederation. When a reform of this kind was national, the combined pressure of the 
country’s rank-and-file brought the trade union top leadership to voice opposition. 
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politique (Hamzaoui 2013).20 This work aims to understand the “relations between the 
trade union confederation and the regime, on the one hand, and between the union 
leaders and the rank-and-file workers […], on the other” (Ibid., p. 6).21 
 Hamzaoui mobilised an immense volume of data in the form of participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative surveys – also going beyond 
the workplace to include family relations, education, or the regional background of 
the trade unionists – to show how the trade union high cadres constitute a mediating 
layer between workers and the state, and how this role gives them the power to “escape 
rank-and-file control and achieve a certain autonomy”22 (Ibid., p. 10) from workers 
and the state at once. This autonomy is grounded in the fact that, on the one hand, the 
union provides workers with a defence from employers and the state which they could 
not otherwise have, and, on the other, it provides the state with a mechanism of control 
over the workers themselves. 
 However, while Hamzaoui refers multiple times to rank-and-file pressures on 
the union, one cannot escape – throughout the book – a deep sense of pessimism over 
the significance of such pressures. Internal dissent tends to be presented as ritualised 
and thus contained (e.g. Ibid., pp. 1280-98) and workers’ struggles as cyclically co-
opted by the union leadership to reinforce its position vis-à-vis the state. There is much 
truth to this interpretation – indeed, the UGTT’s post-2011 trajectory can be 
interpreted in these terms – but this thesis attempts to underline also the other side of 
autonomy, namely the possibility of workers’ autonomy in pressuring the union 
leaders to take decisions they would not have otherwise taken. 
 This thesis insists that a class-based approach is better equipped to understand 
the role of the trade unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings. In fact, institution-based works 
that underline the significance of corporatist labour-state relations for authoritarian 
resilience in Tunisia and of union pluralism for democratic reform in Morocco end up 
minimising workers’ capacity to challenge and destabilise labour institutions. This 
thesis argues that while labour institutions are crucial in mediating social conflict, they 
should be analysed in their relation to the balance of class power and the course of 
class struggles that transcend labour institutions, particularly the trade unions. This 
                                                 
20 While this thèse d’état was published in 2013, the vast majority of it was conceived and written 
before 2011. Hamzaoui’s work is both academic and related to his personal experience as a UGTT left 
activist in the 1970s and SG of the higher teaching federation in the 1980s. 
21 Translated from French by the author. 
22 Translated from French by the author. 
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thesis can thus be located within the class-based camp, which is more adequate to 
understand the pressures on the union cadres coming from unionised and non-
unionised workers, and to consider internal divergences within the trade unions 
themselves. This strategy accounts for the possibility of workers’ autonomy from 
institutionalised trade unions, which manifests itself in groups of workers operating 
within the trade union to influence its leadership or acting outside of the union 
framework altogether. 
 However, as the next section shows, even the class-based academic works that 
appeared after the 2011 uprisings did not address the puzzle stemming from the 
analysis of Cammett and Posusney’s (2010) work, i.e. why the Moroccan and Tunisian 
trade unions’ role in the 2011 uprisings diverged in unexpected ways, and what was 
the respective importance of labour institutions and of the balance of class power in 
contributing to such roles. 
 
1.2 North African Workers’ Mobilisations in the 2011 Arab Uprisings 
This section provides a literature review of recent academic interventions on workers 
and trade unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings within the broader debate on the outcomes 
of the Arab Spring (see Achcar 2016; Hinnebusch 2015a; 2015b). The post-2011 
period saw a revival of class-based approaches (e.g. Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; 
Beinin 2016), as the struggles that played out during the uprisings made evident the 
divergences between trade union leaderships and mobilised groups of workers. 
Most of the published literature on the topic affirms that workers’ 
mobilisations, within the established trade unions or outside of them, were an 
important – if often unacknowledged – element of the 2011 uprisings, and that the 
uprisings’ fortunes were to some extent tied to those of workers’ struggles. Therefore, 
the uprisings’ “modest harvest” in respect to democracy (see Brownlee et al. 2013; 
2015) is also linked to the high labour-repressiveness of the region (ITUC 2015). 
In the historical debate on social classes and democratisation, some authors 
argued that the “bourgeoisie” (e.g. Moore 1966) or the “middle-class” (e.g. Lipset 
1960) have a privileged role, while others claimed that labour has historically been the 
most consistent pro-democracy collective actor because democracy is in the interest 
of the workers (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1985; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Therborn 
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1977). The importance of workers’ mobilisations in recent struggles against 
authoritarianism has been observed in different parts of the world.23 
 Academic work on labour in the 2011 Arab uprisings has maintained that 
labour was a significant actor in struggles for social justice and democracy, 
counterbalancing the excessive attention given to the urban “middle-class” by the 
mass media and some scholars (e.g. Fukuyama 2013). Much of this research deals 
with Egypt,24 which – as seen above – historically has been the Arab country attracting 
the greatest attention from labour scholars. 
 Anne Alexander and Mostafa Bassiouny, in their book Bread, Freedom, Social 
Justice (2014), provide an in-depth account of the role of workers’ struggles in the 
2011 Egyptian uprising. The book presents a historically-grounded analysis of the 
Egyptian class structure, with particular attention paid to how trends in employment 
and in the characteristics of the workforce impacted upon workers’ capacity for 
mobilisation. It then goes on to draw a rich empirical account of labour unrest, its 
organisation, and its political implications, from the strike wave that began in 2006 to 
General Sisi’s military coup in 2013. The authors show how this cycle of struggle 
against neoliberal reform escaped restorative illusions, emptied out the Nasserist 
corporatist shell, created new and independent trade unions, and made a crucial 
contribution to Mubarak’s downfall. However, the Egyptian workers’ transformative 
power was limited by the ETUF’s relative non-permeability to pressures from below, 
by the persistence of Nasserist ideology, and – in their view – by the absence of a 
strong vanguard party (Ibid., pp. 327-9). 
 The role of workers in the 2011 Egyptian uprising is also touched upon in John 
Chalcraft’s Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Chalcraft 
2016), a much broader book that deals with mobilisation, organisation, leadership, and 
culture, to provide a history of popular mobilisations in the Middle East from the 19th 
century to the present day. In respect to this thesis, Chalcraft’s scope is at once much 
broader – temporally and geographically – and narrower – singling out politicised 
movements. Yet this thesis shares with Chalcraft’s approach a stress on the role of 
                                                 
23 Latin America: Collier 1999; Collier and Mahoney 1997; Seidman 1994. Southern Europe: Collier 
and Mahoney 1997; Fishman 1990. Eastern Europe: Ciobanu 2009; Dale 2005; Ost 1990. Africa: Adler 
and Webster 2000; Kraus 2007; Seidman 1994. Asia: Katsiaficas 2012; 2013; Kwon and O’Donnell 
1999; Sonn 1997. 
24 Adly and Ramadan 2015; Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; Beinin 2012; De Smet 2012; 2016; El-
Mahdi 2011; Hartshorn 2018; Taha 2014; Totonchi 2011; Zemni et al. 2012. 
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struggles from below in provoking social change. As he claims: “This history cannot 
be captured by solely top-down or power-institutional accounts” (Chalcraft 2016, p. 
529). 
 Recently, Tunisian organised labour also came under the spotlight due to the 
decisive role of rank-and-file trade unionists in the uprising, which became clear as 
the UGTT turned into a central broker of the post-uprising political negotiations.25 
L’UGTT, une passion tunisienne by Hèla Yousfi (2015), translated into English as 
Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Case of UGTT (Yousfi 2017a), is the only 
book-length work to focus exclusively on the role of trade unionism in the 2011 
Tunisian uprising and the ensuing transition period (see also Feltrin 2016). Under Ben 
Ali, the UGTT played a paradoxical role as both one of the mightiest supporters of the 
regime and one of its fiercest opponents (Yousfi 2015, pp. 48-56). It is impossible to 
understand this contradiction without analysing the complexity of the fractures inside 
the confederation in its interaction with the rest of society. While the UGTT NEC 
consistently supported Ben Ali in manifold ways – most notably in its endorsement of 
his candidacy in all the presidential elections in which he ran – a strong opposition 
current led by left-wing activists was well rooted in the rank-and-file and had 
penetrated some of the intermediate structures. This cleavage brought the struggle for 
democracy into the trade union itself and allowed the UGTT’s internal opposition to 
mobilise the infrastructure of the organisation in support of the 2011 uprising (Ibid., 
pp. 59-98). 
After Ben Ali’s flight, the UGTT concentrated its efforts on fostering political 
and constitutional change while protecting a large degree of institutional continuity. 
As we will see, the trade union confederation became the main broker of a pact 
between government and opposition. By taking up a function of counter-power against 
the Islamists in a time when the secular parties were still weakened by their 
organisational overhaul, the UGTT sacrificed, to a quite large extent, its pressure for 
the achievement of the core demands of the 2011 uprising, particularly those 
concerning social justice and the cleansing of the state of old regime incumbents. Yet 
the trade union certainly played a key role in the consolidation of democratic 
institutions. 
                                                 
25 Beinin 2016; Hartshorn 2018; Mizouni 2012; Netterstrøm 2016; Omri 2017; Wilder 2015; Yousfi 
2015/2017a; 2017b; Zemni 2013; Zemni et al. 2012. 
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This thesis owes much to Yousfi’s fine-grained study of the cleavages and 
struggles internal to the UGTT. Her account, however, is mainly centred on the UGTT 
as an organisation interacting with other organisations, institutions, and social 
movements. This thesis expands upon this, giving a more central place to class 
analysis and historical comparison. 
The advantages of a comparative and historical approach like the one adopted 
here were demonstrated by Joel Beinin in his comparison of the Egyptian and Tunisian 
cases, titled Workers and Thieves (2016). In this book, Beinin shows how Tunisian 
workers were better positioned than Egyptian ones to wage struggles for social justice 
and democracy because of the UGTT’s associational power and its permeability to 
pressures from below. 
In Egypt, as Beinin documented, the ETUF was the only legal trade union and 
it was strongly under state control and more insulated from rank-and-file pressure than 
the UGTT. For this reason, the impressive spike in labour militancy that preceded the 
2011 Egyptian uprising took a localised and weakly organised form. After the 
uprising, the newly established independent trade unions were too weak and 
inexperienced to give workers a determining and independent voice in Egypt’s bumpy 
post-25 January 2011 political process, which was dominated by the well-entrenched 
military establishment and Muslim Brotherhood. The independent trade unions, just 
like the state-sponsored one, ended up initially endorsing the military-led removal of 
elected President Mohamed Morsi on 3 July 2013. 
In Tunisia, on the other hand, the UGTT’s organisational infrastructure, even 
if dominated by an NEC mostly allied with the regime, provided its politicised rank-
and-file militants with a solid and relatively well-endowed nationwide network, which 
they were able to mobilise to spread the rebellion from the peripheral town of Sidi 
Bouzid to other areas of the country, and from the “unemployed” (in Beinin’s 
terminology) to more secure workers in public administration and industry through 
the regional general strikes. The role of these militants in the events gave the UGTT, 
after its December 2011 Congress, a revolutionary legitimacy of its own that it was 
able to employ in the subsequent political negotiations, which led to a more democratic 
outcome compared to the Egyptian case. 
Beinin’s work indicates that, from a comparative perspective, the fact that 
Tunisia was the Arab country where workers had stronger mobilisational capacity was 
a central factor contributing to its democratisation. Jamie Allinson reached the same 
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conclusion in his comparative assessment of labour in the 2011 uprisings of Egypt, 
Syria, and Tunisia (Allinson 2015). In a similar vein, Gianni Del Panta holds that 
authoritarian resilience in Algeria is due, among other things, to labour weakness there 
(Del Panta 2017). 
All these works, however, analysed the post-populist single-trade union 
regimes, especially Egypt and Tunisia. Therefore, they did not address the puzzle 
identified in the former section concerning the divergent political roles of the trade 
unions in countries with radically different systems of labour institutions, and the 
respective importance of the institutional framework versus the balance of class 
power. Before 2011, Morocco was the only North African country featuring trade 
union pluralism, consequently a comparison including Morocco is necessary to 
address this puzzle. 
Recently published academic research on Moroccan labour is very scant and 
almost non-existent in the English literature. Zemni et al. (2012) compared workers’ 
struggles in the 2011 Arab uprisings of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, but the article – 
while valuable – contains no substantial analysis of Moroccan trade unionism. Buehler 
(2015) produced an article showing how, in 2011, the Moroccan unions gained 
socioeconomic concessions due to political instability. However, the second most 
recent English-language work on Moroccan unions is a short MERIP report dating 
from thirty years before (Clement and Paul 1984). At the time of writing, there is no 
published academic work, in any language, comparing in depth Moroccan workers’ 
mobilisations and trade unionism with those of Tunisia (or any other North African 
country).26 
This thesis, then, builds on the aforementioned class-based works on labour in 
the 2011 uprisings, but it also expands upon their contributions by bringing Morocco 
into the comparison. Moreover, this thesis is original in that the authors cited above 
seem to use a relatively narrow notion of working class and class struggle, centred on 
manual waged workers mobilising in the workplace or within a trade union 
framework. This lens is particularly problematic for the Moroccan and Tunisian cases, 
in which the first-movers of the uprisings were “unemployed” or precarious youths, 
high school students, and “middle class” activists.27 As the next section shows, this 
                                                 
26 The exception is Feltrin 2018a, which is based on materials from this thesis. 
27 As Chapter 2 will clarify, the autonomist-inspired, broad notions of working class and class struggle 
deployed in this thesis make the question of whether workers’ mobilisations were significant or not in 
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thesis’s heterodox approach to class analysis has not yet been applied to the study of 
workers and trade unions in North Africa. 
 
1.3 The North African Working Class: Precarious versus Secure Workers 
This section reviews different conceptions of “working class” in the academic 
literature on North African workers, highlighting the question of the relation between 
precarious and secure workers. The most widely recognised authors who have 
researched the topic, Pierre Bourdieu and Frantz Fanon, debated the issue in the form 
of a quest for an economically-determined “revolutionary subject”, which was 
arguably fruitless.28 While the two reached opposite conclusions on the revolutionary 
subject, they agreed that secure and precarious workers constitute two different social 
classes, which they called the proletariat and the sub-proletariat (Bourdieu) or 
lumpenproletariat (Fanon). The subsequent literature on North African workers has 
mostly accepted this orthodox dissection, or avoided challenging it. 
 Pierre Bourdieu’s Travail et travailleurs en Algérie (Bourdieu et al. 1963) and 
Frantz Fanon’s Les damnés de la terre (Fanon 2002) – translated into English as The 
Wretched of the Earth (Fanon 2004) – became classics of social thought, influencing 
debates on class and social change on a global level. Both Bourdieu and Fanon wrote 
on the role of workers in the Algerian War for Independence. They investigated the 
same empirical events and there are many points of agreement in their class analysis 
of Algeria: the national bourgeoisie is weak and non-hegemonic, the post-colonial 
state will have a preponderant role in compensating for this weakness, and labour 
markets are strongly segmented because of the uneven nature of dependent capitalist 
development, which creates deep divisions among the workers.29 However, despite 
these affinities, Bourdieu came to the conclusion that the proletariat is the only viable 
revolutionary subject, while Fanon found it in the lumpenproletariat. 
 The young Bourdieu’s analysis of the Algerian workers is credited as the very 
first deployment of the theme “précarité” in the sociology of work (Bourdieu et al. 
                                                 
the 2011 Arab uprisings scarcely relevant, as the positive answer becomes self-evident. Therefore, the 
thesis focuses more specifically on working-class power – as an outcome of former class struggles – as 
an important factor contributing to shape the outcomes of the uprisings. 
28 From an empirical standpoint, both secure and precarious workers have been at the forefront of 
mobilisations for social change at different times and places. Patterns of subjectivity construction and 
concrete mobilisations depend on a host of contextual factors that must be discerned through multiple 
levels of analysis, and cannot simply be derived from the position of a working-class fraction in the 
economic system. 
29 These observations also apply to colonised Morocco and Tunisia. 
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1963, p. 353). Bourdieu, through his own variety of modernisation theory (see 
Burawoy and Von Holdt 2012, p. 75), described how the processes of dispossession, 
proletarianisation, and monetisation set in motion by colonialism had unleashed the 
forces of the market on the Algerian working class in formation (see also Lazreg 
1976). 
 While part of the dispossessed peasantry found relatively secure employment 
in the modern sector, the rest became a precarious mass of landless rural dwellers or 
lumpen urbanites of rural origin. The enclave economy typical of colonialism, with 
islands of highly productive workplaces in a sea of “underdevelopment”, had led to a 
dual labour market in which: “[W]orkers are sharply divided in two groups, those who 
are stable, and are then extremely so, and those who are unstable, and are then 
extremely so”30 (Bourdieu et al. 1963, p. 361). Bourdieu makes it clear that, in his 
class grid, the sub-proletariat and the proletariat are two different social classes (Ibid., 
pp. 382-9). 
 Bourdieu notes that precarity in employment is characterised by an experience 
of arbitrariness, disorganisation, incoherence, anxiety, lack of dignity, demoralisation, 
and loss of reference points (Ibid., pp. 352-61). The existential insecurity associated 
with precarity makes it impossible to project into the future a rational, measured, and 
calculated life-plan. The precarious are thus imprisoned in “presentness”, and this 
discontinuous, non-linear relation to time prevents them from participating in a 
political project for systemic social change: “The sub-proletarian is consciousness of 
unemployment; the proletarian has consciousness of unemployment” (Ibid., p. 311).31 
The mobilisations of the precarious are thus limited to spontaneous outbursts of 
frustration, which Bourdieu saw – through his modernisation theory lens – as 
“messianic”, dreamlike, and devoid of revolutionary consciousness (Ibid., p. 309). 
 The opposite applies to the proletarians (Ibid., pp. 361-75). In an explicit 
criticism of Fanon, Bourdieu wrote: 
 
[T]wo attitudes correspond to two types of material conditions of 
existence: on one side, the sub-proletarians of the cities and the uprooted 
peasants whose existence is reduced to fatality and arbitrariness, on the 
                                                 
30 Translated from French by the author. 
31 Translated from French by the author. 
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other side, the stable workers in the modern sector, equipped with the 
security and the guarantees that allow the setting of aspirations and 
opinions into a rational perspective. The disorganisation of daily life 
impedes the formation of the system of projects and rational foresights of 
which revolutionary consciousness is an aspect. […] This is why doubt 
must be cast on the thesis according to which, in the colonised countries, 
the proletariat is not a true revolutionary force under the pretext that, 
differently from the peasant masses, it has everything to lose because of 
its position as an irreplaceable cog of the colonial machine. […] 
Paradoxically, this privilege is the condition for the appearance of a truly 
rational revolutionary consciousness.32 (Ibid., p. 312) 
 
 Thus, starting from a non-Marxist theoretical standpoint, Bourdieu reached the 
traditional Marxist conclusion that workers in the most advanced sectors of the 
economy are the privileged – in the double sense of most resourceful and most 
effective – makers of systemic social change. Paradoxically, from a “slightly 
stretched” (Fanon 2004, p. 5) Marxist perspective, Fanon arrived at the opposite 
conclusion. 
 The Wretched of the Earth analyses decolonisation struggles in the whole 
Global South, but Fanon’s standpoint was Algeria during the War for Independence, 
where he had been working as a psychiatrist and militating in the National Liberation 
Front. The book, published shortly before Fanon’s premature death, would become a 
paradigmatic source of inspiration and ideas for anti-imperialist movements 
worldwide. In Fanon’s view, the waged workers of the modern urban sector are part 
of the social basis of the nationalist political parties as well as the backbone of the 
nationalist trade unions (Ibid., p. 22, pp. 64-5, and pp. 74-6). However, these urban 
workers are integrated – even if in a subaltern position – into the colonial system and 
benefit to some extent from it: “[T]he proletariat in the colonies is embryonic and 
represents the most privileged fraction of the people” (Ibid., p. 74). Proletarians, 
therefore, tend to have sectorial, economistic, and reformist aspirations and they are 
not up to the task of the revolutionary overthrow of the colonial system. 
 According to Fanon, the dispossessed peasantry is the only social force 
                                                 
32 Translated from French by the author. 
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genuinely incompatible with the status quo. By this, he meant both the peasantry in 
the countryside and “that fraction of the peasantry blocked at the urban periphery” 
(Ibid., pp. 80-1), i.e. the lumpenproletariat: “It is obvious that in colonial countries 
only the peasantry is revolutionary. It has nothing to lose and everything to gain” 
(Ibid., p. 23, see also pp. 65-71) and “[t]he lumpenproletariat, this cohort of starving 
men, divorced from tribe and clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneously and 
radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people” (Ibid., p. 81). 
 Thus, despite their disagreement on the identity of the revolutionary subject, 
Bourdieu and Fanon seemed to agree on the fact that the proletariat and the 
lumpen/sub-proletariat constituted two separate social classes, in which only the 
relatively secure workers were considered as the proletariat. 
 More recent studies on North African workers have understandably abandoned 
the quest for the revolutionary subject. However, the orthodox assumption that the 
“lumpenproletariat” – e.g. unwaged informal-sector workers and the “unemployed” – 
is external to the working class has been reformulated in new ways (e.g. Beinin and 
Lockman 1988) or simply gone unchallenged (e.g. Bayat 2013). 
 Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman’s masterpiece Workers on the Nile (1988) is 
centred on urban waged workers in large modern enterprises because “in the course of 
the period covered by this study, they became the best organized, most politically 
conscious workers, and came to constitute the active core of the working class. This 
justifies our focusing on them.” (Beinin and Lockman 1988, p. 5). The authors show 
how the making of the Egyptian working class in the context of the struggle for 
national independence facilitated its integration into the Nasserist regime. The 
important role of the Egyptian labour movement in the national liberation struggle 
forced the post-colonial regime to address its demands, but it also enhanced the 
penetration of nationalist ideology in the workers’ movement. This was instrumental 
in legitimising its loss of autonomy to a corporatist arrangement which denied the 
existence of class conflict (see also Beinin 1989).33 
 Beinin and Lockman recognise that urban workers in large and modern 
                                                 
33 Other academic works on relatively secure workers in Egypt are Ellis Goldberg’s social history of 
industrial workers before the Free Officers’ coup (Goldberg 1986), Marie Duboc and Samer Shehata’s 
ethnographies of public sector textile workers (Duboc 2012; 2013; Shehata 2009), and Dina Ebeid’s 
ethnography of Helwan’s metal workers (Ebeid 2012). In Tunisia, Salah Hamzaoui wrote his PhD thesis 
on the Gafsa miners (Hamzaoui 1970, in French). In Algeria, Ben Bella’s post-independence 
experiments with workers’ self-management attracted the attention of multiple researchers (e.g. Clegg 
1971; and, in French, Laks 1970; Mahsas 1975). 
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enterprises did “not constitute the whole of the Egyptian working class” (Ibidem), and 
they also include within the working class “[t]hose craftsmen who owned some means 
of production but were in fact completely dependent on merchants and factory 
owners” (Ibidem). However, they used an E. P. Thompson-inspired notion of working 
class (see Thompson 1963) which conflates the concepts of class and class 
consciousness, thus including in the working class only those who subjectively share 
an identity as workers. This excludes – as they make clear – “landless agricultural 
wage workers” (Ibidem) but also those engaged in intellectual work and much 
unwaged work, including housework and informal work in services. Both authors have 
later broadened the scope of their research to less secure workers (see Beinin 2001; 
Lockman 1994), but they seem to have maintained the theoretical position that 
workers are only those who understand themselves as such and act accordingly.34 
 If Beinin and Lockman focused on relatively secure workers, Asef Bayat dealt 
extensively with precarious workers in the MENA (including Egypt), particularly in 
his book Life as Politics (Bayat 2013).35 Here, Bayat shows how groups that are 
normally thought to be powerless to advance their interests – including the urban poor 
in authoritarian contexts – can in fact do so through “social nonmovements” and “the 
quiet encroachment of the ordinary”: 
 
[S]hared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented 
but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these 
practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and 
organizations. […] [T]he “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” 
encapsulates the discreet and prolonged ways in which the poor struggle 
to survive and to better their lives by quietly impinging on the propertied 
                                                 
34 Arguably, this position has unintentional but thorny political implications, in that it shores up those 
right-wing narratives according to which the working class does not exist anymore due to “declining 
class consciousness” among working people. 
35 Other publications on North African precarious workers include John Chalcraft’s social history of 
small-enterprise and service workers in late 19th century and early 20th century Egypt (Chalcraft 2005), 
Habib Ayeb, Ray Bush, and their associates’ volume on marginality in Egypt (Ayeb and Bush 2012), 
Koenraad Bogaert and Soraya El Kahlaoui’s works on the Moroccan marginalised from a “spatial” 
perspective (Bogaert 2011; 2015; 2018; in English – El Kahlaoui 2017 – in French), and Montserrat 
Emperador’s works on the Moroccan unemployed movement (Emperador 2007; 2009; in French). The 
importance of precarious workers in the 2011 uprisings, especially in Tunisia, has prompted a new wave 
of academic works on the precarious and their mobilisations (Bayat 2015; Feltrin 2018b; Hamdi and 
Weipert-Fenner 2017; – in English –; Belhadj and De Facci 2015; Bono et al. 2015; Emperador 2011; 
Meddeb 2011; – in French –; Pontiggia 2017; – in Italian). 
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and powerful, and on society at large. (Ibid., p. 15) 
 
 Through everyday, direct, contentious action, the urban poor occupy land and 
buildings to inhabit, take over public spaces to carry out the activities on which they 
rely for an income, and illegally acquire utilities and other services. These ordinary 
practices are carried out by large numbers of people, but they remain fragmented and 
scarcely organised through communal “passive networks” (Ibid., p. 23). 
Nonmovements are a vehicle to defend the interests of the poor who cannot organise 
themselves through traditional trade unions due to their volatile employment 
conditions (Ibid., p. 84). They can also coalesce into full-fledged social movements if 
they fall under a common threat or if the opportunity to turn encroachment into right 
otherwise arises, which is what happened during the 2011 uprisings (Ibid., p. 315). 
When he examines different perspectives on the urban poor, Bayat aptly notes that 
“Marx theorized them [the “lumpenproletarians”] later [in Capital] in terms of the 
‘reserve army of labor,’ and thus a segment of the working class” (Ibid., p. 36). 
However, he does not take a clear position in this debate, as demonstrated by his quite 
loose deployment of the term “class”. 
 Another body of literature concerns a group of workers in an intermediate 
position within the precarious-secure spectrum.36 The labour law reforms that 
accompanied neoliberal structural adjustment liberalised precarious employment in 
the formal sector to attract foreign investment and boost the international 
competitiveness of manufacturing. This generated a new layer of workers, mostly 
women, employed in private sector light manufacturing for export. Working 
conditions here are usually more secure when compared to the informal sector, but 
short-term contracts, low skills, sexism, violations of the labour legislation, and a 
business strategy centred on cheap labour ensure that these workers still face 
extremely precarious conditions relative to the public sector or to most heavy industry. 
Such employment trends resulted in the emergence of a literature on these relatively 
precarious industrial workers.37 However, to the author’s knowledge, this literature 
                                                 
36 The distinction between precarious and secure workers, in fact, should be understood not as 
sociologically clear-cut but as an analytical tool useful to make sense of a highly diverse and 
interpenetrating continuum. 
37 Cairoli 2011; Debuysere 2018; Moghadam 1998; – in English – Barrières 2018; Bouasria 2013; El 
Aoufi 2000; – in French – Gondino 2015; Turco 2014 – in Italian. The rise of agribusiness, especially 
in Morocco, has also opened the way for relatively precarious feminised employment in formal sector 
agriculture (Moreno Nieto 2016). 
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has not explicitly challenged the conception of the working class based on waged 
work. 
 This section has shown that the distinction between precarious and secure 
workers as poles of a highly diverse continuum remains a meaningful entry point for 
class analysis in North Africa. However, the authors who have thus far researched the 
subject have either understood the two categories of workers as separate social classes 
– Bourdieu and Fanon in an “orthodox”, “objective” way, and Beinin and Lockman in 
a more sophisticated, “consciousness-informed” manner – or chose not to address this 
question explicitly. As Chapter 2 will clarify, this thesis prefers a heterodox solution, 
which understands all kinds of precarious and secure workers as part of a broadly 
conceived working class. In fact, one of the claims of this thesis is that, to fully 
understand the role of labour organisations in the 2011 uprisings, it is necessary to take 
into account the pressures placed by precarious workers on the trade unions. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has first evaluated the capacity of the pre-2011 literature to understand 
the role of the unions in the 2011 uprisings, arguing that “class-based” approaches are 
more adequate than “institution-based” approaches. In fact, the latter proved to be 
excessively optimistic concerning “union-pluralist” Morocco and overly pessimistic 
about single-trade union Tunisia. The working class cannot be, even heuristically, 
reduced to its official organisations, which mediate between workers and the state and 
are subject to pressures coming from both sides. 
However, no post-2011 research has compared union-pluralist Morocco with 
Tunisia or with any other single-trade union regime, therefore the puzzle of why the 
role of the unions in the 2011 uprisings did not match the expectations of institution-
based approaches is left unaddressed, and with it the parallel question of the relative 
importance of institutions versus the balance of class power. 
Moreover, no post-2011 study has challenged the long prevailing, narrow 
notions of working class, centred on manual waged work. In order to interpret more 
effectively the 2011 Arab uprisings in class terms, a broader conception of class is 
necessary, which is able to account for the relations not only between the unions as 
organisations and their potential recruitment pool of relatively secure workers, but also 
between the unions and the non-unionised precarious workers. 
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By positioning itself in such a way within the existing literature, the thesis 
builds an innovative approach to the study of trade unions in the region (see Chapter 
2), revealing the advantages of such a perspective in addressing the puzzle identified 
in the first section of this chapter: 
 
Why did the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions have a divergent role in the 
2011 Arab uprisings and their outcomes? 
 
 In light of the debates analysed in the literature review, two sub-questions can 
also be posed: 
 
 1) What was the respective significance of labour institutions and of the 
balance of class power in contributing to shape how the Moroccan and Tunisian trade 
unions acted in the 2011 Arab uprisings? 
 
 2) How can we conceptualise the ways in which precarious and secure workers 
in Morocco and Tunisia mobilised and interacted during the 2011 Arab uprisings and 
their influence on the trade unions in this context? 
 
The answers to these questions cannot be found in the existing academic 
literature. On the one hand, empirical work on Moroccan labour is extremely scant. 
On the other hand, and more importantly, the thesis will address these questions 
through an original approach, focusing on the constituent power of class struggles in 
history and deploying a heterodox notion of class well suited to grasp important 
aspects of the mobilisations under study. 
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Chapter 2 – Theory and Methods: Studying Workers, Trade 





This chapter expounds the theoretical approach adopted by the thesis to tackle the 
questions of the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions’ role in the 2011 Arab uprisings, 
the respective significance of labour institutions and the balance of class power, and 
the relations between precarious workers, secure workers, and the trade unions. To 
answer such questions, this research deploys a historical sociological approach that is 
centred on autonomist Marxism and which critically incorporates some elements of 
historical institutionalism. The chapter concludes with an exposition of the research 
methods and the data sources used. 
For the purposes of this thesis, three key themes of autonomist Marxism will 
be explored: an expanded conception of the working-class composition, a theoretical 
distinction between workers and their official organisations, and a struggle-centred 
approach to understanding working-class power as a vector of social change. 
The advantage of autonomist Marxism is that, with its emphasis on class 
struggle as a form of collective agency, it constitutes a theoretical alternative to more 
economic deterministic versions of Marxism (see Cleaver 1992), while at the same 
time maintaining a systemic understanding of such struggles as taking place “in and 
against capital”. With Mario Tronti’s “Copernican inversion”, the focus of analysis 
shifted from the structures of capital’s “objective laws” to the agency of subjective 
class struggles (Tronti 1966). Autonomist Marxism thus saw capital as an antagonistic 
social relation including the working class within it and changing as a result of 
struggles from below. Therefore, attention turned to class struggle, and later on other 
forms of social struggle, as an “independent variable” able to transform the structures 
of society in unpredictable ways. While class struggle is far from the only type of 
social conflict relevant to social change,38 it is the most important one when analysing 
                                                 
38 Because this research does not establish a hierarchy between class struggle and other emancipatory 
struggles, Marxism is considered here not as an exhaustive worldview able to make sense of all aspects 
of society, but as a body of theory useful to understand issues relating to class and capitalism, which 
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the three themes on which this thesis focuses. Working-class compositions, systems 
of labour institutions and levels of working-class power, therefore, are seen here as 
outcomes of past contingent struggles rather than as manifestations of necessary 
economic laws. 
By stressing contingent struggles, this approach counterbalances the focus on 
the weight of institutional arrangements that has characterised several works on North 
African labour (see Chapter 1). As labour institutions are constituted by former class 
struggles and grounded in specific balances of class power, they can be unsettled and 
transformed in unforeseeable ways by workers’ initiatives. Furthermore, autonomist 
Marxism’s expanded notion of the working class allows scholars to conceptualise the 
community mobilisations of precarious workers (including unwaged workers) as class 
struggle, and to innovatively thematise the relations between precarious workers and 
the trade unions as part of dynamics internal to the whole working-class composition. 
 
2.1 Autonomist Marxism and Class Composition Analysis 
This section starts by outlining the concepts developed by autonomist Marxism that 
are most useful for this thesis. It then explains the conception of class adopted here, 
focusing on the inclusion of unwaged workers in the working-class composition and 
on the distinction between precarious and secure workers as a salient characteristic of 
the technical composition of the working class. 
Autonomist Marxism, as defined by Harry Cleaver, underlines the role of class 
struggle in unsettling and transforming social structures, including labour institutions: 
 
What gives meaning to the concept of "autonomist Marxism" as a 
particular tradition is the fact that we can identify, within the larger 
Marxist tradition, a variety of movements, politics and thinkers who have 
emphasized the autonomous power of workers – autonomous from 
capital, from their official organizations (e.g. the trade unions, the 
political parties) and, indeed, the power of particular groups of workers 
to act autonomously from other groups (e.g. women from men). By 
"autonomy" I mean the ability of workers to define their own interests 
                                                 
needs to be combined with other bodies of critical theory to understand other forms of social domination 
– e.g. feminism to understand issues relating to gender and patriarchy. 
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and to struggle for them – to go beyond mere reaction to exploitation, or 
to self-defined "leadership" and to take the offensive in ways that shape 
the class struggle and define the future. (De Angelis 1993) 
 
Autonomist Marxism thus defined is a broad tradition with several sub-currents 
as divergent as, for example, Italian operaismo (“workerism”) and British Open 
Marxism,39 with different – often mutually incompatible – positions. This thesis 
privileges the minor and interrelated strands constituted by American autonomism (see 
Caffentzis 2013; Cleaver 2017) and autonomist feminism (see Federici 2012; Weeks 
2011) rather than the more well-known post-operaismo predicated on the thesis of the 
hegemony of cognitive labour as popularised by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(see Hardt and Negri 2000). 
The autonomist Marxist class composition approach emerged in 1960s Italy with 
the journals Quaderni Rossi (1961-1966) and Classe Operaia (1964-1967), animated 
by intellectuals like Raniero Panzieri, Romano Alquati, and Mario Tronti, in rupture 
with the leadership of the USSR-aligned Italian Communist Party (see Wright 2002). 
Due to the fact that these intellectuals emphasised rank-and-file workers’ initiatives 
vis-à-vis party and trade union hierarchies, they came to be known as operaisti 
(“workerists”). 
In order to assess the emancipatory potential of workers’ struggles, the operaisti 
studied historic-specific technical and political compositions of the working class (see 
Alquati 1975). The technical composition refers to workers as organised, segmented, 
and stratified – that is divided – by capital as labour power, through different economic 
sectors, labour processes, wage hierarchies, etc. The feminist and American strands of 
autonomism would then push the analysis further, showing how these divisions are 
deepened through the subsumption by the capitalist organisation of society of 
gendered and racial forms of oppression (James 2012). The political composition, 
instead, indicates the extent to which workers as a class overcome, or not, their 
divisions, so that they can resist and attack capitalist commodification and 
exploitation, i.e. their forms of consciousness, struggle, and organisation. These forms 
                                                 
39 Open Marxism is normally considered as separated from autonomism, despite the intersections 
between the two traditions. It is considered here as part of autonomism by virtue of Cleaver’s broad 
definition. 
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of struggle range from overt and self-conscious militancy – strikes, political 
campaigns, mass demonstrations, etc. – to covert and non-politicised everyday acts of 
resistance – absenteeism, pilfering, “laziness”, etc. While the technical composition 
provides the material bases on which the political composition stands, there is no 
mechanical determination from the former to the latter – workers’ agency is the 
element of contingency between the two. 
Capital needs to constantly transform through technological and organisational 
innovations to contain working-class struggles, and in doing so it transforms the 
working class in turn. A cycle of struggle is the process of class composition, de-
composition, and re-composition by which capitalist restructurings are pushed through 
(Dyer-Witherford 1999, pp. 131-8).40 In its constant quest to reproduce itself, capital 
displays a tendency to subsume society as a whole into the social factory (Tronti 
1966), although this pressure to subordinate all social spheres to the imperatives of 
commodity production is always met with open or covert resistance. The insight that 
all aspects of society tend to be – successfully or not – integrated into the circuits of 
capital accumulation takes the autonomist conception of class struggle well beyond 
the immediate point of production in manufacturing. All social domains affected by 
capital’s subsumption drives thus become terrains of class struggle. 
The social factory idea went hand in hand with a criticism of the hierarchy, set 
up by Leninism, between secondary economic demands (arising spontaneously from 
workers’ particular mobilisations) and primary political demands (conforming to the 
general strategy brought by the vanguard party from outside of the working-class 
composition). As the logic of capital accumulation expands beyond the factory walls, 
it becomes evident how the economic aspects of capitalism are closely intertwined 
with the political ones. The successful circulation of struggles – even those carrying 
only basic economic demands – through different groups of workers creates so many 
obstacles to the smooth reproduction of capitalism, resulting in recurrent systemic 
crises that take on a general and political character (see Tronti 1966, pp. 60-85).41 As 
                                                 
40 In Morocco and Tunisia’s recent history, it is possible to identify three major cycles of struggle linked 
to historic-specific working-class compositions: the national liberation movement of the 1940s and 
1950s (which falls outside of the domain of this thesis), the strike wave of the 1970s and 1980s, and the 
mobilisations for social justice and democracy of the 2000s and 2010s. 
41 This emphasis on working-class self-activity does not mean that political organisation is irrelevant 
for the outcome of such struggles, but it does mean that an organisation that is not “internal” to the 
working-class composition (i.e. rooted in the rank-and-file self-organisation of the mobilised segments 
of the class) is condemned to remain isolated or to found a new kind of oppressive system. This is why 
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John Holloway put it: “Crisis is quite simply the manifestation of the fact that the 
screw [of capital] is not being tightened fast enough. Somewhere it is meeting 
resistance” (Holloway 2010). 
Autonomist feminists like Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James adapted the 
social factory concept to the analysis of unwaged, reproductive labour (Dalla Costa 
and James 1972). As Silvia Federici – another prominent autonomist feminist – writes: 
 
Tronti referred here to the increasing reorganization of the “territory” as a 
social space structured in view of the needs of factory production and 
capitalist accumulation. But to us, it was immediately clear that the circuit 
of capitalist production, and the “social factory” it produced, began and 
was centered above all in the kitchen, the bedroom, the home – insofar as 
these were the centers for the production of labor-power. (Federici 2011, 
pp. 7-8) 
 
Autonomist feminists held that housewives are also part of the capital-labour 
relation because they perform unwaged work producing and reproducing the peculiar 
commodity that is labour power. Initially in the context of American autonomism, 
which developed from the 1970s onwards around the journals Zerowork and Midnight 
Notes (see Midnight Notes Collective 1992), the autonomist feminists’ insights on 
unwaged housework were applied to other categories of precarious workers, such as 
peasants in the Global South (Cleaver 1976), self-employed intellectual workers in the 
Global North (Bologna 2018), or artisans, indentured servants, and slaves in the North 
and South (Van Der Linden 2008). The perspective of the autonomist feminists, 
therefore, does not apply to female workers only but to the capital-labour relation in 
general, and this is the way in which it is used here. As Harry Cleaver summarises: 
“[T]he wage divides the class hierarchically into wage […] and unwaged […] sectors, 
such that the latter groups appear to be outside the working class simply because they 
are not paid a wage” (Cleaver 1979, p. 72). 
Building upon this theoretical infrastructure, this thesis departs from the 
orthodox conceptions that – like the ones presented in Chapter 1 – understand the 
                                                 
organisational forms need to change according to the context constituted by the working-class 
composition in which they operate. 
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“lumpenproletariat” as a social class separate from the working class. Marx himself 
abandoned this view in his mature writings. In fact, the “scum of all classes” of The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx 1996, p. 78) reappears in Capital as 
the “reserve army of labour” (Marx 1992, pp. 781-801), and thus as a fraction of the 
working class.  
The working class is here defined by dispossession rather than by exploitation. 
Dispossession from significant ownership and control of the means of production42 
generalises the dependence on the sale of labour power for access to income.43 This 
dependence on commodified work is the key mechanism of capitalist social control 
(see Cleaver 2017). The precarious too are part of the working-class composition 
because they are forced to sell – directly or indirectly – their labour power to capital, 
even if there is nobody to buy it enduringly. 
This broad conception of working class includes both waged and unwaged 
workers, even those unwaged who own some means of production but are in fact 
subordinated to the controllers of significant magnitudes of capital. As Michael 
Heinrich writes: 
 
The question of who belongs to what class in a structural sense also cannot 
be determined according to formal properties […]. [M]any formally self-
employed people (who might even own some small means of production) 
are still proletarians, who live de facto from the sale of their labor-power, 
except that this happens under potentially worse conditions than under a 
formal wage relationship. (Heinrich 2012, p. 193) 
 
The members of the so-called “middle class”, performing mainly intellectual 
labour, are also considered here as part of a broadly conceived working class if they 
are dispossessed of significant ownership and control of capital. Conversely, managers 
who are formally waged employees but control significant magnitudes of capital, are 
considered as part of the capitalist class: 
                                                 
42 The threshold of “significant” is, of course, virtually impossible to establish in a clear-cut way, 
leaving space for a wide “grey area” in which the class relationship cuts across single individuals, but 
quantitative accounting is not a concern here. 
43 As Simon Clarke wrote, “all of the dispossessed are potential wage-labourers for capital, and in that 
sense are members of the working class whose existence presupposes and is presupposed by its 
opposition to capital” (Clarke 2002, p. 56). 
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The chairman of the board of a corporation might formally be a wage-
laborer, but in fact he is a “functioning capitalist”: he disposes of capital 
(even if it is not his personal property), organizes exploitation, and his 
“payment” is not based upon the value of his labor-power, but on the profit 
produced. (Ibidem) 
 
 In line with the approach outlined above, class struggle is a much broader 
phenomenon than class-conscious manual workers’ collective mobilisations in the 
workplace. It refers to all contentious action – individual or collective, within or 
beyond the workplace, class-conscious or not – by people dispossessed of significant 
ownership and control of capital to assert their class interests vis-à-vis those owning 
or controlling significant magnitudes of capital.44 Different from traditional Marxism, 
the notion of “class interest” is not treated here as “objective”,45 but as depending to a 
large extent on one’s political evaluations.46 Dispossession from the means of 
production points to a potential common interest in democratising their ownership and 
management. The fact that individual workers will appreciably act upon such common 
interest is far from granted,47 but it is a constant possibility. 
The precarious-secure division, like the unwaged-waged division, is an aspect 
of the working-class technical composition that tends to weaken the potential for 
workers to re-compose politically against capital. Precarity, informality, and the lack 
of a wage are mutually reinforcing phenomena, but they should not be confused. 
Precarity refers to insecure employment – waged or unwaged, formal or informal – 
incapable of providing a regular income; it exists in agriculture, industry, and the 
service sector. The trade unions most often organise secure waged workers (both 
                                                 
44 This does not mean that capitalists cannot join workers in their class struggles – Friedrich Engels was 
a fine example of this – it rather means that, to the extent that they do so, they are not acting in their 
own class interest. 
45 The notion of the “objectivity” of class interests provided the ideological justification for a wide 
range of authoritarian practices by communist parties worldwide. Conversely, the recognition that a 
certain definition of class interest is to some extent constructed demotes it from the status of an 
authoritative truth to that of a political proposition to be promoted by democratic means. 
46 The demands for social justice and democracy expressed during the 2011 Arab uprisings are treated 
here as being in the interest of the working class because they point towards increased workers’ control 
over access to resources and over the state. 
47 This is indeed the point of the distinction between technical working-class composition and political 
working-class composition. 
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manual and intellectual) because the employment conditions of precarious workers 
usually make it hard for them to unionise.48 
Due to automation in agriculture and manufacturing, in many Global South 
countries that have never reached levels of industrialisation comparable to the West, 
workers are being thrown directly from agricultural employment into the tertiary 
sector (see Benanav 2015a; 2015b). For the vast majority of them, this does not mean 
a highly paid job in finance or creative work in the media industry, but insecure toil in 
low-end services, often informal and/or self-employed. In the same way that 
automation augments the productivity of those workers who remain in core 
production, it makes an increasing proportion of workers relatively less necessary to 
it. This is Marx’s reserve army of labour or surplus population (Marx 1992, pp. 781-
801; see also Benanav and Clegg 2010). 
In countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, where there are no adequate 
unemployment subsidies, the surplus population must still work to gain access to the 
means of mere survival. “Unemployment” is often a cultural construct, signifying that 
somebody is not engaged in the kind of work to which she feels entitled by prevailing 
social norms that result from previous struggles (Feltrin 2018b). The category 
“unemployed” is therefore misleading, in that it is generally used in these contexts to 
refer to people who perform a wide variety of casual work.49 This is why this thesis 
uses the label “precarious workers” to designate most members of the surplus 
population. 
Precarious workers impose latent or active pressures on relatively secure 
workers, eroding their bargaining power and thus blurring the sociological frontier 
between the precarious and secure workforce. Precarity and security, then, are best 
seen as two poles of an interpenetrating continuum. Precarity spreads across sectors 
and subjects, undermining or weakening the forms of consciousness and organisation 
that characterised the age of expanding industrial employment. 
Of course, rising precarity is not a deterministic “law” any more than rising 
automation. Indeed, in the post-World War II period many countries – including 
Tunisia – saw the advent of a social pact providing sources of regular income for 
expanding sections of the population. This period, however, can be regarded as 
                                                 
48 This is certainly true for Moroccan and Tunisian precarious workers. 
49 This is also why unemployment statistics for countries without unemployment subsidies are virtually 
useless for the purposes of this thesis. 
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exceptional in the history of capitalism and dependent on a series of specific 
conditions. Since the 1970s, the social pact has continuously deteriorated, and no 
inversion of this tendency is in sight. However, as Cleaver noted, extremely 
widespread precarity can become a problem for capital, as the lack of work takes away 
the main capitalist instrument of social control (Cleaver 2017, pp. 92-5). 
This framework of class analysis is more effective in studying North African 
class compositions compared to narrower approaches that define the working class by 
waged labour or, even worse, industrial manufacturing. As seen above, the unevenness 
of dependent capitalist development has led to trajectories of class composition and 
re-composition that are markedly different from the West, where a central role has 
been played by private sector manufacturing bourgeoisie and labourers (see Ayubi 
1995, pp. 174-82). While private factory owners and workers obviously exist in North 
Africa and have at times had a significant role in producing social change, these 
countries have historically featured relatively large informal sectors, on the one hand, 
and sizeable public sectors, on the other.50 The existence of large informal sectors 
means that a significant proportion of workers undertake extremely precarious 
employment (often unwaged). Sizeable public sectors, on the other hand, mean that 
both non-propertied managers and intellectual workers have been particularly 
important in North Africa. 
As we will see, the concepts outlined above are important in the analysis of the 
role of the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings. In Tunisia, 
community struggles by precarious workers over access to employment and local 
development circulated across the country, taking on a political character. Through 
pressure from below, the UGTT leadership was pushed to call for regional general 
strikes, thus spreading these struggles to factories and public administration and 
mobilising the relatively secure workers. In Morocco, the regime consciously and 
quite successfully manoeuvred to fragment and de-politicise workers’ protests, 
deepening the wedge between secure and precarious workers. 
The eye-opening perspective provided by an expanded conception of working 
class can be illustrated by this quote from Harry Cleaver on 1960s Marxism and social 
movements in the United States: 
 
                                                 
50 Although, regarding relatively large public sectors, Morocco is a notable exception. 
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Baran and Sweezy, and those who followed them, still defined the working 
class as wage workers and thus identified the struggles of unemployed 
Black Panthers, militant Students for a Democratic Society, radical 
feminists, or welfare rights activists as being outside that class. All that 
could be seen of the working class within this perspective were the hard-
hat attacks on anti-war demonstrators. (Cleaver 2000, p. 39) 
 
Applying this, by way of example, to Tunisia’s 2008 revolt for employment in 
the mining basin of Gafsa, all that could be seen of the working class from a traditional 
Marxist perspective were the miners and their unions scorning young unemployed 
demonstrators. The heterodox framework outlined in this section is an alternative to 
such a traditional view. It is against this conceptual background that the relations 
between the trade unions and the working class are interpreted. 
2.2 A Non-Institutionalist Approach to Labour Institutions 
This section explains how labour institutions, and trade unions in particular, are 
understood here as mediating instances between the working class and capital. The 
trade unions cannot be seen simply as the full representatives of the working class 
because only part of the working class is organised in trade unions, and because there 
are both internal and external pressures that constrain union democracy.51 In order to 
distinguish different, more or less rigid, systems of labour institutions, this thesis uses 
as an entry point the strategies that authoritarian states can deploy to control workers 
and trade unions. These strategies are grouped here into three categories: substantial 
inducements targeting workers, organisational inducements targeting trade union 
officials, and constraints targeting both. 
Labour institutions are seen here as systems of mediation between the working 
class and capital. Within a system of labour institutions, the trade unions have a 
particular status in that they are, at least theoretically, organisations run by 
representatives elected and funded directly by the workers and thus they are often 
crucial in advancing the interests of the latter. However, as the Zerowork Collective 
wrote: 
 
                                                 
51 Representation, in any case, is always a “creative” act, as it involves the aggregation of the interests 
and preferences of a multiplicity of represented individuals. 
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We should never identify the working class with its organizations. Indeed, 
much of the working class struggle producing the present crisis [the 1973 
“oil crisis”] arose outside or against these very organizations. But by the 
same token one cannot follow the ideological line of "class purity" that 
analyzes struggle entirely independent of these organizations. Whether a 
particular organization advances the interests of the working class or not, 
it plays a role in the relationship between the working class and capital. 
(Zerowork Collective 1992, p. 112) 
 
In all countries, only a fraction of the working class are union members. The 
trade unions, in the absence of pressures to defend non-members, can sometimes act 
to further divide the working class by augmenting the inequalities between secure 
unionised workers and precarious, non-unionised workers. Furthermore, as Richard 
Hyman has shown, union representatives at all levels must aggregate members’ 
demands and mediate them with external pressures coming from capital and the state, 
as well as internal pressures stemming from the trade union hierarchy itself (Hyman 
1975; 1979). 
Internal pressures against union democracy have been captured by Robert 
Michels’ classic concept of the “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1999), although he 
arguably overstated its rigidity. Control over a large, hierarchical, and centralised 
organisation allows the trade union leaders to exercise a degree of undemocratic 
control over their members, even if free and fair internal elections periodically take 
place (and much more so when they do not take place). 
Some Marxist theorists have identified the main cleavage within the trade unions 
as between members depending for their income on extra-union jobs versus full-time 
trade union officials; the latter constitute the “trade union bureaucracy”52 and feature 
a structural tendency to compromise with capital (Darlington and Upchurch 2011). 
This thesis acknowledges the fact that full-time officials – because they depend on the 
organisational viability of the trade union for their income and social standing – tend 
to be more vulnerable to undemocratic pressures compared to other union members. 
However, this factor by itself is not sufficient for understanding the behaviour of union 
                                                 
52 We will see that the notion of “trade union bureaucracy” is very common among the union Left of 
Morocco and Tunisia. However, the union militants normally use it to identify opportunistic trade 
unionists regardless of whether they work full-time for the union or not. 
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officials and members. Non-full-time union representatives, for example, are far from 
immune to undemocratic temptations, as the empirical materials collected in this thesis 
confirm. 
Therefore, David Camfield’s alternative understanding of bureaucracy as a 
social relation in which internal democracy is limited through formal rules (Camfield 
2013) is preferred here. Bureaucratic practices, however, are not the only way to limit 
internal democracy; a common alternative are informal patrimonial practices through 
which trade unionists can exercise undemocratic control over the organisation by the 
very violation of formal rules. According to this conception, both bureaucratic and 
patrimonial practices can be found all across the trade union hierarchy, although they 
obviously have more important consequences when deployed at the top. 
External undemocratic pressures, as opposed to internal ones, refer to the 
interest of the state and capital in using the trade union hierarchy as a means to control 
the workers. As Hyman put it: 
 
[U]nions can readily be transformed, at least partially, into an agency of 
control over their members to the advantage of external interests (that is, 
the power over the membership which is the prerequisite of concerted 
action is divorced from its explicit purpose as a means of control for these 
same members). […] Trade unions, as organisations of the relatively 
powerless in an environment of power, can achieve any meaningful 
internal democracy only against external resistance and considerable odds. 
For this very reason, the role of trade unionism as a medium of control 
over work relations is inherently ambiguous. (Hyman 1975, p. 68, italics 
in the original) 
 
In this struggle for control of the trade union organisation, the capitalist state 
cannot be seen as a neutral arbiter between workers and capital because its material 
reproduction relies on the well-being of capitalist accumulation, on which the state is 
dependent for its revenue (see Clarke 1991). 
Trade unions, then, are perpetually subject to a struggle for control in which the 
internal promoters of bureaucratic and patrimonial practices and the external 
influences of capital and the state combine into constant pressures to use workers’ 
organisations for aims that might diverge significantly from the interests or 
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preferences of most rank-and-file members. This is why the working class (or even 
the unionised working class) cannot, again, be reduced to the trade unions, and vice 
versa. This reasoning is even more crucial in the case of authoritarian countries, where 
undemocratic tendencies within the trade unions are usually directly supported by 
severe state repression. 
Labour-state relations, then, cannot be reduced to trade unions-state relations, 
assuming that unions can be treated as proxies for the working class. Labour 
institutions are systems of institutionalised relations between workers, the trade 
unions, the state, and capital, which emerge as outcomes of class struggles and can be 
further modified by successive rounds of struggle.  
Once a configuration of labour institutions is in place, further conflicts are 
themselves mediated through it, and this has important effects on the concrete forms 
of change. Change and continuity are always coexistent, but the “amalgam” between 
the two varies, with more change in times of crisis and more continuity in times of 
stability. Agency and struggles have a role to play in periods of stability too (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010). 
Fundamental change in labour institutions and in the political regimes of which 
they are part can happen through paths of “breakdown and replacement” or “gradual 
transformation” (Streeck and Thelen 2005). In the face of shifts in the balance of class 
power and pressures towards institutional change coming from below, flexible 
political institutions – featuring built-in mechanisms to assess the power and 
discontent of the subordinates – are more likely to accommodate change in a gradual 
and negotiated way, while rigid political institutions – dealing with the power and 
discontent of the subordinates in a systematically repressive way – will more probably 
change in an abrupt and insurrectional manner.53 
A common system of labour institutions in authoritarian regimes is 
“authoritarian corporatism”. Philippe Schmitter’s path-breaking article describes 
corporatism as follows: 
 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, 
                                                 
53 This thesis holds that this was the case, respectively, of Morocco and Tunisia in the 2011 uprisings 
and their aftermath. 
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compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support.54 (Schmitter 
1974, pp.93-4) 
 
Authoritarian corporatism has been widespread among late industrialising 
countries because of the important role of the state in attempts at catch-up 
development (O’Donnell 1977). As Arab Marxists like Samir Amin and Nazih Ayubi 
have emphasised, North Africa was no exception (Amin 1976; Ayubi 1995). 
David and Ruth Collier, in their work on authoritarian corporatism, noted that 
“[c]orporative provisions have been used in some cases to strengthen the position of 
workers and unions in relation to employers, whereas in others they have been used to 
weaken their position” (Collier and Collier 1979, p. 968). In order to distinguish 
between the two cases, they refined the conceptualisation of authoritarian labour 
institutions with a typology based on the levels of inducements and constraints 
deployed by the state to control labour. However, the two authors think about 
inducements exclusively in the sense of “advantages upon the labor organizations that 
receive them” (Ibid., p. 969, italics added). Yet “organisational inducements”, as 
Collier and Collier recognise (Ibid., p. 980), are in the interest of the trade union 
officials but not in themselves directly advantageous to workers. An exclusive focus 
on organisational inducements does not grasp the possible divergences of interests 
between trade union officials and rank-and-file workers.  
This thesis builds upon Collier and Collier’s analysis of labour institutions based 
on organisational inducements and constraints, but it also adds “substantial 
inducements”, i.e. inducements that benefit the workers directly. The distinction 
between substantial and organisational inducements is crucial because it is an 
instrument to analyse divergences of interests within the trade unions themselves, as 
union action can give priority to securing substantial inducements for the workers or 
                                                 
54 Schmitter then distinguishes between state (i.e. authoritarian) corporatism and societal (i.e. 
democratic) corporatism, depending on the extent of state control over representational organisations. 
Obviously, in authoritarian corporatism control over the trade unions lies further from the workers and 
closer to the state. Workers’ compliance can therefore be maintained only through a mix of incentives 
and repression. 
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organisational inducements for the trade unionists. In this way, it is possible to avoid 
treating the trade union as a monolithic entity and reducing it to the actions of its top 
leadership. Moreover, the analysis of substantial inducements provides a window into 
the social bases of a regime and into the class struggles over the production and 
distribution of value, avoiding the formalist biases of some institution-based research 
(see Chapter 1). This thesis thus analyses labour institutions along three dimensions: 
substantial inducements, organisational inducements, and constraints, which 
authoritarian states provide to labour to secure its submission. As the empirical 
materials collected in the thesis confirm, these state strategies always meet some 
degree of resistance. 
Substantial inducements – i.e. direct concessions to the workers – have 
contradictory effects, in that the regime grants them to secure the workers’ 
acquiescence, but any attempts to retrench them can fuel discontent and these same 
inducements provide workers with the resources to act upon that discontent (see 
Cleaver 2000, p. 101). The substantial inducements considered here are job security 
provisions, wage increases, welfare services, and public sector employment. 
 
Table 1 – Dimensions of labour institutions 
 
Substantial inducements Organisational 
inducements 
Constraints 
Job security Direct advantages to trade 
unionists 
On internal democracy 
Wage increases Trade union incorporation in 
policy-making 
On civil and political rights 
Welfare services Monopoly of representation On workplace org and rep 
Public sector employment State-encouraged 
membership 
On the right to strike 
 State subsidies On collective bargaining 
 
 Organisational inducements are benefits targeting the trade union officials, 
who, thanks to them, gain more secure control over a more powerful organisation. The 
organisational inducements analysed in this thesis are direct advantages to the trade 
unionists, the incorporation of the trade unions in policy-making, the guarantee of 
monopoly of representation, state-encouraged membership, and subsidies to the 
unions by the state. 
 Constraints are sanctions upon those workers and trade union officials who, 
despite the respective inducements, still refuse to toe the regime’s line. The constraints 
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studied in this research are state interference in internal democracy, limitations on civil 
and political rights, limitations on the rights of workplace organisation and 
representation, limitations on the right to strike, and limitations on collective 
bargaining. These are sometimes enforced through actual, legal or extra-legal, state 
violence. 
 In the post-independence phase, the labour institutions that emerged in Morocco 
and Tunisia differed significantly as a result of the two countries’ respective divergent 
trajectories of struggle. To characterise these different systems of labour institutions, 
this thesis has developed the concepts of authoritarian conservative pluralism for 
Morocco and authoritarian populist corporatism for Tunisia (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
The North African authoritarian populist corporatist regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia), under nationalist ideology, featured a state-led developmental strategy based 
on import-substitution industrialisation and a populist social pact between workers and 
capital that, mutatis mutandis, was the regional equivalent of post-WWII 
Keynesianism in the West (see Ayubi 1995). Organised labour was incorporated by 
these regimes through the enforcement of a single-trade union system and the 
interpenetration of state, single party, and single union bureaucracies. The 1960s and 
1970s saw an unprecedented expansion of the industrial base of Arab populist 
corporatist countries and average levels of GDP per capita growth higher than those 
of the subsequent decades. However, already in the late 1960s, populist corporatism 
globally started to show signs of the crisis that would lead to rising government debt 
and eventually neoliberal structural adjustment (see Cleaver 1989).55 The Arab 
populist regimes underwent an incremental and tentative process of erosion of 
substantial inducements. In the neoliberal phase, they thus became authoritarian post-
populist corporatist systems, whereby “post-populism” indicates a partial 
retrenchment of the former substantial inducements to the working class (Hinnebusch 
1988; 2010). 
Confronted with unrest sparked by neoliberal reform, authoritarian post-
populist corporatism proved to be an inherently rigid system of labour institutions 
because of its high repressiveness and because of the difficulties in retrenching former 
substantial inducements. The post-populist regimes, whose stability was endangered 
                                                 
55 In several Latin American countries, populist corporatism was forcefully replaced by “bureaucratic 
authoritarianism”, which – while maintaining organisational inducements – abruptly withdrew 
substantial inducements (O’Donnell 1977). 
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by neoliberal reform, were tempted to tighten the screws of corporatist control to 
ensure that the trade unions provided them with needed organised societal support. 
This made them recalcitrant to political liberalisation but wary of complete repression, 
and unable to channel workers’ unrest into institutionalised outlets. With its stiff 
controls on trade unions and political parties, authoritarian corporatism tends to 
suppress the institutional feedback mechanisms through which workers could voice 
their grievances. Post-populist corporatism, therefore, was unable to adapt to the 
struggles sparked by neoliberalism, facilitating the emergence of “breakdown and 
replacement” (see Streeck and Thelen 2005) mechanisms of institutional change. 
Morocco’s authoritarian conservative pluralism was a unique institutional 
configuration in North Africa. Under a traditionalist ideology that affirmed the King’s 
religious legitimacy, the Moroccan post-colonial regime was based upon a 
conservative alliance between the Palace, rural elites, peasantry under their hegemony, 
and urban bourgeoisie in a subordinate position. Economic policy did not signify a 
radical break with the colonial pattern of primary exports, substantial inducements to 
the working class remained limited, and repression was high. Yet the monarchy also 
encouraged party and union pluralism, relying on divide-and-conquer tactics to curtail 
the opposition. In the 1990s, the Palace engineered a partial political opening in 
response to continuing social unrest, easing to some extent limitations on political 
dissent (the socialist opposition was allowed to lead the government) and civil rights, 
particularly freedom of the press and freedom to protest. In this context, consultative 
social dialogue among the labour confederations, government, and employers’ 
association was established. After these transformations, the Moroccan regime can be 
described as semi-authoritarian conservative pluralism.56 
Faced with the transformations engendered by neoliberalism, semi-
authoritarian conservative pluralism revealed itself to be relatively flexible, and thus 
better able to adapt. The absence of a former populist social pact made reductions in 
substantial inducements to the workers less drastic and probably lowered the 
expectations of many Moroccans (see Anderson 1991). Furthermore, trade union 
pluralism, party mediation between the unions and the state, and social dialogue 
                                                 
56 As evident from the rest of the thesis, the use of the term “semi-authoritarian” does not mean to 
understate the limits on political and civil rights enforced by the regime, nor to suggest that Morocco 
entered a phase of “democratic transition”. It merely indicates a difference of degrees in 
authoritarianism relative to Morocco in the post-independence phase or pre-2011 Tunisia. 
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provided feedback mechanisms to channel some social discontent into 
institutionalised outlets. This facilitated “gradual transformation” (see Streeck and 
Thelen 2005) patterns of institutional change. 
 To sum up, labour institutions mediate between the working class and capital 
through the interposed layers of the trade unions and the state. The entry point chosen 
in this thesis to analyse different systems of labour institutions are the strategies 
deployed by the state to attempt to control workers and trade unions. Rigid 
configurations of labour institutions are more likely to change in an abrupt and 
insurrectional manner, while flexible ones are more likely to transform in a gradual 
and negotiated way. Yet this says nothing of the direction and magnitude of social 
change in which the trade unions are involved. To investigate this, it is necessary to 
analyse working-class power. 
 
2.3 Working-Class Power, Within and Without the Trade Unions 
This section defines working-class power and operationalises it along the dimensions 
of “structural power” and “associational power”, enumerating the indicators adopted 
to assess it. A comparison of Morocco and Tunisia on the basis of these indicators is 
presented in Chapter 5 (see also Feltrin 2018a). 
Harry Cleaver – perhaps in exceedingly martial language – wrote:  
 
In the class war, as in conventional military encounters, one must begin 
with the closest study of one’s own forces, that is, the structure of working-
class power. Without an understanding of one’s own power, the ebb and 
flow of the battle lines can appear as an endless process driven only by the 
enemy’s unilateral self-activity. (Cleaver 2000, p. 57) 
 
 A viable way to compare levels of working-class power in Morocco and 
Tunisia on the eve of the 2011 uprisings thus needs to be established. Erik Olin Wright 
defines class power in these terms: “In the context of class analysis, power can be 
thought of as the capacity of individuals and organizations to realize their class 
interests” (Wright 2000, p. 962; see also Silver 2003).57 He then distinguishes between 
                                                 
57 While this thesis finds the distinction between the two types of working-class power extremely useful, 
it does not follow Erik Olin Wright in his conception of class and the class structure (even if he does 
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working-class “structural power” – depending on workers’ position in the economic 
system – and “associational power” – depending on the strength of labour 
organisations. In autonomist terms, while working-class structural power is directly 
linked to the technical composition of the class, associational power is an aspect of its 
political composition. This distinction is particularly useful because structural power, 
unlike most indicators of associational power, provides information on the potential 
for workers’ mobilisation both within and without the trade unions and, as we will see, 
Morocco and Tunisia’s uprisings featured both kinds of mobilisation. 
Working-class power is seen here as arising both from “economic” factors (e.g. 
sectors of employment or characteristics of the labour market) and “political” factors 
(e.g. civil and political rights or collective bargaining institutions). Yet such factors 
are in turn historically constructed through successive and contingent rounds of class 
struggles and can change through further conflicts. In turn, a given balance of class 
power does not allow one to predict the results of future social conflict, it rather 
indicates a certain distribution of resources between classes, pointing to a range of 
likelier outcomes. How the relevant actors will actually mobilise such resources 
cannot be foreseen. This non-deterministic relation can be visualised through Bob 
Jessop’s concept of “strategic selectivity”, according to which social structures do not 
determine the actors’ choices but merely make some strategies more feasible than 
others (Jessop 2008). 
 
Table 2 – Indicators of working-class power 
 
Working-class structural power Working-class associational power 
Sectorial location Trade union density 
Job security Collective bargaining coverage 
Human Development Index Civil and political rights 
Welfare services Internal democracy 
 
To assess working-class structural power in Morocco and Tunisia, the 
following indicators are singled out as the most informative, given the availability of 
data and the characteristics of the cases. 
1) Sectorial location: this indicator refers to the distribution of employment in 
economic sectors that tend to provide, other things being equal, more mobilising 
                                                 
consider precarious workers as part of the working class, see Wright 2016), based as it is on the wage 
relationship and on the relegation of intellectual labour to the category of the “middle class”. 
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potential and more advantageous conditions to the workers (e.g. manufacturing versus 
agriculture). 
2) Job security: this indicator is heuristically measured through the share of 
workers with open-ended contracts and social security benefits. In both countries, 
open-ended contracts grant a series of legal protections against layoffs.58 
3) The Human Development Index: the UNDP’s human development 
indicators provide information on workers’ – who, in the broad definition of this 
thesis, constitute the vast majority of Morocco and Tunisia’s population – wealth, 
health, and education, and thus on the extent to which such workers are empowered to 
mobilise for their interests (see Cleaver 2000, p. 101). Moreover, in the absence of 
complete and reliable data on wages, the combination of GNI per capita and inequality 
indexes outlines a picture of the national distribution of income to workers. This is 
also consistent with the theoretical choice of including unwaged workers in the 
working class. 
4) Welfare services: the level of public expenditure on welfare services 
indicates the extent to which workers are independent of the market for their 
education, health, and social security, and independent of charity for poverty relief. 
This partial decommodification, in turn, reinforces their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the employers (see Esping-Andersen 1985). 
The reader may wonder why some apparently obvious indicators, such as wage 
levels and unemployment rates, do not appear in the list. The problem with wages is 
the absence, at the time of writing, of publicly available complete data for the 
Moroccan private sector.59 Comparing the legal minimum wage, or any other legal 
indicator, presupposes that labour legislation was equally applied in the two countries, 
which is very far from warranted. Unemployment rates are normally used as an 
indicator for the tightness or looseness of national labour markets, which in turn affects 
workers’ bargaining power. Official unemployment rates, however, are not very 
meaningful in Global South countries that do not provide unemployment subsidies to 
their workers. In fact, the latter are forced to work regardless, no matter the availability 
                                                 
58 The preciseness of this indicator is affected by the impossibility of measuring the extent of the actual 
application of the labour legislation. However, as labour law violations are similar or worse in Morocco 
relative to Tunisia, this difficulty does not invalidate the indicator. 
59 Data on public sector wages in Morocco were used to study the diachronic evolution of substantial 
inducements in the country, but the absence of reliable data on private sector wages there makes it 
unfeasible to establish a synchronic comparison of wages across sectors in Morocco and Tunisia. 
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of palatable employment opportunities. Unemployment rates in the Global South are 
often lower than in the West (Benanav 2015a, p. 21), but working-class structural 
power is not higher in the former. Morocco’s official unemployment rate in 2010 was 
9%, four percentage points lower than Tunisia’s 13% (ILO), which even used a more 
restrictive definition of unemployment. However, these numbers have a very limited 
meaning, as in the same year 23.5% of the Moroccan employed population belonged 
to the “unpaid employed” category (HCP 2011). Surely, both Moroccan and Tunisian 
workers face extremely loose labour markets, marred by acute underemployment and 
precarity. 
To assess associational power, the following indicators are used: 
1) Trade union density: this is the most common indicator of trade union 
power. Other things being equal, trade unions with more members can stage larger 
and more effective mobilisations. The preciseness of this indicator is affected by the 
fact that trade unions can sometimes mobilise non-members too. However, as shown 
in the following chapters, it was in Tunisia (where trade union density was higher) that 
trade unionists contributed more successfully to mobilise the non-unionised. 
2) Collective bargaining coverage: the extension of collective bargaining 
coverage reflects the trade unions’ capacity to improve workers’ wages and conditions 
through collective agreements, and it is, therefore, another classic indicator of trade 
union power. 
3) Civil and political rights: the scope of civil rights indicates the range of 
contentious action to which workers and their organisations can recur without facing 
state repression, including the right to form new trade union confederations. The scope 
of political rights signals the extent to which workers can elect representatives of their 
choosing in state institutions. 
4) Internal democracy: this is not a direct indicator of union power, but it refers 
to the extent to which union power is power of the workers, rather than just power 
over the workers (Hyman 1975). This aspect is of particular importance in 
authoritarian countries, where trade unions can be strictly controlled by the regime. 
The reader will notice the absence of any reference to labour parties, tripartite 
institutions, and competitive trade unionism. In fact, these elements cannot be 
considered as straightforward indicators of working-class associational power, 
because they can act as vehicles of both empowerment and co-optation/weakening, 
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depending on the context. These elements will, therefore, be discussed in the following 
chapters, but they cannot be synthesised as univocal indicators. 
Also missing is the breadth of trade union freedoms in the two countries 
because it is difficult to compare. Stallings (2010) used an index composed of legal 
provisions, on the one hand, and reports on labour law violations by the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the US State Department, and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), on the other. The resulting index stated that de facto trade 
union freedoms were higher in Morocco than in Tunisia. However, evidence from this 
thesis’s interviews and archival research points in the opposite direction. For example, 
the author has witnessed three cases (Doha, Maghreb Steel, Med Paper; see Chapter 
6) in which hundreds of striking Moroccan workers were fired for defending their 
trade union representatives against illegal layoffs. While anti-union discrimination in 
the Tunisian private sector is a very widespread phenomenon, to the author’s 
knowledge violations on this scale are not seen there. In any case, both reports by 
international agencies and qualitative fieldwork are anecdotal evidence for a large-
scale phenomenon and cannot be seen as conclusive.  
As seen in Chapter 1, there is a strand of academic literature claiming that 
workers have historically tended to play an important role in democratisation 
processes because, ceteris paribus, representative democracy as opposed to 
authoritarianism is in the interest of the workers (see Esping-Andersen 1985; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Therborn 1977). From a Marxist perspective, this does not 
mean that democracy in capitalism is the best possible way of organising society. 
However, while there is nothing democratic in the capitalist state’s dependence on the 
production of value, civil and political rights usually allow workers to defend their 
interests more than the absence thereof. 
This thesis argues that relatively high working-class power facilitated the 
UGTT’s active role in Tunisia’s democratisation, while lower working-class power 
contributed to keep most Moroccan trade unions in line with the strategy of the regime. 
Chapter 5 will show that, despite the gaps in the data, the overall divergence between 
Morocco and Tunisia on the above indicators for working-class power is significant 
and coherent enough to allow for solid conclusions on their different balances of class 




2.4 Methodology: Historical Comparison and Data Sources 
This section first justifies the comparison between the cases of Morocco and Tunisia 
and then specifies the data sources used to answer the research questions of the thesis. 
The methodology deployed here – in order to analyse the divergent role of the 
Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions in the 2011 uprisings – combines a modified 
version of the comparative method of difference with historical narrative (see Lange 
2013). 
The method of difference in its standard, so-called “Millian”, version consists 
in comparing two similar cases featuring different outcomes. The similarities between 
the two cases are used to problematise rival explanations, while the differences that 
do exist between them point to factors that possibly contributed to divergence in their 
outcomes. The advantage of the method of difference is that it allows the researcher 
to problematise several rival explanations while at the same time producing in-depth 
and historically contextualised research. However, Michael Burawoy’s (1989) critique 
of Theda Skocpol’s (1979) inductive use of the Millian method is convincing: 
empirical differences among concrete cases are innumerable, even among most similar 
cases, and one cannot infer from the comparison alone which elements are the most 
relevant in causing the outcomes of interest. Any pretension of pure empiricism will 
mean that the selection of relevant explanatory factors will happen through hidden or 
unconscious assumptions rather than through explicit and contestable theoretical 
guidelines. 
In this thesis, such difficulties are minimised by departing from the standard 
method of difference in two ways: 
-Theoretical guidelines: social theories point to global trends and sets of factors 
that can be seen as especially relevant across multiple contexts. Therefore, they 
provide guidance on what factors to single out among the empirical wealth of concrete 
cases. This thesis focuses on how historical trajectories of class struggle contributed 
to shape the role of the trade unions in the uprisings because it relies on an autonomist 
Marxist theoretical framework that emphasises the role of struggles from below in 
transforming social structures. 
-Historical narrative: in-depth qualitative analysis allows one to move away 
from explanation as a mechanical causal relation between discrete and static variables, 
and to bring forward the agency of social actors as an element of contingency between 
structural factors and the outcomes under investigation. In the case of this research, 
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in-depth historical narrative regarding how class struggles brought into being new 
configurations of labour institutions and transformed balances of class power allows 
one to assess the evolution of the goals, strategies, and perceived options of the 
relevant trade union actors. 
Despite the fact that Morocco is a monarchy and Tunisia a republic, the two 
countries are similar in many other respects. Morocco and Tunisia are both Maghribi 
countries where Arab and Muslim cultures are prevalent. They suffered several 
decades of French colonisation and achieved independence at the same time to then 
endure indigenous authoritarian regimes, which gradually opened the political arena 
to a restricted multipartism (Angrist 1999; Storm 2007). Before 2011, they featured a 
pro-democracy opposition that covered a strikingly broad political spectrum 
(Haugbolle and Cavatorta 2011; Sater 2007). Patrimonialist practices were common 
in both regimes (Achcar 2013 pp. 67-96; Ben Hammouda 2012, pp. 13-38). 
Particularly interesting for this thesis, Morocco and Tunisia embarked upon parallel 
processes of neoliberal structural adjustment in the 1980s and, in both cases, this 
triggered social unrest. Both countries also experienced mass mobilisations in 2011 – 
yet, only in Tunisia did these mobilisations lead to significant political transformation. 
This opportunity for comparison has not gone unnoticed, and other authors have taken 
advantage of it with different research topics (e.g. Allal and Bennafla 2011; Cammett 
2007; Charrad 2001; Mohsen-Finan 2013; White 2001). 
The time frame of the comparison goes from independence – achieved by both 
countries in 1956 – to the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath. The period from the eve 
to the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings is analysed in particular depth. 
The thesis draws on a variegated range of data sources, which were analysed 
through qualitative coding (see Boyatzis 1998). The main data sources are the 
following: 
-Semi-structured interviews: as the social processes under investigation are 
recent, it was possible to interview the actors who had a direct role in them. Semi-
structured interviews were particularly apt because they allowed to direct the 
conversation towards the themes and indicators of interest while at the same time 
giving space to the interviewees to express in some depth their interpretation of the 
phenomena under study (Brinkmann 2013). 
For this research, 94 semi-structured interviews were realised. In Tunisia, the 
interviews were conducted in Greater Tunis, Kasserine, Gafsa, Sfax, and Sidi Bouzid, 
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as well as in smaller towns in the vicinities of these cities. In Morocco, the interviews 
were carried out in Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Marrakesh, Khouribga, Agadir, and 
Fes. Most interviewees were rank-and-file and mid-level trade unionists from a wide 
range of employment sectors. However, workers with no union responsibilities, top-
level trade union leaders, social movement and party activists, civil servants, experts, 
and members of the unemployed associations were also interviewed. Moving outside 
of the capital cities and talking with activists and workers located in different positions 
in respect to the labour confederations allowed the author to gain a multi-faceted and 
articulated grasp of Morocco and Tunisia’s working-class mobilisations and trade 
unionism. 
The interviews were conducted in French, which is widely spoken in the two 
countries.60 The interviewees were contacted mostly over the phone, although some 
were reached directly in their offices or approached on social media. In most cases, 
they were in principle available to speak to the researcher, but this did not prevent a 
long series of cancellations and the fact that several individuals refused de facto to be 
interviewed. Over time, the network of contacts in both countries grew relatively large, 
which facilitated the task of communicating with potential interviewees in new cities. 
In order for the participants to be protected from potential harm, they were asked for 
their explicit consent to take part in the research, were requested not to disclose 
dangerous information, and were granted anonymity and confidentiality. 
One problem with interviews is the accuracy of the interviewee’s memories, 
especially concerning events that took place several years before. This is why 
interviews were triangulated with other interviews concerning the same events, as well 
as with news articles and other archival and secondary sources. Additionally, the 
meaning that an interviewee ascribes to an event is susceptible to change in light of 
later developments. Reactivity of this kind can be a source of interesting data in itself, 
as it suggests divergences between initial evaluations and intentions and actual 
outcomes. Therefore, when possible, the researcher tried to assess how the 
interpretations of the interviewees changed with time, by asking directly or by 
comparing them with earlier statements by the interviewees. 
Interviews were used to gather data on the functioning of labour institutions, 
                                                 
60 The author has training in Arabic, however, given his lack of fluency, French was the most practical 
option. 
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on perceptions of the balance of class power, and on the playing out of the struggles 
that contributed to changing these structures, particularly during the 2011 uprisings, 
including the motivations and interpretations of the involved actors. Interviews were 
necessary to complement other data sources on labour institutions – such as labour 
legislation and state reports – because constraints and inducements often operate in 
informal ways that are not captured by official sources. 
-News articles: archival research was conducted in the documental centres of 
Rabat and Tunis, as well as online. This resulted in a digitalised press archive on 
Moroccan and Tunisian workers’ mobilisations and trade unionism featuring over 
2,500 items. The archival data was used to prepare the semi-structured interviews, to 
triangulate the factual information provided by the interviewees, and to contribute to 
answering the research questions with information on the functioning of labour 
institutions, indicators of working-class power, and the history of class struggles 
(again, with a more in-depth focus on the 2011 uprisings). 
-Labour legislation: the most important pieces of labour legislation in Morocco 
and Tunisia are the respective labour codes. Tunisia adopted its first labour code in 
1966 and significantly reformed it in 1994 and 1996, while Morocco approved its first 
labour code in 2003. The labour codes and other pieces of labour legislation were 
especially useful to gather information on the three dimensions of labour institutions: 
substantial inducements, organisational inducements, and constraints. This 
information was complemented with interviews and secondary sources, since – as the 
latter sources strongly confirm – laws very often go partially or totally unapplied. 
-Socioeconomic statistics: socioeconomic statistics and related reports – 
particularly by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), ILO, and 
Morocco and Tunisia’s national statistics bureaus61 – provided important information 
on the evolution of working-class compositions in the two countries, substantial 
inducements to the workers, and indicators of working-class power. There are several 
gaps in the available statistical data, especially for what concerns the early decades of 
independence. However, the data gathered was sufficient to delineate a clear picture 
of the main transformations and trends. As several commentators noted (e.g. Achcar 
2013, pp. 29-36; Pfeifer 1999), some statistics are often quite unreliable – particularly 
                                                 
61 These are the Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP) in Morocco and the Institut National de la 
Statistique (INS) in Tunisia. 
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those on social indicators like poverty and unemployment – which is why they were 
used with caution and should be read with similar prudence. However, the differences 
between Morocco and Tunisia according to the statistical indicators central to this 
research are consistent and wide enough to draw solid conclusions on their overall 
different levels of substantial inducements and working-class power. 
-Secondary sources: academic publications on the political, socioeconomic, 
and labour history of Morocco and Tunisia were coded when they provided 
information on the themes and indicators relating to the research sub-questions. This 
published information was thus reinterpreted in light of the theoretical framework and 
the questions of this research, and combined with the data stemming from the primary 
sources. Secondary sources were particularly useful to investigate the emergence and 
development of labour institutions in the first decades of independence.  
This research has also benefited from published memoirs of political activists 
and trade unionists (see Chapter 1), which often contain rich empirical information as 
well as their authors’ interpretations of relevant historical events and processes. 
Additional sources include documents produced by the trade unions themselves 
(statements, press releases, internal regulations, etc.) and by the state (press releases, 
ministerial reports, etc.). These sources were accessed through archival research or 
they were provided by some of the research participants. All primary sources are 
referenced in the “Primary Sources” section of the bibliography.62 
Such sources were combined to build a historical narrative of social struggles 
– and particularly class struggles – in the relatively similar cases of Morocco and 
Tunisia. Following the theoretical guidelines provided by autonomist Marxism, the 
comparison focused on the themes of working-class composition, labour institutions, 
and working-class power. 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis is based on an autonomist Marxist understanding of social change, 
emphasising the role of struggles from below in creating and transforming the 
structures of society. When studying trade unionism, the most relevant type of social 
struggle is class struggle. In the heretic, autonomist-inspired conception of class 
                                                 
62 Therefore, news articles, legislation, statistics, memoirs, and other non-academic documents will not 
be found in the “Secondary Sources” section of the bibliography. 
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adopted by this thesis, the working class is not composed simply of manual workers 
or waged employees, but of anybody excluded from significant ownership and control 
of capital. 
 This theoretical approach, emphasising workers’ self-activity and an expanded 
notion of working class, sees the trade unions not as proxies for the working class, but 
as mediating instances between workers and capital. As such, the unions are part of 
systems of labour institutions. Whether shifts in the balance of class power and 
struggles from below will change a given system of labour institutions in a gradual 
and negotiated way, or in an abrupt and insurrectional manner, depends importantly 
on how flexible or rigid the system is. The thesis analyses the strategies deployed by 
the state to control workers and trade unions as an entry point to distinguish between 
different systems of labour institutions. 
 The flexibility or rigidity of labour institutions, however, does not provide 
much information on the possible directions of social change. In this respect, the 
contributions of the trade unions to mobilisations for social justice and democracy are 
significantly influenced by the level of working-class power and by the strategies of 
the relevant actors to mobilise such power in the struggle. In order to build a viable 
comparison of working-class power in Morocco and Tunisia, this concept was 
operationalised along the dimensions of structural power and associational power. 
 This thesis is the result of extensive qualitative empirical research, drawing on 
a wide range of sources to show how divergent historical trajectories of class struggles 
led to different working-class compositions, systems of labour institutions, and levels 
of working-class power in Morocco and Tunisia on the eve of the 2011 uprisings. It 
thus maps the different contexts in which the uprisings played out and builds a 
qualitative narrative of how the relevant trade union actors navigated such contexts. 
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This chapter provides a historical account of Moroccan trade unionism in order to 
analyse labour institutions through the lenses of the three dimensions discussed in the 
theoretical framework: substantial inducements, organisational inducements, and 
constraints. Morocco and Tunisia’s recent histories were conceptually divided into two 
broad phases: the post-independence phase and the neoliberal phase, connected by a 
transitional period in the 1970s that coincided with an intense cycle of struggle in both 
countries. 
 The post-independence phase in both Morocco and Tunisia began in 1956. The 
Moroccan post-independence phase can be said to have ended with the first coup 
attempt in 1971, which marked the beginning of a transitional phase that lasted until 
1984, when IFI-led structural adjustment was launched. The neoliberal phase ran from 
the mid-1980s to the late 2000s. The chapter is thus divided into four sections: a 
contextualisation section that presents the origins of Moroccan trade unionism, 
followed by three sections that compare how social struggles shaped labour 
institutions in the post-independence phase, the transitional period, and the neoliberal 
phase. 
 In the post-independence phase, the Moroccan system of labour institutions 
can be labelled “authoritarian conservative pluralism”, whereby “authoritarian” refers 
to high constraints, “conservative” to low substantial inducements, and “pluralist” to 
a configuration of organisational inducements based on trade union pluralism. 
Moroccan postcolonial labour institutions were characterised by widespread 
informality and – different from Tunisia – by the marginalisation of organised labour 
from the social bases of the regime. 
 In the neoliberal phase, the institutional system transformed into what is 
described here as “semi-authoritarian conservative pluralism”. The most notable 
change was a partial political opening engineered from above to contain the social 
struggles that had been threatening the stability of the regime. Such opening allowed 
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for an expansion of civil and political rights that – while falling well short of 
democratisation – augmented the institutional flexibility of the regime. Working-class 
power remained relatively weak and substantial inducements, while increasing in 
some domains, stayed below Tunisian levels. In the meantime, trade union pluralism 
had turned into a balkanisation of organised labour, with a myriad of confederations 
wielding only limited power. 
 Therefore, by the time of the 2011 uprisings, Moroccan labour found itself in 
a different position compared to its Tunisian counterpart. The balance of class power 
was less favourable to the workers, while the institutional framework – featuring union 
fragmentation and party intermediation between the unions and the state – displayed 
a remarkable degree of flexibility compared to Tunisia. As Chapter 6 will show, this 
placed the regime in a better position to defuse social conflict. 
 
3.1 The Origins of Moroccan Trade Unionism and the National Movement 
This section provides a historical contextualisation that discusses the origins of 
Moroccan trade unionism under the French protectorate and the role of the unions in 
the national liberation struggle. Moroccan labour, through the organisational vehicle 
of the UMT, was a pole of the anticolonial National Movement together with the 
nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) Party and the armed resistance. However, different 
from Tunisia, Moroccan labour participated in the anticolonial struggle through its 
own national organisation only in the latest stages of the fight for independence and it 
had a less central role compared to that of the UGTT. This contributed to its 
marginalisation in the postcolonial regime. 
 Similar to the Tunisian case, Moroccan trade unionism was initially imported 
from Europe under the French protectorate, with the local branch of the Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT) established in 1930 as the first legal confederation and 
renamed Union Générale des Syndicats Confédérés du Maroc (UGSCM) in 1946 
(Ayache 1982; 1990). The dahir (royal decree) on trade unions of 24 December 1936 
mentioned the right to unionise for European workers only, while the dahir of 24 June 
1938 explicitly forbade Moroccan workers from unionising. However, following 
1944, Moroccan workers began to join the CGT/UGSCM in great numbers despite the 
legal ban (Ayache 1990, pp. 93-108). The main centre of Moroccan trade unionism 
was the area of Casablanca, the economic capital that attracted the lion’s share of 
investments and was a major pole of internal immigration from the East and South of 
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the country. 
 The most prominent organised manifestation of Moroccan nationalism was the 
Istiqlal Party (see Zisenwine 2010). The Istiqlal was essentially an expression of the 
Moroccan urban bourgeoisie, concentrated in commerce and real estate (Waterbury 
1970, pp. 94-110). However, the Istiqlal also developed a leftist wing of intellectuals 
aiming to establish a social base among the working class. In 1946, the Istiqlal 
leadership forbade its members from joining the UGSCM. Yet in late 1948, faced with 
the fact that Moroccan workers continued to unionise, it changed its position and 
encouraged its militants to compete for positions of authority in the French 
confederation (Forst 1976, p. 273). In the meantime, the Moroccan Sultan Mohammed 
V had struck an alliance with the Istiqlal and started to show some sympathy for the 
demands of Moroccan workers.63 
 Throughout the 1940s, Moroccan workers did not establish an autonomous 
Moroccan confederation, which possibly accounts for the lesser role of Moroccan 
trade unionism in the national liberation struggle, relative to the UGTT. They were, 
however, far from passive, waging combative strikes – especially in 1947-48 – and 
standing for civil rights and for the end of the protectorate. Since the UGSCM 4th 
Congress in 1946, the communist-led confederation was headed by two SGs, one 
Moroccan – Mohammed Tahar – and the other French – Henri Prudhomme (Ayache 
1990, pp. 173-7). In 1950, the dahir forbidding Moroccan workers to join trade unions 
was abrogated, but there was still no legislation declaring their right to unionise (Ben 
Bouazza 1992, p. 29). The UGSCM 5th Congress in 1950, which elected Taieb Ben 
Bouazza and André Leroy as joint SGs, passed a resolution to turn the UGSCM into a 
fully Moroccan confederation, but repression on the part of the protectorate halted the 
implementation of this decision (Ayache 1993, p. 94). 
 The day after UGTT SG Farhat Hached was assassinated in Tunisia (see 
Chapter 4), the Istiqlali UGSCM leaders called a general strike in solidarity to be held 
on 8 December 1952. On 7 December 1952, the authorities declared that the strike 
would not be tolerated. The protectorate’s hard-line was seen as a provocation by the 
                                                 
63 On 29 April 1949, the Sultan received a delegation of trade unionists – including the future UMT SG, 
the Istiqlali Mahjoub Ben Seddik – and declared his support for the right of Moroccan workers to 
unionise. Albert Ayache notes that: “It was the beginning of some kind of entente, if not a pact, between 
the Sultan and the young trade union leader” (Ayache 1998, p. 65, translated from Franch by the author). 
One could add that perhaps it was the beginning of some kind of entente between the Palace and the 
UMT leadership. 
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population of Hay Mohammadi – Casablanca’s most important working-class 
neighbourhood – who took to the streets that evening. The police reacted by 
massacring civilians and carrying out many arrests. On 8 December 1952, the police 
detained the main Moroccan trade union leaders, raided the Casablanca UGSCM 
building, and fired upon the funeral procession for the victims. On 11 December 1952, 
the authorities banned the UGSCM, along with the Istiqlal and the Parti Communiste 
du Maroc (PCM) (Ayache 1993, pp. 147-57). 
 On 20 August 1953, the protectorate deposed Sultan Mohammed V through an 
alliance with the Moroccan rural and religious elites led by Thami El Glaoui 
(Marrakesh’s pasha), who did not appreciate the Sultan’s alliance with the urban 
nationalist movement. From then on, the national liberation struggle intensified, with 
the appearance of the armed resistance, whose leaders mainly hailed from rural milieus 
(Waterbury 1970, pp. 203-13). The resistance had as its main demands the 
reinstatement of Mohammed V and the end of the protectorate. 
 The events of 7-8 December 1952 established Moroccan labour as one of the 
three poles of the National Movement, along with the Istiqlal and the resistance. But 
the role of organised labour was not as central as it was in Tunisia, where the UGTT 
was to some extent able to capture the leadership of the National Movement – 
including some of its armed wing – after the repression of the Neo-Destour Party (see 
Chapter 4). 
 Only one year before independence, on 20 March 1955, the Moroccan 
nationalist labour leaders founded the Moroccan confederation UMT. The founding 
meeting was attended by 45 delegates and held clandestinely in Ben Bouazza’s house 
in Casablanca. The contest for the post of SG was between Taieb Ben Bouazza and 
Mahjoub Ben Seddik.64 Ben Seddik enjoyed the support of the Istiqlal leaders, who 
were mistrustful of Ben Bouazza’s alleged communist past (Zamane, 12 March 2018). 
According to Ben Bouazza, before the vote had even taken place, Ben Seddik had sent 
a press release declaring the composition of the new NEC, with himself as SG (Ben 
Bouazza 1992, pp. 76-7). When the majority of the delegates voted for Ben Bouazza, 
Ben Seddik threatened to form a break-away union and Bouazza thus accepted the 
                                                 
64 Ben Bouazza, originally an organiser of the mining sector in the North West, had already been the 
USGCM SG and was better connected to the milieus of labour militancy (Ayache 1998, pp. 54-6). 
Mahjoub Ben Seddik, instead, came from the railway sector and had been a member of the last UGSCM 
NEC (Ibid., pp. 64-8). 
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position of vice-SG to avoid the split. Ben Seddik’s leadership was then confirmed at 
the UMT 1st Congress on 24-25 December 1955. Despite his retirement from 
employment in 1977 (Bazwi 1993, p. 69), Ben Seddik would hold on to the post of 
UMT SG, without interruption, until his death in 2010. 
 As Fouad Ben Seddik notes: “The UMT’s historical specificity is of course its 
political genesis from the top, with the general staff preceding the troops” (Ben Seddik 
1990, p. 519).65 The thorough repression of December 1952 had reduced Moroccan 
trade unionism to little more than a network of informally coordinated activists. The 
dahir of 12 September 1955, however, finally gave Moroccan workers the right to 
unionise. While Mohammed V returned to Morocco on 16 November 1955 and 
fervour for the coming independence increased, a strike wave exploded in late 1955 
and continued throughout 1956 (Ayache 1993, p. 202). The UMT NEC lost no time in 
taking advantage of the favourable political context to bring its own base into being: 
local unions were created before the existence of workplace unions, their leaders were 
appointed on the basis of political criteria (activism in the Istiqlal) and were in turn 
charged with forming workplace unions and appointing their leaders (Ben Seddik 
1990, pp. 515-6). In the enthusiastic phase immediately preceding the end of the 
protectorate, the UMT multiplied its members, which engendered a serious problem 
of scarcity of experienced cadres (Ibid., pp. 518-9). The remaining UGSCM groups 
dissolved and entered the UMT. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these successes, the 
fruits of independence would turn out to be quite meagre for Moroccan labour. 
 
3.2 The Post-Independence Phase: Authoritarian Conservative Pluralism 
This section reconstructs the social struggles that followed Morocco’s independence 
to show how they resulted in a system of labour institutions called here “authoritarian 
conservative pluralism”. Such struggles were characterised by a competition between 
the National Movement and the Palace for the control of the state. The Palace 
eventually gained the upper hand by forming a coalition with rural elites. The ensuing 
system of labour institutions was characterised by high constraints, low substantial 
inducements to the workers, and a configuration of organisational inducements based 
on the political marginalisation of multiple labour confederations. 
                                                 
65 Translated from French by the author. Fouad Ben Seddik should not be confused with his uncle and 
former UMT SG Mahjoub Ben Seddik. 
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 Regarding working-class composition, the first post-colonial census reveals 
that, in 1960, 75.2% of the “Muslim”66 employed population worked in the primary 
sector in rural areas (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 – Employment by economic sector and milieu (Morocco, 1960) 
 
 Urban Rural Total 
Primary 0.9% 75.2% 76.1% 
Secondary 5.1% 2.8% 7.9% 
Tertiary 9.1% 4.3% 13.4% 
Undefined 0.9% 1.7% 2.6% 
Total 16.0% 84.0% 100.0% 
Calculated by the author based on Royaume du Maroc 1961. 
 
 Waged employment constituted only 23.3% of total employment (see Table 4), 
with the official unemployment rate at 7%, the activity rate at 38.9%, and the female 
activity rate at 7.5%. The relative majority of economically active Moroccan men 
(36.6%) were “independent workers”, while the lion’s share of economically active 
women (86.9%) worked in “family assistance”. 
 
Table 4 – Active population by status in employment and gender (Morocco, 1960) 
 
 Female Male Total 
Employers 0.1% 4.4% 4.5% 
Independent 1.6% 23.6% 25.1% 
Waged, private 
sector 
2.5% 16.6% 19.2% 
Waged, public 
sector 
0.2% 3.8% 3.9% 
Waged, 
undefined sector 
0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 
Family 
assistance 
30.9% 8.7% 39.6% 
Undefined 0.3% 7.2% 7.4% 
Total 35.6% 64.4% 100.0% 
Calculated by the author based on Royaume du Maroc 1961. 
 
 This data shows that the bulk of the “Muslim” Moroccan working-class was 
composed of unwaged rural peasants. As Rémy Leveau’s classic work Le Fellah 
                                                 
66 The census presents separate data for foreigners and for Moroccan “Jews”. At the time, the non-
“Muslim” population (foreigners and Moroccan “Jews”) constituted 4.8% of the total population. All 
percentages presented here were calculated by the author based on Royaume du Maroc 1961. 
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marocain: Défenseur du trône (1985) argued, most of the peasantry was under the 
hegemony of the rural elites allied to the Palace. While UMT membership was also 
open to unwaged workers, the employment conditions of peasants made their 
unionisation unlikely (Waterbury 1970, p. 198). Therefore, since its beginnings, the 
UMT struggled with the narrowness of the relatively secure fraction of the working 
class – mainly located in public administration, transport, mining, and manufacturing 
(Ben Seddik 1990, pp. 517-8) – within the general technical composition of the 
Moroccan working class. 
 The years following independence were characterised by a power struggle for 
the control of the state between the Palace and the National Movement (see Monjib 
1992). At first, the latter – under Mehdi Ben Barka’s direction – seemed bound to 
establish a single-party populist regime, with the monarch reduced to a symbolic role. 
However, the outcomes of the post-independence struggles in Morocco diverged 
markedly from the Tunisian case. Contributing to this was the fact that Mohammed V 
retained much popularity thanks to his opposition to the protectorate, while Moroccan 
labour organisation was more recent than its Tunisian counterpart and thus more 
fragile. 
 To counter the National Movement, Mohammed V established an alliance with 
the very social coalition that had contributed to his ousting. As Leveau summarises: 
 
Independence was obtained by a coalition gathering, behind the Istiqlal, 
the King, the urban bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the working class, 
against a colonial regime based on rural and religious elites. As an 
inheritance from the protectorate, the Istiqlal controlled, at the beginning, 
the administration […]. But the Istiqlal’s mistakes eventually prompted 
the rural elites – who were threatened by the end of the colonial regime – 
and the peasantry – worried about the effects of the modernisation process 
clumsily started by the administration – to support the monarch.67 (Leveau 
1985, p. 72) 
 
 The struggle between the Palace and the National Movement was accompanied 
by a parallel struggle within the National Movement itself, between its conservative 
                                                 
67 Translated from French by the author. 
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and its progressive wings. The former was represented by the Istiqlal’s old guard and 
its business networks (Waterbury 1970, pp. 169-95), while the latter was constituted 
by a coalition of the Istiqlal’s left-wing, the UMT, and sections of the resistance (Ibid., 
pp. 196-216). 
 After the Istiqlal SG Ahmed Balafrej – discredited by the mounting peasant 
uprising in the Rif – resigned from his post as PM on 3 December 1958,68 Mohammed 
V charged Abdallah Ibrahim – an Istiqlal leftist with close ties to the UMT – with 
forming a new government (Monjib 1992, pp. 137-55). In the meantime, the 
disagreements between the Istiqlal Left and Right finally split the party. Its progressive 
wing created the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) on 6 September 
1959. The UMT followed the UNFP in the split, with the union leaders also having a 
seat in the UNFP NEC (Menouni 1979, p. 420). This prompted the Istiqlal to create 
its own smaller trade union, the Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc (UGTM), 
officially founded on 20 March 1960. This marked the early beginnings of trade union 
pluralism in Morocco. The UMT opposed the recognition of the UGTM with a general 
strike, but the regime did not bend. 
 On 23 May 1960, Mohammed V dismissed the Ibrahim government and took 
direct leadership of the executive. The Istiqlal entered the royal government, 
definitively signalling its capitulation – and that of the urban bourgeoisie it represented 
– to the rural bloc led by the monarchy,69 accepting the position of junior partner in 
this conservative social coalition. On 26 February 1961, Mohammed V died and his 
son Hassan II – the arch-enemy of the Moroccan Left – succeeded to the throne 
(Monjib 1992, pp. 227-40). 
 With the fall of the Ibrahim government, the possibility of a Tunisian-style 
corporatist state-party-union architecture was over: 
 
                                                 
68 The PM was also discredited by his lack of actual power, as the King retained de facto control over 
the police and the army. An important feature of Moroccan politics is that semi-informal authoritarian 
institutions (collectively referred to as the “Makhzen”) have often more relevance than more formal and 
democratic ones. For example, the Royal Cabinet – a sort of “shadow government” composed of the 
King’s advisers – can still be said to be more influential than the official government itself (see 
Vermeren 2009, pp. 60-71). 
69 The Moroccan leftist intellectuals Abraham Serfaty and Abdellah Elharrif divided large landowners 
into two class fractions, “semi-feudal” landlords emanating from the caïdal system and capitalist 
landowners. They argued that, during the 1960s, capitalist landowners became the hegemonic fraction 
of the ruling bloc, thanks to their purchasing of colonial lands from departing Europeans and to the 
expansion of capitalist relations in the countryside (Majid 1987). 
 90
The majority of the strikes staged in Morocco in 1960 (starting in May) 
and 1961 had a thinly disguised political character […] against the 
abandonment of the social policy of the Ibrahim government but 
especially against the recognition of a rival union that would end the semi-
official status of the UMT.70 (Belaïd 1989, pp. 198-9) 
 
 The most remarkable labour mobilisations of the time were the late 1960 and 
July 1961 miners’ strikes (Majid 1987), which resulted in the promulgation and 
application of the Statute of the Miners (Dahir 1-60-007 of 24 December 1960). Yet 
the defeat of the Ibrahim government created a new crisis in the National Movement 
– this time within the progressive wing itself – between the leadership of the UMT and 
that of the UNFP. The UMT SG Mahjoub Ben Seddik, in fact, took an increasingly 
compromising stance towards the Palace. He was, however, challenged by the public 
administration federations loyal to the UNFP, most notably in teaching and Postal, 
Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) (see Benhlal 1985). Ben Seddik and his associates 
were able to maintain control of most unionised industries and several state agencies. 
However, this came at the cost of the dissolution, in the early 1960s, of the national 
multi-employer industrial federations (Majid 1987). The workplace unions of most 
private sector firms could thus only rely on the local and regional unions for 
coordination purposes (Menouni 1979, p. 170). 
 The UMT public administration federation called a general strike for 19 June 
1961, but the UMT NEC refused to back it and the strike was cancelled at the last 
minute (Waterbury 1970, pp. 220-1). The PTT federation reiterated the call for a public 
administration general strike to be held on 20 December 1961. This time, with UNFP’s 
support, the strike took place, but the postmen were only joined by a few public sector 
structures, while the UMT NEC directed its efforts at moderating the unrest (Ibid., pp. 
221-2). 
 The UNFP 2nd Congress held on 25-27 May 1962 was marked by a struggle 
between party and union leaderships. Ben Barka – advocating a “revolutionary option 
in Morocco” – called for the submission of the union to the political strategy of the 
party (Ben Barka 1966), while Ben Seddik defended the autonomy of the UMT. The 
quarrels between the UMT and the UNFP became manifest through their divergent 
                                                 
70 Translated from French by the author. 
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positions on the 7 December 1962 constitutional referendum and the first post-
independence parliamentary elections that took place on 17 May 1963 (Moore 1970, 
pp. 186-7).  
 With the approval of the new authoritarian constitution and the electoral 
“win”71 by the monarchist Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles, 
the Palace formalised its victory over the National Movement. As such, Hassan II 
gained the confidence to crack down on the “disloyal opposition”. On 16 July 1963, 
he proceeded to arrest around one hundred UNFP cadres on the grounds of plotting 
against his life (Daoud 2007, pp. 84-6). The raid on the UNFP leadership was followed 
by around 5,000 arrests in the leftist milieus and many forced disappearances 
(Vermeren 2002, pp. 36-8). In a memoir written from prison, the UNFP cadre and 
UMT PTT federation activist Omar Benjelloun accused Ben Seddik of colluding with 
the regime despite his radical rhetoric; the UMT’s passivity in the “conspiracy affair” 
being the culmination of a longstanding entente between the top union leaders and the 
Palace (Benjelloun 2002-03). 
 The conservative wing of the National Movement was thus co-opted, while the 
progressive wing was repressed or marginalised. Yet Hassan II’s political masterpiece 
was not as perfect as it seemed. On 23 March 1965, a demonstration of high school 
students in Casablanca turned into a riot as precarious workers joined the protest. 
Despite the intervention of the army, it took two days of bloodshed to quash the unrest. 
In June 1965, Hassan II declared a state of emergency. On 29 October 1965, Ben Barka 
was kidnapped and assassinated in Paris. The UMT called a general strike for 12-13 
November 1965, demanding an end to the state of emergency and the formation of a 
new government (Waterbury 1970, pp. 227-8). Clement Moore holds that the strike 
was called “ostensibly in reaction to the kidnapping but actually as a show of strength 
against the UNFP Ben Barkists” (Moore 1970, p. 188). 
 Under the thoroughly repressive conditions of the state of emergency, the 
Palace was less in need of the acquiescence of the UMT leadership, whose base had 
been weakening since independence. On 7 July 1967, Ben Seddik himself was arrested 
for criticising the regime’s foreign policy in the wake of the Six-Day War. Tens of 
trade unionists were also arrested in the following days (Menouni 1979, p. 403). The 
UMT called a general strike for 12 July 1967 – once again to no avail. The UMT SG 
                                                 
71 The elections were in fact rigged (Storm 2007, p. 24). 
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was only released after 18 months. 
 The regime that emerged from these struggles was built upon a conservative 
social basis composed of the rural elites, the peasants under their hegemony, and the 
urban bourgeoisie in a subordinate position.72 Additionally, European capital remained 
in control of the commanding heights of the economy (Clement 1986, pp. 15-6). 
Substantial inducements to the working class were thus limited. The regime was also 
authoritarian, in that the Palace did not hesitate to harshly repress any real opposition 
and rig elections (see Storm 2007) to unilaterally control the key institutions of the 
state. Unlike Tunisia, however, the regime allowed party and trade union pluralism, 
relying on divide-and-conquer tactics to marginalise or co-opt rivals. 
 To this day, substantial inducements to the working class are lower in 
Morocco than in Tunisia. The Ibrahim government had adopted a typical populist five-
year plan that was based upon heavy industry via protectionism, land reform, and an 
expansion of welfare (Monjib 1992, pp. 145-55). This policy was, however, rapidly 
reversed when the King took over the government. As Leveau notes, the abandonment 
of developmentalism was politically motivated and linked to the social bases of the 
new regime: 
 
Very quickly, the evolution of the situation made [the Palace] fear that it 
would lose the support of the local elites before having managed to attract 
other social groups that might have encouraged these reforms, but without 
accepting a continuing active role on the part of the monarchy. […] These 
fears accentuated the conservative aspects of his [Hassan II’s] policy…73 
(Leveau 1985, p. 10) 
 
 In continuity with the policies of the protectorate, most state efforts focused on 
encouraging private agriculture for export through the construction of high dams and 
the expansion of irrigation, which – coupled with increasing land ownership 
concentration – reinforced the power of the economic elite that gradually took over 
most of the formerly foreign-owned lands (Swearingen 1988, pp. 179-85). 
 In the first four years of independence, important social legislation was 
                                                 
72 As Khalid Alioua put it: “After Independence the Moroccan state ruled the cities through the 
countryside” (Alioua 1990, p. 87). 
73 Translated from French by the author. 
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approved74 but the defeat of the National Movement meant that the promulgation of 
the Labour Code – a key demand of the UMT – was indefinitely postponed, while the 
application of the existing legislation remained highly incomplete. 
 Concerning job security, the royal decrees of 14 August 1967 regulated layoffs 
in the private sector.75 They stated that mass layoffs had to be authorised by a 
commission presided over by the governor, unless the concerned workers were hired 
temporarily or replaced within eight days. This confirmed the legal recognition of 
temporary contracts and it also meant that mass layoffs did not require authorisation 
if the dismissed workers were replaced (Bouharrou 1997, p. 47), which left room for 
the disposal of militant workers or simply workers with higher seniority benefits. 
Finally, unlike in Tunisia (Labour Code 1966, Art. 391), the legal text did not include 
workers’ representatives in the mandatory composition of the layoff commissions. 
 While data on real wages are not available for this period, the government 
raised the nominal legal minimum wage in 1959 and 1962 in an attempt to keep its 
value in line with rising prices. However, the minimum wage subsequently remained 
frozen until 1970, despite increases in the cost of living (Menouni 1979, p. 324). 
 The post-independence phase featured a rapid expansion of the public 
administration, which rose from 68,000 employees in 1955 to 256,775 employees in 
1971 (Ibid., p. 91), that is 17% of the waged employed population. However, Tunisia’s 
public sector as a whole (the public administration plus the SOEs) likely employed a 
higher share of the workforce in the 1960s due to the high number of SOEs created 
under Ben Salah’s government (see Chapter 4). 
 According to experts (Catusse 2010; El Said and Harrigan 2014), the 
Moroccan welfare state and public sector were always more limited compared to 
Tunisia. On 29 March 1965, in the aftermath of the Casablanca riots, Hassan II 
famously declared against intellectuals: “It would have been better if you had been all 
illiterates”76 (quoted in Rollinde 2002, p. 123). This declaration is significant in light 
of the fact that, to this day, Morocco has the worst human development and educational 
indicators in North Africa (UNDP 2016). 
 Organisational inducements to trade union officials were moderate but 
                                                 
74 Including dahir 1-56-093 of 8 July 1957 on workplace health, dahir 1-57-182 of 9 April 1958 on the 
rights of agricultural labourers, dahir 1-59-352 of 31 October 1959 indexing wages to prices, and dahir 
1-59-148 of 31 December 1959 on social security. 
75 Royal decrees 314-66, 315-66, 316-66, 317-66, 319-66 of 14 August 1967. 
76 Translated from French by the author. 
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significant. The main difference with Tunisia was that the Moroccan state – after 
initially encouraging a single-trade union system as a concession to the National 
Movement – recognised trade union pluralism in 1960.77 Along with the Istiqlal-linked 
UGTM, other political parties – such as the monarchist Amazigh-based Union 
Constitutionnelle (UC) – created their own trade unions, although the latter remained 
largely irrelevant (Moore 1970, p. 184). This abolished the UMT’s monopoly of 
workers’ representation and thus ended the semi-official status to which the first 
Moroccan labour confederation had aspired. 
 Trade union and party pluralism ruled out the possibility of a triangular state-
party-union architecture of the Tunisian kind. In Morocco’s post-independence phase, 
top UMT leaders were also members of the political bureau of the Istiqlal and, after 
the split, of the UNFP (Menouni 1979, pp. 415-27). Yet with the political 
marginalisation of the UNFP and the deterioration of UMT-UNFP relations, this 
overlapping of union-party memberships did not lead to the same influence on and 
within the state that characterised the UGTT-Neo-Destour combination. 
 During the first years of independence, the government created several 
tripartite institutions78 to incorporate the UMT into policy-making but, under Hassan 
II, these bodies became inactive (see Bouharrou 1997, p. 82; Menouni 1979, p. 400). 
The UMT, just like the Istiqlal, had ten representatives in the Consultative Assembly 
that were appointed by Mohammed V in 1956. Later, workers’ representatives selected 
through the professional elections (see below) were given five seats in the Chamber 
of Councillors – the higher chamber of the Parliament that first convened in 1963. The 
Chamber of Councillors was, however, suspended during the state of emergency that 
was declared in 1965. The decay of tripartite institutions and parliamentary 
representation meant that the UMT’s weak incorporation happened chiefly through 
informal channels, particularly irregular public consultations with the monarch in 
times of crisis and private communications between the top union leadership, 
especially the UMT vice-SG Mohammed Abderrazak,79 and the Royal Cabinet (Moore 
                                                 
77 As formalised by decree 2-60-499 of 8 October 1960 ending the governmental right to veto new trade 
unions that had been stated by decree 2-57-0571 of 17 July 1957 on trade unions. 
78 Including the Higher Council of the Plan, the Higher Council of Collective Agreements, the 
Consultative Council of Labour Health, the Central Commission of Prices and Wages, the Higher 
Council of the Public Administration, the national and local Workforce Commissions, and the local 
Joint Commissions for the Supervision of Employment Agencies. 
79 Abderrazak was the SG of the UMT electricity federation. In 1956, he had been co-opted into the 
UMT NEC and in 1958 he had substituted Ben Seddik’s rival Ben Bouazza as vice-SG (Ayache 1998, 
p. 28). As we will see, he will be implicated in the UMT’s most notorious corruption scandals. 
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1970, pp. 187-90; Waterbury 1970, p. 222). 
 The state, however, still influenced the trade unions by including them in some 
bipartite and tripartite institutions, funding them in various ways, and providing formal 
and informal advantages to trade union officials. Trade union representatives, in fact, 
were present on the executive boards of the national pension funds – most importantly 
the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) – and smaller insurance funds (the 
“caisses mutuelles”) and managed firm-level welfare bodies (the “comités d’œuvres 
sociales”). This provided trade unionists with access to resources that they sometimes 
administered in a clientelist and even plainly corrupt manner, as later scandals would 
reveal (see France Libertés 2011; La vie éco, 24 June 2005). Additionally, as in 
Tunisia, the unions gained the right to manage hiring in some sectors, e.g. the ports 
(Ben Seddik 1990, p. 571) and several trade unionists were individually appointed to 
managerial positions in state agencies (Menouni 1979, pp. 400-1). 
 In his memoir, Benjelloun mentions direct funding from the state (central and 
local) to the UMT in the early years of independence (Benjelloun 2002-03). Moreover, 
many UMT buildings were former French administrative buildings that the state had 
conceded to the union.80 There was no check-off system for membership fees in the 
public sector like in Tunisia,81 but the state put in place a system of union secondments 
in which – similar to Tunisia – the employer, most often the state, continued to pay the 
wage for full-time union officials (see dahir 1-58-008 of 24 February 1958, Art. 48 
bis). 
 Concerning the informal advantages of the time, Benjelloun (2002-03) held 
that the central leadership used various forms of clientelism and corruption – including 
the manipulation of secondments, union dues, external funding, and relationships to 
the powerful – to create a network of loyal cadres.82 According to some observers, the 
regime’s threat to suspend all organisational inducements if the UMT followed the 
UNFP in its challenge against the Palace was an important factor in the distancing of 
the union from the party (Benjelloun 2002-03; Menouni 1979, pp. 387-9; Moore 1970, 
                                                 
80 This explains the fact that up to today the UMT is the best equipped confederation in terms of office 
space. 
81 An exception was the Office National d’Électricité (ONE) – the state-owned electricity provider – 
where Mohammed Abderrazak had negotiated an automatic check-off scheme for the UMT. 
82 The diffusion of these practices was aggravated by the fact that the UMT passed very rapidly from 
being a small clandestine network to a mass semi-official organisation. The urgent need for cadres 
meant that many of the new arrivals did not have a history of labour militancy and were thus more 
prone to unprincipled behaviour (Benjelloun 2002-03). 
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pp. 185-90). 
 The most important constraints were state protection for the lack of internal 
union democracy, the direct repression of political dissidents, and the limitation of 
collective bargaining, workplace organisation, and the right to strike. 
 As Ayache writes, the UMT was run on a very centralised and hierarchical 
basis:  
 
The NEC, in fact the national SG, could intervene to cancel an election or 
dissolve a committee, to impede a strike or conversely to accompany it 
and intervene in its settlement.83 (Ayache 1993, p. 201) 
 
 Like the UGTT, the UMT had a body of union stewards colloquially known as 
“the militia” (Ben Seddik 1990, p. 524) that could be used to repress internal dissent.84 
According to Benjelloun (2002-03), Mahjoub Ben Seddik directed the UMT through 
a patron-client network of loyalists that operated effectively to hinder internal debate 
and the election of dissident leaders. Ben Seddik’s associates would use the 
manipulation of secondments and financial resources, workplace transfers or layoffs 
– in coordination with management – of dissident unionists, membership freezes, the 
dissolution of elected ECs, and plain – and at times violent – harassment of 
dissidents.85 For example, Benjelloun himself was kidnapped, held in a cellar, and 
severely mistreated by members of the UMT “militia” while trying to attend the 3rd 
UMT Congress in January 1963 as a delegate (Benjelloun 2010). After the 3rd 
Congress, the UMT leadership dissolved the PTT federation (dominated by the Left) 
and expelled several leftist cadres (Monjib 1992, pp. 288-9). These testimonies 
regarding the lack of internal democracy appear to be credible given Ben Seddik’s 
record 55-year tenure as UMT SG.86 
 In contrast to the case of the UGTT, the regime did not need to directly 
intervene to attempt to impose a pliant leadership upon the UMT. Rather, the regime 
could rely upon Ben Seddik to prevent the rise of more radical or ambitious SGs. 
                                                 
83 Translated from French by the author. 
84 Fouad Ben Seddik also talks of some sort of internal “secret police” (Ibidem). 
85 Waterbury adds clientelist hiring practices (Waterbury 1970, p. 229). 
86 The institutional mechanism to legitimise the reproduction of the leadership was the Commission for 
Candidatures, which compiled the list of the new NEC members and then proposed it to the Congress. 
According to Menouni (1979, p. 148), the preferences of the incumbent NEC went unchallenged in the 
Commission for Candidatures, and the Congress was a mere means to ratify them. 
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However, as Abdeltif Menouni esteemed, the broader state repression of political 
dissent and social unrest was a necessary condition for the stifling of internal union 
democracy: 
 
[T]he Moroccan regime, constraining the actions of the trade unions first 
by pulling them apart from the UNFP and the Resistance and then by 
opposing energetically the escalation of demands [from the base], 
intervened in the selection of the leadership.87 (Menouni 1979, p. 408) 
 
 Leaders and militants on the Moroccan Left were subject to several waves of 
arrests, systematic torture, and forced disappearances (see Vairel 2014), while the 
regime violently quashed the 1958-59 Rif uprising and the 1965 Casablanca riots. This 
had the effect of weakening the UMT Left – stifling its efforts to challenge Ben 
Seddik’s domination of the organisation. The state sometimes also intervened 
violently and directly in union affairs. For example, on 20 December 1961, during the 
PTT strike, Benjelloun was kidnapped and tortured (Benjelloun 2010). 
 In respect to limitations on labour rights, dahir 1-57-119 of 16 July 1957 on 
trade unions did not contain provisions for the protection of workplace unions 
(Bouharrou 2007, pp. 36-9). However, a legal framework for consultative firm-level 
workers’ representation, through workplace professional elections, was established.88 
Professional elections were meant to serve as the basis for the selection of workers’ 
representatives in the Chamber of Councillors. The dahirs granted protections for 
workers’ delegates against abusive layoffs, as well as paid time for representational 
work, and meeting and communicational spaces. The trade unions could present their 
candidates at professional elections, but – given the political marginalisation of trade 
unionism and the absence of legal protections for workplace unions – the 
institutionalisation of workers’ delegates meant that union representation was 
overshadowed by non-union representation (see Bouharrou interviewed in La vie éco, 
19 October 2012). 
 Dahir 1-57-067 of 17 April 1957 on collective bargaining established a legal 
framework for collective agreements on a national, local, or firm level, while dahir 1-
                                                 
87 Translated from French by the author. 
88 See Decree 2-59-0200 of 5 May 1959; dahir 1-61-116 of 29 October 1962; decree 2-63-164 of 14 
November 1963. 
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58-145 of 29 November 1960 established the Higher Council of Collective 
Agreements, charged of encouraging collective bargaining. In the early years of 
independence, over one hundred collective agreements were signed (Meknassi and 
Rioux 2010, p. 9). However, analogously to the bipartite and tripartite corporative 
bodies, collective bargaining was abandoned in the 1960s.89 
 As opposed to Tunisian corporatism, the UMT did call political general strikes 
in 1958,90 1960, 1965, and 1967. The right to strike was granted by the 1962 
Constitution, which stated that an organic law would specify the conditions for a strike 
to be legal. However, such law was never promulgated, which means that workers can 
effectively strike without being victimised only where there is a favourable balance of 
power on the ground. Moreover, some legal norms severely restrained the 
constitutional right to strike. Dahir 1-57-119 of 16 July 1957 on trade unions 
established that they could only defend the economic interests of their members, which 
was used to justify the layoffs that followed the 1965 and the 1967 general strikes 
(Menouni 1979, p. 250). Decree 2-57-1465 of 5 February 1958, on the trade union 
rights of public administration employees, stated: “For all employees, any organised 
suspension of work, any collective act of indiscipline, can be punished without 
disciplinary guarantees” (Art. 5).91 Ahmed Bouharrou comments that: “It seems that, 
on a strictly juridical level, any collective action organised as a strike or under other 
forms is inacceptable [for public administration employees]”92 (Bouharrou 2007, p. 
35).93 Finally, Article 288 of the 1962 version of the Penal Code criminalised 
“anybody who, using violence, assaults, threats, or fraud, tries to carry out or maintain 
an organised suspension of work, with the aim of raising or lowering wages, or 
undermining the right to manage a business or the right to work” (dahir 1-59-413 of 
26 November 1962, Art. 288).94 The revision of Article 288 of the Penal Code is still 
a traditional demand of Moroccan labour, since the trade unions complain that it is 
                                                 
89 Only a dozen collective agreements – all at firm level – were signed between the early 1960s and the 
late 1990s, and the frequent – and weaker – substitutes were non-binding accords between the employer 
and the workers’ delegates (Ibidem). 
90 The official motivation of the first post-independence general strike was a simple mass layoff in 
Rabat, but it was most probably an attempt by Ben Seddik to oppose the Istiqlal Right’s choice to form 
the Balafrej government (Monjib 1992, pp. 120-1). 
91 Translated from French by the author. 
92 Translated from French by the author. 
93 For example, when 200 public employees went on strike on 20 December 1961, 168 were dismissed 
and they were reintegrated only one year later (Waterbury 1970, p. 222). 
94 Translated from French by the author. 
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often improperly used to criminalise the constitutional right to strike.95 
To summarise, between 1956 and 1960 the Left of the National Movement 
gained a series of organisational inducements for the UMT and started a process that 
aimed to provide significant substantial inducements to the working class. However, 
as the conservative social coalition led by the Palace gained increasingly secure 
control of the state, inducements of both kinds were de jure or de facto rolled back 
and constraints increased. While substantial inducements remained low compared to 
the North African republics, organisational inducements stabilised at a moderate level, 
which marginalised the unions politically but still meant that they remained sensitive 
to the threat of the withdrawal of state-sponsored advantages. 
 
3.3 The Transitional Period: The Years of Lead 
This section presents the cycle of struggle that constituted the transitional period 
between the post-independence phase and the neoliberal phase. This moment in 
Moroccan history is known as the “Years of Lead” because systematic political 
imprisonment, torture, and forced disappearances on the part of the regime reached 
new heights (see Vairel 2014). While in Tunisia the radicalisation of the student 
movement and the mounting strike wave pressured the UGTT leadership to 
temporarily take a more radical stance towards the regime (see Chapter 4), in Morocco 
the UMT leadership remained impermeable to pressures from below, which resulted 
in the further fragmentation and weakening of organised labour. 
In the early 1970s, political authoritarianism and conservatism in economic 
policy imperilled the stability of the regime. With the marginalisation of the 
progressive opposition and the suppression of broader social mobilisations, the most 
dangerous threats came from within, as manifested by the military coup attempts of 
10 July 1971 and 16 August 1972.96 
The monarchy responded to these threats by trying to imitate, to a limited 
extent, the nationalist policies that many Global South countries had adopted after 
independence. This was encouraged by the 1973 spike in phosphate prices – the 
                                                 
95 On top of these pieces of legislation, the 19 January 1946 dahir on labour conflicts, mandating 
conciliation and arbitration before a strike, remained valid, but the institutions it had established became 
inactive (Bouharrou 1997, p. 61) and it was never effectively applied after independence (Menouni 
1979, p. 250). 
96 It is likely that some UNFP leaders had been informed about the plans for the latter coup (Bennouna 
2002, pp. 193-9). 
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phosphate industry was Morocco’s main earner of hard currency and a direct source 
of income for the state.97 In the same year, the government decided to expropriate 
foreign-owned colonial lands. Yet, as Swearingen notes, 40% of colonial lands had 
already been sold by their European owners to the Moroccan elite between 1956 and 
1973, 24% remained state-managed,98 and only 36% was redistributed (Swearingen 
1988, p. 180; see also Doumou 1990). Dahir 1-73-210 of 2 March 1973 provided for 
the “Moroccanisation” of the economy, mandating that all major firms had to be at 
least 51% Moroccan owned. This was an opportunity for the country’s economic elite 
to diversify its assets from agriculture and trade into industry and services through 
family-owned holdings (see Berrada and Saadi 1992). In 1982, Morocco’s largest 
investment holding – the Omnium Nord-Africain (ONA) – passed from French to royal 
control (Clement 1986, p. 17). 
 
Table 5 – Employment by economic sector and milieu (Morocco, 1982) 
 
 Urban Rural Total 
Primary 1.7% 40.2% 41.9% 
Secondary 16.7% 8.1% 24.7% 
Tertiary 22.5% 6.8% 29.3% 
Undefined 2.0% 2.0% 4.0% 
Total 42.9% 57.1% 100% 
Calculated by the author based on Royaume du Maroc 1984. 
 
Table 6 – Active population by status in employment and gender (Morocco, 1982) 
 
 Male Female Total 
Employers 1.9% 0.1% 2% 
Independent 22.3% 2.8% 25.1% 
Waged 33.4% 7.1% 40.5% 
Family assistance 12.2% 5.4% 17.6% 
Apprentices and 
undefined 
1.9% 2.2% 4.1% 
Unemployed 8.6% 2.1% 10.7% 
Total 80.3% 19.7% 100% 
Calculated by the author based on Royaume du Maroc 1984. 
 
These policies significantly transformed the Moroccan working-class 
composition. Census data show that, between 1960 (see Table 3, p. 87) and 1982 (see 
                                                 
97 Until today, the mines are state-owned through the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP). 
98 However, much of it would later fall into the hands of the elite with the gradual privatisation of the 
agricultural SOEs (Ibidem). 
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Table 5, p. 100), the share of the urban employed population more than doubled, the 
share of primary sector employment almost halved, and the share of industrial 
employment tripled. In the same period, the share of waged employment increased 
from 23.3% of the active population (see Table 4, p. 87) to 40.5% (see Table 6, p. 
100). 
However, the share of agricultural employment in Morocco remained 
significantly higher than in Tunisia (see Table 7, p. 141), reducing the potential 
recruitment pool for the Moroccan labour movement. 
Dissent within the military was not the only headache for the monarchy. In 
fact, the global cycle of struggle of the 1970s affected the Maghreb too. As in Tunisia, 
the transitional period in Morocco was characterised by a new strike wave and by the 
leftwards radicalisation of the student movement. The two main New Left groups were 
the Mouvement 23 Mars (founded in 1968) and Ila Al-Amam (“Forward”, founded in 
1970), which mainly emerged from the UNFP and the ex-PCM respectively. At the 
15th Congress of the student union Union Nationale des Étudiants du Maroc (UNEM), 
held in 1972, the radical tendencies won the leadership of the organisation at the 
expense of the UNFP,99 which eventually led to the banning of the UNEM on 24 
January 1973 (Vermeren 2002, pp. 61-2). 
On 3 March 1973, the Tanzim, a radical UNFP group led by elements of the 
old resistance, attempted an armed rising in the Middle Atlas. The failure of the 
insurrection resulted in new arrests. After several student mobilisations and strikes, 
the state rehabilitated the UNEM on 9 November 1978. However, the continuing 
arrests of student activists and the militarisation of university life made sure that – 
after the 17th Congress of 1981 – the 18th Congress never took place (UECSE 2014). 
To this day, the UNEM survives as a network of student tendencies with no national 
structures. 
Both Tunisia and Morocco experienced a strike wave in the mid-1950s, 
corresponding with independence and its immediate aftermath. Labour unrest then 
declined in the 1960s, although Morocco maintained a higher level of strikes relative 
to corporatist Tunisia (Belaïd 1989, pp. 198-204). The first signal of a renaissance of 
labour mobilisations came in September 1968, with the 7,000 strong, two-month long 
                                                 
99 On 2 August 1972, Abdelaziz Menebhi and Abdelwahed Belkabir – the newly elected President and 
Vice-President of the UNEM – were arrested (UECSE 2014). The mobilisations for their liberation 
prompted a wave of expulsions and arrests of militant students. 
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strike of the Khouribga miners (Majid 1987). Morocco’s new strike wave (see Ben 
Seddik 1986) started in 1971, spiked first in 1972 and then again in 1976 (see Graph 
1, p. 102). 
The main demands put forward by the workers concerned the defence of wage 
levels against inflation and opposition to layoffs (Belaïd 1989, p. 211). The most 
important centres of labour militancy were the mines – particularly the state-owned 
Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP) in Khouribga – and the industrial estates 
surrounding Casablanca, such as Mohammedia’s state-owned refinery Société 
Anonyme Marocaine de l’Industrie et du Raffinage (SAMIR). The transport sector 
also witnessed notable strikes (Abouhani 1995, p. 168). In 1971, the Khouribga miners 
waged a new two-month strike that ended in victory, despite the withdrawal of support 
by the UMT NEC (Majid 1987). In the private sector, the most prominent were the 
textile workers, since textiles had become the country’s main manufacturing industry 
(Daoud 1980, p. 77). Similar to Tunisia, public administration workers also mobilised 
en masse, particularly in teaching, health, and PTT (Benhlal 1985). 
 
Graph 1 – Strike activity in Morocco, 1961-1983 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on ILO data. 
 
Moroccan workers, however, were likely less unionised than their Tunisian 
counterparts. While the UGTT claimed between 400,000 and 500,000 members in 
1977-76, the UMT had between 250,000 and 300,000 members in the 1970s (Belaïd 
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between 45% and 56% for Tunisia,100 and at around between 15% and 20% for 
Morocco.101 
The severity of state repression prevented the New Left, which originated from 
the universities, from building an important presence in the UMT.102 In 1972, most 
leaders of Ila Al-Amam, the Mouvement 23 Mars, and Servir le Peuple were arrested 
and condemned to lengthy prison sentences (Daoud 2007, pp. 171-2). The Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP),103 however, maintained a solid and 
dissenting presence in the union, especially in the public administration federations. 
Yet Ben Seddik and his associates proved to be quite impermeable to pressures from 
below. The only general strike of the decade was the 1978 strike against Sadat’s visit 
to Israel (Ben Seddik 1986, p. 159) – a relatively innocuous demand in Moroccan 
politics. Faced with the UMT’s lack of initiative and internal democracy, the USFP 
gradually moved towards creating its own confederation (see Abouhani 1995, pp. 168-
9; Benhlal 1985, pp. 235-40).104 
In 1975, phosphate prices dropped suddenly, and the planned public 
investments had to be funded through external debt (Denoeux and Maghraoui 1998, 
p. 56). The short-lived experiment in nationalist economic policy came to an end in 
1978, when the government adopted an austere Three-Year Plan, which froze public 
administration wages, raised taxes, and reduced investment by 36% (White 2001, p. 
133). Large, inflation-fuelled strikes took place, most notably in teaching (the national 
sectorial strike of 11-12 April 1978), mining, transport, and the state-owned oil 
refinery SAMIR (Benhlal 1985, p. 237). The strikes led to the creation of new 
workplace unions, which on 25-26 November 1978 merged into a new confederation 
together with the USFP-linked structures of the UMT. The Confédération 
Démocratique du Travail (CDT) was thus created, with the primary school teacher 
                                                 
100 Estimated by the author using data from Belaïd 1989 and Ben Chaabane 2014. 
101 Estimated by the author using data from Belaïd 1989, Menouni 1979, and Royaume du Maroc 1984. 
102Interviews 19, 27. 
103 In 1972, the UNFP’s “Rabat faction” (led by Abderrahim Bouabid and other elements from the 
capital’s intellectual milieus) split from the “Casablanca faction” of the party (led by Abdallah Ibrahim 
and with close ties to the UMT leaders) to create the USFP. The USFP held its founding Congress in 
January 1975, cutting its ties with the armed groups led by Mohammed Basri. The post-1975 UNFP 
will lose its political importance to the USFP. 
104 This decision was reinforced by the assassination, on 18 December 1975, of Omar Benjelloun by a 
militant of the Chabiba Islamiyya (“Islamic Youth”), with the probable involvement of the Ministry of 
the Interior (Dalle 2004, pp. 435-42). The Chabiba Islamiyya, founded in 1970, was the main Islamist 
organisation in Morocco in the 1970s. 
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Noubir Amaoui as its SG (CDT 2013, p. 8).105 The CDT’s first major shows of force 
were the strike in solidarity with Palestine on 30 March 1979 and the national strike 
in the teaching and health sectors on 10-11 April 1979 (CDT 2013, pp. 12-3). 
Such class struggles pressured the government into abandoning its austerity 
plan in 1979 (Azam and Morrison 1994, p. 92). However, in 1980, Morocco negotiated 
a stabilisation plan with the IMF. On 28 May 1981, the government announced its 
intention to cut subsidies for basic consumption goods. On 15 June 1981, the CDT 
called for a general strike against the cuts, to be held on 20 June 1981, and asked the 
other labour confederations to join (see Benhlal 1985, pp. 239-42). The UMT and the 
UGTM refused, but – under pressure – the UMT regional union of Casablanca 
declared a regional general strike to be held on 18 June 1981. Similar to Tunisia’s 
Black Thursday, on the day of the CDT strike, precarious workers in Casablanca took 
to the streets and the demonstrations turned into riots. The police and the army fired 
upon the crowds, resulting in a high death toll. In the aftermath, a wave of arrests 
swept through leftist milieus and Casablanca’s working-class neighbourhoods. 
Hundreds of USFPists and CDTists were arrested, their offices closed, and their 
newspapers banned. The CDT SG Amaoui was imprisoned between June 1981 and 
November 1983 (CDT 2013, p. 38). 
The 1980 stabilisation plan was dropped in the aftermath of the 1981 general 
strike, but the government agreed a fresh structural adjustment programme with the 
IMF in 1983.106 In January 1984, large riots took place against the price hikes, this 
time without the involvement of any labour confederation. The unrest reached several 
regions of the country, with the biggest clashes taking place in the Rif, where 
numerous protesters were killed. Mass arrests followed, especially among students 
and the young (Daoud 2007, p. 273). After the riots, cuts to food subsidies were eased 
                                                 
105 The main point of doctrinal disagreement between the CDT and the UMT concerned the relation 
between economic and political demands, and thus between the trade union and the party (Interviews 
1, 4, 7, 43). The UMT defended the autonomy of trade unionism from partisan politics and de facto, 
since the 1960s, it prioritised economic demands over political ones. The CDT leaders held that the 
only way to satisfy the economic demands of the union members was by associating them to the broader 
popular classes in a political struggle, led by the party, for democracy at the national level and against 
imperialism at the international level. 
106 The new economic policies involved cuts in public spending, freezes on public sector wages and 
hiring, privatisations, the repeal of the “Moroccanisation” ownership law, reductions in property taxes, 
reductions in import and export duties, devaluation of the national currency, and the temporary 
suspension of agricultural taxes (Rhazaoui 1987). 
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but the government proceeded on the course of structural adjustment, completing the 
transition to the neoliberal phase. 
In Morocco’s transitional period, substantial inducements followed a quite 
similar trajectory to the Tunisian one (see Chapter 4), although they started from a 
lower position. When the crisis took a political form, the regime increased substantial 
inducements in order to garner consent. Yet as the crisis became economic in nature, 
pushing the state towards austerity, escalating constraints replaced substantial 
inducements. 
The 1973-77 Five-Year Plan expanded the public sector and public investment. 
By 1979, the state acquired ownership of 460 enterprises (not counting 118 
agricultural firms), achieving a majority ownership in 260 of them (Jouahri 1980, p. 
16). Between 1972 and 1977, public administration employment rapidly grew from 
268,000 to over 400,000 (Daoud 1980, p. 77). Although job security legislation did 
not change, this relative increase in public sector employment resulted in the extension 
of the associated job security to the new recruits. This expansion of secure 
employment in the public sector probably contributed to broadening the strike wave 
of the 1970s. In 1978, however, this expansive policy was halted and with the 1983 
structural adjustment plan Morocco committed itself to privatisation and austerity.107 
Data on wages for this period is still scant, but UNIDO figures on industrial sector 
wages indicate that the purchasing power of industrial workers fell dramatically in the 
early 1980s. Moreover, a survey on wages in medium and large enterprises carried out 
by the weekly magazine Jeune Afrique found that while in Tunisia high cadres earned 
on average four times as much as deskilled workers, in Morocco this proportion was 
11 to 1 (Jeune Afrique, 1 September 1983, p. 40).108 Finally, in 1975, only 14% of the 
Moroccan employed enjoyed social security coverage (Berrada and Saadi 1992, p. 
378). 
The organisational inducements to trade union officials analysed above were 
maintained without major changes. Although it is impossible to measure them, 
informal advantages to UMT officials in the form of corruption appeared to reach new 
heights, at least according to the account published by Hassan Bazwi (1993), an ex-
                                                 
107 Real government capital expenditure was halved between 1983 and 1986 and nominal public 
administration wages were frozen between 1981 and 1985 (El Said and Harrigan 2014, p. 109). 
108 The survey covered 500 enterprises for seven African countries and had a response rate of 20%. The 
results are therefore far from certain, but it is credible that wage dispersion was significantly higher in 
Morocco than in Tunisia, given the higher general inequality existing in the former. 
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member of the UMT NEC. Bazwi reported the existence of widespread corruption 
among union cadres and several episodes of private appropriation of large sums of 
union funds by Ben Seddik himself, in the absence of regulation by any financial 
commission (Ibid., pp. 161-3).109 
As seen above, the consultative tripartite bodies that had been established in 
the first years of independence had fallen into disuse. The Chamber of Councillors had 
been abolished by the 1970 Constitution, but – under the 1970 and 1972 Constitutions 
– the single chamber of the parliament included a number of seats reserved for 
representatives of the workers. The opposition, including the UMT, boycotted the 
1970 elections, and the parliament was suspended between 1971 and 1977. 
Nevertheless, the UMT achieved six seats out of eight in the 1977-1983 legislature. 
These seats did not give trade unionists real influence over public policy, but they 
were a source of patronage from the state, administered by the UMT leadership (Ibid., 
pp. 72-83). 
During this period, the UMT also maintained its hegemony over workers’ 
representation in the executive boards of the most important national pension funds, 
like the CNSS or the Mutuelle Générale de l’Éducation Nationale (MGEN) (Al-
Bayane, 30 October 1993). The UMT vice-SG Mohammed Abderrazak was the Vice-
President of the CNSS executive board and the President of the administrative 
committee in charge of monitoring the CNSS CEO (Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 26 May 
2004). Starting in 1975, the CNSS built 13 polyclinics, using the resources of the 
pension fund and operating under its management (see CNSS 2009, p. 34). Abderrazak 
was seen as the man behind this project (Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 9 December 2004). 
The CNSS also built 12,452 social housing units between 1984 and 1988 and provided 
a series of social services to its members (CNSS 2009, pp. 34-6). These projects 
allowed Abderrazak, among others, to use contracts for suppliers, hiring, and access 
to services in a clientelist manner, at the expense of the CNSS’s finances (Maroc 
hebdo, 19 March 2004a; Tel quel, 27 April 2018). 
In 1974, the tripartite Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la 
Promotion du Travail (OFPPT) was created. Similar to the firm-level welfare bodies 
and insurance funds (see Section 3.2), the OFPPT became a source of patronage for 
the UMT. According to an investigation by the Inspection Générale des Finances 
                                                 
109 See also Al-Massae, 23 February 2012, Appendix, pp. 304-9. 
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(IGF), until 2001, the OFPPT endowed firms with funding for professional training 
without any controls, which meant that part of the money went to fictitious enterprises 
or to enterprises that did not actually use it to carry out training programs for their 
workers (see Maroc hebdo, 7 May 2004). According to the report, the UMT was 
implicated in the misappropriation of such resources (Ibidem). In fact, the UMT was 
represented on the executive board of the OFPPT and – like the CNSS and the ONE – 
the OFPPT is a UMT stronghold. 
Constraints were notoriously high during this period. Hundreds of political 
militants and civilians were killed by state violence, either during the repression of 
demonstrations and riots or through forced disappearances and mistreatment in 
custody (see Vairel 2014). Torture and arbitrary arrests were used systematically. 
Opposition news outlets were repeatedly shut down. Political militants were often 
laid-off or discriminated against in public sector recruitment. The repression of 
political dissent and social unrest indirectly contributed to the stifling of trade union 
democracy, because it made it virtually impossible for critics of the incumbent 
leadership to organise an effective internal opposition. The UMT leadership 
maintained the undemocratic practices described above (see Bazwi 1993; Menouni 
1979, p. 148). Indeed, in 1975, John Waterbury likened the UMT leadership to a 
“sclerotic mandarinate” (Waterbury 1975, p. 263). 
Different from the UGTT’s usual adherence to basic internal regulations, the 
UMT was run in a highly informal manner. Strikingly, the UMT has never had an 
internal regulation to complement its statute. Electoral procedures and deadlines at all 
levels were grossly disregarded.110 Concerning informality, Bazwi claims that “[t]his 
way of managing the UMT was convenient in that it allowed M. Ben Seddik to be the 
master of the UMT. ‘Too much organisation harms’, he used to say” (Bazwi 1993, pp. 
65-6). In addition, for Ben Seddik, “[t]he UMT had to be neither strong nor weak, but 
in a middle ground adequate to maintain his material interests” (Ibid., p. 134). 
Very few collective agreements were signed during this period (Menouni 
1979, pp. 289-90), while the lack of legal protections for workplace unions continued 
to go unaddressed. The strike legislation did not change, which allowed the regime 
itself to victimise strikers on several occasions. The year 1979, in particular, was 
                                                 
110 For example, during the transitional period there were only two Congresses, one in 1972 and the 
other in 1979. 
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marked by mass layoffs and arrests of strikers (Bazwi 1993, p. 88).111 
Altogether, Morocco’s experiment with economic nationalism, with the 
increase in substantial inducements that this involved, was short-lived and did not 
fundamentally modify the market-oriented nature of the economy (see El Malki 1989) 
and the original social bases of the regime. The only significant change in the latter 
was a sectorial diversification of investment on the part of the economic elite. Industry, 
however, continued to remain relatively marginal, contributing to union weakness.112 
The expansion of the public sector was short-lived, as industrial unrest in this sector 
quickly prompted the state to restructure it. Organisational inducements, especially 
informal ones, were maintained at a level considerable enough to influence the trade 
unions, but during this period the systematic deployment of heavy constraints was key. 
 
3.4 The Neoliberal Phase: Semi-Authoritarian Conservative Pluralism 
The first years of Morocco’s neoliberal adjustment were not accompanied by a 
significant reconfiguration of labour institutions. As shown below, the pattern of union 
marginality punctuated by rioting continued with the 1990 general strike. During the 
1990s, however, the Palace triggered a limited political opening in order to respond to 
continuing unrest from below. This increased civil and political rights to some extent, 
while falling well short of democratisation. In the neoliberal phase, substantial 
inducements to the workers were partially retrenched, but some sectors of the welfare 
state probably increased more rapidly than in the post-independence phase. The most 
important innovation in organisational inducements – parallel to the political opening 
– was the incorporation of the trade unions into a system of consultative social 
dialogue. Constraints in the form of direct state repression decreased, but state 
tolerance for widespread and severe anti-union practices in the private sector 
remained. Overall, while working-class power remained relatively low, the regime 
partially accommodated struggles from below, creating a more flexible institutional 
system relative to the one that characterised the post-independence phase. 
In the late 1980s, with the liberation of many political prisoners, Ila Al-Amam 
militants started to build a left-wing opposition in the UMT.113 They chose to work 
                                                 
111 For example, after the national strike launched by the CDT in the teaching and health sectors on 11 
April 1979, more than 1,600 strikers were fired or suspended (Benhlal 1985, pp. 238-9). 
112 In 1977, while manufactured goods constituted 33.5% of Tunisia’s exports, they were an 
insignificant portion of Morocco’s (White 2001, p. 108). 
113 Interviews 7, 19, 24, 27, 30, 35. 
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within the UMT despite their obvious political distance from the leadership because 
Ila Al-Amam, following the Marxist-Leninist precept of workers’ unity, had been 
against the CDT split (see Majid 1987). 
The entry of the leftists was in part beneficial to Ben Seddik because it 
contributed to the UMT’s performances in the professional elections114 and boosted 
its negotiating power with the state and the employers, since the SG had the possibility 
of containing the UMT Left when necessary. A leader of the UMT Left said: 
 
In the 1980s the UMT really was an empty shell. Because at the time it 
was the CDT… what they called “the historical alternative”. But 
unfortunately the CDT became more bureaucratic than the bureaucracy. It 
was only after 1986 that Mahjoub Ben Seddik understood that without the 
Left he couldn’t do anything.115 (Interview 35) 
 
The leftists started with the reorganisation of the UMT’s Fédération Nationale 
du Secteur Agricole (UMT-FNSA), which had become inert during the Years of Lead 
(see Hakech 2013). These labour activists were civil servants in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and in agricultural SOEs, but their project was that of extending trade 
union organisation to the agricultural workers too.116 On 18 May 1991, the renewed 
UMT-FNSA 1st Congress elected Ila Al-Amam militant Abdelhamid Amin as SG. 
In 1995, numerous Ila Al-Amam militants joined the project of turning the 
clandestine group into a legal political party called Ennahj Eddimouqrati (The 
Democratic Path, usually referred to as Ennahj). The Nahjists were the backbone of 
the UMT Left, but to their Left there were also the Marxist-Leninists who had refused 
to join Ennahj (mostly known as the “basists”) and Al-Mounadil-a’s Trotskyists.117 
                                                 
114 The number of UMT labour representatives in parliament had declined from six out of eight in the 
1977-1983 legislature to five out of ten in the 1984-1992 legislature, and only three in the 1993-1997 
legislature. The CDT had achieved three representatives in 1984 and four in 1993, becoming the most 
represented union in parliament. 
115 All interviews were conducted in French and translated into English by the author. 
116 Interviews 24, 29, 35. 
117 The Moroccan Trotskyists that would create Al-Mounadil-a (Militant) started their activities in the 
1990s. In 2004, the journal Al-Mounadil-a appeared, and the group began to be known by this name. 
Al-Mounadil-a is also the largest group within the social movement organisation ATTAC Maroc. The 
hyphen in their name is a spelling device to avoid gender discrimination through language, as the 
spelling reflects both the masculine and feminine forms. 
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During the 1990s and the 2000s, the UMT Left expanded and consolidated its 
presence, particularly in the Fédération National de l’Enseignement (UMT-FNE), the 
Fédération Nationale des Ouvriers et Fonctionnaires des Collectivités Locales (UMT-
FNOFCL), and the Rabat-Salé-Témara regional union. 
The revival of the UMT-FNE began with its 1995 Congress and grew after a 
wave of defections from the CDT’s teaching federation in the early 2000s.118 
However, after 1995, the militants did not manage to hold a new Congress until 
2012.119 The UMT-FNOFCL, instead, grew out of the Moroccan movement of 
unemployed graduates,120 whose most important organisation is the leftist Association 
Nationale des Diplômés Chômeurs du Maroc (ANDCM). Since the early 1990s, the 
ANDCM managed to get many of its members hired by the local administrations. 
Many unemployed graduates with a background of activism in the ANDCM 
consequently organised in the UMT-FNOFCL. 
The emergence of the UMT Left developed in parallel to the crisis of the CDT, 
which reached its zenith in the 1990s but declined in the 2000s. On 14 December 1990, 
the CDT and the UGTM held a general strike with economic demands against the 
rising cost of living and political demands for democratisation (see Abouhani 1995, 
pp. 171-3). Once again, riots erupted. The most severe clashes took place in Fes, with 
over one hundred casualties of state repression. 
In April 1992, the CDT SG (and USFP Political Bureau member) Noubir 
Amaoui was sentenced to two years in prison for “insulting and defaming” the 
government. He would be released after 14 months of detention.121 The repression of 
the 1990 general strike and Amaoui’s arrest indicate that Morocco’s pattern of utterly 
repressive labour relations continued into the first decade of the neoliberal phase. 
However, in the mid-1990s, an aging Hassan II started to negotiate with the opposition 
to prepare for a smooth handing over of the throne to his son Mohammed. The USFP, 
                                                 
118 Interviews 3, 30, 42. 
119 This meant that UMT-FNE SG M’hmed Ghayour, born in 1920, remained in charge despite the 
mounting strength of the Left in the federation. The resistance of the UMT leadership to allowing a new 
Congress to take place was probably due to the fact that the UMT traditionally controlled the MGEN, 
and thus Ben Seddik and his associates did not want this source of revenue to fall into the hands of the 
leftists. 
120 Interviews 22, 41. 
121 The pretext for the conviction was that, in an interview to El País published on 11 March 1992, 
Amaoui had denounced the pervasive corruption of the Moroccan state and called the ministers “a gang 
of thieves”. However, the CDT leaders convincingly claim that the real reason for Amaoui’s conviction 
was another interview, published in February 1992 by Hourriyat Al-Mowaten, in which the trade 
unionist opined that the Moroccan King should “reign but not rule” (Interview 1). 
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under the leadership of Aderrahmane Youssoufi, was willing to participate, along with 
the Istiqlal, in the so-called “transition”. 
The CDT and the UGTM followed the line of their parties and, after 1994, they 
took part in a series of negotiations aiming to institutionalise a tripartite system of 
consultative social dialogue inspired by the ILO’s model (see Catusse 2001). The 
UMT boycotted the social dialogue as it considered that it would compromise its 
independence vis-à-vis party politics. As the negotiations spluttered, the CDT and the 
UGTM held a general strike on 5 June 1996. However, on 1 August 1996, the CDT, 
the UGTM, the Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), and the 
government signed a joint Declaration for the institutionalisation of social dialogue.122 
This opening inaugurated a new system of labour institutions, which saw a 
significant decline in the most severe human rights violations that characterised the 
Years of Lead. Nonetheless, one of the worst abuses of this period was the kidnapping, 
torture, and killing of trade unionist Abdallah Mounasser. In the 1990s, Mounasser 
was the main figure in the drive to organise the Agadir fishermen,123 who worked 
under extremely precarious and hard conditions. Yet on 27 May 1997, Mounasser 
disappeared and four days later his tied-up body was found in the waters of the Agadir 
Port. The responsibility for the assassination was never legally proved, but 
Mounasser’s family and comrades hold that the involvement of the police is self-
evident.124 
The social dialogue was part of a broader political opening promoted by the 
Palace, designed to put in place a new institutional configuration that would allow it 
to control the levers of power despite its concessions to the opposition.125 On 14 March 
1998, Hassan II appointed the so-called “gouvernement de l’alternance”, led by 
USFP’s Youssoufi. He died on 23 July 1999 and his son Mohammed VI became the 
new monarch. 
The USFP hoped to democratise the country and improve social injustice, but 
these goals were largely unmet. Despite the signature, on 23 April 2000, of a second 
                                                 
122 However, as the 1996 Declaration was only partially implemented, on 29 October 1997 the CDT 
and the UGTM carried out another general strike demanding its application. 
123 Interview 21. 
124 See also the documentary “Mounasser: Marin, syndicaliste et militant ouvrier révolutionnaire” by 
Miriam Atif, Omar Radi, and Souad Guennoun 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42wEcIZ7C2c&t=38s). 
125 A sign of the times was the participation of the infamous Minister of the Interior Driss Basri in the 
opening of the CDT 3rd Congress on 14 March 1997. 
 112
tripartite Declaration for the reactivation of the conciliation and arbitration 
commissions, private sector strikes – which had peaked before the beginning of the 
social dialogue negotiations – reached a new high during the Youssoufi governments 
before falling throughout the 2000s (see Graph 2). 
 
Graph 2 – Private sector strike activity in Morocco, 1984-2008 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on ILO and Ministry of Employment data. 
 
The Youssoufi governments coincided with the beginning of the CDT’s crisis. 
The two main causes were the lack of internal democracy and the transposition within 
the union of the party struggles that accompanied the USFP’s failure to implement its 
governmental programme. The tensions between the CDT and the USFP finally came 
to a head at the CDT 4th Congress on 14-16 March 2001, where a clear cleavage 
emerged between the followers of Amaoui and those of Youssoufi. The CDT NEC 
thus broke the union’s ties to the USFP – with Amaoui resigning from the Political 
Bureau of the party – to create a new party, the Congrès National Ittihadi (CNI). The 
CDT then held two general strikes, on 5 June 2002 and 28 June 2002, while Youssoufi 
was still PM. However, on 7 April 2003, the USFP faithful, including the majority of 
the teaching federation, officially exited the CDT and created the Fédération 
Démocratique du Travail (FDT). This was the first in a chain of splits.126 
                                                 
126 The other most important, albeit small, confederation that emerged from the CDT diaspora was the 
Organisation Démocratique du Travail (ODT), which was founded in 2006 and would later ally itself 
with the Parti Authenticité et Modernité (PAM). There were also the Confédération Générale du 
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The CDT’s loss of autonomous power became apparent when the 21 May 2008 
general strike for higher wages called by the confederation proved to have little impact 
(see La vie éco, 12 December 2008). The union that had hoped to overcome the 
shortcomings of the UMT had been weakened in turn. As for the USFP, its electoral 
weight and political significance continued to decline following the end of the 
Youssoufi governments. 
During the 2000s, the regime further deepened the process of neoliberal 
restructuring. The unions were particularly concerned by the privatisations of the 
SOEs and the approval of Morocco’s first Labour Code in 2003 (dahir 1-03-194 of 11 
September 2003). The Labour Code was approved after a series of tripartite 
consultations that ended with the signature of a third tripartite Declaration on 30 April 
2003. This time the declaration was signed by the UMT too, along with the CDT, the 
FDT, the UGTM, and the UNTM.127 The Labour Code was apparently a bargain in 
which the unions accepted the flexibilisation of the formal labour market in exchange 
for the protection of trade union freedoms and other concessions. Yet, as detailed 
below, no real general improvement of trade union freedoms was seen on the ground. 
The UMT Left opposed the privatisations and the Labour Code through statements, 
meetings, and strikes in some of the firms facing privatisation, but it was unable to 
significantly alter the process.128 
The neoliberal phase was characterised by an overall decline in substantial 
inducements. However, due to the fact that in the post-independence phase Morocco 
had not seen an expansion of substantial inducements comparable to that of the 
populist regimes, this decline was far less steep. Some welfare sectors, such as social 
security, probably grew more rapidly in the neoliberal phase than in the post-
independence phase. 
The neoliberal phase, however, featured a reduction in the legal provisions for 
job security. The Labour Code confirmed labour subcontracting (Art. 86), legalised 
temporary work agencies (Art. 477), and formally recognised fixed-term contracts, 
establishing their maximum duration to two years,129 after which they become open-
                                                 
127 The Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc (UNTM) is the labour confederation linked to the Islamist 
Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD). Founded in 1973, it started to have a significant national 
presence with the ascent of the PJD in the 2000s. 
128 Interviews 10, 29, 32, 35, 46. 
129 In the agricultural sector, employers can offer six-month contracts and renew them up to a total 
duration of two years. In other sectors, the maximum duration of a fixed-term contract is one year, 
renewable only once. 
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ended (Art. 16-7).130 Employment through temporary work agencies can legally last 
no more than six consecutive months, but it is seen as extremely difficult to regulate.131 
In 2007, the Moroccan Association of Temporary Work Agencies itself declared to 
the press that: 
 
In the last two years, over 200 [temporary work] agencies were created 
and most of them do not declare their workers to the CNSS and do not pay 
the leave allowances required by the regulations.132 (La vie éco, 27 April 
2007) 
 
An additional concession to the employers in the Labour Code was the 
establishment of fixed criteria for the determination of layoff compensation (Art. 53), 
but mass layoffs for technological and economic reasons were made conditional to the 
authorisation of a tripartite local commission (Art. 67-8). Dahir 1-11-10 of 18 
February 2011 legalised subcontracting in public administration. Finally, another 
mechanism for legal non-standard employment emerged with the introduction of 
internship contracts.133 
Data on wages in the private sector are scant and not necessarily reliable. 
According to UNIDO data and El Said and Harrigan (2014, p. 110), real wages fell 
from the early 1980s and subsequently failed to return to their pre-structural 
adjustment values. The real average daily wage declared to the CNSS – the main 
national pension fund for the private sector – increased by a yearly average of 1.2% 
between 2001 and 2010, while real GDP per capita increased by a yearly average of 
3.8% over the same period (see Graph 3, p. 115). 
 
                                                 
130An organic law should have established the sectors in which fixed-term contracts are permitted, but 
it has never been promulgated and, as such, they are used in all sectors (see La vie éco, 26 July 2013). 
131 One should keep in mind that contractual temporary employment is not, quantitatively speaking, an 
important form of precarious employment in Morocco given the small share of contractual waged 
employment. In 2010, only 11% of the Moroccan employed population worked under written open-
ended contracts (HCP 2011). Between 1999 and 2010, the share of contractual temporary employment 
doubled, but this merely meant that it passed from 1% to 2% of the employed population (HCP 2000; 
2011). In 2010, 1.5% of the employed population worked in waged employment with an “oral contract” 
and 29% with no contract at all (HCP 2011). The remaining absolute majority of the employed 
population lies outside waged employment altogether. 
132 Translated from French by the author. 
133The main institution administering them is the Agence Nationale pour la Promotion de l’Emploi et 
des Compétences, created with dahir 1-00-220 of 5 June 2000. 
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Calculated by the author based on CNSS and WB DataBank data. 
 
In the central public administration, the gross real average wage increased by 
a yearly average of 2.1% in the 1984-2010 period, while the net wage increased by a 
yearly average of 1.3%.134 Over the same period, real GDP per capita increased by a 
yearly average of 2.9% (see Graph 4). Overall, the available data suggests that average 
real wages in the formal economy increased, while relative wages decreased.135 
 
Graph 4 – Public administration wages vs. GDP per capita (Morocco, 1983-2010) 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on HCP and WB DataBank data. 
                                                 
134 Calculated by the author on the basis of Ministry of Finance data. 
135 In Marxist economics, the relative wage refers to the share of wages versus the share of profits in 
the GDP. 
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The share of public sector employment diminished. The first privatisations 
took place in the late 1970s without legal regulation, but Law 39-89 of 1989 
established the legal framework for the privatisation of state assets (dahir 1-90-01 of 
11 April 1990) and the actual sales began in 1993 (see Catusse 2008, pp. 83-125). In 
2006, the state had sold 44 firms and 26 hotels (La vie éco, 23 June 2006). The 
government also delegated to the private sector the management of several services, 
such as water and electricity, communications, and transport. The majority of these 
assets were sold to foreign investors, but the royal family was the main national 
beneficiary through the acquisition of control of the Société Nationale 
d’Investissement via the ONA. 
Data on employment in the public sector as a whole136 is available from 1999. 
At that time, the public sector already accounted for only 10.1% of total employment, 
which declined to 8.4% in 2010 (HCP).137 The percentage of SOE employees halved 
from 1.5% in 1999 to 0.8% in 2010 (Ibidem).138 
According to a governmental report, between 1993 and 2005 welfare 
expenditure increased from 39% to 50% of the state’s budget, not including debt 
service payments (Royaume du Maroc 2006).139 While the government tried to contain 
consumption subsidies, it concentrated its efforts on education, health, and social 
housing (Royaume du Maroc 2002). However, public expenditure on education has 
remained around 5% of GDP from the late 1980s to 2009 (World DataBank). 
Concerning poverty relief, the subvention of basic consumption goods 
persisted as the most important form of state intervention. In 2005, however, 
Mohammed VI inaugurated the Initiative Nationale Développement Humain – a 
public agency coordinating social development and charity programs with a plethora 
of local and international NGOs and private firms. Poverty relief, thus, is not framed 
as a universal social right but as particularistic state-encouraged aid (see Catusse 
2010). 
Along with poor performances in education, another oft-quoted dark spot of 
the Moroccan welfare system was its very weak health insurance and retirement 
coverage. In the late 1990s, health insurance coverage included just 15% of the total 
                                                 
136 National and local public administration plus the SOEs. 
137 In 2005, the government had launched a programme encouraging early retirement from public 
administration. 
138 It should be kept in mind that a large share of the privatisations took place in the mid-1990s. 
139 This figure includes the wage expenditure of the relevant ministries. 
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population (Boudahrain 2000, p. 124), while retirement coverage included only 21% 
of the active population (Ibid., p. 212). Even by 2008, no more than 30% of the 
employed population had retirement coverage (CNSS 2009, p. 10). In 2002, the 
government created two new schemes in order to extend health insurance.140 In 
parallel, between 1995 and 2010, public health expenditure increased from 1.2% to 
2.1% of GDP (UNDP). However, in 2010, only 18% of the employed population 
enjoyed health insurance coverage (HCP 2011). 
Overall, expenditure on the welfare system increased, in contrast with 
declining legal job security, relative wages, and public sector employment. However, 
it is necessary to remember that the Moroccan state had never struck a populist social 
pact with the working class, and, therefore – when it entered structural adjustment – 
its welfare system started from a lower level compared to the populist states (see 
Catusse 2010). 
The most noticeable trend in organisational inducements was that towards 
rising formal organisational inducements in the form of the partial institutionalisation 
of tripartite social dialogue (see below). Informal inducements, under the guise of 
corruption in the manifold forms already enumerated, are still perceived as high for 
all the trade unions, especially the UMT.141 
The most significant corruption scandals concerned the relations between the 
UMT and the “Basri system”. Driss Basri was Hassan II’s dreaded Minister of the 
Interior during the Years of Lead. He had placed directors with close personal ties to 
himself in several public agencies and enterprises (Vermeren 2009, pp. 278-9).142 
These managers used the public resources of such agencies in a clientelist and even 
criminal manner to boost Basri’s power. However, after Mohammed VI dismissed 
Basri in 1999, the latter’s network began to crumble.  
The UMT’s main link to the Basri system was Mahjoub Ben Seddik’s right 
hand Mohammed Abderrazak. While never convicted, Abderrazak was involved in 
high-profile public scandals related to the misappropriation of resources from the 
CNSS (see e.g. La vie éco, 15 February 2002 and 14 June 2002) and the Comité 
                                                 
140 The Assurance Maladie Obligatoire was funded by social security contributions while the Régime 
d’Assistance Médicale was funded through the state budget in order to cover those who did not have 
sufficient contributions. The former was activated in 2005 and the latter in 2011. 
141 Interviews 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 21, 27, 29, 30, 37, 40, 43, 46. 
142 Including the Haddaoui brothers at the Caisse Nationale du Crédit Agricole and the CNSS, and 
Moulay Zine Zahidi at the Crédit Immobilier Hôtelier. 
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d’Oeuvres Sociales of the Office National d’Électricité (COS-ONE) (see e.g. La vie 
éco, 2 April 2004; Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 9 December 2004). On 12 March 2004, as 
the COS-ONE scandal became public, the UMT National Council expelled 
Abderrazak by the UMT NEC – where he had sat for fifty years – under the pretext 
that he did not show up to NEC meetings (Maroc hebdo, 19 March 2004b).143 
Other public corruption scandals saw the involvement of the UMT-FNE SG 
M’hmed Ghayour in the misappropriation of funds from the MGEN (Al-Hayat, 29 
April 2010; Tel quel, 27 April 2018) and the involvement of the Union Syndicale Inter-
Bancaire (UMT-USIB) SG Farouk Chahir in the misappropriation of funds from the 
banking national insurance fund (Akhbar Al-Yaoum, 21 March 2012). 
Another organisational inducement is state funding to the unions. The state 
transfers money to the unions as a reimbursement for campaigning in the professional 
elections. The unions also receive state contributions for participating in workers’ 
training programs, national tripartite institutions, and international missions (Labour 
Code, Art. 424). The Labour Code also stipulates the creation of a national 
commission in charge of supervising the correct use of this funding, but the 
commission was never actually brought into existence. In addition to such legal 
funding, one should add illegal funding tolerated by the state, in so far as the practices 
of corruption detailed above are not only used for personal enrichment but also to 
finance the union apparatuses. Another case is, allegedly, the creation of “yellow” 
workplace unions funded by employers to compete with an authentic workplace union 
affiliated to a different confederation.144 
With the constitutional reform of 1996, the House of Councillors was 
reinstated. As before, a share of its seats was allocated to the most representative 
unions. At the national level, the status of “most representative union” is given to any 
confederation that attains at least 6% of representatives in the public and private sector 
professional elections (Labour Code, Art. 425). This requirement is not as effortless 
to fulfil as it seems, given the fragmentation of Moroccan trade unionism and the fact 
that most workers’ delegates have no union affiliation. In the 1992 professional 
elections for the private sector, 50% of the workers’ delegates had no union affiliation 
                                                 
143 It is in any case unlikely that Mahjoub Ben Seddik had never suspected before the shady practices 
of his vice-SG. After all, as documented in the press, Ben Seddik had himself turned some real estate 
assets of the UMT into his personal property (Al-Massae, 23 February 2012, Appendix, pp. 304-9). 
144 Interviews 7, 10, 18, 19, 21. 
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(see Al-Bayane, 10 January 1993). Commentators at the time already took the result 
as a sign of the decline of Moroccan trade unionism (Ibidem). In 2009, the share of 
private sector workers’ delegates with no union affiliation had soared to 65% (see La 
vie éco, 29 May 2009). 
Corruption, informal contacts, state funding, and parliamentary representation 
already existed in the post-independence phase. However, during the neoliberal phase, 
bipartite and tripartite bodies that had fallen into disuse during the Years of Lead were 
revitalised, or new ones were created.145 Yet these institutions still convened 
irregularly (see La vie éco, 2 February 2007) and they seldom provided a real 
opportunity for the unions to shape national economic and social policy. 
The most important novelty was rather the quasi-institutionalisation of 
consultative social dialogue. On 24 November 1994, the Council for the Continuation 
of Social Dialogue was created with the task of establishing a framework for the 
government to regularly consult the most representative trade unions and employers’ 
associations146 on public policy. As seen above, the social dialogue was the main tool 
for the normalisation of the relations between the CDT and the regime. However, in 
2008, the CDT itself complained that: “The Council convenes only exceptionally, 
under the invitation of the King, on the subject of national scale social conflicts. The 
lack of efficiency of this mechanism explains the recrudescence of labour conflicts” 
(CDT 2008).147 Another common complaint is that, as the social dialogue is 
consultative and is not regulated by legislation, its recommendations are only partially 
implemented. Surely, the unions do use social dialogue to oppose initiatives that harm 
their constituencies or their organisations (e.g. containment of public administration 
                                                 
145 The Central Commission of Prices and Wages and the national and local Workforce Commissions 
remained inactive. In 1991, the National Council of Youth and Future was created as a response to the 
unemployed graduates’ movement, and the unions were given representation within it. Under the 
Labour Code, the Higher Council of Collective Agreements was renamed the Council of Collective 
Bargaining (Art. 101-2) and the Consultative Council of Labour Health became the Council of Labour 
Health and Prevention of Professional Risks (Art. 332-3). The Labour Code also created the Higher 
Council for the Promotion of Employment (Art. 522-3) and the Commission for the Application of 
Norms on Temporary Work (Art. 496). The Higher Council of the Public Administration, created in 
1958, convened for the first time in 2000. In 2009, the government started the legislative procedure for 
the creation of the Economic and Social Council (ESC), a 100-member consultative body mandated by 
the 1996 Constitution that can advise the government and the parliament on economic and social policy. 
The trade unions have 24 representatives in the ESC. The Council, however, started to function only 
after the beginning of the 2011 uprising. 
146 The main employers’ association in Morocco is the CGEM. 
147 Translated from French by the author. 
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wages, the pension reform, the organic laws on strikes and trade unions), but as a leftist 
trade unionist declared: 
 
The social dialogue never obtains anything for merely socioeconomic 
reasons; there are always political motives behind it. In 1996, it was to 
open the way, on the social and labour side, for the gouvernement de 
l’alternance and the succession to the throne. In 2003, it was a 
compromise to approve the Labour Code, which contained measures 
increasing work precariousness and other unfavourable decisions. In 2011, 
it was the time of the M20Fev. […] But as the situation on the ground is 
marked by the violation of trade union freedoms and of the right to strike, 
what social dialogue are we talking about? (Interview 10) 
 
This interpretation is not unworthy, in fact, it is impossible to understand social 
dialogue in Morocco without analysing the constraints under which the trade unions 
function. As seen above, the trade unions’ internal democracy was only indirectly 
constrained by the regime, through limits on the space for political opposition and the 
repression of working-class mobilisations. Compared to Hassan II’s Years of Lead, 
these limits decreased significantly under Mohammed VI, but they are far from gone. 
Internal democracy in most trade unions remains weak. Due to the limited space 
for rank-and-file trade unionism (see below), legitimation and funding for the unions 
come more from the state than from their own members. It is the central leadership of 
the confederations that participates in social dialogue and that directly receives the 
external grants, meaning that it can, to some extent, distribute them to the lower levels 
in a way that reinforces its position.148 Opportunist trade unionists, moreover, often 
use the corrupt practices analysed above to boost the incumbent leadership.149 Many 
interviewees complained that too often the committees and Congresses, at all levels, 
do not convene regularly150 and lamented the informality and lack of due process in 
the selection of delegates for the Congresses.151 
                                                 
148 Interviews 7, 10, 13, 19. 
149 Interviews 7, 10, 19, 43, 46. 
150 Interviews 19, 24, 37, 40, 41, 46. 
151 Interviews 10, 13, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 40, 43, 46. 
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Partisan politics had a role in limiting internal democracy in the CDT, the 
UGTM, and the FDT, while the UMT’s utter disregard for internal regulations 
continued unabated into the neoliberal phase. This can be easily assessed: between 
1995 and 2010 the confederation held no national Congress. Additionally, the UMT 
NEC could ask the authorities not to recognise the results of lower level Congresses, 
so that a dissident Executive Committee (EC) would not gain official recognition (see 
Al-Massae, 23 February 2012, Appendix, pp. 304-9).152 In exceptional cases, the 
central leadership recurred to direct violence.153 
A crucial obstacle to the democratisation of Moroccan trade unionism is the 
repression of rank-and-file activism in the workplace. Morocco’s legal framework on 
the matter is relatively advanced154 but scarcely applied. While, in the public sector, 
workers’ representation is still regulated by the 1959 legislation with its Joint 
Administrative Commissions (see above), in the private sector the Labour Code 
instituted a dual representation system of workers’ delegates and union 
representatives.155 The Labour Code mandates the recognition of union 
representatives from the most representative trade unions in all firms with 100 or more 
employees (Art. 470), and such representatives enjoy the same resources and 
protections as the workers’ delegates (Art. 419 and 472). This norm is, however, 
problematic in two ways. The vast majority of Moroccan firms are small enterprises156 
(see El Aoufi 2000), meaning that only a tiny minority of workers are covered by the 
article. Moreover, at firm-level a union reaches the “most representative” status only 
if it gathers 35% of the votes, which is not easy in practice, given the high 
fragmentation of Moroccan trade unionism. Therefore, the majority of workplace 
union representatives are not actually covered by the protections of Articles 470-2. It 
                                                 
152 Interviews 29, 30. 
153 This happened, for example, with the UMT-FNE of Khemisset. On 19 April 2005, the future UMT 
SG Miloudi Moukharik had an informal “militia” to invade the premises of the union, which had 
recently elected a leftist SG, and hold a “Congress” to reinstate the former Local SG (Al-Massae, 23 
February 2012, Appendix, pp. 304-9). 
154 Article 9 of the Labour Code protects trade union freedoms in the workplace and forbids anti-union 
discrimination. Article 36 confirms that union membership and activism are not a valid motivation for 
layoffs and disciplinary measures. 
155 As before, workers’ delegates must be present in all firms employing ten or more employees (Art. 
430) and they have the right to discuss regularly with the employer individual grievances and summon 
the Labour Inspection if the grievances cannot be resolved (Art. 432 and 460). Workers’ delegates are 
granted by the employer: office space, a notice board, and paid hours to carry out their duties (Art. 455-
6). In addition, an authorisation from the Labour Inspection is necessary for disciplinary actions against 
them (Art. 457). 
156 In 2010, only 6% of the employed population worked in firms with 50 or more employees (HCP 
2011). 
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is not a case that Morocco has not yet signed ILO’s 87 Convention on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. 
In most interviews, as well as in many real-life conversations, the interlocutors 
stressed the width of the gap between formal rules and realities on the ground. In fact, 
violations of labour legislation are severe and systematic in much of the private 
sector.157 Sometimes they are reported in the public sector too.158 This exchange 
between a CDT leader and the author is quite representative of the dominant view 
among labour activists: 
 
CDT: What is stronger? A collective agreement or the law? 
LF: The law. 
CDT: So, as in Morocco the laws are not respected, what’s the point in 
having collective agreements if they will not be respected by the 
employers? The Constitution, the Labour Code, the collective agreements 
are to no avail. When the employers are strong they apply their own law. 
This is Morocco. (Interview 4) 
 
There are private sector firms in which workplace unions have a stable presence, 
especially multinational companies and large Moroccan-owned factories created 
before the neoliberal phase. But in most cases the employees avoid creating workplace 
unions, especially militant ones, because a very common reaction to that is the simple 
firing of the unionised workers.159 Discrimination in promotions and transfers of 
militant trade unionists are also often reported.160 
The interviewees interrogated on the role of the Labour Inspection see it as often 
ineffective,161 both because resources and tough legal norms are lacking and because 
the inspectors are vulnerable to corruption or simply scared to bother an employer 
                                                 
157 The most frequent violations reported are wage arrears, the non-payment of social security 
contributions, forced and unpaid overtime, lack of paid holidays, disregard of health and safety norms, 
lack of due process concerning work accidents, irregularities in dismissals, and violations of trade union 
freedoms and the right to strike. An extreme example of disregard for labour legislation is the case of 
the Rosamor furniture factory in Casablanca. On 26 April 2008, the factory caught fire and 55 workers 
died due to the non-application of the most basic health and safety measures (Le monde, 26 April 2008). 
158 Interviews 7, 16, 28, 46. 
159 Interviews 11, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42. 
160 Interviews 7, 10, 13, 19, 21, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40. 
161 Interviews 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 45. 
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with powerful connections.162 Another problem is that, even when the Labour 
Inspection drafts reports that are favourable to the workers, the courts might not 
process them, or the sentences might not be enforced (see La vie éco, 20 May 2011). 
In 2009, because of the efforts of the Ministry of Employment, 10,000 
enterprises out of 13,000 eligible held professional elections (La vie éco, 29 May 
2009). However, the interviewees interrogated on the subject perceive that the 
workers’ delegates usually have scarce leverage over the employer and in many cases 
the winners of the elections are the candidates supported by the employer.163 The first 
point is confirmed in an official ESC report: 
 
Collective representation through the Enterprise Committees and the 
Safety and Hygiene Committees remains for the most part purely symbolic 
and ineffective. The opinions gathered in the interviews point at the 
limited powers of these organs, at the incompetence of many delegates, 
and at the excessive distrust towards collective representation by 
employers and HR managers.164 (CES 2012) 
 
Unlike union representatives, the workers’ delegates do not have the power to 
sign collective agreements. Yet, as we have seen, officially recognised union 
representation exists in a very small minority of the private sector. This contributes to 
explaining the low level of collective bargaining coverage (see Chapter 5), in spite of 
the fact that the Labour Code encourages it (Art. 92-5). 
The Labour Code leaves the regulation of the constitutional right to strike to an 
organic law, which has not been promulgated until today. In the meantime, Article 
288 of the Penal Code (see above) remains unreformed despite the social dialogue 
engagements to amend it. The application of the right to strike thus still depends on 
the balance of power on the ground. As there is no organic law regulating strikes, the 
authorisation of a labour confederation is not legally necessary, but a strike that does 
                                                 
162An oft-cited case is that of labour inspector Zine Al-Abidine Kacha from Marrakesh. In 1993, Kacha 
had drafted a report denouncing irregularities in the mass layoff of a group of bakers who had gone on 
strike against the dismissal of their union representative and three other workers. Kacha was sued by 
the employer and, on 8 April 2005, he was sentenced to ten years of prison (La vie éco, 15 April 2005). 
The stunning sentence spurred a campaign for his liberation, including a national strike of the labour 
inspectors, which prompted the Ministry of Employment to intervene for a retrial (Le matin, 29 April 
2005). 
163 Interviews 7, 11, 16, 37, 40, 43. 
164 Translated from French by the author. 
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not have the support of a union is almost certainly doomed to fail. In 2006, 86% of the 
strikes were backed by a union (La vie éco, 18 May 2007). While conciliation is often 
utilised effectively,165 arbitration was not actually adopted in this period (La vie éco, 
24 April 2012).  
When a labour conflict is taken to court, the judge can either prioritise Article 
14 of the Constitution granting the right to strike or Article 288 of the Penal Code (see 
above and Al-Mounadil-a, 5 July 2015) and Article 39 of the Labour Code (which 
states that the unjustified refusal to perform one’s tasks is punishable with dismissal). 
Whether backed by a court or not, the dismissal of private sector workers for striking 
is reported as very common.166 This means that often private sector workers only join 
unions or wage strikes when their situation becomes so bad that the risk of losing the 
job is seen as preferable to continuing under the existing conditions, or when that risk 
already exists because a mass layoff is in sight. As the Ministry of Employment 
reported to the press, the majority of strikes were called merely to demand the 
application of the labour legislation (La vie éco, 16 October 2009). 
In sum, during the neoliberal phase the most repressive traits of the regime eased 
but the country’s characteristic pattern of informal control remained central. While 
trying to improve its historically weak welfare system, the regime contained the other 
kinds of substantial inducements. Civil and political rights increased but, for what 
concerns the labour movement, their effectiveness was limited by a combination of 
formal and informal organisational inducements to the unions, the unions’ lack of 
internal democracy, and diffuse state-tolerated disregard for labour rights in the 
workplace. The resulting loss of union power was widely perceived as a “crisis of 
trade unionism”.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the struggles that followed independence gave rise to a 
system of labour institutions – authoritarian conservative pluralism – that differed 
from the varieties of populist corporatism that characterised the other North African 
countries. The Palace – and the rural elites that backed it – won the struggle for control 
of the state against the National Movement, which had both bourgeois and working-
                                                 
165 Interviews 8, 9. 
166 Interviews 7, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38. 
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class constituencies. The new regime thus marginalised the trade unions and provided 
a relatively low level of substantial inducements to the working class. 
Since the early 1960s, the UMT became gradually more conciliatory towards 
the regime, despite its political marginality. The confederation thus took a 
conservative position towards the cycle of struggle that raged in the 1970s, which led 
to the emergence of the more radical CDT. 
However, in the 1990s, faced with continuing social instability, the regime 
adopted the strategy of a limited political opening, which – through continuing 
pluralism, party mediation between the unions and the state, and consultative social 
dialogue – resulted in a more flexible system of labour institutions termed here semi-
authoritarian conservative pluralism. Constraints thus partially eased, while some 
welfare indicators improved. However, the political opening fell well short of 
democratisation and substantial inducements remained lower compared to Tunisia 
(see Chapter 5). Yet this process was successful in normalising the relations between 
the CDT and the regime and encouraged a crisis within the union that eventually 
resulted in multiple splits. The continuing repression of labour rights in the workplace 
left the unions with a narrow base and weak internal democracy. 
The year 2011 thus found the Moroccan trade unions plagued by a severe lack 
of legitimacy, a very meagre base of members, and a high dependency on the state for 
their functioning. This combination of labour weakness and institutional flexibility 
contributes to explaining why the unions played a limited role in Morocco’s 2011 
uprisings (see Chapter 6). 
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This chapter traces the history of Tunisian labour institutions through the social and 
class struggles that led to their emergence. After a preliminary sketch of the pre-
independence origins of Tunisia’s labour movement, the analysis presents a 
periodisation parallel to that of the preceding chapter. In Tunisia, the post-
independence phase can be said to have begun in 1956 and to have finished in the 
early 1970s, after which there was a long transitional period (1970-85), ridden with 
heightened social conflict. With the inception of the structural adjustment plan in 1986, 
the neoliberal phase commenced. 
 Tunisia’s post-independence system of labour institutions can be described as 
a case of authoritarian populist corporatism, featuring high constraints, relatively high 
substantial inducements, and a configuration of organisational inducements 
characterised by a single trade union confederation. The UGTT was incorporated into 
a triangular state-party-union architecture typical of corporatist regimes, although it 
maintained a degree of autonomy – the scope of which varied according to the political 
conjuncture. 
 During the 1970s, a strike wave led by SOE workers and the entry into the 
UGTT of intellectual workers who had become radicalised during the student 
movement put mounting pressure on the union, which resulted in the UGTT NEC 
staging a national general strike on 26 January 1978. While the strike was repressed 
and the UGTT leadership imprisoned, the event cracked the regime’s corporatist 
armour as it existed at the time. The struggles of the 1970s resulted in the consolidation 
of a notable left-wing opposition within the confederation and elements of its top 
leadership ceased to be a reliable ally of the regime. 
 During the neoliberal phase, the corporatist system was reconstituted on a new, 
more informal, basis. Substantial inducements were partially retrenched, such that the 
system of labour institutions that emerged can be described as “authoritarian post-
populist corporatism”. Due to the lack of union pluralism and party mediation between 
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the unions and the state, as well as the narrow incorporation of the UGTT based on 
tri-annual wage negotiations and informal contacts, this institutional system was more 
rigid than the Moroccan case. At the same time, larger substantial inducements relative 
to Morocco made the level of working-class power higher in Tunisia (see Chapter 5). 
This meant that, in 2011, working-class power was stronger in Tunisia than in 
Morocco, but it faced a more rigid institutional system, such that the Tunisian trade 
unionists had to devise their strategies in a context markedly different from the 
Moroccan one.  
 
4.1 Tunisian Organised Labour in the National Liberation Struggle 
This section summarises the genesis of Tunisia’s trade unionism in the context of the 
struggles for independence. From a relatively early stage, Tunisian organised labour 
participated in the anti-colonial movement through a national union, the UGTT. With 
the repression of the nationalist party Neo-Destour at the hands of the protectorate, the 
role of the UGTT in the National Movement increased in importance, strengthening 
its position in the post-independence balance of power. 
 Similar to Morocco, the first legal union in Tunisia was the local branch of the 
French CGT and it comprised both foreign and Tunisian workers. The earliest 
Tunisian-led union appeared in 1924, when Mohamed Ali El Hammi167 and his 
associates founded the Confédération Générale Tunisienne du Travail (CGTT) (see 
Haddad 2013). In 1925, however, the French authorities repressed and disbanded the 
CGTT. A second attempt came in 1937, when Belgacem Gnaoui founded the second 
CGTT, which was also repressed by colonial powers. 
 In 1944, under the leadership of Farhat Hached, a number of unions broke 
away from the CGT out of frustration over the lack of willingness from the French 
communists and socialists to take Tunisians’ grievances seriously, especially the 
priority they placed on national independence (Ben Hamida 2003; Kraiem 1980). 
These unions coalesced into the UGTT two years later. 
 The founding UGTT 1st Congress took place in Tunis on 20 January 1946 and 
elected Farhat Hached as SG. The union developed three main geographical poles: the 
                                                 
167 Between 1920 and 1924, El Hammi had studied economics in Berlin, where he had come into contact 
with the socialist movement in full swing in Germany at the time. With the repression of the CGTT, he 
was forced into exile and died only three years later in Saudi Arabia, but he would become one of 
Tunisia’s most beloved national heroes. 
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Sfaxians168 (the companions of Farhat Hached, who were strong in the transport 
sector), the Gafsians (who had their base among the miners of the Gafsa basin), and 
the Tunisans (mainly representing the intellectual workers concentrated in the capital) 
(see Hamzaoui 2013, pp. 279-81). 
 Since its beginnings, the UGTT took part in the national liberation movement 
in alliance with the nationalist Neo-Destour Party, led by Habib Bourguiba and Salah 
Ben Youssef. Typical of colonised countries, class and national struggles and identities 
became enduringly interwoven (see Chapter 1). With the crackdown of 18 January 
1952, as the protectorate utterly repressed the Neo-Destour and the Parti Communiste 
Tunisien (PCT), Hached’s UGTT partially took the leadership of the National 
Movement both through mass mobilisations and participation in the armed struggle 
(Kraiem 1980, pp. 422-7). On 5 December 1952, Hached was assassinated by the 
extremist colonial organisation Main Rouge, linked to the French secret services. The 
UGTT leadership was thus transferred to the intellectual Mahmoud Messadi. The 1954 
UGTT 5th Congress elected the Saheli, Tunis-based intellectual Ahmed Ben Salah as 
SG, confirming a temporary transfer of leadership from the Sfaxians to the 
Tunisans.169 
 Thanks to its central contribution to the national liberation struggle, 
symbolised by the martyrdom of Farhat Hached, the UGTT had become a mighty 
social force that enjoyed widespread popularity.170 Its political weight became evident 
at the 1955 Neo-Destour 5th Congress, when the UGTT backed the modernist wing of 
the party – led by Habib Bourguiba – resulting in the defeat of the more “traditionalist” 
opposition led by Salah Ben Youssef (Achour 1989, p. 51). 
 
4.2 The Post-Independence Phase: Authoritarian Populist Corporatism 
The regime that emerged from the cycle of struggle for national liberation was an 
instance of authoritarian populist corporatism. The National Movement had 
marginalised the traditional beylical elite formerly associated to the protectorate. This 
                                                 
168 More precisely, Hached and several of his companions originated from the Kerkennah Islands in the 
governorate of Sfax. 
169 Within the Tunisian student movement of the 1970s, this intra-union rivalry between North (Tunis) 
and South (Sfax and Gafsa) was reinterpreted as a struggle between the would-be state bureaucracy and 
the labour aristocracy (Naccache 2009, p. 39). In the terminology of this thesis, this is a competition 
between the two main class fractions constituting the social bases of the UGTT: intellectual workers 
and secure manual workers. 
170 To this day, this constitutes the main source of legitimisation of its pivotal role in national politics. 
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balance of power was formalised on 25 July 1957, when hereditary rule was abolished 
and the republic declared. The main social bases underpinning the new regime were, 
on the one hand, landowners from the Sahel (North East), the new stratum of state 
managers, “petty bourgeois” categories such as merchants, professionals, etc. that 
were linked to Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour, and, on the other hand, the intellectual and 
relatively secure manual workers organised by the UGTT. This was an internally 
hierarchical alliance, with the embryonic “national bourgeoisie” and the state 
managers competing with one another for hegemony over the other fractions (Ben 
Romdhane 1985). During this phase, the state conceded high levels of substantial 
inducements to the working class (populism) and high levels of organisational 
inducements to the trade union officials (corporatism), in exchange for the UGTT and 
its constituencies surrendering their political autonomy and therefore remaining 
subject to high levels of constraints (authoritarianism). 
 However, unlike in most populist corporatist regimes, the UGTT – while was 
allied to the state – preserved a certain degree of autonomy, the scope of which varied 
historically, depending on the political conjuncture (see Hamzaoui 2013). The regime 
would have liked to impose unilateral control over the single union confederation, 
turning it into just another monopolistic “national organisation”, similar to those 
created under the Neo-Destour initiative.171 However, the UGTT’s autonomous 
genesis and its pivotal role in the struggle for national liberation empowered its leaders 
to seek a partnership with the regime on a more equal footing (see Achour 1989). This 
meant that the consent of the workers organised in the UGTT was always mediated to 
some extent by the trade union officialdom, which founded its own power on this role 
as the broker. Moreover, the mediation of the UGTT was probably necessary – 
geographically speaking – for the Southern regions (see Liauzu 1996, p. 212). In fact, 
the core of support for the regime was located in the wealthier North-Eastern Sahel 
(where Bourguiba and many other Neo-Destour leaders came from), while the 
marginalised South, where Ben Youssef’s legacy was strongest and the legitimacy of 
the ruling elite weakest (especially among the former guerrillas), was mainly 
represented in the state through the Sfaxian and Gafsan UGTT leaders (Hamzaoui 
                                                 
171 Similar to the Union Tunisienne de l’Artisanat et du Commerce (later renamed Union Tunisienne de 
l’Industrie du Commerce et de l’Artisanat, UTICA), the Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens 
(later renamed Union Nationale de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche), the Union Nationale de la Femme 
Tunisienne, and the Union Tunisienne des Organisations de la Jeunesse. 
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2013, p. 282). There was thus a certain degree of internal intersection between class 
and locality. 
 The alliance between the UGTT and the Neo-Destour was consolidated after 
the 20 March 1956 declaration of independence. That year, the communist-led and 
CGT-associated Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Tunisie (USTT), led by Hassan 
Saadaoui, dissolved and invited its members to join the UGTT, which thus became the 
country’s only trade union confederation (Kraiem 1997, p. 357). At the 25 March 1956 
elections for the Constituent Assembly, the UGTT presented candidates under the Neo-
Destour-dominated National Front. The only opposition party, the PCT, won zero 
seats. 
 The 1956 UGTT 6th Congress was won again by the left-leaning intellectual 
Ahmed Ben Salah. The Congress resolutions criticised the liberal economic policy 
espoused by Bourguiba in its alliance with the Western bloc and proposed a state-led 
developmental plan. Bourguiba did not tolerate this insubordination and approved the 
Sfaxian leader Habib Achour’s temporary split from the UGTT and the creation of the 
Union Tunisienne du Travail (UTT) (Allouche 2016, p. 69). The split weakened Ben 
Salah, who was removed from leadership in December 1956 and replaced by the 
Gafsan Neo-Destour treasurer Ahmed Tlili. In 1957, Achour’s UTT returned into the 
UGTT ranks. 
 Ben Salah’s fall from grace did not last long. In 1958, he was appointed 
Minister of Social Affairs.172 In 1961, as liberal policy failed to mobilise the necessary 
investment from the private sector, Ben Salah became the de facto head of the 
government and started to apply the same statist policy that had led to his removal 
from UGTT leadership.173 Efforts were concentrated on the development of the 
industrial sector through the creation of manufacturing SOEs and on the modernisation 
of agriculture through the expropriation of the foreign settlers’ lands (1964) and the 
establishment of a system of rural “cooperatives” (Ben Romdhane 1985, pp. 267-
74).174 The UGTT was asked to accept wage restraint to provide room for investment. 
 In September 1962, 6,000 miners went on strike against wage austerity in the 
                                                 
172 To this day, the Ministry of Social Affairs is the agency most concerned with the relations between 
the government and the UGTT. 
173 This change in direction was confirmed at the 1964 Neo-Destour 7th Congress, in which the party 
renamed itself the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD). 
174 These cooperatives had little to do with self-management and were substantially under the control 
of the state bureaucracy (Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 120). 
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Gafsa region (Belaïd 1989, p. 201). The strike was not authorised by the UGTT NEC 
and was eventually repressed by the police. Habib Belaïd notes that: 
  
A certain psychological break was established by the Gafsan miners, it was 
the first time in which a conflict opposed the workers on one side and the 
trade union officials and the Tunisian government on the other side.175 
(Belaïd 1989, p. 201) 
 
 In December 1962, a planned coup by a group of Youssefists176 was discovered 
(Chouikha and Gobe 2015, p. 15). This gave the upper hand to the Neo-Destour to 
strangle the little political pluralism that existed at the time, the main victim of which 
was the PCT, which was outlawed in January 1963.177 The Neo-Destour also 
established its own workplace cells to contain the UGTT’s influence in the firms and 
public administration. 
 Meanwhile, the government manoeuvred against Ahmed Tlili at the 1963 
UGTT 9th Congress, as he had criticised both Bourguiba’s tightening grip on the 
country’s political life and Ben Salah’s state planning (Moore 1967, p. 661). Habib 
Achour was thus elected as SG. However, the 1964 Neo-Destour 7th Congress 
mandated that the country’s “national organisations”, including the UGTT, would be 
formally transformed, through “coordination committees”, into components of the 
party’s structure (Perkins 2014, p. 151). Yet Achour resisted this resolution as he saw 
that it would undermine the UGTT’s margins of autonomy (Achour 1989, pp. 69-73). 
In the same period, Achour started to publicly criticise wage austerity, particularly 
during his speech at the 1965 May Day demonstration. 
 These tensions triggered the first major crisis between the UGTT and the state. 
In June 1965, Achour was jailed for one month after being accused of mismanagement 
of a UGTT cooperative of which he was the President (Achour 1989, pp. 80-107). He 
would be sentenced to six months in prison the following year. This was a manoeuvre 
to remove him from office. At the July 1965 Extraordinary UGTT 10th Congress, 
Achour was substituted with party loyalist Bechir Bellagha, the governor of Tunis. 
                                                 
175 Translated from French by the author. 
176 Followers of Salah Ben Youssef. The latter had been assassinated on 12 August 1961 in Germany, 
while in exile, by the regime’s hitmen. 
177 Hassan Saadaoui, the former USTT SG, was arrested and died in police custody (Bessis 1985, p. 
126). 
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Tlili, meanwhile, fled to Europe to oppose the new course of the union from there. 
 In the meantime, Ben Salah’s “socialism” started to reveal signs of crisis. His 
attempts to extend the cooperatives system beyond the former colonial lands elicited 
resistance from landowners and peasants, particularly in the Sahel, where rioting in 
January 1969 led to police intervention and one death (Anderson 1986, p. 239). Faced 
with stiff resistance from one of its key constituencies, Bourguiba dismissed Ben 
Salah178 the same year and in November 1970 appointed the economic liberal Hedi 
Nouira as Prime Minister. 
 During the post-independence phase, substantial inducements to the working 
class came mainly in the form of the rapid expansion of the welfare state, high yearly 
real wage increases (starting in 1966), expanding public sector employment, and job 
security. 
 The Tunisian regime placed a high priority on the expansion of education, 
adopting a meritocratic rhetoric, according to which hard study was the way for the 
children of the poor to achieve inter-generational social mobility. In 1956, 85% of the 
population was illiterate. Between 1956 and 1961, real public expenditure on 
education grew by 40% (Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 185). Between 1961 and 1969, it 
increased by 316% (Ibid., p. 189). Healthcare expansion was also quick in the first 
years of independence, with an increase in state expenditure of 52% between 1956 and 
1961, but this decreased to a yearly average of +1.3% between 1961 and 1969 (Ibid., 
pp. 185 and 189). The social security budget more than doubled between 1961 and 
1969 (Ibid., p. 190). In 1965, a system of basic consumption subsidies, later named 
Caisse Générale de Compensation, was established. 
 Over the whole post-independence phase, while the average yearly rate of GDP 
per capita growth was 3.2% (1960-1986), the average yearly rate of per capita welfare 
expenditure growth was 5.7% (Ibid., p. 224). 
 The average real wage level was contained between 1956 and 1965, as the 
regime demanded that workers accept wage austerity for the sake of national 
development. Interestingly, however, wages started to grow more rapidly in 1966, 
directly following the conflict over wage austerity between Achour and the 
government. Overall, between 1962 and 1983, the estimated average yearly growth 
                                                 
178 On 25 May 1970, Ben Salah was sentenced to ten years of hard labour, but he escaped from prison 
and fled to Algeria in 1973. 
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rate in real average wages was 6.15% (see Graph 7, p. 147). 
 The public sector grew rapidly: “[B]etween 1955 and 1960, the number of 
Muslim public employees rose from twelve thousand to eighty thousand” (Anderson 
1986, pp. 235-6). The share of public sector employment most probably increased 
significantly under Ben Salah’s “socialist” government, which oversaw to the creation 
of many SOEs. In 1980, the public sector still employed 41% of all wage-earners 
(Zouari 1989, p. 339).179 
 The Tunisian Labour Code was promulgated in 1966 and improved job security 
in the formal sector by including restrictions on layoffs.180 Workers could be fired 
either for serious misconduct (Art. 14) or for economic or technological reasons (Art. 
21). All economic and technological layoffs had to be preceded by conciliation with 
labour inspectors and, if this failed, authorised by an administrative commission 
including a union representative (Art. 391). If the layoff was approved, the fired 
workers had to be compensated with one day’s wage for every month of seniority in 
the firm (Art. 22). According to Christopher Alexander: 
 
[B]ecause administrators worked to minimize layoffs, owners spent weeks 
or months in tedious negotiations before they could let workers go. During 
this time, the law required them to continue paying salaries. When 
administrators did allow owners to dismiss workers, they often ordered 
them to pay severance indemnities three and four times higher than the 
amount stipulated in the 1966 code, and if judges ruled that an employer 
had illegally dismissed workers, they often imposed extremely costly 
fines. (Alexander 2001, p. 113) 
 
 The regime also provided a wide array of organisational inducements for 
trade union officials. The most important were the guarantee of the UGTT’s monopoly 
of workers’ representation, membership in party and state decision-making bodies, 
material and symbolic benefits, and state subsidies to the UGTT in various forms. In 
this period, the only trade union confederation other than the UGTT – the UTT – was 
                                                 
179 This was after ten years of efforts to expand the private sector under Hedi Nouira’s liberal 
government. 
180 The Labour Code also obliged employers to notify all offers of permanent employment to the public 
recruitment offices (Art. 280). 
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created with the encouragement of the state when a conflict arose between the regime 
and the UGTT. 
 In the post-independence phase, there was a significant overlapping of 
memberships in the single party, the single trade union, and state institutions (see 
Khiari 2003, pp. 63-8) – resulting in a triangular state-party-union architecture: “A 
large share, if not the majority, of the union cadres were Neo-Destour members and, 
until the early 1970s, being candidate to a union post required the approval of political 
officials on the bases of fidelity to the party” (Hamzaoui 2013, p. 27).181 Members of 
the UGTT NEC were also members of the Neo-Destour Political Bureau and the union 
participated in the building of the post-colonial state, with many of its cadres taking 
high-ranking positions in public institutions, including posts as ministers.182 The 
UGTT was strongly represented in the Constituent Assembly, and, up to 1986, it 
officially presented candidates to the parliamentary elections in alliance with the Neo-
Destour/PSD. 
 UGTT representatives participated, with mere consultative powers, in the 
Economic and Social Council (ESC) and in the Higher Council for the Plan, as well 
as on the boards of the national social security funds and in the Vocational Training 
Council. On a lower level, the UGTT was granted the right to manage the hiring of 
casual dockers and of workers in other sectors (Naccache 2009, p. 39) and many 
directors of public enterprises were appointed from UGTT ranks (Yousfi 2015, p. 37). 
 Material advantages for trade union officials were both formal and informal. 
The main formal advantage was the secondment that, as in many other countries, 
allowed union officials to work full time for the union while keeping their job and the 
income associated with it. Yet in Tunisia, as in Morocco, it was normally the employer 
rather than the union itself that continued to pay the wage of the unionist. In most 
cases, the employer was the state itself. 
 Informal advantages included a wide array of illicit behaviours made possible 
by the position of trade union official (both full-time and on the job), especially 
corruption of various kinds (money, services, priority in access to loans, light 
workloads, etc.) and clientelist or nepotistic practices in hiring and promotion 
                                                 
181 Translated from French by the author.  
182 Ahmed Ben Salah, Mahmoud Messadi, Mustapha Filali, Abdallah Farhat, Ahmed Noureddine, 
among others, were UGTT leaders before becoming ministers (Kraiem 1980, p. 385). 
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(Hamzaoui 2013, pp. 21-5).183 Furthermore, with union responsibilities also came 
some freedom from the employer, contacts with the powerful, travels abroad, offices, 
etc. 
 Symbolic advantages consisted in the great prestige associated with UGTT 
officialdom, rooted once again in the role of the union in the National Movement. The 
state actively reinforced such symbolism. Until Ben Ali’s time, this was exemplified 
by two annual official ceremonies. Before May Day, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
selected certain citizens to bestow with Soviet-inspired labour medals “in order to 
reward the professional conscientiousness and the productivity of wage-earners on 
their job” (Labour Code, Art. 429).184 On May Day, the President of the Republic 
himself handed the labour medals to the winners in an official grand ceremony, and a 
share of the medals was reserved for UGTT officials. On 5 December, the anniversary 
of Farhat Hached’s assassination, the President participated in a commemorative 
ceremony together with the UGTT NEC.185 
 State subsidies to the union came in various forms. Since 1958, the state 
withdrew 1% of public sector employees’ wages and transferred it directly to the 
UGTT as membership fees, which at one point constituted about 80% of the UGTT’s 
total revenue (Zouari 1989, p. 330). This practice was not legally regulated, and it 
could happen without the spontaneous consent of the workers.186 Salah Hamzaoui 
wrote:  
 
In the 1960s, when I was studying the mines in the South of Tunisia, one 
of the workers’ main demands was that the state stop withholding 1% of 
their wage to transfer it to the UGTT. The reason was that the union did 
                                                 
183 Interviews 48, 51, 54, 81, 82, 86, 87, 91. 
184 Translated from French by the author. 
185 Every 4 December, the day before the anniversary, a commemorative demonstration left from the 
UGTT national HQ and proceeded to Hached’s mausoleum in Kasbah square, next to the Prime 
Ministry (in 2002, for the 50th anniversary of Hached’s assassination, Ben Ali ordered the construction 
of a larger and more prestigious-looking mausoleum). Similar to the May Day demonstration, this 
public gathering was sometimes an occasion for politicised rank-and-file militants to voice – within 
varying limits – their discontent at the UGTT NEC’s alliance with the regime. On both occasions, then, 
the partnership between union and state was celebrated in official ceremonies and contested in street 
marches – an interesting embodiment of the contradictions internal to the UGTT (see Hamzaoui 1999). 
186 A trade union leader explained that, even at the time, it was necessary for the worker to sign an 
UGTT membership form in order for the state to retain the union dues from his wage. Yet, in the 
political conjuncture of the 1960s, public sector managers encouraged workers to sign the membership 
form at the moment of hiring, and it was often difficult for workers to consequently opt out when they 
realised this entailed a financial cost (Interview 94). 
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not deserve their membership as it was perfectly aligned to the state.187 
(Hamzaoui 2013, pp. 15-6) 
 
 As seen above, the state paid the secondments of full-time trade unionists that 
came from the public sector. 
 The UGTT, therefore, depended on the state for the majority of its funds. Union 
dues from the private sector constituted a minority of the UGTT’s budget. Another 
source of income came from the cooperatives and firms owned by the union – which, 
according to Achour, employed almost 4,000 workers in the 1960s (Achour 1989, p. 
65) – and from rent from its properties. 
 However, this set of inducements – while certainly having important 
persuading and moderating effects – did not guarantee the unconditional consent of 
the UGTT and its constituencies. During this period, union leaders voiced their 
disagreement with the government on several occasions and some groups of workers 
engaged in wildcat strikes (Moore 1967, p. 660). When the carrot proved ineffective, 
the regime resorted to the stick. The main constraints were state limitations on the 
confederation’s internal democracy, workplace organisation and representation, 
collective bargaining, and the right to strike. 
 As seen above, the party-state was able to manoeuvre successfully against 
union leaders that questioned its directives. According to Hamzaoui: 
 
Keeping in mind that the rigging of elections was common practice at the 
national level, we should not be surprised that this happened also within 
the union. Until the mid-1970s, notions like that of democracy were so to 
speak absent. Notions like patriotism (“wataniyya”) were instead the 
norm. The worth of a militant was determined more by his patriotism, i.e. 
his political conformism, than by his union representativeness.188 
(Hamzaoui 2013, p. 27) 
 
 For instance, when the 1964-65 conflict between Achour and the government 
broke out, the regime mobilised the single party and the police to escalate the 
                                                 
187 Translated from French by the author. 
188 Translated from French by the author. 
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manipulation of local and regional union elections (Achour 1989, pp. 73-9; Moore 
1967, p. 661). 
 In the post-independence phase, a legal framework for workplace 
representation was established. The 1959 Constitution stated that “trade union rights 
are guaranteed” (Art. 8) and Law 60-31 from 1960 declared that workers had the right 
to elect representatives to Enterprise Committees – with control and consulting 
functions – in firms with 50 or more employees.189 These representatives had some 
protection against unfair layoffs.190 
 The 1966 Labour Code confirmed the Enterprise Committees but, by 1977, 
only 188 Enterprise Committees had been created – the vast majority belonging to 
large SOEs – and only 38 functioned regularly (Zouari 1989, p. 337). One reason for 
the weakness of the Enterprise Committees was opposition by trade unionists 
themselves, who saw them as a threat to workers’ representation through the 
workplace unions (Zghal 1998, p. 13). In fact, the Labour Code did not add anything 
to the vague constitutional protection of trade union rights and it did not even mention 
the existence of workplace unions, let alone rights for union representatives to 
communicate with workers or take leave for union-related matters. The lack of legal 
protections for workplace unions was aggravated by the fact that, in 1962, the Neo-
Destour started to create its own workplace cells, with the aim of countering the 
influence of independent-minded unionists on the workers. An interviewed trade 
unionist commented on the workplace cells as follows: 
 
The workplace cells were supposed to control people. And they were into 
everything that concerns the administration of fringe benefits, they 
organised trips for the employees and their families and all that. And, 
above all, they had to be a pro-management counterweight to the union; 
they had to hand out privileges to the pro-management employees and 
keep the others under surveillance. (Interview 54) 
 
                                                 
189 According to the same law, workers in firms with 20 or more employees could elect a personnel 
delegate with more limited functions. 
190 If the employer wanted to dismiss an Enterprise Committee representative, she had to ask for the 
approval of the Committee itself. If approval was denied, the layoff had to be authorised by a labour 
inspector. If the employer wanted to dismiss the personnel delegate, the layoff had to be authorised by 
the labour inspector (Law 60-31 of 14 December 1960, Art. 16; 1966 Labour Code, Art. 166). 
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 In sum, union penetration of particular firms depended on the balance of power 
on the ground, and recalcitrant trade unionists could be victimised without specific 
legal sanctions (Safi 1989). 
 Formal collective bargaining in the public sector did not exist and wage-fixing 
– including the minimum wage – was a unilateral prerogative of the government, the 
UGTT having only an advisory role in wage commissions (Zouari 1989, p. 336). 
Although the 1966 Labour Code made provisions for collective agreements to be 
concluded in the private sector, Article 51 forbade wage bargaining and thus emptied 
potential negotiations of much of their substance. 
 The 1966 Labour Code also made the right to strike conditional to mandatory 
preliminary conciliation (Art. 376) and to the approval of the trade union 
confederation (Art. 387). This gave great powers to the UGTT high cadres to intervene 
in workers’ struggles initiated from below (see Hamzaoui 2013, pp. 954-74). The 
UGTT NEC under Bechir Bellagha did not favour militant action, which contributed 
to the low officially recorded strike levels during this period (see Graph 6, p. 144). 
 In the “classic” years of the post-independence phase, there were, as seen 
above, several tensions between the UGTT and the party-state. Nevertheless, the mix 
of high inducements and constraints was effective in stabilising Tunisia’s authoritarian 
populist corporatist system of labour institutions. The alliance between the UGTT and 
the regime under the banner of national unity was therefore never credibly threatened. 
Yet this would change dramatically during the transitional period to the neoliberal 
phase. 
 
4.3 The Transitional Period: The “Bloody Divorce” 
This section shows how the cycle of struggle that ran through Tunisia in the 1970s and 
early 1980s – while eventually repressed – cracked the corporatist system of labour 
institutions as it existed at the time. The social bases of this cycle of struggle – mainly 
constituted by SOE workers and intellectual workers (see Zeghidi 1997) – expressed 
changes in the technical composition of the Tunisian working class, particularly the 
expansion of the industrial sector and rising levels of education. The regime initially 
responded to the crisis by increasing inducements, but – when this proved to be 
economically unaffordable and politically ineffective – it resorted to escalating 
constraints. 
 In 1970, the former Chairman of the Tunisian Central Bank, Hedi Nouira, 
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became Prime Minister with a mandate to move away from the “socialist” 
developmental path. With the downfall of Ben Salah, his old enemy Achour had been 
asked by Bourguiba to return to the post of UGTT SG (Achour 1989, p. 108).191 
Achour’s leadership was confirmed at the 1970 UGTT 12th Congress. 
 During this period, the state maintained a strong role in the economy, but its 
interventions were more directly geared towards the expansion of the private sector. 
In 1972, a new Investment Code was promulgated, encouraging foreign direct 
investment and production for export with a consequent growth of the feminised 
textile sector. In 1973, a system of national-sectorial collective bargaining between the 
UGTT and the UTICA was established (see below). 
 During these years, the main challenge to the party-state came from the radical 
Left. The origins of the Tunisian New Left must be traced to the milieu of Tunisian 
students in France, who created, in 1963, the Groupe d’Études et d’Action Socialiste 
Tunisien, which produced a monthly review called Perspectives pour une Tunisie 
meilleure (El Waer 2018). During the 1960s, the “Perspectivists” extended their 
activities from France to the motherland. Here, their doctrines penetrated a base of 
students that came in large proportions from the peripheral regions of the country; they 
were the first generation in their families to have access to higher education. 
 On 13 March 1968, the student movement launched an open-ended student 
strike, the central demand being the democratisation of the universities (Ibidem). On 
20 March, the regime cracked down on the rebellious students, arresting and torturing 
over two hundred youths and sentencing tens to long prison sentences (Naccache 
2009, pp. 97-100). From that moment, Perspectives splintered into several Marxist-
Leninist192 and Arab nationalist underground organisations, the most important being 
El ‘Amel Ettounsi (The Tunisian Worker) and Esh’ola (The Spark). 
 In August 1971, the New Left won the Union Générale des Étudiants de 
Tunisie (UGET) 18th Congress in Korba. It was the first major crack in the corporatist 
system of monopolistic “national organisations” aligned with the regime. The PSD 
was therefore quick to impose a loyalist NEC in what is remembered as the “Korba 
                                                 
191 Achour, in return, supported Bourguiba against his rivals at the 1971 PSD 8th Congress in Monastir 
(Achour 1989, p. 123). 
192 This expression was used as a euphemism for Stalinism and Maoism. Of course – and, in the eyes 
of the author, quite paradoxically – these doctrines at the time had a wide appeal for rebellious students 
worldwide. Yet, in any case, these groups usually fought for civil and political rights at least as “tactical 
goals”. 
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putsch”. On 2 February 1972, an Extraordinary Congress was convened at the 
University of Tunis as part of a leftist initiative to reclaim internal democracy. On 5 
February 1972, the police broke into the university and disbanded the Congress. A 
solidarity strike of university and high school students was launched. On 7 February, 
the police repressed the demonstrations, making hundreds of arrests (see Chegrouche 
1983, pp. 49-50). Apart from the state-controlled 19th Congress in 1977 (Ibid., pp. 52-
3), the regime prevented the UGET from holding its Congresses until 1988. In the 
meantime, the student union continued its activities through “provisional structures” 
deprived of formal national coordination. 
 For our purposes, the most important element is that the rebellion expanded 
from the UGET into the UGTT as the radical students graduated and joined the 
workforce and the union, bringing with them the same demands of internal democracy 
and organisational autonomy vis-à-vis the regime. The UGTT thus ceased to be a 
Destourian organisation and became – as it is often said – a “shelter” for all political 
tendencies. During the 1970s, the Left took over the newly created higher teaching 
federation193 and the secondary teaching general union.194 The newly created banking 
federation195 (see Zeghidi 2007), the primary teaching general union,196 and the PTT 
federation would follow suit.197 These changes were, at times, propelled by non-
authorised “heroic strikes”, such as the secondary teaching strike that took place on 
28 January 1975 (Ibid., p. 112).198 
 The political shift in the teaching sectorial organisations signalled the rupture 
between the most important UGTT federations of intellectual workers and the regime, 
while up to that point the leading UGTT intellectuals (Messadi, Ben Salah, Kraiem, 
etc.) had championed the corporatist triangular state-party-union architecture.199 
Hassine Hamza noted that: 
  
It is this ‘multi-functionality’ and this ‘three-headed configuration’ that 
allows the teachers to take a special and frankly central place within the 
                                                 
193 Interviews 56, 66, 82. Here, the PCT was particularly influential. 
194 Interviews 65, 71, 81, 87. 
195 Interviews 94. 
196 Interviews 72, 73, 75, 79, 88. In the UGTT, the federations and the general unions are both sectorial 
organisations. However, while the federation groups a set of similar but related professions, the general 
union only represents one profession. 
197 Interviews 48, 52. 
198 This was the first national sectorial general strike in public administration since independence. 
199 As we will see, the UGTT teaching federations had, in turn, a central role in the 2011 uprising. 
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tripolar mechanism state-party-union, that has founded and sustained for 
a long time the Tunisian political system. […] [Even if there are] relatively 
recent signs (more or less since the late 1970s) of malfunctioning and 
therefore of disintegration of this system.200 (Hamza 1992, p. 229) 
 
 Intellectual workers, however, could not have had much weight without a new 
generation of militant manual workers that rejected wage austerity. Between 1961 and 
1982, in fact, the share of primary sector workers declined by one third, while the 
share of industrial workers increased significantly (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7 – Employment by economic sector (Tunisia, 1961 and 1982) 
 1961 1982 
Primary 45.3% 29.6% 
Secondary 24.3% 33.9% 
Tertiary 30.4% 36.5% 
Calculated by the author based on Ben Chaabane 2014. 
  
 These workers, encouraged by the UGTT Left, and mostly without the support 
of the UGTT NEC, took the lead in the strike wave that swept the country starting in 
1971 and reaching its peak in 1977 (see Graph 5, p. 142). The strongholds of industrial 
militancy were SOEs like Bizerte’s ironworks El Fouladh, Sousse’s automobile 
factory STIA, or Gabes’s chemical complex (Zeghidi 1997). Strikes in the transport 
sector were also very common (Zeghidi 1989).201 The core demands revolved around 
wages, and indeed real wages grew quickly, surpassing the rate of GDP growth (see 
Graph 7, p. 147). 
 In this conjuncture, the fracture between significant sections of the base and of 
the intermediate structures, on one side, and the UGTT top leadership, on the other 
side, began to be theorised as a double struggle by the “militants” against both the 
“trade union bureaucracy” and the regime. Belaïd speaks of: 
 
A “trade union dualism” featuring on the one hand an official trade 
unionism recognised and controlled by the regime, and on the other hand 
an “underground” autonomous trade unionism opposing the union 
                                                 
200 Translated from French by the author. 
201 Interviews 58, 60, 83, 94. 
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leadership and the state at once. […] This “trade union dualism” 
temporarily disappeared when the confluence between official leadership 
and base was forged in a time of great working-class and trade union 
mobilisation (from 1976 to 1978).202 (Belaïd 1989, p. 215) 
 
 In this context, the UGTT NEC allowed the radicals into the editorial board of 
Esh’aab (The People), the union’s weekly newspaper (Bellin 2002, p. 106). On 19 
January 1977, in an attempt to bring strikes under control, the government and the 
UGTT signed a social pact establishing social peace and a five-year freeze in collective 
bargaining203 in exchange for an increase in the minimum wage of 33% and an 
increase in all wages of a fixed amount corresponding to the value of the minimum 
wage hike (Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 243). However, dissident union cadres signed the 
“Petition of the 600”, which rejected the social pact (Zeghidi 1989, p. 279), and 1977 
was a record year of industrial action, with 452 strikes, involving 88,335 workers, and 
140,201 workdays lost (see Graph 5).  
 
Graph 5 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 1961-1979 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on ILO data. 
 
 The PSD, in response, arranged for violent groups, known as “Destourian 
militias”, to attack the union buildings and intimidate independent-minded trade 
unionists (Allouche 2016, p. 139). 
                                                 
202 Translated from French by the author. 
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 On 10 October 1977, clashes erupted between the police and the striking 
workers of the textile SOE SOGITEX in the Saheli town Ksar Hellal, which was seen 
as a stronghold of the single party. The dispute turned into a protracted revolt involving 
many residents. The unrest lasted until 14 October, at which point the army intervened. 
At the same time, a major industrial dispute arose that concerned the renewal of the 
statutes of several SOEs – with the consequent wage increases – which the government 
refused (Allouche 2016, pp. 138-41). In late 1977, 13,000 miners went on strike, soon 
followed by thousands of railway workers (Beinin 2016, p. 34). Moreover, the UGTT 
organised a campaign of rolling strikes to protest the death threats against Achour 
proffered by Abdallah Ouerdani, an individual close to the party leadership (Achour 
1989, p. 182). 
 The UGTT NEC was thus positioned between portentous rank-and-file 
assertiveness and increasing harassment by the regime. The matter was further 
complicated by in-fighting within the PSD, as the struggle to succeed Bourguiba 
started to mount. These criss-crossing horizontal and vertical conflicts quickly came 
to a head. On 10 January 1978, after the meeting of the UGTT National Council, 
Achour resigned from the PSD Political Bureau (Achour 1989, pp. 194-5). The UGTT 
NEC responded to escalating political and physical attacks by the PSD by declaring a 
24-hour national general strike – the first since independence – for 26 January 1978. 
In what is remembered as “Black Thursday”, riots broke out and the police and army 
intervened. Estimates of the death toll vary between 47 and several hundred (Perkins 
2014, p. 168). The General Director of National Security at the time was Zine El-
Abidine Ben Ali. The French review Politique hebdo described Black Thursday as the 
“bloody divorce” between union and party-state, reproducing on its cover the photo 
of a young, long-haired protester bleeding from his head. 
 In the aftermath, eleven UGTT NEC members out of thirteen were imprisoned, 
along with hundreds of trade unionists (Achour 1989, pp. 207-45).204 At the beginning 
of February 1978, the party loyalist Tijani Abid was appointed UGTT SG. On 25 
February 1978, a façade Congress confirmed Abid’s post and elected a new NEC 
                                                 
204 Several of the arrested trade unionists were tortured, including the future UGTT SGs Ismail Sahbani 
– who at the time was the SG of the national federation of metalworkers – and Abdessalem Jerad – SG 
of the national transport federation. At least two – Houcine El Kouki and Said Gagui – died in police 
custody (Achour 1989, pp. 231-6). 
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entirely composed of PSD faithful. Both the Achourists and the UGTT Left205 
denounced the new NEC as made of “fantoches” (puppets) and demanded the return 
of Achour and the other “légitimes” (legitimate): 
 
We, the leftist militants, found ourselves in a very peculiar situation during 
the events of 26 January and the following weeks and months. As the 
UGTT leadership was almost entirely in prison, we – that up to that point 
had opposed that leadership together with the regime – found ourselves 
first in line to defend our legitimate leaders. […] We found ourselves […] 
acting as some sort of provisional leadership.206 (Zeghidi 2007, p. 115) 
 
 Strikes temporarily declined in 1978-79, but reached new record levels 
between 1980 and 1984 (see Graph 6). 
 Outright union repression endured until the regime was forced by social and 
political instability to allow an UGTT 15th Congress on 29-30 April 1981 in Gafsa, but 
Bourguiba vetoed Achour’s candidacy as SG. Despite the fact that many delegates 
opposed Bourguiba’s veto of Achour, the non-Destourian university professor Taïeb 
Baccouche was elected SG instead.207 
 
Graph 6 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 1976-1983 
 
 
Data: Ministry of Social Affairs (Bellin 2002, p. 110). 
                                                 
205 Among the other initiatives, Esh’ola kept publishing a clandestine and “legitimate” version of the 
UGTT’s weekly Esh’aab (Interviews 75, 82, 94). 
206 Translated from French by the author. 
207 In the 1970s, Baccouche was considered to be close to the PCT. Paradoxically, in the skirmishes 
between Achour and Baccouche, most radical leftists supported Achour, who – while ideologically and 
historically closer to the regime – in that political conjuncture was strongly opposed to it (see Réalités, 
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 In the meantime, the political crisis had continued to develop. On 26 January 
1980,208 an armed commando attempted to initiate an insurrection in Gafsa. In April 
1980, Mohamed Mzali took Nouira’s place as PM. In January and February 1981, the 
students rose again, especially in high schools (Abdelali 2012, pp. 39-45). For the first 
time, the prominent role was taken by the Islamists rather than the leftists. On 6 June 
1981, Rached Ghannouchi and his associates founded the Mouvement Tendance 
Islamique (MTI). Fighting between leftist and Islamist students escalated in the 
universities. 
 The regime considered the single party regime to no longer be viable: it 
formally accepted multipartyism and called for fair and free elections to be held on 1 
November 1981. However, the elections were rigged, with over 90% of the votes 
assigned to the PSD-led National Front (Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 196). The UGTT, 
under Baccouche’s leadership, had run again in the National Front and achieved a 
record 27 MPs (Allouche 2016, pp. 170-1). 
 In November 1981, Achour returned to formal UGTT leadership, not as SG but 
as President, a post that did not exist before and that was created to circumvent 
Bourguiba’s veto of him as UGTT SG. In 1983, he obtained the expulsion of seven 
NEC members who were close to the Neo-Destour leadership (Ibid., pp. 182-3). On 
18 February 1984, these union leaders founded the Union Nationale Tunisienne du 
Travail (UNTT) led by Abdelaziz Bouraoui. In the December 1984 UGTT 16th 
Congress, Achour was re-elected SG. 
 The economic downturn of the early 1980s increased Tunisia’s dependency on 
foreign lenders. The fiscal crisis of the state made the reproduction of populism 
increasingly difficult by limiting the potential for the state to resort to substantial 
inducements. At the end of 1983, social tensions exploded again with the attempt to 
abolish food subsidies as demanded by the international financial institutions. Rioting 
began on 27 December 1983 and quickly spread throughout the country. It only 
stopped on 6 January 1984, after Bourguiba announced that the measure had been 
repealed. The number of victims of state repression was possibly in the thousands 
(Perkins 2014, p. 173). The UGTT NEC did not play a role in the protests, which were 
mainly the work of students and the precarious fractions of the working class.209 
                                                 
208 Note that this was the second anniversary of Black Thursday. 
209 The UGTT Left, however, participated in the events and the young poet Fadhel Sassi from the 
secondary teaching general union was among the victims. 
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 As the government was clearing the ground for structural adjustment, tensions 
with the UGTT intensified again. In 1985, an escalation of repression hit the union: 
the secondments and the check-off system for union dues were suspended, workplace 
union meetings were prohibited, Esh’aab was banned for six months, the UGTT’s 
bank account and enterprises were confiscated, the Destourian “militias” attacked and 
occupied the union buildings countrywide, and over two thousand public 
administration employees were dismissed or arrested (Allouche 2016, pp. 191-4; 
Bellin 2002, pp. 112-3). In November, Achour was again placed under house arrest 
(Réalités, 15 November 1985). On 20-21 January 1986, the police invaded the 
UGTT’s last remaining building (rue de Grèce, Tunis)210 (Allouche 2016, p. 197). The 
legitimate NEC, who had refused to disavow Achour, was eventually deposed and 
replaced with party loyalists known as shourafa (the honourable ones). Within the 
same year, the IFI-supervised structural adjustment plan was officially launched, and 
Tunisia entered its neoliberal phase. 
 In the transitional period, substantial inducements were first escalated to 
compensate for the political crisis and finally retrenched – amid heavy repression – in 
response to the economic crisis. Here the most crucial aspect revolved around the 
struggles over the individual and social wage. Between 1970 and 1980, public 
expenditure on education grew by 6.4% per year on average (Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 
195). Over the same period, the social security budget more than tripled, partly due to 
the fact that social security was extended to new categories of workers, the largest 
being agricultural workers (Ibid., p. 194). Between 1970 and 1984, public expenditure 
on health grew by 10% per year on average (Ibid., pp. 195 and 200). Yet the most 
spectacular expenditure increase was in the form of consumption subsidies, which, in 
the 1970-1980 period, rose by 1,660% (Ibid., pp. 194-5). 
 The average real wage also exploded. Between 1971 and 1984, it increased by 
117%, despite the slowdown in its growth that corresponded with the repression of 
1978-79 (see Graph 7, p. 147). During most of this period, the real average wage 
                                                 
210 Across Tunisia, the UGTT premises are highly symbolic because public demonstrations often start 
from there. Most symbolic of all is Mohamed Ali El Hammi square – colloquially known as the “Batha” 
– the space outside the national HQ in Tunis. This space was used by the NEC to call for sit-ins and 
give speeches, as well as by the UGTT Left to vent its frustration at the official leadership. Many central 
and dramatic events in the history of the country happened here, examples of which include: in the early 
1970s the radical students criticising Achour’s policy of compromise clashed with the “UGTT militia”, 
in January 1978 the police surrounded the HQ to prevent the demonstrations from leaving, on 14 
January 2011 the demonstration against Ben Ali started from there, and in December 2012 the HQ were 
stormed by pro-government protesters. 
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growth rate exceeded the per capita GDP growth rate. Furthermore, these increases in 
the average wage were accompanied by a reduction in wage dispersion (Zouari 1989). 
 
Graph 7 – Real wages and GPD per capita growth (Tunisia, 1961-2013) 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on Ben Chaabane 2014 and WB Databank data. 
 
 At this moment of labour strength, which, among other things, boosted 
Achour’s political aspirations, organisational inducements also proved to be 
ineffective. It was the union itself that dismantled the triangular state-party-union 
architecture under rank-and-file and left-wing pressure. As seen above, the most iconic 
fissure appeared in January 1978 when Achour resigned from the PSD Political 
Bureau. The politically weak Mzali, after becoming PM, sought a compromise with 
the UGTT by allowing the 15th Congress to proceed, but his attempts to win the trade 
union’s loyalty failed and he would soon turn to support the Islamists instead. In 1982, 
in fact, the UGTT refused to lend legitimacy to the new five-year plan by boycotting 
the consultations and, in 1983, it withdrew from the ESC (Bellin 2002, p. 111). State 
retaliation commenced in 1984-85, when most organisational inducements were 
suspended. In 1977-78 and 1984-86, the government temporarily ended the UGTT’s 
monopoly by recognising and encouraging the Mouvement Force Ouvrière Tunisienne 
and the UNTT respectively. 
 Constraints were then the last resort of the regime and, while they were 
relaxed in the first Nouira years, they were then deployed with increasing 












































































blatant. This did not only come directly in the form of the removal of the legitimate 
NEC in 1978 and 1985-86 but also indirectly when the NEC itself cracked down on 
those trade unionists that refused to abide by its policies of relative compromise.  
 The main tool of inside repression was the Internal Regulation Commission, 
charged with examining and sanctioning members suspected of breaching the UGTT’s 
internal regulation. Another tool was the Financial Control Commission, in charge of 
supervising the use of the UGTT’s funds. The SG, the Secretary of Internal Regulation, 
and the Secretary of Finances thus controlled the most important engines of what 
union militants call the “machine” of “trade union bureaucracy”.211 The “machine” 
could dissolve lower-level ECs or warn, suspend, or expel a union member, and loyalty 
to the NEC was often an important criterion in the decision.212 The suspension of union 
membership, known in the union jargon as tajrid (ouster), was often a de facto green 
light for direct state repression (including intimidation, workplace transfers, layoffs, 
military service in remote areas, and arrests), a practice that would continue to exist 
during Ben Ali’s reign.213 The so-called “UGTT militia”, a body of union stewards 
from the loyal sectors (like dockers or transport workers), acted to support internal 
repression, as they were used on several occasions to quell union dissidents.214 
 An example of internal repression can be found in the 1975 secondary teaching 
general strike. In the aftermath, Achour annihilated the federation’s EC and simply 
substituted it with a more pliant one. Indeed, the epithet “puppets” that would soon be 
used to refer to the illegitimate trade unionists that usurped the Achourists’ place in 
the NEC was first used to designate the secondary teaching EC manoeuvred by Achour 
himself (Zeghidi 2007, pp. 112-3). At the same time, several unionists were transferred 
to remote regions or fired.  
 For what concerns collective bargaining, the initial surge in wildcat strikes put 
a strain on unilateral wage determination by the state and, in 1973, the government, 
the UGTT, and the UTICA established a system of national-sectorial negotiations for 
the non-agricultural private sector. This signals that the regime was willing to 
recognise some level of stable trade union penetration in the private sector. 
                                                 
211 Interviews 50, 54, 65, 82, 87, 91. 
212 Achour himself writes that the “deviation from the principles of the UGTT” (translated from French 
by the author) was a sufficient reason for disciplinary measures to be taken (Achour 1989, p. 149 and 
p. 160). 
213 Interviews 54, 63, 65, 66, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 81, 82, 86, 87, 94. 
214 Interviews 48, 50, 65, 66, 82. In the early 1970s, the “UGTT militia” was also deployed to confront 
Tunisia’s student movement (Hamzaoui 2013, p. 30; Naccache 2009, pp. 152-3). 
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 On 20 March 1973, the UGTT and the UTICA signed a Frame Collective 
Agreement (FCA), establishing the general conditions for the national-sectorial 
agreements that would then be applied to all employers and employees of a given 
sector, regardless of membership in the signatory organisations.215 The wages and 
conditions of the SOE workers were determined either by the statute of the enterprise 
or, if this was absent, by the relevant private sector national-sectorial agreement 
(Zouari 1989, p. 331). Collective bargaining was not institutionalised for public 
administration and for the setting of the minimum wage, although the UGTT had some 
influence in both domains (Ibid., pp. 331-3).216 
 Between 1974 and 1977, 39 sectorial agreements were signed (Ibid., p. 332). 
The presidency and the government probably had a significant influence over the 
outcome of the negotiations. Nevertheless, this was the most advanced collective 
bargaining system in North Africa (which remains true to this day). The collective 
agreements contained several improvements in working conditions, on top of the wage 
increases. However, collective bargaining was suppressed between 1978 and 1980, 
and once again in 1985. 
 In respect to workers’ representation, the 1973 FCA established a new 
workplace representation body, the Joint Consultative Commission (JCC), for all firms 
with 20 or more employees (Art. 39-42). Some of the tasks of the JCC overlapped 
with those of the Enterprise Committee, but its specific function was that of 
monitoring the application of the national-sectorial collective agreements. The FCA 
also improved the recognition of trade union rights in the workplace (Art. 5), stating 
explicitly that workers were free to join the legal trade unions (there was only one, of 
course) and that they could not be discriminated against for being union members. The 
employer or manager also had to provide a notice board for union communications 
and to meet the union representatives at least once a month. As shown above, however, 
anti-union discrimination reached gigantic proportions during the years of repression, 
despite the FCA. 
 While in the early 1970s the government expanded most labour rights, it 
restricted the right to strike since the beginning of the transitional period. The 1973 
amendments to the Labour Code (Law 73-78 of 8 December 1973) augmented prison 
                                                 
215 See the Minister of Social Affairs’ ordinance (arrêté) of 29 May 1973. 
216 The union, for example, negotiated with the government a new statute for public administration 
workers promulgated as decree 75-355 of 3 June 1975 and the new firm-level statutes of SOE workers. 
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terms for the instigators of illegal strikes (Art. 388) and facilitated the requisition of 
workers that by striking threatened a “vital interest of the nation” (Art. 389-90). The 
1976 amendments to the Labour Code (Law 76-84 of 11 August 1976) mandated a 40-
day warning for a strike to be considered legal (Art. 376 bis), which was soon 
corrected to a 10-day warning.217 Strikers were on several occasions prosecuted by the 
authorities or harassed by the Destourian “militias” (Achour 1989; Belaïd 1989, pp. 
207-14). 
 During the transitional period, class struggles in Tunisia were unable to prevent 
neoliberal restructuring, which – as a global trend – was unlikely to be reversed by 
events taking place in a small, marginal country. These struggles, however, dismantled 
the triangular state-party-union architecture as it had existed – a remarkable 
achievement that did not obtain in the other Arab populist countries. This outcome had 
important long-term consequences in that it posed limits on how the corporatist 
alliance between union and party-state could be reconstituted in the neoliberal phase 
and it left significant space for manoeuvre to the UGTT Left. 
 
4.4 The Neoliberal Phase: Authoritarian Post-Populist Corporatism 
In the neoliberal phase, authoritarian corporatism was rebuilt in a new, post-populist 
form. While substantial inducements to the workers were gradually retrenched and the 
regime was opened to a greater extent to international capital and Ben Ali’s crony 
capitalist clique (post-populism), high levels of organisational inducements were 
maintained (corporatism) – although informal inducements gained in relative 
importance – and high levels of constraints also persisted (authoritarianism). The 
informalisation of organisational inducements can be interpreted as a ploy made 
necessary by former struggles. In fact, after the “bloody divorce” of 1978, the formal 
interpenetration of state, party, and union posts was no longer viable and had to be 
substituted with less explicit and visible clientelist relations. 
 It is important to note, however, that the social and individual wages kept 
increasing, but at a slower pace relative to the post-independence phase. Retrenchment 
of these substantial inducements, then, did not mean an absolute loss but rather a 
decline in their pace of growth relative to the post-independence phase. This dynamic 
signified both a suspension of the post-independence populist social pact and a 
                                                 
217 See the correction (rectificatif) of 20 August 1976. 
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continuing increase in some dimensions of working-class power (see Chapter 5). The 
contradiction between the conservation and the stiffening of a rigid authoritarian 
corporatist system of labour institutions, on the one hand, and social change, 
particularly the suspension of the populist social pact and increased working-class 
power, on the other hand, contributed to the demise of this system in an abrupt and 
insurrectional manner. 
 The retrenchment of substantial inducements also signified a suspension of the 
post-independence trend towards rapidly expanding job security, as shown in the 
changing technical composition of the Tunisian working class. Employment in 
manufacturing stopped growing quantitatively (see Graph 8)218 and changed 
qualitatively. Relatively secure employment in the SOEs declined, and precarious 
employment in private sector light manufacturing for export increased. 
Employment in public administration grew from 13% of total employment in 
1961 to 17-18% in the mid 1980s, after which it remained at the same level until the 
uprising. As employment in industry and public administration stagnated, the burden 
of expanding employment opportunities fell entirely on the shoulders of the private 
service sector. To a larger extent than in Western countries, most new employment in 
services meant a wide and fragmented array of deskilled jobs in highly precarious 
conditions. 
 
Graph 8 – Total employment by economic sector (Tunisia, 1961-2014) 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on Ben Chaabane 2014. 
                                                 















































Graph 9 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 1986-2005 
 
 
Calculated by the author based on ILO data. 
 
Between 1985 and 1988, the regime survived on sheer labour repression: the 
UGTT NEC was sequestered by the shourafa, collective bargaining was suspended, 
and trade union militants were kept out of public administration or transferred to 
remote areas. However, the continuing rise of the Islamists, on the one hand, and 
persistent wildcat strikes against the effects of the restructuring (see Graph 9), on the 
other, made this arrangement difficult to sustain (see also Alexander 1996a). 
Interior Minister Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali became PM on 2 October 1987 and 
President of the Republic on 7 November 1987 as a result of the so-called “medical 
coup”, in which a team of doctors declared Bourguiba “psychophysically” unfit to 
rule. Ben Ali initially consolidated his power by promising nothing short of 
democratisation, as stated in his 7 November 1987 Declaration. This promise was 
reiterated in the 7 November 1988 National Pact, signed by all the main civil society 
organisations (including the UGTT) and political parties of the country, from the PCT 
to the Islamist MTI (Chouikha and Gobe 2015, p. 49). Only the radical Left refused to 
cooperate.219 
The promise of democratisation, however, was soon revealed to be hollow. In 
the April 1989 elections, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD)220 
won all parliamentary seats and Ben Ali was elected as President with 100% of the 
                                                 
219 In the meantime, most of El ‘Amel Ettounsi had become the Parti Communiste des Ouvriers de 
Tunisie (PCOT) and Esh’ola had further splintered into several tendencies, the largest ones collectively 
known as the Democratic Patriots (Watad). 
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votes (unsurprisingly, as he was the only candidate). The Islamist party Ennahda (ex-
MTI) was denied legal recognition altogether and would soon be harshly repressed 
(Perkins 2014, pp. 195-6). As Ben Ali decided not to compromise with the Islamists, 
he had to find a social basis elsewhere, and the easiest solution was to reconstitute the 
corporatist alliance with the UGTT (see also Khiari 2003, pp. 68-74), which had been 
dismantled with the repression that characterised Bourguiba’s last years. 
In 1988, Ben Ali appointed a National Labour Commission in charge of 
overseeing new elections in the UGTT’s base and intermediate levels, in view of 
preparing the UGTT 17th Congress. In the process, the trade unionists that had been 
imprisoned, laid off, transferred, or suspended from the union were reinstated. The 
UGTT assets that the state had confiscated were returned to the union. 
The 17th UGTT Congress was held on 17-19 April 1989 in Sousse. In the lead-
up to the Congress, the National Labour Commission had collaborated with the regime 
to contain the number of leftist and Islamist delegates (Alexander 1996a, pp. 264-5). 
The two main contenders were both Achourists with a history of militancy and 
imprisonment during the 1970s and early 1980s. Ali Romdhane was a Sfaxian civil 
servant and a former SG of the agricultural federation221 who ran on a platform of 
alliance with the Islamists present within the union (Zeghidi 1997, pp. 54-5). Ismail 
Sahbani was a former metal worker from the Bizerte region, SG of the metal workers’ 
federation, and the candidate backed by the regime. Most of the Left supported 
Sahbani, fearing that Ali Romdhane would open the way for Ennahda to take control 
of the UGTT (Ibidem). In any case, the people interviewed for this thesis and other 
observers were unanimous in arguing that the Congress was an unequal compromise 
that was heavily influenced by the regime: 
The Tunisian regime had its strategists; it had its own interpretation of the 
union and political landscape. They knew very well that within the UGTT 
the Achourists are not homogeneous. Ali Romdhane is Achour’s cousin, 
he’s a Kerkennian, an engineer, more or less an intellectual, but his defect 
was that he was a bit close to the Islamists. […] Sahbani had assembled a 
broad coalition with the Destourians and the Left, because the regime had 
managed to demonise Ali Romdhane. He used to be called Ali Sistani, like 
                                                 
221 The agricultural federation organises more Ministry of Agriculture employees than agricultural 
labourers. 
 154
the imam of Najaf.222 […] Sahbani was rotten, he was a crook and an 
ignorant, and everybody knows that. And he was just a puppet in the hands 
of Ben Ali, he did everything he could to quell any form of militancy 
within the UGTT, all forms of dissent. (Interview 82) 
 
 The regime wanted to maintain a leadership at the top of the UGTT that would 
deliver organised societal support to Ben Ali without opposing neoliberal 
restructuring. Indeed, the UGTT NEC signed a declaration of support for Ben Ali 
before every presidential election and Sahbani abandoned substantial opposition to 
structural adjustment. In 1993, the parliament approved a new Investment Code that 
increased incentives for foreign investors. For what concerns the UGTT, the most 
painful and controversial measure was the reform of the Labour Code that occurred in 
two rounds, in 1994 and 1996 (see below). 
 However, acceptance of neoliberal reforms, coupled with escalating 
authoritarianism and corruption in the management of the UGTT, undermined 
Sahbani’s grip on the organisation. An interviewed trade unionist stated: 
 
It was Sahbani who gave the UGTT to Ben Ali, for its own economic 
interests, a lot of money. The regime let him do what he pleased, and this 
has been proven. Sahbani was chased away because he was totally corrupt 
and because he accepted the erasure of past achievements. Before we used 
to have the Enterprise Committees, but they were substituted with the 
Enterprise Joint Commissions. The difference is that the Enterprise 
Committees could intervene with the boss even in the strategy of the firm. 
And many other things in the Labour Code, like the fact that you can’t 
have a permanent job before four years of employment and that the bosses 
can outsource the workers. If he stayed any longer there would be no 
UGTT by now. He used to work directly with the Interior Ministry, if a 
trade unionist bothered him he took up the phone and said: “Hey, he’s a 
fundamentalist”. (Interview 53) 
 
 In September 2000, Sahbani was removed from his post of UGTT SG and, in 
                                                 
222 Ali Sistani is a highly influential Iranian Islamic cleric based in Iraq. 
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2001, was sentenced to thirteen years in prison on misappropriation charges (Le 
monde, 26 June 2001). One possible reason is that, during an interview in the USA in 
December 1999, Sahbani did not contradict a journalist who suggested he could 
become the future President of Tunisia (Business news, 31 January 2012). Yet a deeper 
cause could be that Sahbani – despite being re-elected SG for the third time at the 
UGTT 19th Congress in 1999 – had increasingly lost legitimacy in the eyes of large 
sections of the base and the intermediate structures: 
 
Rage in society was starting to mount and the trade union confederation 
could not take Sahbani’s style of leadership anymore. The regime started 
to fear that – if things were left like that – it might be caught by surprise 
by some major social explosion, which could get out of hand, become 
politicised, and threaten its security. So they thought it best to change, to 
try to postpone and channel [discontent]… (Interview 57) 
 
 Militants refused to defend Sahbani and actually cooperated in the plot to 
dismiss him (see Hamzaoui 2013, pp. 1280-98).223 Sahbani was provisionally replaced 
by the long-time Secretary of Internal Regulation – and Achour’s former right hand – 
Abdessalem Jerad, the Sfaxian former SG of the transport federation. 
 Jerad’s leadership was confirmed at the Extraordinary 20th Congress that took 
place on 7-9 February 2002 in Djerba. The main opposition was led by Ali Romdhane 
and the Marxist Salah Zeghidi224 with their “Trade Union Platform for the 
Rehabilitation of the UGTT”. Ali Romdhane and two of his associates were integrated 
into the NEC, while Zeghidi and his followers broke away to form a more 
confrontational third list that won no seats (Gobe 2002). In a move reminiscent of Ben 
Ali’s, Jerad began his mandate with the promise to end the union dictatorship that had 
characterised Sahbani’s time. Taking advantage of this favourable conjuncture, the 
UGTT Left won the approval of a new Article 10 of the internal regulation, 
establishing a two-term limit for permanence in the UGTT NEC. Article 10 would 
later become a highly symbolic point of contention in the struggle for internal 
democracy. 
                                                 
223 Interviews 53, 57, 75, 88. 
224 Zeghidi was the former SG of the banking federation. 
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 In the neoliberal phase, the most important change in labour institutions was 
the gradual retrenchment of the substantial inducements that had characterised the 
post-independence phase. This is mainly seen in the flexibilisation of the formal labour 
market, the decline in the share of public employment, and the great slowdown in the 
rate of increase of real wages and welfare expenditure. 
 A new form of precarious work was introduced with the creation of a legal 
framework for internships.225 Furthermore, a law establishing Special Economic 
Zones was approved, stating that in such zones all contracts were fixed-term (Law 92-
81 of 3 August 1992, Art. 23).226 While labour outsourcing had always existed in the 
private sector, in the 1990s it became more diffuse and it started to hit the public sector 
heavily too (King 2013). 
 After the 1996 reform of the Labour Code (Law 96-62 of 15 July 1996), Article 
6-4 specifies a list of situations in which fixed-term contracts can be used,227 but then 
states that fixed-term contracts can be adopted in other cases for no longer than four 
years, after which the worker must receive an open-ended contract. In line with the 
global trend, this provided the legal framework for the diffusion of formal precarious 
employment across the economy. Workers on fixed-term contracts faced likely 
dismissal after the four-year period and found it virtually impossible to join workplace 
unions that were not directed by management (Gondino 2015, p. 114).228 It is thus very 
unlikely that the more stringent procedures for economic and technological layoffs 
(Labour Code, Art. 21) compensated for such losses in job security. 
 In respect to public sector employment, between 1987 and 2010, 219 SOEs 
were privatised (ITCEQ 2010, p. 29). Outsourcing and automation also reduced the 
number of workers in the remaining SOEs. Total public sector employment (public 
administration plus the SOEs) declined from 41% of wage-earners in 1980 (Zouari 
1989, p. 339) to no more than 32% of wage-earners (and possibly less than that) in 
2010.229 
 If during the post-independence phase the yearly average increase in the 
                                                 
225 See Decree 87-1190 of 26 August 1987 and Decree 87-715 of 31 March 1988. 
226 Two Special Economic Zones would be created, one in Bizerte and the other in Zarzis. 
227 The start-up of a new firm, a peak in demand, the replacement of an absent worker, emergency work, 
and seasonal work. 
228 Interviews 53, 62. 
229 Calculated by the author with data from the IMF (2014, p. 13). However, data from Tunisia’s INS 
are different. For example, according to the IMF, the Tunisian public administration employed 615,000 
wage-earners in 2012, while the INS places their number at 533,000 – a significant divergence. 
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average real wage was 6.15% (1962-1983), in the neoliberal phase this figure was 
reduced to 1.3% (1984-2011) (see Graph 7, p. 147). Moreover, as a study 
commissioned by the UGTT lamented, the share of the net wage bill in GDP fell from 
33% in 1983 to 26% in 2001, signalling a decline of relative wages (Bédoui and 
Mkaddem 2006, p. 123). 
 This trend in individual wages was paralleled by a slowdown in the increase in 
the social wage, especially for what concerns healthcare and poverty relief. Between 
1987 and 2007, the average yearly increase in healthcare expenditure was a modest 
1.4%, less than half the average per capita GDP growth (Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 211). 
Regarding poverty relief, the government gradually diminished consumption subsidies 
and substituted them with targeted cash transfers and other forms of aid to low-income 
families (Ibid., p. 217). As Mahmoud Ben Romdhane noted, while consumption 
subsidies are universal and therefore unconditional, targeted transfers are amenable to 
all kinds of clientelist practices geared towards political control (Ibid., pp. 231-40). 
Indeed, the lists of the households eligible for aid were compiled by loyalist RCD 
members who would exclude troublemakers and ensure the submission of the 
recipients. Poverty relief had thus become the main tool in the hands of the regime to 
regulate the precarious fractions of the working class.230 
 The two sectors of welfare in which the state maintained a strong performance 
were education and social security.231 Between 1987 and 2007, public expenditure on 
social security grew from 3.5% of GDP to 6.8% (Ibid., p. 219). In the same period, the 
average growth in education expenditure was about 6.5% (Ibid., p. 210). The number 
of high school and university graduates increased massively (see Table 8), although 
this came at the cost of a fall in their average educational achievement.  
 
Table 8 – Population aged over 10 by educational level (Tunisia, 1966, 1980 and 2011) 
 
 1966 1980 2011 
Nothing 67.5% 48.3% 18.4% 
Primary 27.3% 37.3% 32.8% 
Secondary 3.8% 13.0% 36.6% 
University 0.6% 1.4% 12.3% 
Calculated by the author based on INS 1973, INS 1981, and INS 2013. 
                                                 
230 It is interesting to note that, with the 2008 financial crisis, food prices underwent sudden spikes in 
2008 and 2010, for which the cash transfers were unable to compensate. 
231 However, even in this best performing domain, one should note that unemployment insurance did 
not exist, which left workers hit by precarisation very vulnerable to the vagaries of the labour market. 
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 Tunisia’s policy-makers possibly thought that keeping the young in education 
for longer could be a palliative for youth unemployment. However, as it turned out, 
this was hardly a recipe for political stability. In fact, while the public sector was 
contracting, investment in the private sector was too weak to create suitable 
employment for the new graduates. Even according to official statistics, between 1994 
and 2011, the unemployment rate for university graduates jumped from 4% (INS 
1995) to 29.9% (INS 2013).232 
 In the post-independence phase, the average yearly GDP per capita growth was 
3.2% and the average yearly growth in per capita welfare expenditure was 5.7% (1960-
1986) (see Table 9). In the neoliberal phase, while GDP per capita growth maintained 
the same pace overall, the growth of the social wage stabilised at 3.2% – and excluding 
increases in social security expenditures it stood at just 1.6%. 
 
Table 9 – Per capita GDP growth and welfare expenditures, constant prices (Tunisia) 
 
 Average yearly per 
capita GDP growth 
Average yearly per 
capita growth in 
welfare expenditures 
Average yearly per 




1960-1986 3.2% 5.7% 5.6% 
1987-2010 3.2% 3.2% 1.6% 
Ben Romdhane 2011, p. 224. 
 
 The available figures confirm that a retrenchment of the populist social pact 
took place, but – for what concerns wages and welfare – this took the form of a 
significant slowdown in increases relative to the post-independence phase, rather than 
an absolute loss. Furthermore, disaffection was aggravated by the cronyism and 
clientelism typical of post-populist regimes in the region, in blatant contradiction with 
the meritocratic rhetoric that had been central in Bourguiba’s discourse. 
 In the neoliberal phase, organisational inducements to the UGTT featured 
some important elements of continuity. The 1% wage check-off system was not 
restored, and union dues were reduced to a lower monthly fixed amount.233 Yet the 
                                                 
232 It should be remembered, however, that someone is socially considered an unemployed graduate 
even if she is working, as long as the conditions that characterise her job fall below what is normally 
held to be the appropriate minimum for the level of education she has attained. 
233 In 2015, the union card cost 2 TDn per month in the public sector and 1 TDn per month in the private 
sector. Considering that the national minimum wage was 290 TDn per month, it is clear that the cost of 
membership became less than 1% of the wage (as it used to be). 
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state still directly transferred to the UGTT the dues of those public sector wage-earners 
that declared their will to join the union. The UGTT’s monopoly of workers’ 
representation, its participation in the peak tripartite bodies,234 and state-funded 
secondments were all maintained. In addition, the CNSS directly transferred a certain 
sum of money to the UGTT every year. 235 
 However, the struggles of the 1970s had demolished the triangular state-party-
union architecture as it had previously existed. This was formalised on 30 November-
1 December 1981, when the UGTT National Council forbade trade unionists from 
holding authority posts in the union and the party at the same time (Jeune Afrique, 9 
December 1981). Formal and publicly visible intersections between union, on the one 
hand, and party-state, on the other, were thus reduced. However, this was compensated 
by informal patron-client relations, only perceivable through word of mouth or sudden 
scandals (often engineered by the corruptors themselves to marginalise the corrupted 
who had started to bother them). 
 As discussed above, corruption within the UGTT had always existed, as it did 
in many trade unions the world over. It is impossible to ascertain whether the level of 
actual corruption increased or decreased over the decades, but perceived corruption 
seems to have augmented. On this matter, Béatrice Hibou wrote: 
 
The perception of an increase in corruption also unveils a transformation 
in the modes of governance and in the rules of social life. Without a doubt, 
corruption has augmented quantitatively less than it has undergone a 
change in its role and meaning: it is today much more intrusive, and more 
political too, it works as an important dispositif of voluntary serfdom.236 
(Hibou 2006, pp. 340-1) 
 
 Indeed, vigorous denunciations of the corruption of the “union bureaucracy” 
are recurrent in most of the interviews collected, and this was the evaluation of an 
internal opposition current: 
                                                 
234 In 1988, the Higher Council for the Plan was renamed Higher Council for Development. 
235 According to Ben Romdhane (2011, p. 245), in 2005 the UGTT had a budget of almost 10 million 
TDn. 5.1 million dinars in union dues were collected by the state from public sector workers, 2.4 million 
dinars were provided by the CNSS, 310,000 dinars were gifts from private firms and organisations, and 
only 626,000 dinars were union dues collected directly from workers by the UGTT. 
236 Translated from French by the author. 
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Clientelism has spread along with opportunism, through the systematic 
exploitation of the membership fees and the revenues of its [the UGTT’s] 
economic institutions, based on adulation and personal, tribal, and 
regional allegiances.237 (RSDM 2010a, see Chapter 7) 
 
 State actors and employers systematically provided opportunist union leaders 
with patronage for themselves and for seeking the allegiance of lower-level unionists 
and workers.238 This did not only buy the recipients’ loyalty but was also a tool for 
blackmail in case they started to show less gratitude down the line. The trajectory of 
Sahbani himself is the perfect illustration of this, but – according to the interviews 
collected – the system was much more capillary than that. As reported on the wake of 
Sahbani’s demise: 
 
[H]e [Sahbani] tried by any means to place his men in all regional unions, 
workplace unions, and national sectorial federations. The “manipulations 
by these accomplices”, as reported by a trade union official, were realised 
through bonuses, improvements in wages and conditions, company cars, 
fuel vouchers, trips abroad, and protection of the union rank-and-file in 
case of conflict.239 (Réalités, 21 September 2000) 
 
 An important informal advantage for loyalist trade unionists was the possibility 
to solve problems and gain advantages for their base, thanks to intervention from 
above by party-state officials, rather than through autonomous mobilisation from 
below. As an oppositional trade unionist explained: 
 
It’s remarkable and somewhat paradoxical that, at the time, there was a 
parallel between the UGTT and the state. Because it was the state, Ben 
Ali, that intervened to solve all problems just like the UGTT NEC did. 
[…] So the NEC intervened directly with the presidential cabinet, the 
governors, or the ministers […], sometimes in very dodgy ways. Like, 
there is a struggle in a given sector to solve whatever problem. [A member 
                                                 
237 Translated from Arabic by Inel Tarfa and the author. 
238 Interviews 48, 50, 54, 59, 65, 81, 87, 91. 
239 Translated from French by the author. 
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of the NEC] can call the Minister and say: “Leave the problem as it is, 
until those unionists are forced to come here and ask me to intervene”. 
And there you go, then he’s the boss, he can solve the problems that the 
others were unable to sort out. (Interview 87) 
 
 At peak level, this meant a strict relationship between the UGTT SG and the 
President himself: 
 
Ben Ali, he’s a clever wolf, he wanted to keep Sahbani on his side. […] 
So he gave him some strength; when there was a deadlock in a given 
sector, Sahbani used to go to Ben Ali to sort out the problem. […] 
Solutions were in the Carthage Palace [the presidential palace]. […] It was 
a policy to put in people’s minds that all problems will be sorted out by 
Ben Ali. (Interview 75) 
 
 This easy access to state authorities (most importantly on the occasion of 
national-sectorial collective bargaining), together with the traditional prestige 
associated with UGTT leadership, is behind the widespread opinion that the UGTT 
NEC members “were like ministers”. These informal relations compensated for the 
weakness of formal incorporating institutions.240 A crucial formal incorporating 
mechanism, however, were the tri-annual national and national-sectorial collective 
bargaining rounds (see below).  
 High constraints were a prominent feature of the neoliberal phase. Tunisia’s 
human rights record remained appalling, and the state continued to limit trade union 
democracy, the right to strike, collective bargaining, and workplace organisation and 
representation. 
 Reportedly, after Sahbani’s ousting, outright fraud in the UGTT’s internal 
elections became increasingly difficult to commit. However, even before this, the 
“bureaucracy” preferred to respect electoral formalities as much as possible in order 
to bolster its legitimacy. According to the UGTT internal regulation of the time, only 
                                                 
240 For example, Decree 2000-1990 of 12 September 2000 approved the creation of the National Council 
of Social Dialogue, but it never actually came into existence. 
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the workplace unions could send delegates to the national Congresses.241 The 
“machine”, therefore, had to try to persuade, directly or through the intermediate 
structures, with reasoning or by offering advantages, the workplace unions to send 
pliant Congress delegates.242 When this failed, the national leaders could use the 
Internal Regulation and the Financial Control Commissions to attempt to remove the 
troublemaking rank-and-file members from their posts, or they could push the base 
(sometimes with the help of the employer or even the police, or simply by offering 
some advantages) to request a no-confidence vote or to elect “moderate” union 
representatives the next time.243 A rank-and-file trade unionist explained: 
 
I’ll give you an example of the collaboration between the [union] 
bureaucracy and the RCD. Say I’m a dissident and I’m bound for being 
elected as union representative. My boss calls me and says: “If you run as 
a candidate we’ll take away some of your benefits” or “We’ll transfer you 
to some other area”. Behind this, there is some union official who wants 
to prevent me from being elected. (Interview 54) 
 
 Other techniques were, for example, gerrymandering or the creation of yellow 
workplace unions in agreement with the employers, sometimes inflating the official 
number of their members.244 When simple manipulation did not work, the “union 
bureaucracy” collaborated with the state security and judicial apparatuses and with the 
employers to crack down on dissent.245 
 For what concerns the right to strike, the legislation remained unchanged. 
According to Christopher Alexander, the UGTT NEC was the first to support the status 
quo (Alexander 2001, pp. 116-7), as the requirement that all strikes be approved by 
                                                 
241 Some trade unionists suggest that this rule reflected Farhat Hached’s strong democratic principles. 
However, the UGTT 23rd Congress of 2017 resolved to extend the right to send Congress delegates to 
intermediate structures. 
242 Interviews 48, 50, 75, 78, 82, 91. 
243 Interviews 50, 53, 54, 57, 62, 71, 72, 75, 79, 82, 91. 
244 Electoral manipulation was allegedly more severe in the private sector, where workers are easier to 
blackmail, or in wealthy but low-skilled public sectors, such as mining and chemicals. Conversely, 
manipulation was harder to carry out in most public administration federations, where the workforce 
was more educated and politicised (Interviews 79, 81, 87, 82, 91). 
245 Interviews 48, 54, 24, 71, 82, 91. The following is a notable example: in 1997, when some trade 
unionists circulated a petition asking for transparency in the financial management of the UGTT, the 
NEC denounced them to the authorities and four of them spent one month in prison (Hamzaoui 2013, 
p. 1287). 
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the confederation to be considered legal gave the central leadership great powers over 
the rank-and-file. As a union representative of an electronics factory complained: 
 
[The rank-and-file unionists from the Fouchana industrial estate] 
thoroughly supported us, but they can’t take decisions alone. Many of 
them told us: “We’re ready to launch a solidarity strike, the workers in our 
factories will stand by your side”. But they couldn’t do it because the 
problem in Tunisia is that the rank-and-file can’t issue a strike notice; it’s 
the Regional EC or the NEC who does that. (Interview 62) 
 
 One success of Ben Ali’s regime in its quest for social peace was the 
stabilisation of national and national-sectorial collective bargaining. The collective 
agreements lasted for a fixed time of three years and were always renewed on time. 
For the private sector, the UGTT and the UTICA negotiated an inter-sectorial national 
level “accord cadre”,246 establishing the issues to be discussed in the national-sectorial 
negotiations. On these bases, the sectorial federations of the “most representative 
organisations” (which for labour obviously meant the UGTT in all sectors) negotiated 
51 national-sectorial collective agreements over wages and conditions.247 Further 
bargaining could take place at firm level, but only if it was geared towards an 
improvement of the wage levels and conditions already established by the national-
sectorial agreement.248 
 It is not easy to assess the extent to which the state constrained the process and 
the outcomes of the negotiations. The discourse of the Ministry of Social Affairs is 
that its role was merely that of facilitator, consultant, and guarantor of legality.249 On 
the contrary, critical trade unionists charge that it was “just a show” – that technocrats 
studied beforehand a suggested range of wage increases and the presidency intervened 
in cases of recalcitrance by the social partners.250 These claims are reinforced by the 
fact that the employers had similar complaints (Cammett 2007, pp. 122-3). A plausible 
                                                 
246 Not to be confused with the 1973 FCA, which was reformed in 1984, 1992, and 2004, and contained 
more general guidelines valid beyond the three-year period of the national-sectorial collective 
agreements. 
247 The national-sectorial bargaining normally took place in March and April, so that the signature was 
celebrated on May Day under the banners of social peace and national unity. 
248 Firm-level agreements, however, were not very widespread in the private sector. In fact, in 2008, 
just roughly twenty firm-level agreements existed (UGTT 2008). 
249 Interviews 59, 64. 
250 Interviews 53, 55, 91. 
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conclusion is that the negotiations left some real space for manoeuvre – as suggested 
by the fact that strikes did take place and that on some occasions the social partners 
failed to meet the May Day deadline – but that this space was limited by the political 
and economic priorities of the regime.251  
 Concerning workplace organisation and representation, the 1992 FCA revision 
expanded the protections for trade unionists established in the 1973 version. Anti-
union behaviour, however, remained widespread in the private sector,252 although the 
UGTT managed to build a solid and stable presence in many large enterprises (see 
Chapter 5). In fact, as the state had given the UGTT the role of negotiator for the 
private sector at the national level, it had to allow for a certain level of union 
penetration in private companies to preserve the credibility of this role. 
 With the 1994 Labour Code reform (Laws 94-29 of 21 February 1994), the 
Enterprise Committee and the Joint Consultative Commission were fused into a single 
representational body called the Enterprise Joint Commission (EJC), to be established 
in every firm with 40 workers or more.253 In 2010, the actual coverage rate of EJCs 
and personnel delegates was 42% of eligible firms.254 The EJC’s functions were 
similar to those of the Enterprise Committee, but while the 1966 Labour Code stated 
that the latter had to be consulted “in order to be progressively associated to the 
management and development of the firm” (Art. 161),255 the wording of the new 
version made no reference to co-management. 
 To sum up, authoritarian corporatism became “cheaper”, perceivably more 
clientelist, and remained repressive. The co-optation of the union “machine” through 
the continuation and informalisation of organisational inducements was accompanied 
by the repression of internal dissidents and the retrenchment of substantial 
inducements to the workers. The limitations on trade union democracy suppressed the 
feedback mechanisms that could have allowed the base to voice their grievances over 
the diminishing quality of their socioeconomic rights through institutionalised outlets. 
There was no exit option either, since the state was determined to enforce the UGTT’s 
monopoly of workers’ representation to avoid the emergence of more radical 
                                                 
251 Interestingly, even some trade unionists said that the presidency used to intervene more often in 
favour of the workers, especially in the most fragile sectors, in order to guarantee social peace 
(Interviews 53, 93). 
252 Interviews 53, 62, 84, 90, 92. 
253 Firms employing between 20 and 40 workers retained the right to elect one personnel delegate. 
254 Calculated by the author using MAS 2014 and INS 2016b. 





This chapter analysed how class struggles transformed Tunisia’s labour institutions 
from the post-independence phase to the neoliberal one. When the Tunisian movement 
for independence entered its decisive stages, the UGTT already existed as an 
established national organisation and it was thus able to play a central role in such 
struggles. This reinforced its position in the post-independence balance of power, 
allowing it to influence to a significant extent the nature of the regime that emerged 
out of the anti-colonial struggles. 
 The relatively secure workers, through the UGTT, were incorporated in the 
social bases of the new regime, and this was institutionalised through an authoritarian 
populist corporatist system of labour institutions, characterised by high constraints 
(including the partial submission of the UGTT to the party-state), relatively high 
substantial inducements to the working class, and a system of organisational 
inducements based on a single trade union integrated into a triangular state-party-
union architecture. 
 Tunisia’s path of state-led development brought about significant changes in 
its working-class composition, the most important being increasing levels of education 
and a great expansion of industrial employment. Industrial workers and intellectual 
workers were the protagonists of the cycle of struggle that, through a strike wave 
mainly over wage levels, cracked the triangular state-party-union corporatist 
architecture by pressuring the UGTT leadership to distance itself from the Neo-
Destour, as epitomised by the 26 January 1978 national general strike. While these 
struggles ended in defeat, they had long-standing consequences. In fact, they partially 
contained the neoliberal retrenchment of substantial inducements, established a solid 
leftist anti-regime presence within the UGTT, and rendered its top leadership a less 
reliable ally of the regime. In fact, Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser estimated that 
the UGTT was the “weakest link” in the regime’s chain (Camau and Geisser 2003, pp. 
220-6). 
 In the neoliberal phase, Ben Ali reconstituted – in a new form – the corporatist 
arrangement that had been dismantled by the utter repression of labour in 1985-86. 
The resulting system of labour institutions can be called authoritarian post-populist 
corporatism. Constraints remained high, as shown by the regime’s renewed crackdown 
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on civil and political rights, meddling in union democracy, and limitations on labour 
rights. Substantial inducements were retrenched, but for the individual and the social 
wage this means that they grew at a much slower rate relative to the post-independence 
phase, not that they decreased in absolute terms. Organisational inducements were still 
based on a single trade union arrangement, but the relations between the UGTT and 
the party-state became more informal relative to the post-independence phase, and 
patrimonial practices took on a prominent role. 
 Authoritarian post-populist corporatism was a rigid system of labour 
institutions because – barring party mediation between labour and the state and union 
pluralism, and limiting the incorporation of the UGTT into wage negotiations and 
clientelism – it suppressed the feedback mechanisms that could have channelled 
workers’ discontent into institutionalised outlets. At the same time, working-class 
power in Tunisia remained relatively high for the standards of the region (see Chapter 
5). 
 As shown in Chapter 7, this state of affairs sharpened the “trade union dualism” 
that had emerged in the 1970s, with a deepening polarisation between the upholders 
of a policy of compromise, who commanded the union “machine” with its capillary 
patron-client network, and the politicised dissident trade unionists, who controlled 
some intermediate structures and had a significant following among segments of the 
base. The latter, notwithstanding the many internal grey areas of compromises and 
inconsistencies, developed an identity as “militants” struggling against both the “union 
bureaucracy” and the regime. The battle for democracy was raging within the UGTT 
itself, with important effects on the complex role of the union during the 2011 uprising. 
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Chapter 5 – Comparing Trade Unionism and Working-Class 





This chapter compares trade unionism and working-class power in Morocco and 
Tunisia on the eve of the 2011 Arab uprisings (see also Feltrin 2018a). The first section 
provides a picture of the presence and organisation of the trade unions in the two 
countries, as well as their relations with political parties and civil society 
organisations. The second section maps the relations of the trade unions with two types 
of marginalised workers: female workers and precarious workers. Finally, the last two 
sections discuss technical composition and working-class structural power, on the one 
hand, and political composition and working-class associational power, on the other.  
The analysis demonstrates that the level of working-class power was higher in 
Tunisia than in Morocco, in both its structural and associational dimensions. As 
illustrated in the previous chapters, these different levels of working-class power were 
the contingent results of successive historical rounds of social and particularly class 
struggles. 
This divergence in working-class power meant that, during the 2011 uprisings 
themselves, the mobilised Tunisian workers had more resources to push the UGTT to 
take up their grievances, and that the UGTT itself could mobilise more resources in 
this direction. To the contrary, in Morocco, the mobilised workers could exercise a 
weaker pressure on the trade unions, which themselves had less power to take radical 
actions in solidarity with the protests. The trade union leaderships behaved in 
contingent and unforeseeable ways, but they needed to take into account this different 
balance of power in their decisions. 
 
5.1 Trade Unionism in Morocco and Tunisia on the Eve of the Uprisings 
This section presents a comparison of trade unionism in Morocco and Tunisia on the 
eve of the 2011 Arab uprisings, focusing on the presence and organisation of the 
unions and on their relationships with political parties and civil society organisations. 
While the UGTT was a central actor in Tunisian political and associational life, the 
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Moroccan trade unions – while relevant – occupied a less preponderant position. 
In the 2000s, the three largest Moroccan confederations were – in decreasing 
order – the UMT, the CDT, and the FDT. The UMT still maintained its historical status 
as Morocco’s largest union, as indicated by the results of the professional elections. 
This is due to its long-standing dominance in the private sector and in some public 
agencies (especially the CNSS, the ONE, and the OFPPT)256 and to the power bases 
created by the UMT Left – starting in the 1990s – in teaching (UMT-FNE), agriculture 
(UMT-FNSA), and the local administrations (UMT-FNOFCL). These last three 
federations were in turn part of the umbrella federation Union Syndicale des 
Fonctionnaires (UMT-USF), which was also revitalised by the leftists in 2001. 
As the UMT is the oldest union, its dominance in the private sector is partially 
due to its presence in historical national firms. Its critics also claim that, because of its 
good relations with the CGEM, the UMT is often the confederation of choice for the 
creation of employer-sponsored unions.257 As seen above, in the 1960s the UMT 
renounced the multi-employer private sector national federations, except for the UMT-
USIB in banking. The private sector agricultural unions have been grouped, since 
1991, in the UMT-FNSA, along with the Ministry of Agriculture employees and other 
public sector agricultural unions (see Hakech 2013). The private sector agricultural 
workplace unions are now particularly numerous in the Souss-Massa region, which 
has an important concentration of foreign and national firms producing for export.258 
Most of the remaining UMT private sector workplace unions are not affiliated with 
any national sectorial multi-employer federation, and are thus organised in the 
framework of their local or regional unions. 
Historically, the most important area for manufacturing in Morocco was the 
Casablanca-Kenitra axis. Since the foundation of the Tangier Free Zone, in 1999, and 
the opening of the Tanger-Med cargo port, in 2007, the Tangier region has seen an 
increase in industrial employment and unrest,259 although unionisation remains low at 
around 5% (LO-FTF 2015, p. 19). 
The UMT traditional leadership has its stronghold in Casablanca, while the 
UMT Left used to control the regional union of Rabat-Salé-Témara with Khadija 
                                                 
256 Interview 6, 19, 44. 
257 Interviews 19, 21, 32. 
258 Interviews 19, 24, 29, 35, 47. 
259 Interviews 37, 38, 39, 41, 43. 
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Ghamiri as Regional SG. An interviewee observed that: “There were actually two 
UMTs, the ‘UMT-Casa’ and the ‘UMT-Rabat’…”.260 The UMT Left had also 
managed to gain a prominent presence in some local unions, such as Taza, Khemisset, 
Khouribga, and Al Hoceima. Outside of public administration, the Rabat UMT had 
been working with manufacturing workers in the industrial estates of Rabat, Salé, and 
Kenitra, especially in the textile sector, which underwent severe difficulties in facing 
international competition. In fact, the share of textile workers in the employed 
population decreased from 6.9% in 1999 to 4.9% in 2010,261 and many textile workers 
countrywide faced restructurings or closures without receiving legal severance pay.262 
Different from the UMT, the CDT and the FDT were dominant in public 
administration. Among the CDT’s strongest federations there were the Syndicat 
National de la Poste (CDT-SNP) and the Syndicat National de la Santé Publique 
(CDT-SNSP), while the FDT, before its internal crisis, was especially present in 
education through the Syndicat National de l’Enseignement (FDT-SNE) and in the 
Ministry of Justice through the Syndicat Démocratique de la Justice (FDT-SDJ). The 
CDT also had an important presence in the publicly-owned phosphate mining 
company OCP and in the formerly publicly-owned oil refinery SAMIR.263 Morocco’s 
academics are organised in a separate union called Syndicat National de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur (SNESup), founded in 1960 and historically close to the 
UNFP/USFP. 
In Tunisia, in the 2000s, the single trade union arrangement was still enforced 
by the regime, meaning that the UGTT was the only labour confederation in the 
country. In 2007, Gabes Regional SG Habib Guiza tried to break away from the UGTT 
and found a new confederation, but the state refused to lend it legal recognition. 
According to an internal survey, in 2006 the UGTT’s union representatives were 
39.2% manual workers, 20.7% clerks, 28% middle management, and 12% senior 
management (UGTT 2006, p. 20). This meant that a sizeable share of UGTT cadres 
                                                 
260 Interview 29. 
261 Calculated by the author based on HCP data. 
262 A salient example of major breaches in the labour legislation was that of Somitex, a textile factory 
in Salé that produced for British retail companies, including Marks & Spencer and Tesco. In March 
2004, three months after the employees had founded an UMT workplace union, the company fired 
around fifty workers, including all union representatives. On 7 April, their colleagues held a strike to 
demand their reinstatement, but the company responded by firing 145 more workers with severance 
pay below the legal minimum (ILO 2005). 
263 However, after being privatised in 1997, SAMIR initially downsized its personnel and finally went 
bankrupt. 
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fell outside of the working class as defined in this thesis, because they participated 
significantly in the management of the means of production (see Chapter 2). In the 
same year, 69% of the workplace union representatives were employed in the public 
sector and 31% in the private sector (Ibid., p. 20). While this indicates that the public 
sector was over-represented relative to the overall class composition, these are 
remarkable figures considering the regional standards of union penetration in the 
private sector. 
The UGTT’s workplace unions are its basic organisational unit and they had 
great importance because they were the only level that could send delegates to the 
National Congresses.264 They were grouped geographically in the local and regional 
unions and sectorially in the federations or general unions. The sectorial organisations 
were in turn structured on a local, regional, and national level. The highest decision-
making body was the National Congress, which normally convened every five years. 
Second in the hierarchy was the National Council, which was composed of the NEC 
plus the ECs of the regional unions and the national federations and general unions; it 
normally convened every two years. The third body was the National Administrative 
Commission, composed of the NEC members and of the SGs of the regional unions 
and national federations and general unions; it met every three months. As with the 
majority of labour confederations, however, most of the power between Congresses 
was de facto concentrated in the NEC. 
In sum, in the 2000s, Moroccan trade unionism was severely fragmented, 
while in Tunisia it was highly centralised. As already argued, the single trade union 
arrangement was a crucial part of Tunisia’s rigid system of labour institutions, making 
it less adaptable to pressures from below. At the same time, the UGTT had a larger 
base both in the public and in the private sector. 
For what concerns the relationship between the trade unions and the political parties, 
the Moroccan system of labour institutions featured party mediation between the 
unions and the state, while in Tunisia the UGTT “hosted” opposition parties within its 
ranks. As seen above, party mediation between the unions and the state had been a 
factor in the fragmentation of Moroccan trade unionism. Most Moroccan trade unions 
are linked to a political party: the FDT to the USFP, the UGTM to the Istiqlal, and the 
                                                 
264 See Note 241. Yet only the workplace unions with several hundred members (the exact number 
varied) had the right to send Congress delegates. This meant that the workers employed in small firms, 
common in the private sector, remained unrepresented. 
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UNTM to the PJD. The CDT, since 2001, has been linked to the CNI. The CDT-CNI 
combination is peculiar in that it is the union that leads the party, rather than the 
opposite. The CNI, in turn, is part of the electoral alliance Fédération de Gauche 
(FdG), along with the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU) and the Parti de l’Avant-garde 
Démocratique et Socialiste (PADS). All the FdG parties emerged out of left-wing 
splits from the USFP, and their militants are active within the CDT, which in turn 
openly endorses the FdG at the elections. The CDT is in any case open to workers 
from all political tendencies, and it thus also includes activists from other radical Left 
groups like Al-Mounadil-a, as well as Islamists from Al-Adl wa al-Ihssane (AwI, 
Justice and Charity).265 
The UMT has historically claimed to be independent from the political parties, 
although its critics (e.g. Chawqui 2014) charge that the leadership seems to follow the 
Palace on important political decisions.266 A great variety of parties are present in the 
UMT through their activists, but the most important are Ennahj (which, as seen above, 
is the backbone of the UMT Left) and the Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS).267 
Indeed, UMT-USIB SG Amal El Amri became MP in 2007 under the banner of the 
PPS. Right-wing parties such as the UC and the Rassemblement National des 
Indépendants (RNI) are also present in the UMT.268 
During the struggle for independence, the UGTT was allied to the Neo-
Destour, but since the party fused with the state apparatus it could not have a real 
mediatory function between the union and the state. The opposition parties were 
always less powerful than the UGTT, therefore – rather than mediating between the 
labour confederation and the state – several of them sought refuge within it. Since 
1956, the UGTT had included the PCT militants that had joined after the USTT’s 
dissolution. From the 1970s onwards, the single labour confederation became home 
to virtually all Tunisian political tendencies, which – within limits – found in the 
                                                 
265 Interviews 1, 4, 17, 19, 20. 
266 Oft-quoted examples are the signature of the agreement for the Labour Code in 2003, the 
endorsement of the 2011 Constitution, and the expulsion of the UMT Left in 2012 (see below). A more 
recent “suspect” episode was the UMT’s endorsement of the PAM at the 2016 parliamentary elections, 
in spite of the union’s traditional distance from party politics. This endorsement came in the midst of 
efforts by the Palace to boost the PAM’s performance to contain the PJD. 
267 In 1974, the ex-PCM was legalised as the PPS under the leadership of Ali Yata, on a platform of 
accepting the monarchical and religious nature of the state. 
268 According to the Moroccan political scientist Mohammed Darif, there was a time when Mahjoub 
Ben Seddik used to ask UMT activists to vote for the UC, and the UC SG Mohammed Abied was also 
a high UMT cadre (La vie éco, 25 May 2012). 
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UGTT a “shelter” from state repression. 
In the 2000s, the UGTT Left included the illegal Marxist-Leninist groups that 
had originated from Perspectives (the most important being the PCOT and the 
Watads), legal leftist parties such as Ettajdid (The Renewal, ex-PCT) and the Parti 
Démocrate Progressiste (PDP derived from a moderate split from El ‘Amel Ettounsi), 
and various Arab nationalist tendencies. The UGTT’s political centre controlled the 
“bureaucratic machine” of the union. It originated from the Neo-Destour and it 
included the Achourists and, less prominently, the RCDists. There was also a right-
wing represented by the Islamists. According to Alexander (2000), Ennahda started 
to build a presence in the UGTT in the late 1980s but it was unable to gain support 
from more than 10% of its base. 
The repression of dissent outside of the labour confederation led to the further 
politicisation of union militancy, as the illegal leftist groups were forced to use the 
UGTT as a cover for their political activities. As a leftist activist declared: 
 
With all the repression, it was very risky for us as trade unionists to declare 
out loud that we belonged to a political party. So we ended up mixing the 
political struggle with the trade union and social struggle. (Interview 75) 
 
 For example, access to the regional and local union buildings was an important 
resource, as the illegal groups did not have the possibility to establish their own 
offices. The relevant UGTT structures were often pressured to mediate with the state 
to ease political repression, e.g. by demanding the liberation of arrested militants. It 
was also possible to use the UGTT’s name to receive the legal authorisation for 
meetings and demonstrations, as long as their political character did not become too 
explicit. 
 Thus, unlike most Moroccan unions, the UGTT was not linked to any particular 
party mediating between labour and the state through the parliament or the 
government. However, it harboured several conflicting political tendencies within its 
structures due to the absence of union pluralism and the external repression of dissent, 
which contributed to internal polarisation. 
 The Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions also maintained contact and 
collaborated with civil society organisations, especially through their leftist internal 
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currents. For example, Ennahj is an important political party within the Association 
Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH), which resulted in interlocking memberships 
and leaderships between the UMT Left and the AMDH, with the same leaders taking 
positions of responsibility in both organisations but usually at different points in time. 
There is also a common militant trajectory leading from the leftist UNEM student 
groups and from the ANDCM to the UMT Left. 
 The ANDCM was founded on 26 October 1991 and it grouped unemployed 
graduates of various leftist tendencies (see Emperador 2007). The unemployed 
movement later splintered into a bewildering array of small groups (most often non-
politicised), but the ANDCM remained the largest national organisation of the 
unemployed. As seen above, the UMT local administrations federation is mostly made 
up of ex-ANDCM members. Under leftist control, the Rabat UMT building was 
opened to these groups, particularly the ANDCM.269 A Rabat trade unionist belonging 
to Ennahj remembers: 
 
At some point, the UMT building had become empty. Nobody wanted to 
go there anymore. It’s when we arrived that the workers found some trust 
again. Those were good times and the [union] bureaucracy was afraid. […] 
The workers met the unemployed graduates and expressed their solidarity 
towards them. There was a big movement. (Interview 30) 
 
 The UGTT too was linked through extensive interlocking memberships to 
other civil society organisations, notably the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme 
(LTDH) and the Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD). However, 
notwithstanding these connections, the UGTT dissidents worried that the compromise 
between the NEC and the regime was damaging the legitimacy of the union in the eyes 
of democratic civil society (e.g. RSDM 2010b, Appendix, pp. 314-8). Strong links also 
exist between the UGTT and the UGET. As the UGET is dominated by the Left, it is 
common practice for former UGET militants to enter the UGTT if they join the waged 
                                                 
269 In 2001, however, after the police repressed a demonstration of the unemployed graduates outside 
of the Rabat UMT building, the authorities razed the section of the building that had been allocated to 
the ANDCM. The ANDCM militants accused Mahjoub Ben Seddik himself of having called for the 




 The explosion of unemployment among university graduates prompted some 
former UGET militants linked to the illegal leftist groups to follow the example of 
their Moroccan comrades and create, in 2006, the Union des Diplômés Chômeurs 
(UDC) (see Hamdi and Weipert-Fenner 2017). The UDC was denied state recognition 
and remained illegal until 2011. It emerged out of struggles against discrimination in 
public administration hiring that targeted former leftist (as well as Islamist) student 
militants.271 The UDC had regular contacts and collaborations with the UGTT 
politicised militants, while the UGTT NEC kept its distance.272 
 The UGTT itself was clearly the largest civil society organisation in Tunisia 
and – also because of the regime’s strict control over the country’s political life – it 
had more influence than even the largest opposition parties. In Morocco, on the other 
hand, the trade unions had a more marginal position in the political and civil society 
landscape due to their fragmentation and small membership. As we will see below, 
this contributed to the difference in the levels of working-class associational power 
between Morocco and Tunisia. 
 
5.2 The Trade Unions and Marginalised Workers 
As noted in Chapter 2, stratifications within the working class weaken workers’ 
capacity to defend their interests vis-à-vis the capitalist class. The trade unions, which 
normally organise the better off fractions of the working class, can reinforce this 
fragmentation by exclusively taking up the grievances of their members rather than 
also considering the interests of marginalised workers. This section explores the 
relations between the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions and two types of 
marginalised workers: female workers and precarious workers. 
The main Moroccan unions, as well as the UGTT, have traditionally supported 
the positions of the women’s movement. However, as it is often pointed out, their 
actual practice has lagged behind their discourse. As everywhere, women in the 
Maghreb face gendered oppression in and beyond the workplace. Female interviewees 
                                                 
270 Interviews 49, 50, 51, 68, 74, 78, 80. 
271 Indeed, the drive to unionise foreign-owned call centres was initiated by UGET graduates who, 
being de facto banned from public administration, had settled for long-term employment in call centres 
(Interview 50). 
272 Interviews 68, 74, 78. 
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have denounced wage discrimination in the private sector273 and career discrimination 
and cases of sexual harassment in both the private and the public sector. Women are 
also disproportionately employed in some of the most vulnerable manual sectors of 
the Moroccan and Tunisian economies, particularly agriculture and light 
manufacturing for export (see Bouasria 2013; Debuysere 2018),274 where they often 
face routinised violations of basic labour legislation. The trade unions have penetrated 
even these vulnerable sectors, but to a much lesser extent than the more secure sectors. 
To discourage unionisation, management can hinder women’s militancy by 
taking advantage of patriarchy in the household and the community. As reported by a 
former union representative in a cable factory: 
 
The bosses used our families to stop the women who spoke out and 
struggled; they called our fathers and brothers many times to tell them to 
stop us. Once they called the boyfriends of the girls and told them: “Your 
woman is not coming to work, she’s out in the street…”. (Interview 62) 
 
Some trade unionists have commented that the presence of female cadres is 
especially important for organising vulnerable feminised sectors such as textiles and 
agriculture, because female workers normally feel more confident in co-operating with 
female trade unionists.275 However, Moroccan and Tunisian women face similar 
obstacles in taking on union responsibilities. These remarks by a Tunisian trade 
unionist are quite representative: 
There is discrimination within the trade union itself, they always try to 
keep the men in the positions of responsibility. And they always use the 
same arguments that management uses: you’ll have to move a lot, 
sometimes you’ll have to stay out late at night… Trade union meetings are 
generally held at uncomfortable times for women with family 
responsibilities […] and there’s a very limited number of men who accept 
                                                 
273 According to a study by the Centre de Recherche et d’Études Sociales (CRES 2012), in 2011 the 
average wage for women in the private sector was 75% of the average wage for men. 
274 In 2012, women in Tunisia made up 25% of the working population, yet they constituted 43% of 
employment in manufacturing and 72% of employment in the textile sector, which – with 240,800 
workers – is by far the largest manufacturing sector in the country (calculated by the author based on 
INS 2013). 
275 Interviews 12, 14, 29. 
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sharing housework. (Interview 52) 
 
Moroccan trade unionism, however, has advanced beyond the UGTT with 
regard to female representation in leadership positions. Several Moroccan unions have 
co-operated with international organisations to carry out training sessions targeting 
women specifically, and some have inserted gender quotas in their statutes. For 
example, the UMT-FNSA had adopted a system of gender quotas since the 1990s. At 
the UMT 10th Congress in 2010, the union adopted a new statute including gender 
quotas of one third for all union structures, with the aim of moving towards parity. At 
the same Congress, two women were included in the NEC: Amal El Amri from the 
UMT-USIB and Khadija Ghamiri from the Rabat UMT. However, while changes in 
formal regulations resulted in actual progress, the unions are still far from parity, the 
quotas are often not met, and actual decision-making power lies in the hands of men 
in the majority of cases. 
In Tunisia, female leaders within the UGTT remain scarce, despite the history 
of women’s struggles within the union. The feminist movement that emerged in the 
1970s established a Commission des Femmes Travailleuses (CFT) within the UGTT, 
in 1982, to push the union to oppose discrimination against women in the workplace 
(see Debuysere 2018). The CFT disappeared with the 1985 crackdown but it was 
relaunched after the 1989 rehabilitation of the UGTT, and in 1991 it achieved a formal 
status in the UGTT’s internal regulation as an advisory body. In the early 1990s, the 
CFT promoted a debate on the adoption of gender quotas for the UGTT internal 
structures, but a unanimous resolution was not attained within the Commission 
itself.276 
In 2006, the UGTT declared that 25% of its membership was female but only 
9% of union cadres (all levels included) were women (UGTT 2006, p. 19). The UGTT 
NEC remained entirely composed of men until the 23rd Congress of 2017, when Naima 
Hammami was elected. Another complaint is that the UGTT should do more to take 
up gender-specific grievances, for example by demanding gender budgeting.277 The 
author has also received reports of sexual harassment within the trade union itself. 
In essence, both the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions – as is the case for 
                                                 
276 Interviews 52, 92. 
277 Interview 92. 
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many labour unions elsewhere – have so far failed to provide strong answers to gender 
discrimination in the workplace, as shown by the fact that the workforce in both 
countries is still strongly segmented along gender lines. 
Regarding precarious workers, due to the obstacles they face in unionising, the 
core social bases of the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions are still relatively secure 
workers. In Morocco, relations with the precarious fractions of the working class 
remain weak, with important exceptions, such as the UMT-FNSA’s efforts to unionise 
agricultural labourers, including seasonal workers. Organising in the private sector 
remains difficult, and it becomes almost impossible for outsourced workers, workers 
on fixed-term contracts, and other precarious labourers to unionise: 
 
It’s hard… Now it’s even difficult to organise the stable workers, because 
Morocco still has the problem of trade union freedoms… […] We have 
tried with the outsourced workers at SAMIR, but the day after they are 
kicked out in the street. Even if we call the labour inspectors, they can do 
nothing. (Interview 32) 
 
 Faced with anti-union discrimination, on the one hand, and with the lack of 
internal democracy and cases of union corruption, on the other, many workers in the 
vulnerable sectors develop a purely instrumentalist attitude towards the unions. A 
fisherman union activist from Agadir observed that: 
 
The people that go to the unions are not politicised, they just want to 
improve their conditions and know nothing about the unions. They go 
there like you’d go to see a lawyer. The fishermen don’t criticise the union 
to improve it, they’re just negative in all senses. If there is a defeat, they 
say the union is useless. Even if they are forced to wage a struggle, they 
don’t have a strong attachment to their union. (Interview 21)  
 
 In many of the accounts collected, workers from a particular firm decided to 
form a union only after they had already come under threat: “When the workers decide 
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to strike, they need the ‘umbrella’ of a union”.278 After defeat, the workplace union 
gets dissolved and, at the next occasion, the workers who survived dismissal form a 
new workplace union with a different confederation, in the hope that it will work 
better. The unions, on their part, are sometimes wary of investing their resources into 
workers employed in small firms and vulnerable sectors, given the difficulties in 
building a stable base there. A leftist trade unionist from Tangier commented: 
 
Let’s take the case of Tunisia. Even if there was a bureaucracy more or 
less corrupt and implicated with Ben Ali’s regime, the UGTT kept a certain 
independence and a certain base in the various regions and sectors… Here 
the union leadership doesn’t have a strategy to keep and develop the new 
[workplace] unions. For example, in the Tangier Free Zone, the people 
who at some point created a [workplace] union might be a total of 4,000… 
It’s a lot. But many left, so there is no accumulation of forces and cadres. 
(Interview 37) 
 
 The workers thus make little distinction between one confederation and the 
other and, unsurprisingly, they have little interest in the ideologies of the parties to 
which such unions are affiliated. A call centre worker from Fes said: 
 
First, we went to the CDT, but they got scared and didn’t want to help us. 
So we tried with the FDT, but they were old… they really had some 
technical problems in understanding how it works in a call centre, we 
couldn’t communicate well. So we finally started a [workplace] union with 
the UGTM, because at the time the SG [Hamid Chabat] was also the mayor 
of Fes [as well as the SG of the Istiqlal Party]. So, as the situation in the 
company had become tense, we hoped this would help us out. (Interview 
11) 
 
In Tunisia too, union penetration in the private sector was mainly limited to 
workers formally hired with open-ended contracts. Employment precarity, however, 
became a pressing issue for the UGTT, as many officials saw that it weakened the 
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bargaining power of the secure workers. In the mid-2000s, a plurality of UGTT cadres 
– 36.2% – declared that the rise in precarious employment and unemployment was the 
worst threat to trade unionism in Tunisia (UGTT 2006, p. 40). Since the 1990s, the 
UGTT waged a campaign against outsourcing and, in April 2011, it won an agreement 
theoretically forbidding it in the public sector, bringing almost 60,000 workers into 
standard employment (King 2013). The direct hiring of outsourced workers was also 
a demand in important private sector strikes, such as the January 2011 strike at Coca 
Cola’s contractor SFBT.279 More radically, the politicised UGTT militants have often 
supported the informally organised mobilisations of the precarious youth that have 
taken a central position in the country’s politics since the 2008 Gafsa revolt.280 
The Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions have at times supported the grievances 
of female and precarious workers but, overall, their main focus remained on the needs 
of their core constituency of male and relatively secure workers. The most important 
difference is that, due to higher union density, on the eve of the 2011 uprisings the 
UGTT had a relatively deeper penetration in the vulnerable sectors compared to the 
Moroccan unions, and it had more resources to defend the marginalised workers when 
pressured to do so. These factors are further discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.3 Technical Composition and Working-Class Structural Power 
This section compares the technical composition of the working class in Morocco and 
Tunisia. At the macro-level, the technical composition refers to the national structure 
of employment as organised through different economic and institutional sectors, 
contractual arrangements, welfare provisions, etc. As discussed in Chapter 2, different 
technical compositions carry with them different levels of working-class structural 
power, in that the location of workers in the economy can provide more or less 
resources and opportunities for mobilisation. 
Table 10 (pp. 180) supplies synthetic data on the indicators for working-class 
structural power presented in Chapter 2, showing that, on the eve of the 2011 
uprisings, overall working-class structural power was higher in Tunisia than in 
Morocco. Some of the figures, while coming from authoritative sources, are unlikely 
                                                 
279 Interview 53. 
280 After Ben Ali’s downfall, on several occasions the UGTT local or regional unions have been 
pressured into declaring local general strikes in solidarity with the protests of non-unionised precarious 
youths. 
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to be exact. Yet the scale and coherence of the differences between the indicators for 
the two countries allow one to draw robust conclusions. 
 
Table 10 – Working-class structural power 
 
When possible, the author selected data for the years immediately preceding the 2011 uprisings. 
 Morocco Tunisia 
Sectorial location – + 
Waged employment in 
total employment 
44.2% (2010)281 68.3% (2010)281  
Formal employment in 
total employment 
47.1% (2000-08)282 64.3% (2000-08)282 
Public sector employment 
in total employment 
8.5% (2010)283 22% (2010)284 
Industrial employment in 
total employment 
20% (2010)281 29.4% (2010)281 
Manufacturing 
employment in total 
employment 
11% (2011)281 18.3% (2010)281 
Employment in 100+ 
firms in total employment 
17% (2015)285 40% (2015)285 
Job security – + 
Workers with open-ended 
contracts in total 
employment 
11% (2010)283 42% (2011)286 
Social security coverage 30% (2008)287 78.9% (2010)288 
Human Development Index – + 
Position in HDI ranking 114 (2010)282 81 (2010)282 
GNI per capita (PPP 2008 $) 4,628 (2010)282 7,979 (2010)282 
Income Gini Coefficient 40.7 (2006)289  35.8 (2010)289  
Coefficient of human 
inequality 
28.5 (2014)282 21.4 (2014)282 
Population in 
multidimensional poverty 
28.5% (2000-08)282 2.8% (2000-08)282 
Adult literacy rate 56.4% (2005-08)282 78% (2005-08)282 
Mean years of schooling 4.4 (2010)282 6.5 (2010)282 
                                                 
281 ILOSTAT. 
282 UN-HDI. 
283 HCP 2011. 
284 Calculated by the author based on IMF 2014 and INS 2011. 
285 European Commission 2015. 
286 INS 2013. 
287 CNSS Morocco 2009. 
288 MAS 2014. 
289 World DataBank. 
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Life expectancy at birth 71.8 (2010)282 74.3 (2010)282 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 
live births) 
32 (2008)282 18 (2008)282 
The social wage – + 
Public expenditure on 
social benefits (% of GDP) 
4.3% (2011)290 7.7% (2011)290  
Public expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
5.7% (2000-07)282 7.2% (2000-07)282 
Public expenditure on 
health (% of GDP) 





In Morocco, the long-standing consequences of Hassan II’s basic continuity 
with the colonial policy of primary product export – as a result of his political wariness 
of industrialisation – are evident today. In 2010, Morocco’s agricultural sector still 
constituted 36.3% of total employment (ILOSTAT). This was an important factor in 
placing a higher share of Moroccan workers in unwaged and/or informal jobs, limiting 
the potential recruitment pool of the trade unions. In Tunisia, in contrast, between 
1961 and 2014, agricultural employment fell from 45% to 15% of total employment 
(see Graph 8, p. 151). 
The Moroccan industrial sector declined from 24.7% of total employment in 
1982 (Royaume du Maroc, 1984) to oscillate between 18.5% and 20% during the 
2000s (ILOSTAT), while manufacturing declined from 16.2% of total employment in 
1982 (Royaume du Maroc, 1984) to 11% in 2011 (ILOSTAT). In Tunisia, industrial 
employment stood at 24% in 1961 and it kept growing until 1981, after which it 
stagnated at around 30% (see Graph 8, p. 151). Employment in manufacturing rose 
from 7% in 1961 to 19% in the mid-1980s, and after that it stayed between 18% and 
20% (Ibidem). This means that the share of employment in the industrial sector, which 
is usually amenable to workers’ mobilisations, and manufacturing in particular, 
stopped growing in both countries from the 1980s onwards, and in Morocco it actually 
declined. However, the share of industrial and manufacturing employment in the 
2000s was significantly higher in Tunisia than in Morocco. 
Waged employment in Morocco declined from 54% in the 1970s to 37% in 
2004, before climbing back up to 45% in 2014 (Daoud 1980; Royaume du Maroc 
                                                 
290 IMF Government Finance Statistics. 
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2006; ILOSTAT). In Tunisia, instead, the rate of waged employment oscillated around 
68-9% during the 2000s and reached 71-2% after the uprising (ILOSTAT). Morocco’s 
small public sector, which stood at 8.5% in 2010, was also an impediment to working-
class power, since violations of the labour law and anti-union behaviour are much 
more common in the private sector. To the contrary, Tunisian public sector 
employment in 2010 stood at 22% of total employment. 
Moreover, in Morocco only 17% of workers laboured in workplaces with more 
than 100 employees – another serious obstacle to unionisation – while in Tunisia this 
figure was more than double. Finally, for what concerns job security, Tunisia had 
larger shares of workers under formal open-ended contracts and covered by social 
security.291 
Despite the Moroccan regime’s recent efforts to promote economic growth and 
social indicators – which resulted in some improvements and much international 
praise – the fact remains that Morocco is still the poorest country in North Africa and 
the lowest-ranking in human development.292 In 2010, Tunisia’s GNI per capita was 
172.5% that of Morocco. At the same time, Tunisia had lower Gini and Human 
Inequality Coefficients, which means that Tunisian workers (in the broad definition 
used here) were less deprived than Moroccan ones. These different performances in 
human development are not only due to Tunisia’s historically higher economic growth 
but also to its larger welfare spending. In fact, despite the slowdown in welfare 
expansion, in the neoliberal period Tunisia was the highest social spender in the region 
(El-Said and Harrigan 2014, p. 113). 
This constitutes another confirmation of the old social sciences discovery that 
revolt is not explained by absolute deprivation (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977). What 
seems most significant in Tunisia is the widespread perception of the neoliberal 
erosion of the former populist social pact. In Morocco, strictly speaking, there never 
was a populist social pact, which probably lowered the expectations of many 
Moroccans. Myriam Catusse observes that:  
 
                                                 
291 Morocco’s two-year limit on fixed-term contracts is more advantageous to workers than Tunisia’s 
four-year limit. However, this difference should be treated carefully because the application of labour 
legislation was probably weaker in Morocco than in Tunisia. 
292 Hassan II reportedly felt humiliated by the first UNDP reports (Vermeren 2009, p. 237). For instance, 
the 1990 report estimated that, in 1985, Morocco still had an adult illiteracy rate of 66%, significantly 
higher than Tunisia’s 45% at the time (UNDP 1990). 
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Contrary to Tunisia or Algeria, the Moroccan welfare state has never had 
a golden age. […] Therefore, the problem of ‘disengagement’, or of the 
privatisation of social protections, did not represent a radical break.293 
(Catusse 2010, p. 189). 
 
A more favourable distribution among economic and institutional sectors, higher 
job security, higher “human development” performances, and a stronger welfare state 
meant that Tunisian workers had more resources than their Moroccan counterparts on 
the eve of the 2011 uprisings. Of course, this does not mean that Tunisia was or is a 
country where workers enjoyed outstanding employment conditions, it merely 
indicates that working-class structural power in Tunisia was high relative to Morocco. 
 
5.4 Political Composition and Working-Class Associational Power 
This section compares the political composition of the Moroccan and Tunisian 
working classes to assess the level of working-class associational power in the two 
countries. Political composition is a multi-faceted concept that includes both formal 
and informal types of organisation. Since this section is geared towards assessing 
working-class associational power, it will mainly focus on formal organisations – 
particularly the trade unions. However, it is important to note that in both Morocco 
and Tunisia the centrality of the trade unions in working-class mobilisations was put 
into question by the prominence of movements by young precarious workers,294 which 
took place outside of the workplace and formal organisations. These must therefore 
be considered before moving on to the analysis of the trade unions.  
Precarious workers’ movements grew throughout the 2000s in Morocco (see 
Bennafla and Emperador 2011; Bogaert 2015), while in Tunisia they appeared 
dramatically with the 2008 Gafsa revolt (see Allal 2010; Chouikha and Gobe 2009; 
Hibou 2015a). The mobilised precarious workers were often backed by the union Left, 
but their very working conditions made it impossible for them to become union 
members and to use strikes as a weapon (Feltrin 2018b). While broadly left-wing ideas 
                                                 
293 Translated from French by the author. 
294 As explained in Chapter 2, this phrase also includes the so-called unemployed, because – for the 
most part – they actually perform precarious forms of work. “Youth” can be understood here as a 
culturally constructed designation to indicate a person “in transition” between childhood and adulthood. 
A consequence of precarity (as well as of longer time spent in education) is the lengthening of this 
transitional phase. 
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and sensibilities were widespread in the 1970s, the Moroccan and Tunisian Left today 
have to compete with strong Islamist movements, and both face widespread “anti-
politics” feelings among the population. A stable left-wing ideological and 
organisational presence among the precarious youth is ensured by the ANDCM in 
Morocco and by the UDC in Tunisia. Yet these organisations mostly represent 
unemployed graduates, who are only a fraction of the precarious. 
Roadblocks and riots are the precarious workers’ main tools for seeking 
concessions. Less sensational than riots, roadblocks can produce greater economic 
damage and have the advantages of being more sustainable in time and of involving 
less risk of harm to the participants and to others. Due to the fact that they halt the 
production of value from outside the workplace, roadblocks are effectively the strike 
of the workless. The latter can exploit logistical weak spots to clog the circulation of 
strategic commodities and, as a consequence, to slow down or stop production. 
However, unlike strikes, roadblocks are always illegal, and therefore their 
practicability depends directly on the balance of power between protesters and law 
enforcement. 
The mobilisations of the precarious are strongly impregnated with the 
protesters’ work ethic295 and their core demands revolve around secure employment 
and local development. Secure employment is often presented as a condition for 
dignity, and one of the most famous slogans of the 2011 Tunisian uprising was 
“Ettashghil istehqaq, ya issabat essoraq!” (“Employment is a right, you gang of 
thieves!”). However, one should not necessarily take this demand at face value – after 
all, what people primarily need is the regular income deriving from secure 
employment, and many protesters have been happy to accept public sector jobs in 
which they were reportedly not given much to do. 
In Morocco, all through the 2000s, social mobilisations emerged in several 
marginalised areas of the country,296 particularly over the cost of living, employment, 
and access to resources (Aziki 2011). The most remarkable were the Bouarfa 
movement against rising water prices and the Sidi Ifni movement for employment and 
local development (see Chapter 6). However, these protests tended to remain 
localised, and they never circulated into a nationwide cascade of mobilisations by the 
                                                 
295 This is also confirmed by Ben Amor and Moussa’s (2015) research on attitudes towards work and 
unemployment among the youth of Tunis’s working-class banlieues. 
296 Al Hoceima, Beni Mellal, Errachidia, Sefrou, Sidi Bouafif, Taza, etc. 
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precarious, as was the case in Tunisia in January 2011 and, to a lesser extent, January 
2016 and January 2018. In 2011, the nationwide circulation of struggles in Morocco 
was ensured by the M20Fev, overall characterised by a more intellectual class 
composition. While, on some occasions, leftist trade unionists attempted to mobilise 
union support for the protests of the Moroccan precarious, this did not result in large-
scale regional strikes until recently.297 
In Tunisia, the cycle of struggle involving young precarious workers as its 
protagonists can be said to have started with the Gafsa revolt for employment in 
January 2008 and to have culminated in the 2011 uprising. State employees and 
manufacturing workers participated in the regional general strikes called by the UGTT 
at the height of the 2011 uprising and contributed to a new surge of strikes after Ben 
Ali’s downfall. However, the 2011 regional strikes were called as a result of pressure 
coming not from the factory shop floor, but from the streets outside. After Ben Ali’s 
downfall, the mobilisations of the precarious have continued to this day, but they have 
since then failed to spread to the other fractions of the working class. 
The informal nature of most mobilisations of the precarious makes it difficult 
to synthetically assess their associational power, despite the importance of this 
phenomenon. The rest of this section will therefore focus on associational power as 
the power of trade unions. Table 11 (p. 186) provides a synthesis of the indicators for 
working-class associational power established in Chapter 2. Again, not all data are 
likely to be exact, but the coherence and the magnitude of the differences among them 
are sufficient to conclude that working-class associational power was higher in Tunisia 
than in Morocco before the uprisings. 
Morocco, before the 2011 uprisings, featured a higher degree of civil and 
political rights than Tunisia. However, despite these freedoms, Moroccan trade unions 
remained very weak, as the other indicators of associational power show. In Tunisia, 
the tension between relatively high working-class power and very low civil and 
political rights probably contributes to explaining the sudden and insurrectional 
trajectory of the country’s democratisation. 
In Morocco, the comparatively large scope of action for opposition parties 
allowed for the existence of party mediation between most trade unions and the state. 
                                                 
297 This was the case of the Hirak Esh’aby of the Rif in 2017 and the Hirak of Jerada in 2018. Yet here 
it is not clear whether official local union support made a substantial contribution to the show of force 
of an already mobilised population. 
 186
At the same time, the Moroccan state’s mode of union incorporation through social 
dialogue touched a broader range of policies than Tunisia’s narrow incorporation via 
tri-annual national-sectorial wage bargaining. Moreover, Moroccan workers enjoyed 
the right to form new unions, while in Tunisia attempts to create alternative 
confederations were repressed (except in times of crisis between the UGTT and the 
party-state). However, so far, party mediation, social dialogue, and competitive 
unionism have not enabled the Moroccan unions to accede to significant power and 
were more often vectors of partial co-optation and weakening, as the CDT’s history 
shows.  
 
Table 11 – Working-class associational power 
 Morocco Tunisia 
Trade union density in 
waged employment 
6% (2015)298  23% (2010)299 
Trade union density in 
total employment 
3.2% (2015)298  15.8% (2010)299  
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
5-10% (2015)285 90% (2015 and before)285 
Civil liberties rating (1 
best, 7 worst) 
4 (2010)300 5 (2010)300  
Political rights rating (1 
best, 7 worst) 
5 (2010)300  7 (2010)300  





Union representation in the Moroccan parliament was a further incentive to 
union fragmentation, as each party tried to have its own labour-wing in order to 
maximise its seats. By the 2000s, there were over twenty labour confederations in 
Morocco. Four confederations gained the “most representative” status in the 2009 
professional elections: the UMT, the CDT, the FDT, and the UGTM (in decreasing 
order). However, low union density meant that even the largest confederations directly 
represented an extremely limited fraction of the working class. In this context, the 
proliferation of trade unions – with little difference between them except for their party 
                                                 
298 HCP 2016. 
299 Calculated by the author based on UGTT and INS 2011. 
300 Freedom House. 
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allegiance – was hardly a blessing for Moroccan workers because each confederation 
wielded meagre power and coordination was costlier.301 
Trade union density in Tunisia was probably almost four times as high as in 
Morocco in 2010 and has increased after the uprising. Before 2011, the UGTT claimed 
517,000 members, meaning that union density was about 23% of the waged 
workforce.302 In 2010, an ILO report estimated union density in the Tunisian private 
sector at 27% (ILO 2010). This is an exaggeration, and the 10-15% estimated by the 
European Commission (2015) seems more accurate. Yet the latter figure is still higher 
than Morocco’s overall union density of 6% of the waged population, which includes 
the more unionised public sector. Since waged employees are about 44% of the 
Moroccan employed population, unionised workers are only 3% of the total employed 
population (see Table 11, p. 186). The UMT declared to the ITUC a membership of 
335,000 (3.2% of the employed), but this seems exaggerated based on HCP statistics 
on union density, professional elections results, and the interviews conducted for this 
research. The CDT declared to the ITUC 61,500 members (0.6% of the employed), 
which instead appears realistic. 
The media often explain the acknowledged “crisis of trade unionism” in 
Morocco by pointing to, among other elements, the unions’ lack of internal democracy 
and their perceived high levels of corruption (e.g. La vie éco, 6 May 2005). While this 
is certainly true, two important but less mentioned factors are the de facto insufficiency 
of trade union freedoms in the country and its structure of employment, whereby 
vulnerable sectors are predominant (see above). 
In Tunisia, since the 1970s, national and national-sectorial collective 
bargaining also applies to non-unionised workers, which results in collective 
bargaining coverage of about 90%. In 2010, Morocco only had one national-sectorial 
collective agreement (for bank employees), one multi-employer local agreement (for 
truck drivers working with the Casablanca Port), and ten firm-level collective 
agreements (La vie éco, 30 April 2010). 
As seen above, until the uprisings, union democracy in Tunisia was marred by 
                                                 
301 The CDT NEC member Abdelkader Zair charged that: “The multiplication of the trade unions, just 
like that of the political parties, has always been encouraged by the state” (La vie éco, 2 May 2003, 
translated from French by the author). 
302 After the uprising, the UGTT claimed a large increase in members that brought the total to 750,000 
in 2014. A report by the European Commission estimates that UGTT membership in 2015 was 650,000 
and that the three unions that emerged after the 2011 uprising had a total of 150,000 members (European 
Commission 2015, p. 52). This would bring trade union density to about 32% of wage-earners. 
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the regime’s attempts to impose a pliant leadership. Yet the struggles of the 1970s 
made unilateral state control over the UGTT untenable. This resulted in a compromise 
in which the union leadership had to be acceptable both for the regime and most of the 
union base. Up to the 2000s, the regime kept intervening effectively and in manifold 
ways in internal union life. However, basic internal regulations – such as the periodic 
election of the union leaders through Congresses – were respected. 
In Morocco, the unions’ internal democracy was only indirectly constrained 
by the regime through (decreasing) limits on the space for political opposition and 
(enduring) tolerance for union repression in the private sector. Due to low union 
density, legitimation and funding for the unions come more from the state than from 
their members. It is estimated that only 10-15% of the Moroccan unions’ budget comes 
from membership fees (La vie éco, 14 February 2017).303 This imbalance allowed for 
severe disregard for internal regulations (see Chapter 3). In the 2000s, the SGs of the 
three historical confederations had been in charge for decades. Mahjoub Ben Seddik 
remained UMT SG from the union’s foundation in 1955 until his death in 2010. 
Abderrazak Afilal led the UGTM from 1962 to 2006. Noubir Amaoui, elected SG at 
the CDT 1st Congress in 1978, headed the union for forty years. 
In brief, on the eve of the 2011 uprisings, the Moroccan trade unions had less 
members, less collective bargaining power, and less internal democracy than the 
UGTT, meaning that they were less powerful and representative despite Morocco’s 
broader scope for civil and political rights. Moreover, the Moroccan trade unions were 
extremely fragmented and probably enjoyed less legitimacy than their Tunisian 
counterpart. The UGTT, despite the submission of its top leadership to the regime, had 
a solid and polarising radical internal opposition. In Morocco, a comparable 
polarisation only existed in the UMT, but the UMT Left had a relatively limited 




This chapter has outlined a comparison of trade unionism and working-class power in 
                                                 
303 According to Ben Romdhane (2011, p. 245), 57% of the UGTT’s budget in 2005 came from 
membership fees. 51% represented dues from public sector employees. The state could and did suspend 
this system in times of crisis. Yet most militant trade unionists were to be found in the public sector, 
and they did use their membership to pressure the UGTT NEC. 
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Morocco and Tunisia on the eve of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Both the Moroccan and 
Tunisian trade unions chiefly represented relatively secure workers at the expense of 
marginalised workers, such as female or precarious workers. However, the UGTT had 
a larger base and it occupied a more central place in the country’s political system and 
civil society landscape relative to the Moroccan trade unions. It was, in fact, the largest 
civil society organisation in the country and it “hosted” within its structures the 
activists of most opposition parties. 
Different from Cammett and Posusney’s (2010) judgement that the Moroccan 
unions were in a more favourable position than the Tunisian ones, the analysis of the 
indicators for structural and associational working-class power shows that working-
class power was overall higher in Tunisia than in Morocco on the eve of the uprisings. 
In fact, regarding the structural dimension, Tunisia featured a more favourable 
sectorial distribution of employment, higher job security, a better performance on 
social indicators, and a more developed welfare state. In respect to associational 
working-class power, in Tunisia trade union density and collective bargaining 
coverage were significantly higher than in Morocco, and internal trade union 
democracy was more developed, despite severe interferences by the regime. 
As recounted in the former chapters, these different levels of working-class 
power were the result of the divergent trajectories of class struggle that played out in 
the histories of the two countries. The two following chapters, instead, show how the 
relevant trade union actors behaved before, during, and after the 2011 uprisings based 
on the pressures they faced and the resources at their disposal. 
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Chapter 6 – Morocco: Trade Union Fragmentation and the 





This chapter offers a narrative of the Moroccan social mobilisations from the run up 
to the 2011 uprisings to their aftermath, tracing the role of the trade unions in these 
events. When the Tunisian uprising erupted, Morocco was already in the midst of a 
wave of social mobilisations within and without the workplace, involving both secure 
and precarious workers. The M20Fev was only the most visible strand of this broader 
unrest, which, however, never reached the same level of radicalism that was seen in 
Tunisia. 
 Most large trade unions initially endorsed the M20Fev, but they gradually 
distanced themselves as the regime proved willing to make concessions. On the one 
hand, the regime offered abundant material inducements through a renewed round of 
social dialogue with the trade unions. On the other hand, it proposed a constitutional 
reform that was to be approved by a referendum. The M20Fev called for a boycott of 
the referendum on the grounds that the new constitutional text was not drafted by an 
elected assembly and that it left substantial authoritarian powers in the hands of the 
Palace. However, the CDT was the only labour confederation that adhered to the 
boycott, and even so it did not promote it through radical actions such as general 
strikes. After the electoral approval of the new constitution, the surge in social 
mobilisations started to lose momentum. 
 As depicted below, in a context of continuing working-class weakness, the 
Palace was able to use the flexibility of the Moroccan system of labour institutions – 
particularly party mediation between the unions and the state, trade union 
fragmentation, and social dialogue – to distance the unions as well as the precarious 
workers’ mobilisations from the uncompromising M20Fev. The trade unions, while 
initially sympathetic to the M20Fev, eventually supported, for the most part, the 
Palace-led adjustments and abstained from radical action against the regime. Arguably, 
a confrontational stance was discouraged by the fact that, compared to Tunisia, the 
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Moroccan trade unions faced weaker pressures from below to directly oppose the 
regime and – in any case – they had more limited resources to mobilise relative to the 
UGTT. 
 
6.1 The Trade Unions and Social Unrest on the Eve of the Uprising 
This section chronicles the most important currents of social unrest that culminated in 
the 2011 Moroccan uprising. These featured community movements led by precarious 
youths, private sector strikes (most notably in mining), and mobilisations by public 
sector workers. The trade unions intervened in all of these types of protest, but – due 
to their limited power – they did not manage to win substantial concessions before 
2011. 
 In the late 2000s, various forms of social unrest surged in Morocco (see 
Bogaert 2015), including community movements that saw a prominent role played by 
precarious youths, the most remarkable being those of Bouarfa and Sidi Ifni. Bouarfa 
is a small town in the marginalised region of Oriental, not far from the Algerian border. 
In September 2006, the population stopped paying their water bills to protest against 
price hikes (Bennafla and Emperador 2011). The boycott was accompanied by various 
mobilisations, especially by the unemployed. On 12 May 2007, about 10,000 people 
(almost half of the population) took to the streets to demonstrate against the 
intervention of the public officials in charge of recovering water dues. This display of 
force led to an agreement for the distribution of water free of charge. 
 Even more protracted in time was the movement of Sidi Ifni, a Southern sea 
town in the Guelmim-Oued Noun region. On 22 May 2005, about 7,000 residents 
marched, demanding employment opportunities and public investment in the local 
infrastructure (Bennafla and Emperador 2011). With a new demonstration on 7 August 
2005, the number of protesters doubled. After this, mobilisations continued 
periodically in various forms: marches, sit-ins, protest camps, etc. In May 2008, the 
protest turned violent and a blockade of the port began. On 7 June, over 6,000 riot 
police raided the town, broke up the mobilisations, and arrested several protesters.  
 These mobilisations displayed striking similarities to the 2008 Gafsa revolt 
(see Allal and Bennafla 2011 for a comparison), since their demands revolved around 
secure employment and local development, and they were located in marginalised 
towns with very little industry except, in some cases, mining. The precarious youths 
were the protagonists in public actions, although they were by no means alone, as 
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virtually the whole community was to some degree involved. The social infrastructure 
for mobilisation was provided by deeply entrenched communal solidarities, rather than 
the concentration of workers in large workplaces. Formal organisations acted as 
supporters of largely informally organised protests. 
 Just like in Gafsa (see Chapter 7), local union activists in public administration 
participated in the movements of both Bouarfa and Sidi Ifni. In this respect, the most 
widely known figure was Seddik Kabbouri, Local SG of the Bouarfa CDT. However, 
the role of the Moroccan trade unionists was not as salient and publicised as that of 
Redeyef’s UGTT militants. In Bouarfa the most prominent group was the AMDH 
(Bogaert 2015, p. 132), while in Sidi Ifni the ANDCM and ATTAC Maroc stood out 
more (Bennafla and Emperador 2011, p. 13).  
 The weakness and fragmentation of Moroccan trade unionism contributed to 
its lack of centrality in community mobilisations relative to Redeyef. Yet it should also 
be kept in mind that Morocco’s political opening of the 1990s granted more space to 
organisations other than the unions – such as political parties and NGOs – to intervene 
in the public sphere. Thus, a coalition of leftist human rights activists, unemployed 
graduates, party militants, labour and student unionists, etc. – often with multiple 
affiliations – coalesced into the Mouvement Contre la Cherté de la Vie in an attempt 
to coordinate the protests. While the Mouvement did not actually establish significant 
national coordination, it was able to support the local protests where they did take 
place. 
 
Graph 10 – Private sector strike activity in Morocco, 2005-2014 
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 Workers’ strikes in the private sector, which had peaked during the 
gouvernement de l’alternance, declined steeply in the early 2000s and remained low 
for most of the decade. Nonetheless, in 2009, as a result of the local impacts of the 
global financial crisis, strikes increased across the private sector and the number of 
workdays lost spiked to 313,523 (see Graph 10, p. 192). In 2010, labour unrest in the 
private sector remained high by the standards of the decade but, as usual, it mostly 
consisted of defensive strikes against severe breaches of the Labour Code, layoffs, and 
the non-payment of wages (La vie éco, 18 March 2011a). 
 However, even in the years before, there were several high-profile strikes that 
attracted the attention of the national activist scene. Restructuring in the mining sector 
caused protracted struggles in various mines, including those of Imini, Jbel Awam, and 
Khouribga. The Imini manganese mine is located in the vicinity of Ouarzazate and is 
operated by the semi-public company Société Anonyme Chérifienne des Études 
Minières. In October 2002, 134 miners affiliated with the CDT started a permanent 
sit-in to protest against the planned restructuring of the workforce.304 On 15 April 
2004, the company – with the UMT’s collaboration, according to the strike leaders – 
organised 120 strike-breakers to attack the sit-in (see ICFTU 2005). During the chaotic 
scenes that ensued, a strike-breaker was hurt and died the day after in the hospital. Six 
strike leaders were accused of homicide and, on 14 February 2005, they were each 
condemned to ten years in prison. The miners and the supportive activists claimed that 
the six were innocent and that the authorities were using the casualty as a pretext to 
imprison the workers’ leaders. After a campaign for their liberation, the strike leaders 
were finally released on 18 April 2005. 
 In the lead, zinc, and silver mine of Jbel Awam, the Compagnie Minière de 
Touissit reduced gradually the share of the directly employed workforce to increase its 
reliance on outsourced workers.305 On 4 July 2007, about 300 miners went on strike, 
demanding direct hiring and improved wages and conditions. On the night between 
10 and 11 September 2007, while 200 workers were still on strike, the police ended 
the mobilisation by disbanding the picket and arresting 29 workers under Article 288 
of the Penal Code (CGT-Andalucía 2007). 
                                                 
304 See the documentary “Les mineurs d’Imini” by Souad Guennoun 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hwSS5SeM6zo).  
305 See the documentary “Mineurs de Jbal Ouam” by Souad Guennoun 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFYzsBlGNE8). 
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 Khouribga has revolved around the state-owned OCP since its foundation as a 
phosphate mining town under the protectorate. In 2008, the OCP turned into a public 
limited company and consequently sought to restructure its workforce, attempting to 
outsource 850 workers (Chawqui 2010). The CDT was the dominant confederation in 
the OCP, but as these workers felt it had not represented their interests properly, they 
started a new workplace union with the UMT. They went on strike demanding direct 
hiring, while the OCP dismissed them. In 2009 and 2010, the police repeatedly 
attacked their sit-ins and made several arrests. The stand-off ended with the direct 
hiring of all workers in early 2011, when, as will be shown below, the regime 
accommodated several socioeconomic demands to avert political strife. 
 In the meantime, as inflation surged, strikes in public administration began to 
mount. Unlike in Tunisia, where the only general strike between independence and the 
2011 uprising was bloodily repressed, in Morocco the general strike had become a 
common occurrence. However, the Moroccan unions did not have enough power to 
significantly alter state policy. 
 On 13 February 2008, the UMT and the FDT held a general strike in public 
administration, demanding the indexation of wages to inflation, an increase in the 
quota of promotions, adherence to the national minimum wage for the lowest echelons 
of public administration, and other improvements. However, the government, while 
unilaterally granting modest wage increases, stopped well short of satisfying the 
unions’ demands (see La vie éco, 25 April 2008 and 2 May 2008). Therefore, on 13 
May 2008, the two confederations were joined by the UNTM in repeating the strike. 
The UGTM did not take part in the initiative because the government at the time was 
led by the Istiqlal SG Abbas El-Fassi. The CDT instead held a general strike on 21 
May 2008. 
 Public sector workers’ discontent persisted the following year. On 23 January 
2009, the UMT and the FDT held a fresh general strike in public administration to 
protest against the ineffectiveness of social dialogue. On 10 February 2009, the strike 
was repeated, this time with the participation of the CDT. Despite the strikes, the 
government refused to discuss wage increases and exceptional promotions (La vie éco, 
1 May 2009). Instead, it opted for a decrease in the income tax, which left the unions 
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unsatisfied (La vie éco, 23 October 2009).306 
 In 2010, the government continued to refuse to discuss wage increases, leading 
the unions to hold a public administration general strike on 3 March 2010 (FDT, UMT, 
UNTM) and to temporarily withdraw from the public sector social dialogue 
commission on 21 June 2010 (La vie éco, 2 July 2010). The government, for its part, 
cancelled the autumn social dialogue round, as the economic downturn discouraged 
concessions (La vie éco, 8 October 2010). 
 Meanwhile, in September 2010, the Ministry of Justice employees under the 
FDT’s guidance started a campaign of weekly strikes to demand promotions and a new 
professional statute. In the same period, the public “urban agencies” also witnessed a 
series of strikes led by the FDT. On 3 November 2010, the FDT, the UMT, the UGTM, 
and the UNTM held yet another public sector general strike, protesting against the 
“emptying out” of social dialogue and demanding higher wages, but the government 
refused once again (La vie éco, 5 November 2010).  
 In this tense context, UMT SG Mahjoub Ben Seddik died on 17 September 
2010, which opened the way for a new Congress. As mentioned before, no Congress 
had been held since 1995. During this time, the UMT Left had significantly expanded 
its presence in the union, and it thus sought to translate its rank-and-file influence into 
access to the NEC. This was a first, as Ben Seddik had never tolerated overt opponents 
in the NEC. Of course, the fact that an SG other than Ben Seddik would be elected 
was also unprecedented in the history of the union. This probably pushed the 
incumbent leadership to compromise with the Left, which sought a series of reforms 
for the union’s democratisation, such as transparency in financial matters and in the 
selection of delegates for international missions. 
 A commission was charged with the organisation of the Congress, including 
the quotas of delegates coming from each region and sector. A UMT-FNE trade 
unionist commented: “I want to the underline the fact that there were no [formal] 
meetings to elect delegates”.307 There was, however, no reported direct pressure by the 
authorities on the delegates’ selection and, in fact, the radical Left was represented. 
                                                 
306 In the autumn social dialogue rounds, the topic of the discussions were the laws on the right to strike, 
trade unions, work accidents, and severance pay, but the social partners could not find an agreement on 
any of these. 
307 Interview 26. 
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The UMT 10th Congress was held in the Casablanca HQ on 11-12 December 2010.308 
The Commission for Candidatures agreed on a consensual list for the Administrative 
Commission, so that there was no competing list. The Administrative Commission 
then elected a NEC that included three UMT Left leaders: Abdelhamid Amin and 
Khadija Ghamiri from the UMT-FNSA and Abderrazak Drissi from the UMT-FNE. 
While the three leftists were from Rabat, the other twelve members hailed from 
Casablanca, and no other regional union was represented in the NEC. The new SG 
was Miloudi Moukharik, aide to the late Ben Seddik, from the UMT-OFPPT. Its vice-
SG was Farouk Chahir from the UMT-USIB, who would later become implicated in a 
corruption scandal that concerned the banking national insurance fund (see Chapter 
3). 
 The Congress also approved a new internal statute, as the original one had long 
fallen into disuse. It is likely that the draft of the statute was mostly the work of the 
leftist activists and it contained many of the reforms for which they had been 
campaigning, such as the two-term limit on the SG’s tenure, the gender and youth 
quotas, the establishment of a Financial Commission to fight corruption and 
mismanagement, and the creation of a Discipline Commission to formalise and 
regulate internal sanctions (UMT 2011a). The new statute delegated the 
Administrative Commission to write a more detailed internal regulation. However, 
most of these provisions remained dead letters and the internal regulation was never 
written.309 
 In any case, the UMT 10th Congress marked an unprecedented display of 
influence by the union Left. The UMT Left would attempt to use its power bases 
within the union to rally the labour movement in support of the 2011 mobilisations 
and unify the protests by precarious workers, private sector waged workers, and public 
administration workers around the M20Fev’s demands, but its efforts were unable to 
substantially change the compromising line of Morocco’s labour confederations. 
 
6.2 The Trade Unions and the M20Fev 
This section examines how the Palace was able to use the flexibility of Morocco’s 
                                                 
308 Reportedly, a total of 1,732 delegates participated, although the number initially established by the 
organisational commission was 1,253 (Le matin, 14 December 2010). 
309A leftist union leader even complained that the list of the Administrative Commission’s members, 
who were supposed to write the internal regulation, was never available to union cadres (Interview 35). 
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labour institutions (party mediation, trade union fragmentation, and social dialogue) 
to distance the labour movement from the M20Fev and channel its grievances into 
institutionalised outlets. Moreover, relatively low working-class power and the 
absence of former populist entitlements contributed to the fact that the various strands 
of social unrest did not coalesce into sustained and widespread anti-regime rioting as 
in Tunisia. The unions thus faced weaker pressures from below and, in addition, they 
did not feel strong enough to take radical action for democratisation. Most trade 
unions, while initially showing sympathy towards the M20Fev’s demands, eventually 
adhered to the Palace-led constitutional reform. 
 The 2011 Moroccan uprising was not just constituted by the actions of the 
M20Fev but also by several mobilisations by precarious and secure workers. In 2011, 
strikes rose again (see Graph 10, p. 192) and several movements of the precarious 
mounted. In January and February 2011, strikes were threatened or carried out by 
several groups of workers, including miners, CNSS employees, dockers, tax 
collectors, and teachers. Ministry of Justice employees continued to hold weekly 
strikes. In Salé, 1,500 workers protested after the British textile multinational 
Mornatex abandoned the country without giving legal severance pay (Reuters, 16 
March 2011). 
In the meantime, solidarity protests with the Tunisian uprising surfaced. 
Several Moroccan leftist organisations coalesced under the umbrella of the 
Coordination Marocaine de Soutien aux Démocrates Tunisiens. On 13 January 2011, 
the Coordination held a sit-in – violently dispersed by the police – in front of the 
Tunisian embassy in Rabat (Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghllaly 2012, p. 877). After Ben 
Ali’s downfall, discussions on how to broaden the mobilisations spread online as well 
as in physical meetings, while the solidarity protests started to focus on the Egyptian 
uprising. 
On 27 January 2011, a first call to demonstrate for a “constitutional monarchy” 
was posted on Facebook by a small group of youths, and it circulated widely. On 12 
February 2011, a coalition of leftist organisations drafted a new platform with a list of 
political and socioeconomic demands and a call to demonstrate on 20 February 2011 
in every Moroccan city. This coalition had three main poles, the weight of which 
varied depending on the location. One pole was the “electoral Left”: the PSU, the 
PADS, and the CNI, which together formed the FdG (see Chapter 5). Another pole 
was the “extra-parliamentary Left” that did not participate in the elections: Ennahj and 
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Al-Mounadil-a (the latter mainly through ATTAC Maroc). The third pole was 
constituted by independent participants, many of whom embraced activism for the first 
time. A fourth pole of the movement emerged when, on 16 February 2011, the youth 
of the Islamist organisation AwI joined the platform. In the list of demands, the 
expression “constitutional monarchy” was discarded in favour of the call for a 
“democratic constitution”. This formulation was made to accommodate both the 
supporters of a constitutional monarchy (the FdG) and the “republicans” (Ennahj, Al-
Mounadil-a, and AwI).310 Most Marxist-Leninist “basists” would eventually refuse to 
join the M20Fev because they rejected cooperating with AwI’s Islamists, which 
contributes to explaining the lesser role of left-wing student unionism and of the 
ANDCM in the movement, given the basists’ substantial presence in these domains.311 
On 20 February 2011, about 120,000 demonstrated across the country (Vairel 
2014). The police, differently from the other North African countries, mostly tolerated 
the protests. However, clashes – mainly involving precarious youths – erupted in 
several cities (Libération, 22 and 23 February 2011).312 Police intervention caused the 
death of Karim Chaib in Sefrou and probably five more deaths in Al Hoceima.313 In 
the following days, the police disbanded several gatherings and made tens of arrests. 
The M20Fev established local groups in most cities of the country and held periodic 
mass protests demanding social justice and democracy.314 Each branch organised 
locally in slightly different ways, but everywhere the decision-making processes were 
assembly-based. In Casablanca, where the movement was largest, demonstrations 
were held weekly. An M20Fev National Support Committee, based in Rabat and 
including about one hundred associations and political parties, was established. The 
Support Committee gave a formal role to the organisations that adhered to the 
movement, but it did not have official leadership capacities. Despite the absence of a 
national executive body, the M20Fev steadily staged nationwide demonstrations, the 
largest being those of 20 March and 24 April 2011. 
The M20Fev’s rise coincided with a new surge of mobilisations and strikes 
across the private sector – from agricultural workers and fishermen to miners and 
                                                 
310 Interviews 2, 3, 5. 
311 Interviews 15, 22, 34. 
312 Most notably Al Hoceima, Fes, Guelmim, Larache, Marrakesh, Sefrou, Tetouan, and Tangier. 
313 The latter event was presented as a failed bank robbery and has never been clarified. 
314 See Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghllaly 2012; Desrues 2013; Fernández-Molina 2011; Hoffmann and 
König 2013; Lawrence 2016; Vairel 2014. 
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manufacturing workers. The strikes also affected the service sector, most visibly 
transport but also other branches such as tourism and telecommunications. If the 
number of lost workdays remained below the 2009 figure, the number of strikes was 
far higher (474 versus 231), suggesting that a growing part of the workers who 
mobilised belonged to smaller firms without a previous history of unionisation. As a 
leftist activist from Agadir observed: 
 
The M20Fev and the climate of struggle that emerged in 2011 had an 
impact on trade unionism. Because there are several examples, here in 
Agadir, of factories that didn’t use to have a union and they got unionised 
in this context. […] There was an awakening of grievances, some in 
sectors that hadn’t seen struggles for a long time. (Interview 19) 
 
On some occasions, the M20Fev became directly involved in supporting labour 
strikes. For example, in Agadir the M20Fev lent its active backing to the strikes in the 
food factories Fresh Express and Doha.315 While the Fresh Express new union 
representatives were fired along with the workers who defended them, the Doha 
workplace union resisted until 2015, before meeting the same fate.  
An important workplace mobilisation that involved M20Fev was that of 
Mohammedia’s oil refinery SAMIR, which culminated in a strike on 26 August 2011. 
A CDT leader commented: 
 
Before [2011], we were unable to gather the SAMIR workforce behind 
our demands. But, as the M20Fev grew, we took advantage of the situation 
to organise inside and outside. The CDT was part of the M20Fev at the 
local and national level, since 20 February 2011. […] The movement was 
fresh air for civil rights in general, and trade union freedoms are part of it. 
[…] The M20Fev was with us [in the SAMIR strike] and we were with 
them. (Interview 32) 
 
                                                 
315 Interview 34. 
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Despite the M20Fev’s support, three CDT trade unionists were fired after the 
strike and their demands were only partially met (a sign that, in late 2011, the situation 
was already on the way towards normalisation). 
In the early months of 2011, groups of public sector workers also continued to 
strike or protest, including teachers, doctors, engineers, postal workers, airport 
workers, railway workers, land registry employees, OFPPT employees, and local 
administrations employees. Ministry of Justice employees also returned on strike. 
These workplace struggles coincided with a surge in mobilisations by the 
precarious. The latter included unemployed graduates demanding public sector jobs, 
outsourced workers reclaiming direct hiring, squatters illegally occupying lands to 
build informal settlements, and informal street vendors requesting space for their 
businesses. Unemployed graduates from the whole country concentrated again in 
Rabat to demand public administration jobs. In Khouribga, there was a long movement 
of the unemployed demanding work in the OCP. On 21 February 2011, Khouribga’s 
unemployed started a permanent sit-in in front of the local OCP offices, which was 
disbanded by the police on 15 March 2011 (Libération, 16 March 2011). In the 
following months, the unemployed staged blockades of phosphate trains and 
occasionally clashed with the police (see Bogaert 2015). The workers employed in 
outsourced companies working for the OCP also recurred to similar practices to 
demand direct hiring (Libération, 17 May 2011). In August, the unemployed of the 
coastal town of Safi, where the OCP has a phosphate processing complex, also staged 
protests for jobs, blocking trains and clashing with the police (Libération, 3 August 
2011). 
Faced with large protests and high regional instability, the regime attempted to 
defuse popular unrest through the mix of political opening and repression that it had 
experimented with since the 1990s. A crucial element in this strategy was the 
separation between the “political” M20Fev and the “apolitical” protests for immediate 
socioeconomic needs. This separation was itself political, as it obscured the fact that 
the substantial and long-term satisfaction of socioeconomic demands was 
incompatible with the political system in place. For instance, on 10 February 2011, 
representatives of the government and of some unemployed graduates groups met to 
define a roadmap for the fulfilment of the latter’s demands. A few days later, the 
Istiqlal’s newspaper announced that: “The unemployed high cadres reject all political 
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exploitation of their social demands” (L’opinion, 16 February 2011a).316 This type of 
discourse – presenting socioeconomic demands as legitimate and political demands as 
driven by shady and opportunistic machinations – became very common in the media 
establishment. Later, the government issued a decree that allowed the extraordinary 
recruitment of unemployed graduates in public administration (Libération, 4 March 
2011). In March, the executive committed to hire 4,300 holders of a PhD or a master’s 
degree with no recruitment exam (La vie éco, 11 March 2011). This strategy proved 
effective. Not only the apolitical groups of unemployed graduates stayed away from 
the M20Fev, but also the relations between the M20Fev and the leftist ANDCM 
deteriorated, with the latter quitting the National Support Committee after the 20 
March 2011 demonstration. While many individual ANDCM members and some local 
sections remained active in the M20Fev, the overall contribution of the unemployed 
graduates to the movement was severely curtailed (see Bono 2015; Emperador 2011). 
 On 14 February 2011, the Istiqlali PM Abbas El-Fassi met with the opposition 
parties and announced a series of socioeconomic concessions: the doubling of the 
budget for consumption subsidies (15 billion dirhams were added to the 17 billion 
already allocated in the 2011 budget), the hiring of unemployed graduates in public 
administration, and the reopening of social dialogue with the unions (L’opinion, 16 
February 2011b). On the same day, the Ministry of Justice employees were offered an 
agreement that promised to fulfil their demands (Ibidem). Additionally, the CGEM 
was mobilised to participate in the governmental initiatives to boost employment 
(Libération, 26 February 2011).  
 On 18 February 2011, Khouribga’s 850 outsourced OCP workers who had been 
demanding direct hiring for years were suddenly accommodated (Actuel, 7 October 
2011). Subsequently, the local unemployed movement refused to join the M20Fev 
because it did not want to be “politicised”.317 On 4 May 2011, the OCP launched a 
training and employment programme called OCP Skills, committing itself to hiring 
5,800 unemployed people (Libération, 6 May 2011). According to an interviewee, 
3,700 unemployed workers were effectively hired after the training, while the rest 
continued to protest.318 
                                                 
316 Translated from French by the author. 
317 Interviews 22, 31. 
318 Interview 31. 
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On 21 February 2011, Mohammed VI inaugurated the ESC (see Chapter 3) with 
the participation of the trade unions’ representatives (L’opinion, 23 February 2011). 
The creation of the ESC had been underway since 2009, but it is plausible that the 
choice of this date for its inauguration was a political manoeuvre. An M20Fev activist 
commented: 
 
The day after [20 February 2011], the King invited the leaders of the most 
representative unions. This was clear. It was necessary [for the regime] to 
calm down social conflict, it had to distance the unions and the workers 
from the mass movement. Because there are no limits in the streets. The 
workers that are crushed every day in isolation had to be stopped from 
joining the M20Fev, which […] struggled in different ways against the 
King’s dominance. (Interview 34) 
 
On 27 February 2011, the royal counsellor Mohamed Mouatassim met with the 
SGs of the country’s five largest unions: the UMT, CDT, FDT, UGTM, and UNTM 
(Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 3 March 2011). The SNESup SG was also present. The exact 
content of the meeting is unknown, but Mouatassim announced Mohammed VI’s 
willingness to satisfy the unions’ demands and to resolve the deadlock whereby social 
dialogue with the government had stalled. This move featured the typical strategy of 
placing the blame on the government, the parliament, and the political parties, rather 
than on the Palace, despite the fact that the latter is actually more influential in the 
politics and the economy of the country. 
 The new social dialogue started on 4 April 2011, with the participation of the 
UMT, FDT, UGTM, UNTM, and CGEM. The CDT initially boycotted the 
negotiations, but it eventually joined after the first bargaining rounds. The central point 
were the wage hikes that had long been demanded by the unions, along with an 
improvement in old-age pensions (La vie éco, 8 April 2011). However, bonuses and 
internal promotions were also discussed in the public sector commission (Libération, 
7 April 2011), while trade union freedoms, health insurance, social security coverage, 
and severance pay were touched upon in the private sector commission (Libération, 9 
April 2011). 
 The most important governmental proposals were a general wage hike of 500 
dirhams in public administration, a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the increase 
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in the minimum old-age pension from 600 dirhams to 1,000 dirhams for the public 
sector and from 600 dirhams to 800 dirhams for the private sector, and the promotion 
of 28% of public employees (La vie éco, 22 April 2011). These concessions were 
extraordinary in the history of the country, but the unions rejected them, stating that 
they were not enough (Libération, 18 April 2011 and 27 April 2011). 
 The social dialogue ended on the night of 26 April 2011 with the signature of 
a generous list of concessions, the most important being: 
 
 -An immediate net raise of 600 dirhams (77.6 USD at the time) per month for 
all public administration employees. 
 -An increase in the minimum old-age pension from 600 dirhams to 1,000 
dirhams (129.4 USD at the time). 
 -An increase in the internal promotion quota in public administration to 30% 
in July 2011 and 33% in January 2012. 
 -A 15% increase in the minimum wage, 10% in 1 July 2011 and 5% in January 
2012.  
 -A commitment to generalise the above increase to all private sector wages 
(unimplemented). 
 -The improvement and enlargement – through various specific measures – of 
social security, health coverage, and social services, particularly social housing 
(partially implemented). 
 -The abolishment of the difference between the agricultural minimum wage 
and the non-agricultural minimum wage (unimplemented). 
 -The adoption of a new wage grid in public administration (unimplemented). 
 -The commitment by the government to promulgate a new law on, and audit 
all, insurance funds (unimplemented). 
 -The ratification of ILO conventions number 87 on trade union freedoms, 
number 102 on social security coverage, and number 141 on agricultural workers’ 
trade unions, as well as the suppression of Article 288 of the Penal Code (all 
unimplemented). 
 
 As indicated, the implementation of these concessions was uneven, and its 
extent is hard to precisely determine. For example, as the USFP’s daily commented at 
the time: “It is necessary to be reminded that the implementation of the minimum wage 
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is still a dream in an important portion of the national economy” (Libération, 28 April 
2011).319 However, the exceptional largesse of the 2011 social dialogue is indisputable, 
at least for what concerns public administration employees. It is important to underline 
that the unions had thus far been unable to win these concessions despite several public 
sector general strikes. It was regional instability and mounting social unrest that 
pushed the regime to accommodate them, with the implicit requirement that they 
renounce radical political opposition. 
 The general economic concessions awarded through the social dialogue were 
complemented by a series of sectorial concessions. Mohammed VI himself ordered an 
increase in the agricultural minimum wage and in the wages of the army and security 
forces (Libération, 28 April 2011). Various groups of public sector workers who had 
mobilised for sectorial demands were to some extent accommodated, the most visible 
examples being teachers, doctors, railwaymen, engineers, Ministry of Justice 
employees, and OCP employees. Additionally, an ameliorative agreement for bank 
employees was reached by the UMT-USIB and the national banking association. 
Several trade unionists and labour activists noticed an improvement in trade union 
freedoms in the private sector, with an upsurge in the creation of workplace unions 
and an unusual share of union representatives spared from dismissal.320 There was also 
a higher tolerance for the occupation of spaces by squatters and informal vendors. 
 The three largest confederations (the UMT, CDT, and FDT) initially endorsed 
the M20Fev. The UMT and the CDT were also part of the M20Fev National Support 
Committee, along with the smaller union ODT. The UMT and the CDT made some of 
their resources available to the movement, most visibly their buildings. Only the fourth 
confederation, the Istiqlal-linked UGTM, refused to provide its support from the 
beginning because it had no interest in backing a movement that was embarrassing a 
government led by the party it was affiliated with. Indeed, the Istiqlal’s newspaper, on 
the eve of 20 February 2011, published an UGTM statement with the title: “20 
February Demonstration Call: The UGTM Boycotts All Calls to Illegal 
Demonstrations; The Homeland First, The Homeland Always” (L’opinion, 19 
February 2011).321 The PJD, and thus the UNTM, adopted a more nuanced position. 
Although they did not officially adhere to the protests, they used them as a bargaining 
                                                 
319 Translated from French by the author. 
320 Interviews 7, 10, 19, 37. 
321 Translated from French by the author. 
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chip and thus they abstained from condemning them out of hand. Some of the party 
youth formed a group called Baraka (Blessing) and initially participated in the 
M20Fev mobilisations with the support of several party leaders. 
 On 9 March 2011, Mohammed VI announced a constitutional reform that 
addressed, to a limited extent, the M20Fev’s demands. The following day, he 
appointed the Consultative Commission for the Reform of the Constitution, charged 
with drafting the new text. The Commission had 19 members and was presided over 
by Abdeltif Menouni.322 Along with the Commission, the Palace established a Political 
Mechanism for Monitoring and Consultation presided over by Mohamed Mouatassim. 
The Mechanism was meant to allow political parties, civil society associations, and 
the trade unions to present their proposals for constitutional reform and voice their 
opinions on the drafts presented by the Commission. The five largest trade unions (the 
UMT, CDT, FDT, UGTM, and UNTM) all participated in it. 
 The M20Fev, however, refused the Palace’s roadmap since it maintained that 
the new constitution had to be drafted by a democratically elected constitutional 
assembly and not by a committee appointed by Mohammed VI. This is why the 
M20Fev did not participate in the Mechanism despite being invited. On 13 March 
2011, a large demonstration in Casablanca against the roadmap was brutally attacked 
by the police, who also invaded the PSU HQ where many protesters had sought refuge. 
During the attack, Mohamed Diidia – FDT representative in the Chamber of 
Councillors – was also beaten by the police (La vie éco, 18 March 2011b). Yet the 
USFP, which had supported the M20Fev after its initial success, decided to engage in 
the political process sponsored by Mohammed VI. This gradually distanced the 
socialists and their associated union FDT from the movement. On 22 June 2011, the 
FDT leaders held an extraordinary meeting to declare their support for a Yes vote in 
the constitutional referendum to be held on 1 July 2011 (Libération, 24 June 2011). 
The PJD, and thus the UNTM, also adhered to the Palace’s roadmap.  
 The UMT initially issued a statement endorsing the M20Fev’s demands as 
legitimate (UMT 2011b). The UMT Left attempted to rally the whole confederation in 
full support of the M20Fev. It did so most effectively in Rabat, where its control of the 
Regional EC allowed it to make the union building available to the M20Fev for 
                                                 
322 In his youth, Menouni had been an opponent of the regime, UNEM SG, a founder of the CDT, and 
a major expert on Moroccan trade unionism. He would be appointed as royal counsellor on 3 August 
2011. 
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assemblies, events, and related activities. The Rabat UMT also created the network 
“Trade unionists for the M20Fev”, attempting to link labour unrest with the movement 
for democracy. The network had, however, a relatively limited impact. The UMT NEC 
half-heartedly accepted these initiatives, but the rupture came in the run up to the 
referendum for the approval of the new constitution. The final draft of the new 
constitution was announced on 17 June 2011. The M20Fev took to the streets again 
on 19 June calling for a boycott of the referendum, as the proposed text – despite its 
concessions – left crucial powers to the Palace (see Benchemsi 2012). The UMT Left 
demanded that the confederation remain neutral on the referendum but, on 21 June 
2011, the UMT NEC publicly endorsed a Yes vote (UMT 2011c). This decision 
possibly resulted from pressures emanating from the Palace, but it is not surprising 
given the compromising position long held by the UMT’s traditional leadership. 
 The CDT thus remained the only confederation siding with the M20Fev and 
boycotting the constitutional referendum. Moreover, on 7 June 2011, the CDT (along 
with the PADS and the CNI) polemically withdrew from the Political Mechanism for 
Monitoring and Consultation (Le matin, 8 June 2011). However, the CDT did not 
promote its opposition through radical actions such as regional or national general 
strikes. Most M20Fev militants interviewed for this research argued that the CDT’s 
support became timid because the confederation “sold out” by participating in the 
social dialogue and accepting material concessions with the implicit condition of 
abandoning radical political opposition.323 For example, an M20Fev activist from 
Casablanca said: 
 
The unions signed the 26 April agreement and left the M20Fev. […] Even 
if the CDT boycotted [the referendum], even if it didn’t quit the M20Fev 
with an official declaration… In the streets you could only find those CDT 
militants that were always on the M20Fev’s side. But, if we speak of what 
I call the union bureaucracy, they made a compromise and thus left the 
streets. (Interview 2) 
 
                                                 
323 It should be reiterated that the historical strategic disagreement that led to the split of the CDT from 
the UMT revolved around the relationship between economic and political demands, with the CDT 
accusing the UMT of prioritising the former. However, the CDT would have probably lost legitimacy 
in the face of many of its members had it given up on this opportunity to participate in the negotiation 
of unprecedented economic gains (Interview 20). 
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 Whatever the plausibility of these claims, the crucial fact is that the CDT alone 
did not have the power to call for a successful general strike. In fact, the second largest 
union of the country had a self-declared membership of 61,500 (0.6% of the 
employed), hardly enough to change the political equilibrium. 
 Meanwhile, since March 2011, repression against the M20Fev had intensified. 
Police charges against M20Fev demonstrations became common, even more so after 
the 28 April terrorist bombing in Marrakesh was used as a justification for prioritising 
law and order. Additionally, in mid-2011, Ministry of the Interior officials stepped up 
the practice of “outsourcing” repression to informal militias (called “baltajis”, i.e. 
thugs), charged with harassing the protesters. The movement thus decided to start 
holding protests in the popular neighbourhoods to break the routine of foreseeable 
marches in the city centres. 
 On 15 May 2011, the M20Fev national demonstration in Temara was brutally 
dispersed before it could begin and, the following Sunday, the police attacked M20Fev 
protests across the country (Libération, 24 May 2011). On 26 May 2011, two 
movement leaders and CDT cadres – Seddik Kabbouri and Chenou Mehjoub – were 
jailed along with eight youths after being accused of having incited violence during a 
demonstration held in Bouarfa on 18 May 2011, which ended in clashes with the police 
(Libération, 9 June 2011). The M20Fev in Bouarfa reacted with a local general strike 
and a series of public actions, but, on 17 June 2011, the accused were handed prison 
sentences of up to three years (Libération, 20 June 2011). On 29 May 2011, after new 
attacks on the movement, the AwI and M20Fev militant Kamal Amari was beaten to 
death by police in Safi. 
 The new constitution passed, on 1 July 2011, with 98.5% approval and a voter 
turnout of 72.4%.324 The constitutional referendum set the stage for the early elections 
held on 25 November 2011. The Islamist PJD won a plurality and was thus allowed 
for the first time to form a government. The early elections spelled the closure of the 
window of opportunity that had opened in early 2011. 
 Most of the interviewed M20Fev activists did not hide their scorn towards the 
compromising line held by the trade unions. These quotes are quite representative: 
 
                                                 
324 The accuracy of the latter figure has, however, been contested by a number of observers. In fact, the 
Moroccan authorities calculate voter turnout on the basis of the electoral roll, which had 13 million 
registered voters, while the voting age population was estimated at 21 million (Desrues 2012). 
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The unions had an ambiguous position towards the M20Fev. The support 
was there, but it wasn’t substantial. The CDT and the UMT just gave their 
buildings. But for what concerns the workers’ mobilisations, the strikes… 
they took advantage [of the movement] to get the concessions of the 26 
April agreement, the 600 dirhams for the public administration employees. 
The agreement has to be contextualised, it was part of the monarchy’s 
attempt to get the constitutional reform through. (Interview 25) 
 
I have to say, because the unions are the topic of your thesis, that the labour 
movement is what we missed. The M20Fev was really a combative 
struggle that opened new horizons, but the car can’t move forward without 
four wheels. (Interview 34) 
 
 Some activists also related the compromising choices of the union leaders to 
the general weakness of contemporary Moroccan trade unionism: 
 
I don’t think the unions represent the workers here [in Morocco]. If we 
analyse things historically, the unions have had an important role in the 
past, they used to be very influential. But with time, their role has 
diminished little by little and trade union density is lower than ever, 3% 
by now [3.2% of total employment]. They can’t be influential, because 
97% of the workers don’t care about what goes on in the unions. So, if 
they can’t give concrete answers to the workers’ problems, how are they 
going to play a role in the movement or influence general public opinion? 
(Interview 15) 
 
 The trade union leaders’ choices were thus influenced not only by the regime’s 
dexterity in using Morocco’s flexible system of labour institutions to distance them 
from the M20Fev, but also by the relatively low level of working-class power existing 
in the country. As workers’ protests remained fragmented and did not escalate, the 
unions faced weaker pressure from below to mount a strategy of radical confrontation, 
and – in any case – their limited resources would have made such a strategy costlier 
and less likely to succeed. 
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6.3 The Regime’s Search for New Stability 
With the decline of the struggles within and without the workplace, the regime moved 
to retrench many of the concessions it had given in 2011 to defuse unrest. The trade 
unions protested vehemently against austerity and the gaps in the application of the 26 
April agreement, but their repeated general strikes were unable to change the regime’s 
course of action, which preserved its undemocratic nature. 
 After the elections, the M20Fev began to gradually lose steam. On 18 
December 2011, AwI announced its withdrawal from the movement. By the end of 
2012, M20Fev demonstrations had become rare. However, throughout the year, 
localised socioeconomic protests continued, with clashes taking place in Beni Mellal, 
Khouribga, Marrakesh, Mohammedia, the Rif, Sidi Ifni, Tangier, and Taza (see 
Desrues and Fernández-Molina 2013). In the Southern commune of Imider, a social 
movement that had started in 2011 demands, to this day, an end to the environmental 
degradation caused by the local silver mine owned by Mohammed VI through the 
Managem group (see Bouhmouch and Bailey 2015). 
 The PJD’s electoral victory would not have been possible without the M20Fev. 
In fact, the Palace had backed the recently formed PAM as a governmental alternative 
to the PJD, but the early elections and the discrediting of the PAM, precipitated by the 
2011 mobilisations, upset these plans. In January 2012, Benkirane finalised the 
composition of his government – including the Istiqlal, the Mouvement Populaire,325 
and the ex-communist PPS. 
 When Benkirane took charge, he faced a state budget in dire straits. The 
socioeconomic concessions that the regime had handed out in 2011 to isolate the 
M20Fev had not been accompanied by measures aiming at making them sustainable 
(e.g. a redistributive tax reform, a crackdown on high-level corruption, a repudiation 
of external debt, etc.). By 2012, the public administration wage bill had climbed to 
11.4% of GDP and public expenditure on consumption subsidies had risen to an 
extraordinary 6.5% of GDP,326 resulting in a budget deficit of 6.8% in the same year 
(Ministry of Economy). To address the situation, in August 2012, Morocco agreed 
with the IMF a Precautionary and Liquidity Line programme, with a $6.2 billion 
                                                 
325 The Mouvement Populaire is a right-wing, monarchist, and Amazigh-oriented party founded in 
1957. 
326 In 2009, the public administration wage bill represented 10.1% of GDP and public expenditure for 
food subsidies represented only 1.8% of GDP (Ministry of the Economy). 
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loan.327 In doing so, parallel to Tunisia, the government committed the country to a 
new round of neoliberal measures. 
 Benkirane’s two governments328 made exams mandatory for recruitment to 
public administration, declared that public administration would withhold wages from 
striking employees, lifted fuel subsidies without substituting them with direct cash 
transfers, left some of the provisions of the 2011 social dialogue agreement 
unimplemented (see above), and provided the minimum further concessions to public 
sector workers. By 2016, the public administration wage bill and consumption 
subsidies had been brought back to roughly their pre-uprising levels, 10.3% and 1.4% 
of GDP respectively (Ministry of Economy). 
 In substance, Benkirane was obliged to directly or indirectly roll back many of 
the socioeconomic concessions of 2011 to comply with the international financial 
institutions’ requirement of reducing the state budget. Regarding the significance of 
the political concessions established with the new Constitution, Benkirane himself had 
a chance to test it when, after the 2016 elections, Mohammed VI discarded him as PM 
despite the fact that he was the leader of the party that had obtained the relative 
majority. 
 The unemployed graduates were among the first to experience the effects of 
the new round of austerity. Over one hundred holders of PhDs or master’s degrees 
protested over their exclusion from work in public administration despite the 2011 
agreements (Libération, 12 December 2011). On 18 January 2012, one day before the 
presentation of the governmental programme to the parliament, three unemployed 
graduates set themselves on fire during a protest in Rabat (Libération, 20 January 
2012). One of them, Abdelwahab Zeidoun, aged 27, died as a result on 24 January. 
 Another visible group who mobilised nationally against governmental policy, 
in late 2015 and early 2016, was that of the trainee teachers, who held an open-ended 
strike and large national demonstrations against two decrees by the Ministry of 
Education (Tel quel, 16 January 2016). The first decree made recruitment after the 
training period conditional upon an exam and the second decree halved the trainees’ 
scholarship. The trade unions played a role as mediators between the striking trainees 
and the government. The movement ended with the 13 April 2016 agreement, in which 
                                                 
327 This would be followed by an additional $5 billion loan in 2014 and a $3.5 billion loan in 2016. 
328 In July 2013, the Istiqlal withdrew its support from the government. Therefore, Benkirane formed a 
new government in which the RNI substituted the Istiqlal. 
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the government modified the decrees so that they would not apply to the current 
trainees. However, about 150 trainee teachers, reportedly including the leaders of the 
movement, were eventually not hired (see Hayns 2017). 
 The unions too expressed their frustration over the government’s refusals to 
accommodate their demands (see also Desrues 2015). On 27 April 2013, all the largest 
unions – with the unsurprising exception of the PJD-linked UNTM – boycotted the 
spring session of the social dialogue, claiming that the government had emptied social 
dialogue of meaning and refused to complete the implementation of the 26 April 2011 
agreement (La vie éco, 3 May 2013). In late 2013, the government started planning a 
reform of the retirement system, involving an increase in the retirement age and the 
contributions paid by the workers, which further worried the unions. Another difficult 
point were the organic laws on strikes and trade unions, on which the unions, the 
CGEM, and the government could not find an agreement.329 
 In 2014, social dialogue continued to stall, despite the fact that the government 
unilaterally mandated a 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage. On 23 
September 2014, the UGTM and the FDT led by Fatihi330 held a public sector general 
strike against the pension reform, the public administration wage freeze, the increases 
in fuel, electricity, and water prices, the lack of trade union freedoms, and the 
government’s disregard for social dialogue (Libération, 18 September 2014). On 29 
October 2014, all the largest unions, with the exception of the UNTM, held a general 
strike in both the public and private sectors (Le matin, 28 October 2014). It was 
probably the largest general strike in Morocco’s recent history, but – after the end of 
the M20Fev and the 2011 Arab uprisings – the government no longer felt compelled 
to make speedy concessions and simply postponed all decisions to the social dialogue 
rounds of the following year.  
 However, the spring 2015 social dialogue also failed to satisfy the unions’ 
demands (La vie éco, 30 April 2015). In the following months, the largest unions 
(except the UNTM) organised several protests against the government. On 10 
December 2015 and 24 February 2016, the UMT, CDT, UGTM, FDT, and other 
smaller unions held two more general strikes, the first in public administration and the 
                                                 
329 These laws, despite being mandated by the 2004 Labour Code, have yet to be promulgated. 
330 By that time, the FDT had divided into a current led by Abdelhamid Fatihi and another led by 
Abderrahmane Azzouzi, both claiming to be the only legitimate representatives of the confederation. 
As a result, the FDT was excluded from the most representative unions after the 2015 professional 
elections. 
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second in all sectors. La Vie Éco commented: “Abdelilah Benkirane, being aware of 
the relatively weak mobilisation capacity of the unions, lets them carry on” (La vie 
éco, 8 December 2015).331 On 31 May 2016, after the spring social dialogue meetings 
failed to produce an agreement, the unions held a new public administration general 
strike. However, on 20 July 2016, the parliament approved the pension reform 
proposed by the government, removing the main point of contention between the latter 
and the unions. 
 The withdrawal of the 2011 socioeconomic concessions did not manifest itself 
in government policy only. Several of the interviewed trade unionists and labour 
activists lamented that, if in 2011 there was a relative opening of trade union freedoms 
in the private sector, this window gradually closed in the following years.332 
 The activist from Agadir quoted above stated: 
 
The main gains that came out of the 20 February context benefited 
especially the public administration workers, or those in very large firms 
like the OCP and the banks. But now inflation is eroding these 
improvements more and more, and there are still some points of the 2011 
social dialogue agreement that were not implemented. In private sector 
manufacturing, after the ebb of the M20Fev, there was a counteroffensive 
that basically took everything away. (Interview 19) 
 
 Numerous reports of violations of trade union freedoms emerged during this 
research, from the Tangier Free Zone to agribusiness in Souss, from manufacturing 
and call centres in Casablanca to mining in the South or local administration 
employees in Fes. Three of the severest examples are reported below: APM Terminals, 
the Bou-Azzer mines, and the case of Wafa Sharaf. 
 On 28 May 2012, APM Terminals – the multinational company managing and 
jointly owning the Tanger-Med Phase I container terminal – signed a non-binding 
accord with the UMT workplace union led by Said Elhairech (La vie éco, 15 June 
2012). However, on 16 June 2012, Elhairech and his fellow UMT trade unionist 
Mohamed Chamchati were placed in preventive detention on suspicion of forming a 
                                                 
331 Translated from French by the author. 
332 Interviews 10, 19, 30, 32, 37, 46. 
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criminal gang, undermining the security of the state, and violating the right to work in 
a different industrial dispute (AFL-CIO 2012). This triggered an international 
solidarity campaign, such that Elhairech was liberated in October 2012 and Chamchati 
was set free in November. Elhairech confirmed that his arrest on trumped up charges 
was linked to his activism at APM Terminals: “I was accused of threatening national 
security because of the Tanger-Med port industrial action. We are supposed to have 
the right to strike in Morocco, but it doesn’t work in practice” (ITF 2012). In February 
2013, Elhairech and Chamchati were sentenced to one year and two and a half years 
imprisonment respectively based on Article 288 of the Penal Code (ITF 2013). While 
Elhairech appealed his conviction, this is a clear example of judiciary repression of 
trade union freedoms. 
 In April 2012, a group of outsourced miners working in the Bou-Azzer cobalt 
mines in the Ouarzazate region started a strike against multiple violations of the labour 
law by the subcontracting firm Agzoumi, contracted by the Managem group (owned 
by the King). The mine remained blocked until June 2012, but the strike was then 
repressed (L’économiste, 8 November 2012). On 15 October 2012, the CDT held a 
local general strike to protest against the trial of eight strikers accused of violating the 
right to work under Article 288 of the Penal Code and the dismissal of 21 strikers 
(L’économiste, 17 October 2012). On 16 November 2012, Hamid Majdi, a member of 
the CDT Local EC, was arrested as drugs were “found” in his car (ATMF 2012). Majdi 
and other Ouarzazate trade unionists were handed prison sentences ranging from six 
months to one year (Histoires ordinaires, 3 June 2014). 
 On 27 April 2014, the AMDH and Ennahj activist Wafa Sharaf visited a sit-in 
of workers protesting against their illegal layoff by the industrial packaging 
multinational Grief, in Tangier. According to Sharaf, she was then followed and beaten 
by plainclothes police officers. After having reported the assault, she was first 
sentenced to one year in prison for false allegations of torture, and when she appealed 
she was sentenced to two years (HuffPost Maghreb, 11 July 2016). Sharaf was only 
freed on 10 July 2016. 
Other cases of severe repression of trade union freedoms are noticeable 
because, if they did not involve heavy prison sentences, they led to the dismissal of 
very high numbers of strikers who had tried to defend their union representatives. 
Three examples are Agadir’s food factory Doha, Casablanca’s steel mill Maghreb 
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Steel, and Tangier’s paper factory Med Paper (see also ITUC 2017).333 In all three 
cases, the companies fired the representatives of a recently created workplace union. 
When other workers struck, demanding the rehiring of their illegally dismissed union 
representatives, management essentially fired all the striking workers at once. This led 
to the layoff of about 550 workers in Doha’s case, roughly 500 workers in Maghreb 
Steel’s case, and about 130 workers in Med Paper’s case. The striking workers were 
substituted with temporary workers, despite the fact that Article 496 of the Labour 
Code prohibits this practice when a strike is taking place. Fifty-one Doha workers 
were also sentenced to suspended prison sentences through Article 288 of the Penal 
Code. Moreover, the Regional SG of the Agadir CDT, Abdellah Rahmoun, was 
ordered to pay a fine of three million dirhams, risking the confiscation of his house 
(IUF 2016).334 
 The post-2011 backlash also had ramifications within the internal dynamics of 
the unions, particularly the UMT. In early 2012, the UMT Rabat was preparing its 12th 
Regional Congress, which the union Left was poised to win once more. The Congress 
was meant to take place in the autumn of 2011, but the UMT NEC had it postponed 
several times. In fact, as the social mobilisations began to wane, the UMT NEC had 
decided to recover control of the Rabat regional union from the Left.335 
 The casus belli was an article that appeared in the major daily newspaper Al-
Massae (23 February 2012, Appendix, pp. 304-9) with the title: “The UMT: When 
Struggle and ‘Mismanagement’ Coexist”.336 The article recapitulated some of the main 
corruption and misappropriation cases in which UMT leaders were involved (see 
Chapter 3). It also explained how the UMT top leadership was breaching internal 
democracy, particularly by refusing to allow the UMT-FNE Congress and the UMT 
Rabat Congress to take place in a free and fair fashion. In the article, a leftist member 
of the Rabat UMT’s Regional EC, Abdellah Lafnatsa, was interviewed to confirm the 
UMT NEC’s attempts to halt the regional Congress. 
 The regional Congress had been rescheduled for 11 March 2012, but, on 5 
                                                 
333 Interviews 19, 20, 33, 36, 40. 
334 In response to local and international pressures, Doha dropped its charges against Rahmoun in 
February 2017 (IUF 2017). 
335 Some activists assert that the UMT NEC was merely implementing a decision coming “from above”, 
suggesting that the Palace or the Ministry of the Interior were not willing to tolerate anymore the use 
of the large UMT Rabat building as a “hot spot” for radical social movements, and thus ordered the 
union’s top leadership to prevent this from happening in the future (Interviews 3, 10, 26, 29). It remains, 
however, impossible to verify these allegations. 
336 Translated from Arabic by Marwa Talhaoui and the author. 
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March 2012, the UMT Administrative Commission dissolved all the Rabat UMT’s 
structures and expelled Abdellah Lafnatsa with the accusation of harming the UMT’s 
public image through the Al-Massae article (see Amin et al. 2012a). A provisional 
Rabat EC was appointed to run the regional union and organise the Congress. On 9 
March 2012, under the pretext of refurbishment works, the UMT leadership blocked 
access to the Rabat union building and changed the entrance locks. The regional 
Congress was eventually held on 13 May 2012, but the leftist trade unionists were 
barred from participating and held a separate Congress on 1 July 2012 (Amin et al. 
2012b). 
 On 22 March 2012, a Discipline Commission expelled the three leftist NEC 
members – Abdelhamid Amin, Abderrazak Drissi, and Khadija Ghamiri – and one 
member of the Administrative Commission. They had all opposed the dissolution of 
the Rabat UMT’s structures. The expelled leaders charged that there was no proof of 
the existence of the Discipline Commission that signed the expulsion order (its 
members being unknown) and that even if it existed it had not been formed according 
to the statutory regulations approved by the UMT 10th Congress (Amin et al. 2012c, 
Appendix, pp. 309-14). 
 In the following weeks, the UMT NEC attempted to dissolve the ECs of the 
national sectorial federations controlled by the Left. It thus constituted a “National 
Steering Committee of the Public Administration Sectors” to remove the UMT-USF’s 
leftist leadership (UMT-USF 2012). In a similar way, the UMT NEC began to organise 
a sectorial union that would replace the UMT-FNOFCL (Amin et al. 2012c, Appendix, 
pp. 309-14). On 9 June 2012, after the UMT-FNOCFCL EC had been expelled from 
the UMT, there were two simultaneous Congresses of the federation, one held by the 
pro-UMT NEC trade unionists and one held by the expelled leftists (Amin et al. 
2012b). The UMT NEC made a similar attempt with the UMT-FNSA, but it failed due 
to the lack of followers (Ibidem). 
 The case of the UMT-FNE was slightly different because, although the 
federation had a majority of leftist members and cadres, its NEC was still dominated 
by the “bureaucratic” leadership, since attempts to organise a new Congress had been 
halted for over seventeen years. On 5-6 May 2012, the two tendencies held separate 
Congresses. The leftist UMT-FNE elected the expelled leader Abderrazak Drissi as its 
SG, while the “official” UMT-FNE re-elected M’hamed Ghayour, the 1920-born 
leader that had been in charge since 1995 and was involved in a corruption case 
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regarding the MGEN (see Chapter 3). 
 This internal earthquake had multiple ramifications at the local level, as in 
many cases the local leaderships barred the UMT leftists from accessing the union 
offices.337 As a leftist militant recalled: “We were not really expelled, they simply 
didn’t let us in”.338 For example, on 27 May 2012, a “militia” led by the UMT NEC 
violently took over the Taza UMT building, hitherto controlled by the UMT Left 
(Amin et al. 2012d). On 26 July 2012, a sit-in against the expulsions in front of the 
Rabat UMT building turned into physical clashes between the leftists and the UMT 
NEC’s followers (Aujourd’hui le Maroc, 1 August 2012). The turmoil led to de facto 
splits in the UMT-FNOFCL and in the UMT-FNE, and thus to divisions in the UMT-
USF umbrella federation too. The Ministry of the Interior granted official recognition 
to the pro-UMT NEC sectorial ECs. Only the UMT-FNSA managed to safeguard its 
unity. The three leftist federations, and the UMT-USF umbrella federation, thus 
regrouped under the label UMT-Courante Démocratique (UMT-CD), which waged a 
campaign to denounce the UMT NEC’s actions as undemocratic and unlawful. 
 However, the UMT-CD soon became divided over which path to follow. Even 
if many in the UMT-CD were not party members, most militants linked to Ennahj – 
consistent with their principle of “workers’ unity” – wanted to keep struggling for the 
democratisation and radicalisation of the UMT.339 Yet several trade unionists 
belonging to other leftist tendencies – Al-Mounadil-a in particular – thought that this 
was the occasion to found a new and militant confederation.340 The position on this 
issue was not only dictated by partisan alignments but also by sectorial belongings. In 
fact, the strategy of leaving the UMT was more popular in the UMT-FNE, while that 
of remaining was dominant in the UMT-FNSA.341 Eventually, the UMT-FNSA and the 
UMT-FNOFCL fully re-entered the UMT before the 2015 professional elections, 
while the UMT-FNE decided to remain outside. On 21 March 2015, the UMT 11th 
Congress re-elected Moukharik as national SG, and no member of the union Left was 
elected to a post in the NEC (see La vie éco, 27 March 2015). 
 It took years for a new compromise to be found between the UMT Left and its 
leadership, but the overall result was a renewed weakening of internal democracy and 
                                                 
337 Interviews 3, 24, 31, 42. 
338 Interview 26. 
339 Interviews 7, 29, 42. 
340 Interviews 19, 22, 37. 
341 Interviews 26, 29, 30. 
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the consecration of the non-application of the internal reforms that had been formally 
approved by the UMT 10th Congress. The UMT Left explicitly pointed out that the 
internal crackdown against it was related to the tensions, shifts in power relations, and 
backlashes set in motion by the broader political events: 
 
The political struggles within the confederation [the UMT] were at first 
centred on the position towards the M20Fev: should the union provide the 
M20Fev with material and human, real and sincere, political support or 
should it restrain itself to theoretical support through public statements, 
without practical, material, and human support? It was the second option 
that prevailed. 
The political struggle intensified when it became necessary to take sides 
vis-à-vis the constitutional draft presented at the 1 July 2011 referendum. 
While the dominant current within the leadership defended the draft, and 
pushed to call for a Yes vote, the democratic current defended the position 
that the NEC should leave freedom of choice to the members…342 (Amin 
et al. 2012c, Appendix, p. 312) 
  
 An interviewed leftist militant added: 
 
The regime had started to see the importance of the Left within the labour 
movement, the unions… especially for what concerns the important role 
played by the UGTT in Tunisia. This pressured the Moroccan state to take 
strong and clear-cut decisions regarding the union Left. (Interview 10) 
 
 The union leaderships that had endorsed a Yes vote in the referendum were 
conscious of the fact that this meant postponing significant reforms for social justice 
and democracy, but they esteemed there was no alternative. Once the mobilisations 
ebbed, the UMT leadership felt confident enough to attempt to simply get rid of its 
internal opposition. While this bid did not succeed as expected, internal democracy in 
Morocco’s largest trade union clearly deteriorated once again, which reflected the 
trajectory of the whole country. 
                                                 
342 Translated from French by the author. 
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Conclusion 
Contrary to Tunisia, in Morocco the various strands of social unrest did not overcome 
sectorial fragmentation. As shown in Chapter 5, two factors that arguably contributed 
to this difference are the lower level of working-class power as well as the absence of 
a former populist social pact, which lowered the expectations of many Moroccan 
workers, despite the fact that they were on aggregate more deprived than the Tunisian 
ones. 
 Therefore, in Morocco, social mobilisations were not strong enough to 
pressure the trade union leaderships to take radical actions in support of the 
movements for social justice and democracy. Moreover, the unions themselves were 
too divided, undemocratic, and weak to take decisive action. At the same time, they 
were inserted in a flexible institutional context – featuring party mediation, union 
fragmentation, and social dialogue – that harnessed them to defuse social tension. 
Labour weakness and flexible institutions contribute to account for the unions’ limited 
and accommodating role during the 2011 uprising, even if – as seen above – most 
unions initially endorsed the M20Fev and the union Left attempted to maintain and 
extend this support. 
 This interpretation differs from that proposed by Matt Buehler, who writes: 
 
Did the situation of unionists parallel that of feminist and Amazigh 
activists in which broader objectives of democratisation were surrendered 
for narrow factional interests?  
The answer to this question is no. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt where 
protestors, a priori, demanded regime change, this did not occur in 
Morocco where they emphasised regime reform. (Buehler 2015, p. 103) 
 
 While in Morocco protests were overall less radical than in Tunisia, Buehler’s 
view ignores that the strategic objectives of several M20Fev components did in fact 
include “regime change”, although this question was left open by the compromise of 
demanding a “democratic constitution” (which obviously means protesters had 
“broader objectives of democratisation”). More clearly, the M20Fev called for a 
boycott of the constitutional referendum, while all trade unions except for the CDT 
promoted a Yes vote. In the cases of the UMT and FDT, support for the constitutional 
reform came despite the fact that the two confederations had initially endorsed the 
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M20Fev. 
 After the mobilisations ebbed, the regime was able to withdraw many of the 
concessions it had made in 2011 without facing efficacious resistance from the unions. 
Yet some interviewees pointed out that the movements of 2011 had the effect of 
spreading and normalising social protest to a higher extent than before.343 This, 
together with deterioration of the socioeconomic and political situation, probably 
contributes to explain the recent and dramatic rise of El-Hirak Esh’aby (Popular 
Movement) in the Rif and of the Hirak (Movement) of Jerada. However, these new 
mobilisations for social justice fall outside the scope of this thesis.  
                                                 
343 Interviews 5, 15, 34. 
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This chapter traces the steps that led from the social struggles of the 2000s to the 2011 
uprising, focusing on the relations between the mobilisations of the precarious and the 
UGTT, as well as on the internal conflicts within the confederation. After the 2002 
UGTT 20th Congress, increasing signs of tension in the country and within the UGTT 
started to emerge. Such tensions reached a first peak in 2008, corresponding with a 
wave of riots – facilitated by the rise in food prices accompanying the global economic 
crisis – that affected several African countries (Berazneva and Lee 2013). In Tunisia, 
the revolt of precarious youths in the mining basin of Gafsa had reverberations within 
the UGTT, as “militants” and “bureaucrats” took opposite sides in the conflict. 
 The 2011 uprising was, in some respects, a repeat of the Gafsa revolt, in that 
the protagonists of the mobilisations were once again precarious youths, and once 
again their protests created a rift in the UGTT between those ready to go to great 
lengths to support them and those who prioritised the safeguarding of the NEC’s policy 
of compromise with the regime. However, in December 2010 and January 2011, the 
mobilisations spread across the country and the politicised rank-and-file were able to 
push the higher levels of the UGTT to authorise the regional general strikes that were 
crucial in bringing Ben Ali down. The union militants were thus able to create a 
juncture between the precarious workers mobilising in the communities and the more 
secure workers who brought the struggle into the workplaces through the general 
strikes and the subsequent strike wave. 
 Relatively high working-class structural power and the breech of the former 
populist social pact contributed to the radicalism and the relative unification of the 
protests in a widespread and sustained wave of anti-regime mobilisations. Radical 
protests meant intense pressure on the UGTT to mobilise their members, and the 
UGTT’s high associational power made the option of politicised general strikes more 
likely to be sustainable. The rigidity of Tunisia’s system of labour institutions – 
characterised by a single trade union and the absence of party mediation between the 
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unions and the state – made it harder to channel social conflict into institutionalised 
outlets. 
 In the aftermath of the uprising, the UGTT found a new role as broker of the 
political negotiations between the Islamist government and the opposition, 
contributing to the stabilisation of the democratic transition. This role gave it a central 
position in the emerging political order – including an influential say over the 
composition of governments – which was formalised through the Pact of Carthage 
(see below). These processes are leading to a new institutional configuration that is 
still in the making but that seems to display the characteristics of democratic 
corporatism. However, in the context of authoritarian restoration or civil war in the 
other countries affected by the 2011 uprisings, the Tunisian uprising was able to 
achieve representative democracy but unable to satisfy the demands for social justice 
that were at its core. This put the UGTT in a difficult position vis-à-vis the precarious 
fractions of the working class, who have continued mobilising to this day. 
 
7.1 Social Struggles and the Battle for Internal Democracy in the UGTT 
This section shows how the class struggles taking place outside of the UGTT – mainly 
waged by non-unionised precarious workers in their communities – interacted with 
the struggles for internal democracy inside the UGTT. The combination of social 
tensions and Tunisia’s rigid system of labour institutions contributed to sharpen the 
internal polarisation between union “militants” and “bureaucrats”. 
 
Graph 11 – Strike activity in Tunisia, 2002-2014 
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 In the early 2000s, street demonstrations on international issues became 
prominent, first in support of the Second Intifada and then against the invasion of Iraq. 
Such demonstrations were tolerated by the regime so as not to further compromise its 
weak nationalist credentials, but they were also an occasion for the opposition to 
stealthily voice their dissent. In the meantime, the UGTT refused to participate in the 
newly created Chamber of Advisors in parliament, reclaiming the right to 
autonomously select its representatives. Parallel to this, a new surge of strike activity 
gained momentum starting in 2003 and reaching a first peak in 2007 (see Graph 11, p. 
221). 
 These mounting social and political conflicts emboldened the UGTT dissidents 
to demand further internal democratisation, while SG Jerad and his associates 
attempted to maintain the compromise between the labour confederation and the 
regime. These tensions came to the fore at the UGTT 21st Congress, held on 14-16 
December 2006 in Monastir.344 Ali Romdhane was by now an ally of Jerad’s and the 
Congress made him the new Secretary of Internal Regulation. The main opposition 
list was led by the left-leaning Tunis Regional SG Taoufik Touati.345 Pressure on the 
Congress by the Ministry of the Interior was extraordinary. Over a hundred union 
militants had organised to be present outside of the Congress hall, but the police made 
sure that they could not find accommodation in the hotels of Monastir. When the 
militants’ march approached the hotel where the Congress was being held, the police 
attacked them. In the meantime, inside the hotel, a major controversy revolved around 
Article 10 of the internal regulation, which mandated a two-term limit on NEC 
membership. When a number of Congress delegates took a break to check on the 
situation of the militants outside, Jerad passed the abolition of Article 10. According 
to the interviewees, the delegates came back into the hall and discovered that the 
motion had been approved without them knowing: 
 
All of a sudden the scene became chaotic. Those who had stayed in the 
hall shouted all over the place, we came back and blocked everything for 
two or three hours. Some delegates mounted the stage, took the 
                                                 
344 Monastir was not neutral territory; it was Bourguiba’s hometown and an RCD stronghold where the 
UGTT Regional SG (Said Youssef) was also an RCDist. 
345 While most dissidents were leftists, candidates close to the Patriotic Democratic Labour Party 
(Awad, one of the descendants of Esh’ola) and Watad’s Abid Briki had reached a compromise with 
Jerad and entered the NEC. 
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microphone and said it was like a coup. So they [the exiting NEC] finally 
agreed to vote again and the large majority chose to keep Article 10. 
(Interview 77) 
 
My mates and I, we entered the place and turned the Congress upside 
down. […] We stopped the reform of Article 10 but Jerad took me aside 
and told me: “Wait and see what will happen!”. (Interview 91) 
 
 The following period is known as the “witch-hunt”. Jerad and Romdhane 
began to roll back secondments and freeze the union membership of several dissidents 
to prepare for the abolition of Article 10 at the 22nd Congress (RSDM 2010b, 
Appendix, pp. 314-8). Notable victims included the Bizerte Regional SG Abderrazak 
Bejaoui and the Nabeul Regional SG Habib Ghannem (Le temps, 6 January 2009).346 
 In 2008, the NEC turned on the Tunis Regional SG Taoufik Touati, accusing 
him of financial mismanagement. Touati and his allies in the Regional EC called for a 
regional union meeting for 25 December 2008 to explain their view that the charges 
were trumped up.347 Yet on that day, the police encircled the UGTT HQ to prevent the 
meeting from being held. According to the dissidents, this was additional proof of 
direct coordination between Jerad and the Ministry of the Interior. Touati and his 
associates resorted to speaking from the rooftop of the regional UGTT building. In an 
extremely tense atmosphere, they denounced Jerad’s corruption and mismanagement. 
The following day, the dissidents found that the locks of their offices had been 
changed. On 10 February 2009, after a protracted struggle, the Internal Regulation 
Commission froze Touati’s membership for seven years and that of Regional EC 
members Radhi Ben Hassine and Raoudha Hamrouni for two years (Le temps, 12 
February 2009). 
 In the midst of such internal conflicts, the Gafsa revolt broke out on 5 January 
2008 (see Allal 2010; Chouikha and Gobe 2009). The event started as an informal 
mobilisation of the precarious youth, protesting against the results of a competition for 
employment in the public mining company Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa 
(CPG). The main demands concerned secure employment and local development. The 
                                                 
346 Reportedly, some NEC members internally opposed this policy, to no avail (see Ouertatani 2007). 
347 Interviews 77, 91. 
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protesters charged that the results were rigged by nepotism and political clientelism in 
which UGTT officials were themselves implicated. The long-time Gafsa Regional SG 
Amara Abbassi – from the Fédération Générale des Travailleurs des Mines (UGTT-
FGTM) – was also an MP with the RCD and the owner of companies that provided 
outsourced labour to the CPG. While Gafsa city remained calm, the mobilisations 
occurred in the nearby mining villages of Redeyef, Moulares, Mdhila, and to a lesser 
extent Metlaoui. 
 
Metlaoui is Amara Abbassi’s hometown. He was Regional SG and MP at 
the same time so more people there sided with him, his tribal network. We 
tried a lot but the mining unions were with him and they are many more 
than us. […] There was a minority against him, all from public 
administration. (Interview 73) 
 
 It was in Redeyef that politicised UGTT rank-and-file led by Adnen Hajji, 
Bechir Laabidi, and Taieb Ben Othman – all members of the Syndicat Général de 
l’Enseignement de Base (UGTT-SGEB) – set up a negotiating committee to support 
the precarious youth’s demands. They were thus able, together with militant 
unemployed graduates from the UDC, to turn the informal insurrection into a 
protracted social movement. For five months, the mobilisations resisted heavy 
repression – with three deaths and hundreds of arrests, including cases of torture in 
police custody – and only stopped on 7 June 2008, when the army stepped in. 
 There emerged a direct conflict between the politicised UGTT militants and 
the Gafsa Regional EC (see also Chouikha and Geisser 2010). The union militants did 
not shy away from denouncing Amara Abbassi and his associates’ corruption and 
tribalised patron-client networks. In return, on 19 February 2008, the Regional EC 
froze Hajji’s membership and the measure was later confirmed by the national Internal 
Regulation Commission. Also, that year, a group of local rank-and-file militants 
publicly protested against Abdessalem Jerad during his visit to Gafsa city, and were 
consequently referred to the Internal Regulation Commission. 
 In June 2008, Hajji and the other movement leaders were imprisoned during a 
wave of arrests that lasted into July. The UGTT NEC had supported Amara Abbassi, 
but after the arrests, NEC member Houcine Abbassi mediated with the regime, asking 
for the liberation of the prisoners. The latter were supported by the Comité de soutien 
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aux habitants du bassin minier de Gafsa, whose spokesperson, Abderrahman Hedhili, 
was an UGTT-SGES militant. Thirty-eight movement leaders were finally tried in 
court and thirty-three were convicted. The prison sentences ranged from two to eight 
years. Hajji’s UGTT membership had only been restored on 3 December 2008, the day 
before the beginning of the trial. 
 The deep-seated imbalances between the coastal and the interior regions 
reinforced the continuing political significance of the historical intersections between 
class and locality. Workers in the interior regions tend to share a strong resentment 
against multi-faceted discrimination on the part of the country’s economic and 
political elites, who originate disproportionately from the Sahel and Tunis (see Ayeb 
2011; Hibou 2015b). In Gafsa, these feelings were accentuated by the fact that the 
mining region used to be relatively privileged under the protectorate and that its 
inhabitants deemed that too little profits from phosphate extraction were reinvested 
for local development (see Allal and Bennafla 2011).  
 This convergence of class and local identities, however, intertwined with the 
longstanding influence of “tribalism”, particularly strong in the mining unions (see 
Pontiggia 2017). Family belonging is a crucial criterion of representation there, 
resulting in what are sometimes referred to as “tribal quotas”. The leftist groups have 
historically attempted to oppose “tribalism”, but in practice it is difficult for 
progressive trade unionists to escape these dynamics: 
 
We’ve tried to fight this scourge, especially in the 1980s, but unfortunately 
we also caught the disease. […] We try to place in each union some 
militants with a different mentality, but then they are forced to work in that 
way too. (Interview 72) 
 
 The revolt was marked by a crucial difference in class composition compared 
with the cycle of struggle of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In both cases, the 
mobilisations were supported by leftist militants organised within the public 
administration unions. However, while the protagonists of the earlier round of 
mobilisations were manual workers in large manufacturing complexes, this time the 
precarious working-class fractions deprived of secure employment came to the 
forefront. The latter included a wide array of profiles, such as informal sector workers, 
unemployed graduates, or employees of the companies providing outsourced labour 
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to the CPG.  
 The Gafsa miners had gained a reputation for their large strikes until the 
transition to neoliberalism. Yet, with the CPG’s technological and organisational 
restructuring, the number of its employees shrunk from 13,464 in 1985 to 6,200 in 
2006 (Dhaoui 2008, p. 76). Consent for the restructuring was bought with higher 
wages for the remaining secure workers and various advantages for the trade unionists, 
including decision-making power over recruitment in the CPG. Entering the CPG was 
widely seen as the way to attain a secure income and thus to ensure existential stability, 
as shown by the fact that employment in the mining company was a main demand of 
the protesters in 2008. Most workers who had managed to enter the CPG were unlikely 
to be willing to jeopardise their position by taking action in solidarity with the 
precarious fractions. They did not mobilise in the workplace during the events of 2008 
and their union representatives mostly took a hostile attitude towards the protests. In 
the Redeyef UGTT Local EC, no UGTT-FGTM official supported the 
mobilisations.348 Hajji and his associates in the Local EC were all members of public 
administration unions: primary teaching, secondary teaching, and health. A primary 
teaching trade unionist was concisely straightforward on the issue: 
 
LF: What about the mining unions? 
UGTT: They are the main enemy. (Interview 72) 
 
 The divergences within the UGTT can be understood through the lenses of the 
internal polarisation between the politicised sections of the rank-and-file, on the one 
hand, and the compromising top leadership and its followers, on the other. Such 
polarisation was sharpened by the rigid neoliberal version of authoritarian corporatism 
analysed in Chapter 4, which handed out organisational inducements to union officials, 
while retrenching substantial inducements to the workers and repressing dissent. In 
the leftist activists’ jargon, this polarisation was conceptualised as an opposition 
between “militants” and “bureaucrats”.349 
 As seen in Chapter 2, a classic Marxist view is that the union bureaucracy is 
                                                 
348 Interviews 69, 70, 73. 
349 This terminology is not employed in this research because the phrase “union bureaucracy” tends to 
obscure the diffusion of the patrimonial (and thus non-bureaucratic) practices that were used by the 
union leadership to limit internal democracy (see Chapter 2). 
 227
the layer of full-time trade union officials mediating between workers, employers, and 
the state, irrespective of their subjective political leanings.350 However, many UGTT 
militants seem more inclined to think of the “bureaucrats” as those unionists willing 
to limit internal democracy to uphold the alliance with the regime and the class 
compromise with capital.351 According to this view, even if the “bureaucracy” held 
sway at the top, while the “militants” had most of their influence at the base, one may 
well find full-time “militant” unionists as well as “bureaucratic” workplace union 
representatives: 
 
The bureaucracy is a mentality, it’s a conception of trade unionism. It 
means tackling the trade union problems not by using transparent, free, 
and democratic procedures with the base but through compromise with the 
state and with the bosses. (Interview 77) 
 
 While the relations between “militants” and “bureaucrats” grew at times 
extremely acrimonious, most of the former maintained that it was necessary to 
exercise their pressure on the UGTT leadership from within, because of the 
confederation’s social weight as the largest mass organisation in the country and its 
historical legitimacy. In the early 2000s, the leftist Mohamed Taher Chaieb attempted 
to establish an alternative labour confederation but the project did not gather enough 
support.352 
 The Gafsa events and the “witch-hunt” within the UGTT prompted the 
dissident trade unionists to step up their efforts for internal democracy. This resulted 
in the establishment of an internal UGTT current called the Rencontre Syndicale 
Démocratique Militante (RSDM), which aimed at coordinating all the (broadly 
speaking) progressive oppositions, mainly Marxists and ex-Marxists, Arab 
nationalists, and independents.353 Two RSDM members explained: 
 
                                                 
350 In 2015, the UGTT had 420 full-time employees (European Commission 2015, p. 54). To this one 
should add an estimated one hundred detached trade unionists (Interview 46), placing the total number 
of UGTT full-timers somewhere between 500 and 600. This is a very small number compared to 
Western trade unions, to which the state delegates a number of administrative and welfare functions. 
351 Interviews 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 65, 74, 77, 81. 
352 In any case, it is highly unlikely that the state would have recognised the new union. 
353 Prominent RSDM leaders were Othman Belhaj Amor (Harakat El-Ba'ath Ettounsi), Radhi Ben 
Hassine (independent), Taieb Bouaicha (Watad), Fraj Chabbeh (Watad), Jilani Hammami (PCOT), 
Houcine Rhili (independent), and Taoufik Touati (independent). 
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[The RSDM] was a leftist group that wanted to establish internal 
democracy in the UGTT. As we always say that the UGTT is the engine 
of the country, we wanted to limit the mandates of the UGTT’s leader to 
do the same with the country as a whole.354 (Interview 91) 
 
For the first time, the internal opposition jointly organised and acted as 
such. Because the opposition had always been there, but each group tended 
to act alone. In this case, we organised around a common platform, with 
shared goals and tactics. (Interview 77) 
 
 During 2009, the promoters of the initiative worked on building a network of 
contacts on a regional basis. On 7 September 2010, the RSDM officially launched its 
platform, accompanied by the signatures of 801 trade unionists (RSDM 2010b, 
Appendix, pp. 314-8).355 By 6 October 2010, the number of adherents had reached 
1,311. The RSDM’s rallying cry was the call for a “democratic, independent, and 
militant UGTT”. The platform did not hesitate to denounce “the complicity of the trade 
union confederation controlled by the bureaucracy and the regime”, adding that “the 
UGTT is ignoring the material and social losses incurred by the workers, as well as 
the threats caused by the new reform projects” and that the “relations between the 
UGTT, on the one hand, and civil society groups and the democratic public opinion, 
on the other, have deteriorated” (Ibidem).  
 Jerad and the RSDM were thus squaring off in view of the UGTT 22nd 
Congress, in which Jerad wanted to amend Article 10 and thus remove the two-term 
limit. Jerad planned to anticipate the Congress – as he had done with the former – in 
order to leave little time for the opposition to organise (Réalités, 9 September 2010). 
Yet he was hindered by internal resistance and external social instability, for example 
the August 2010 Ben Guerdane riots.356 However, unexpected developments would 
soon subvert the calculations of all contending parties: 
 
The first phase [of the RSDM] was a period of preparation. The second 
                                                 
354 According to the Tunisian Constitution of the time, presidential candidates could not be older than 
75. As Ben Ali had turned 74 in 2010, he was trying to amend it to be able to run for a new mandate.  
355 The very first version had 786 signatures, but it was then corrected. 
356 Interview 75. 
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phase, when we started to see how to mobilise… Well, there came the 
uprising. (Interview 87) 
 
 During the 2011 uprising, these UGTT internal opponents would become 
important actors in mobilising the confederation’s associational power in solidarity 
with the struggles taking place outside of the workplaces and of the union framework.  
 
7.2 The 2011 Uprising Outside and Inside the UGTT 
This section documents and analyses the 2011 Tunisian uprising through the lenses of 
workers’ struggles in their interaction with the UGTT. As specified in Chapter 2, 
unwaged workers and the so-called unemployed are considered here as part of the 
working-class composition – in line with the conception of class deployed in this thesis 
– because they are excluded from significant ownership and control of capital. 
 As it is well known, the Tunisian uprising started on 17 December 2010 in the 
marginalised interior region of Sidi Bouzid, with the self-immolation of street vendor 
Mohamed Bouazizi and the ensuing clashes between mostly precarious youths and the 
police. Shortly after Bouazizi’s act, relatives and friends assembled in front of the 
governorate and the gathering gradually grew. The day after, the crowd gathered again 
and were confronted by riot police, with clashes quickly ensuing. The mobilisation 
picked up momentum and it persisted for weeks, mostly through peaceful 
demonstrations during the day and clashes between youths and police during the night. 
As typical in Tunisia, many of the marches started from the UGTT premises.357 
 It was the RSDM spokesperson in Sidi Bouzid, Atia Athmouni, along with 
three other unionists from the Syndicat Général de l’Enseignement Secondaire 
(UGTT-SGES), who first visited Mohamed Bouazizi in the local hospital to demand 
that he be transferred to the better-equipped Sfax hospital.358 The unionists and other 
activists intervened to underline the social and political causes of Bouazizi’s deed and 
then coordinated with the protesters and with local lawyers to launch a committee in 
support of the mobilisations. An important role was played by Ali Zouari, Regional 
SG of the UGTT-SGES. A second, more uncompromising, committee was formed on 
19 December 2010, by other activists and trade unionists including UGTT-SGES 
                                                 
357 As Mizouni (2012), among others, points out, this distinguishes Tunisia from other Arab countries 
concerned by the 2011 uprisings, where many demonstrations started from the mosques. 
358 Interview 85, 89. 
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militant Slimane Rouissi. 
 On 18 December 2010, a group of politicised UGTT militants coming from the 
whole region decided to spread the mobilisations to the areas outside of Sidi Bouzid 
city to break the police “siege”.359 The villages that saw the largest solidarity 
demonstrations were Menzel Bouzayane and Regueb. The UGTT had a local union in 
both villages, and militant unionists like Abdessalem Hidouri, Youssef Salhi and 
Nasser Zribi coordinated with the precarious youth and particularly with the 
unemployed graduates to organise local actions (see also Hmed 2012; Salmon 2016). 
 Like in Gafsa, the UGTT Sidi Bouzid Regional SG, Touhami Heni, was also 
an MP for the ruling party. However, he did not disavow the protest, although – 
initially – he was wary of officially mobilising the regional UGTT in support.360 The 
UGTT NEC did not declare any solidarity action, but it fulfilled its traditional role of 
lobbying for the liberation of the prisoners. The militant unionists, however, mobilised 
autonomously despite (and against) the lack of calls for action from the intermediate 
and higher structures of the organisation. The UGTT’s deepening internal polarisation 
had also affected the local level: 
 
The [regional] union was split into two poles. One pole was that of 
secondary teaching, around which a number of militant unionists 
gravitated. The other pole was that of the bureaucracy, revolving around 
the Regional SG. So the struggle between the two became fiercer and 
fiercer. (Interview 85) 
 
 Meanwhile, the RSDM organised a solidarity demonstration to be held on 25 
December 2010 in front of the UGTT HQ in Tunis. In parallel, a group of hackers 
linked to the Takriz collective shared on social media a forged UGTT NEC statement 
calling for a demonstration in front of the UGTT HQ on the same day (see also Salmon 
2016, pp. 147-50). The result was the first relatively large protest in the capital. 
Momentum was also generated by the fact that, the day before, the police had killed 
                                                 
359 Interview 75. 
360 The interviewees offered two kinds of explanations of Heni’s conduct. According to one view, Heni 
did not disavow the movement because he wanted to safeguard his credibility in the face of the 
mobilised base (Interviews 74, 82, 85). According to a second view, it was a feeling of local loyalty 
that pushed the Regional SG to side with the population, as the governor Faouzi Ben Arab was from 
the Sahel (Interviews 48, 82). The two explanations are not incompatible as the two factors were 
mutually reinforcing. 
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protesters Mohamed Amari and Chawki Nassri in Menzel Bouzayane – they were the 
first to fall in the uprising. The slogans of the demonstration directly targeted the 
regime, for example: “Down with the RCD, down with the assassins of the people”.361 
The gathering was surrounded and attacked by the police. Five UGTT national 
sectorial federations then called for a new demonstration for 27 December 2010.362 In 
this case too, the demonstration was attacked by the police and the slogans were 
directly political, one of the reasons why Jerad disavowed it in the media: “The slogans 
that were chanted do not represent the UGTT at all […] and what happened yesterday 
was not organised by the union confederation” (Essabah, 28 December 2010).363 
 In early January, as the school winter break finished, the protests spread to 
several areas of the country. Heavy clashes broke out in the village of Thala (in the 
marginalised region of Kasserine) and in Kasserine city. The movement repeated the 
format of peaceful demonstrations during the day and nocturnal clashes. On 9 January 
2011, the police gunned down at least five protesters in Regueb,364 after which the 
UGTT’s Local EC declared an open-ended local general strike. Between 8 and 10 
January 2011, the police fired live bullets at protesters in Thala and Kasserine city, 
killing at least 18.365 The Kasserine Regional EC, led by the RCDist Amor Mhamdi, 
maintained an ambiguous stance until the massacre, after which it sided with the 
protesters, eventually declaring a general strike. 
 In Gafsa, the mining basin villages were still reeling from repression, but a 
mobilisation of the precarious youth supported by local militant unionists gathered 
momentum in the village of El Guettar. Clashes broke out in El Guettar and Gafsa city 
on 10-11 January 2011 and continued during the following days. Amara Abbassi stood 
by the regime until the very end and there was no general strike in the region. Yet, 
reportedly, this did not spare the UGTT Gafsa building from being shot at by the police 
on 14 January 2011.366 
 The killings of protesters on 8-10 January 2011 created widespread public 
outrage and increased the explicit politicisation of the protests. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
361 Interview 65. 
362 They were the UGTT-SGEB, UGTT-SGES, Fédération Générale des Postes et 
Télécommunications, Syndicat Général des Médecins des Pharmaciens des Chirurgiens-Dentistes de 
la Santé Publique, and Syndicat Général de la Sécurité Sociale des Caisses (Achourouk, 28 December 
2010). 
363 Translated from Arabic by Inel Tarfa and the author. 
364 See http://www.14janvier2011.com/victimes.html (retrieved 30 September 2016). 
365 Ibidem. 
366 Interview 67. 
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killings provided an opportunity for the UGTT militants to step up their pressure on 
the union’s intermediate and higher structures (see also Ayari et al. 2011). On 11 
January 2011, while heavy clashes had reached the popular neighbourhoods of the 
capital, the UGTT National Administrative Commission authorised regional initiatives 
to support the protesters’ demands, opening the way to regional general strikes. This 
was the second “bloody divorce” between the union and the state.  
 On 12 January 2011, the general strike in the industrialised region of Sfax took 
place, along with the regional strikes of Kairouan and Tozeur. The Sfax Regional EC, 
led by SG Mohamed Sha’aban, had actually taken the decision to strike on 9 January 
2011 and thus before the National Administrative Commission gave it its 
“blessing”.367 The Sfax demonstration gathered tens of thousands of protesters and it 
was followed by clashes with the police. The 19-year-old Amor Haddad was shot and 
killed. The Sfax general strike is seen as the turning point of the uprising; it was in 
fact the first mass mobilisation outside of the marginalised regions. It also signalled 
that the UGTT’s national structures had been successfully pressured into siding with 
the uprising. As an interviewee said: “The Sfax strike liberated the UGTT”.368 
 It can hardly be said, however, that the Sfax strike “liberated” the UGTT SG. 
In the afternoon of the same day, Jerad met Ben Ali at the presidential palace. The true 
content of their discussion is unknown and the speculations of the trade unionists vary 
wildly. In any case, in the aftermath of the meeting, Jerad declared to the press: 
 
I have had the honour of meeting the Head of State and it was the occasion 
of a very important discussion, in which we tackled the painful situation 
of some regions of the country and some ideas and proposals by the UGTT. 
I have found that the President of the Republic has a deep vision of the 
main problems and of their causes, and he is willing to solve them. […] 
The UGTT is sorry for the victims but in the same way it rejects all forms 
of violence and all attacks on the public and private assets and on the 
achievements of the country. […] I have found that the Head of State has 
a high consideration of the workers and of their organisation… (La presse 
de Tunisie, 14 January 2011, Appendix, pp. 318-9) 
                                                 
367 Interview 83. 
368 Interview 86. 
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 However, the mobilisations continued to follow their own momentum. On 13 
January 2011, regional general strikes were held in Sidi Bouzid and Jendouba. On 14 
January 2011, the general strike of Greater Tunis369 took place. It was meant to be a 
mere two-hour stoppage but it became a large demonstration that filled the city centre, 
from the UGTT HQ to the vicinity of the Ministry of the Interior, where it devolved 
into a series of clashes. In the late afternoon of the same day, Ben Ali fled to Saudi 
Arabia to widespread disbelief. 
The UGTT as an organisation had a complex role in the uprising. The 
politicised rank-and-file militants played a crucial part since the beginning, the 
intermediate and finally the peak structures gradually responded to pressure from 
below, and the national SG remained open to a compromise with Ben Ali until the 
end. The fracture within the UGTT should not be understood merely as a cleavage 
between base and top, since ideological inclinations and belonging to militant sectors 
also mattered. Only some sections of the base – the politicised ones – took early action 
in support of the revolting working-class precarious fractions, and they were backed 
in this by those left-wing cadres who had gained access to posts in the intermediate 
structures. A notable example is Sami Tahri, who at the time was the UGTT-SGES 
SG. However, the influence of the politicised militants was inversely proportional to 
the organisational level of the union, strongest among the base and weakest in the 
NEC. This is not surprising, as pressures by the state and capital increase as one moves 
up the organisational ladder. Furthermore, there was no organised counter-
revolutionary mobilisation among the UGTT’s rank-and-file – those who did not 
actively support the uprising simply remained passive. 
The politicised UGTT militants’ role was geographically uneven and this 
depended mainly on the local strength of the union Left. For example, in Metlaoui, 
Amara Abbassi’s fiefdom, the protesters reportedly set the local UGTT building on 
fire,370 a treatment that was usually reserved for police stations and RCD buildings. 
Yet the overall contribution of the UGTT militants has been underlined by all 
interviewees and it seems to be acknowledged even by the UGTT’s adversaries. For 
instance, an article published on a pro-Islamist online platform that takes sides against 
                                                 
369 Greater Tunis comprises the four regions of Tunis, Manouba, Ariana, and Ben Arous. 
370 Interview 73. 
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the UGTT and the “Marxist leftists hiding behind the UGTT” reads as follows: 
 
During the revolution, the relationship between the leadership of the 
UGTT and the regime was not affected. Nevertheless, a number of union 
members in several governorates helped to organise anti-government 
protests in December 2010. Those protests, along with the solidarity 
actions in cities such as Sidi Bouzid and Gasserine, were what really 
triggered the revolution. (Middle East Monitor, 24 December 2012) 
 
As Hèla Yousfi pointed out, the UGTT militants contributed to the uprising by 
politicising the “spontaneous” movement, coordinating with the other organised 
actors, and mediating with the trade union and political authorities (Yousfi 2015, p. 
65). The linkages between socioeconomic and political demands had existed since the 
beginning. Baccar Gherib writes the following about the famous slogan “Ettashghil 
istehqaq, ya issabat essoraq!” (“Employment is a right, you gang of thieves!”):  
 
In this short sentence we actually find, in addition to the demand for the 
right to employment, the damning of the corruption at the top of the state. 
There is also the connection between the misery and the hopelessness of 
some and the abuses and crimes of others.371 (Gherib 2012, p. 24) 
 
The protests became even more explicitly aimed at the regime in the later stages 
of the uprising, as the growing mass movement clashed with escalating repression, 
e.g. “Ben Ali sabrek sabrek, Kasserine tahfer qabrek” (“Ben Ali wait wait, Kasserine 
is digging your grave”). It thus seems that the slogans promoted by the politicised 
militants had found fertile ground among the mobilised population since the 
beginning. 
In many cases, it was the militant unionists that appeared in foreign media to 
explain the protesters’ demands, particularly on Al Jazeera. Furthermore, the 
demonstrations often started from the UGTT buildings, which were also used to hold 
citizens’ assemblies to coordinate the movement. An indispensable task of the union 
militants was that of using the UGTT’s network to spread the movement 
                                                 
371 Translated from French by the author. 
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geographically, in order to ease police pressure on Sidi Bouzid (see also Hmed 2012): 
 
There were many communications among the regions that wouldn’t have 
been possible outside of the UGTT. I mean that the ordinary citizens who 
took to the streets in Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Sfax were not in touch with 
each other. But the UGTT is an organisation that already has its own 
architecture, it’s thus the union militants who made the connections so that 
the other regions join the movement and that the same slogans are used. 
[…] They lived 2008 as a defeat and they learnt their lessons to make sure 
that it’d work out well at the next occasion. (Interview 61) 
 
Here is an example, from Gafsa, of how this mechanism functioned: 
 
I had been in touch with the comrades from Tunis, Sfax, Kasserine. Yeah, 
on the telephone. “What’s happening, what do you think, how is it 
evolving?” One day, in January, a comrade from Kasserine calls me and 
says: “Hey, the police are attacking us at the UGTT building”. […] After 
two days he got mad at me and said: “If you don’t do something in Gafsa, 
never call me again”. So on 11 January we decided to move from the 
UGTT premises, which were already encircled by the police. We were just 
about twenty people. The police marched next to us […]. On the way back, 
we came across the kids coming out of school, and the whole thing kicked 
off and continued for days. (Interview 72) 
 
The Tunisian uprising thus confronts us with the paradox of the importance of 
trade unionism in concomitance with the relatively marginal role of the industrial 
workers, who are traditionally associated with labour militancy. The real protagonist 
of the uprising was the precarious youth, with the politicised public administration 
unionists (and other activists) providing support and some guidance. 
In 2010, in the whole Sidi Bouzid region, there were only 28 private sector 
industrial enterprises with 10 employees or more – most of them in food processing 
and textiles – employing a total of 2,750 workers (API 2015a; 2015b) out of a 
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population of 411,880 (INS 2011).372 The sectors in which the regional UGTT had 
most members were, in order, primary teaching, secondary teaching, agriculture, and 
health.373 Most members of the UGTT’s Fédération Générale de l’Agriculture were 
civil servants at the Ministry of Agriculture rather than agricultural labourers. Indeed, 
it is public administration that gave the UGTT a comprehensive and capillary national 
infrastructure, even in the marginalised regions that had gone through very little 
industrialisation. Thus, the militant trade unionists who mobilised to defend and 
expand the uprising were public administration intellectual workers, especially in 
secondary and primary teaching. 
As seen above, with the decline of agricultural employment, the stagnation of 
industrial employment, and the effects of austerity on hiring in public administration, 
the burden of absorbing the workforce expelled by automation from agriculture fell 
mostly on the low-end tertiary private sector. The events in Sidi Bouzid demonstrate 
this clearly. During the 1990s, land ownership, which up to that point was mostly 
transmitted via inheritance, became increasingly commodified (see Gana 2012). This 
allowed investors from the coastal regions, often connected to the regime through 
patron-client relationships, to grab profitable plots of land in the interior of the country 
and restructure production on them. Mohamed Bouazizi himself, in fact, used to be an 
agricultural labourer working on a plot of land owned by his uncle, but the latter was 
over-indebted to the Banque Nationale Agricole, which in turn forced him to sell the 
land to a Sfaxian businessman (Fautras 2015). In June 2010, Bouazizi’s uncle and 
other tomato farmers staged protests and land occupations in Regueb, claiming a right 
to own the local lands. Also, in this case, the UGTT militants intervened to support 
such demands.374 The day Bouazizi set himself on fire, he was selling vegetables on 
the street, as an alternative source of income to the agricultural labour from which he 
had been expelled. 
Kasserine too is very scarcely industrialised. In 2010, the region had 72 private 
sector industrial firms with 10 employees or more, employing 4,945 workers (API 
2015a) out of a population of 431,821 (INS 2011). Here, the textile sector is followed 
                                                 
372 According to an interviewee, the UGTT had a long-term presence only in two large factories, the 
German toys manufacturer Steiff and the Tunisian-owned Coala, a factory that made climate control 
devices. However, no known large struggles took place in these or other industrial units in the region 
at the time (Interview 88). 
373 Interviews 85, 90. 
374 Interviews 48, 85, 88. 
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by the production of construction materials (API 2015b). Kasserine features a 
Benetton plant, but by 2015 it was still non-unionised. To this one must add the Société 
Nationale de Cellulose et de Papier Alfa (SNCPA), a state-owned cellulose factory 
established in 1956 (GIZ 2015, p. 21). On a smaller scale, Kasserine’s SNCPA has a 
similar role to Gafsa’s CPG in the local political economy. Similar to the CPG, the 
SNCPA produces worrying levels of toxic pollution (Chennaoui 2016),375 but it is seen 
by male precarious workers as the most obvious way to attain economic and thus 
existential security. It is therefore an ordinary target of protests for employment. Just 
like the CPG, the SNCPA does not need as many workers as it used to. The number 
of workers employed there fell from 1,200 in 2005 to 400 in 2015 (GIZ 2015, p. 24).376 
Following this, the workplace union lost leverage and corrupt practices augmented: 
 
It’s a shame, the cellulose is screwed for good. Before 2005 we used to 
have some very good militants there, it has a good history. […] The 
cellulose and the CPG, it’s the same. It’s the corruption in hiring, in 
finance, in management, in production… (Interview 81) 
 
It should not come as a surprise, then, that the SNCPA workers did not mobilise 
in solidarity with the protests of the precarious youth and its politicised allies: 
 
There was no movement inside of the factories, nothing at all. Outside, 
when they got off from work, this could change [i.e. some workers joined 
the demonstrations]. (Interview 78) 
 
The uprising, then, was mainly the work of the working-class precarious 
fractions outside of the UGTT, in alliance with activists that included the politicised 
UGTT militants mainly located in public administration. This phenomenon can be 
interpreted in light of the UGTT’s internal polarisation between “militants” and 
“bureaucrats”. The breech of the populist social pact caused by the gradual 
retrenchment of substantial inducements, coupled with the relative increase in 
                                                 
375 Due to the SNCPA’s toxicity, the Kasserinians nicknamed it “the bomb”. 
376 While in the CPG this was due to technological restructuring, the SNCPA did not upgrade its 
machinery, which – along with the diminution of protectionist duties – resulted in a loss of international 
competitiveness and therefore in a shrinking of production. 
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clientelism and the endurance of high repressiveness, contributed to the fact that the 
politicised unionists defended highly radical direct actions by a constituency that was 
not naturally their own – against the directives of their own union leadership. Dissent 
did not have real institutionalised outlets to be expressed through, and authoritarian 
corporatism could be abolished only by insurrectional means. 
This cooperation between public administration trade unionists and precarious 
youths was also evident in the case of the high school students (who, in the marginal 
regions, are for the most part future precarious workers), who had been encouraged by 
their professors to mobilise on international issues, particularly the Palestinian cause. 
The coordination between students and professors was reactivated in the early stages 
of the uprising. However, it is also necessary to stress the ephemeral nature of this 
alliance between precarious youths and leftist unionists. The two groups were not 
linked through stable ideological and organisational ties, with the exception of the 
UDC (which had a very limited membership at the time). This became all the more 
evident when the Islamists, who had no organisational role in the uprising, won large 
pluralities in the 2011 elections, while the Left suffered a crushing defeat. 
Additionally, one should not discount the role of factory workers in the 
industrial centres of the country. With the regional strikes in Sfax and Greater Tunis, 
the industrial estates mostly stood still and empty, resulting in great economic damage, 
and demonstrators asking for Ben Ali’s departure flooded the city centres. Greater 
Tunis’s governorate of Ben Arous has the second highest number of private sector 
manufacturing workers after Nabeul (API 2015a).377 Importantly, many workers in the 
industrialised coastal regions originate from the marginalised interior. Internal 
migration, therefore, reinforced feelings of solidarity among workers across the 
marginalised and industrialised regions. The regional strikes, however, were the 
outcome of pressure coming from the struggles of precarious workers in the squares 
and the neighbourhoods, and not from shop-floor militancy in the factories. The public 
administration union militants served as a juncture between the precarious working-
class fractions mobilising in the communities and the relatively more secure workers 
in the public sector and in manufacturing.  
Compared to Morocco, Tunisia’s relatively high working-class structural and 
                                                 
377 While Sfax, Nabeul, and the Saheli regions (Monastir and Sousse) feature a plurality of workers in 
the textile sector, Ben Arous stands out for its engineering and electronics industries (API 2015b). 
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associational power, as well as the rigidity of the country’s system of labour 
institutions, contributed to the radicalisation of the mobilisations and to their 
convergence in a temporally protracted and geographically diffuse anti-regime 
insurrection. Through the regional general strikes, the politicised militants used the 
UGTT’s associational power to harness the economic leverage of public sector and 
industrial workers against the regime, bringing the struggle from the communities into 
the workplaces, despite the compromising position of the union’s top leadership. 
 
7.3 After the Uprising: Democracy without Social Justice 
The aim of this section is not to analyse Tunisia’s “democratic transition” but to 
outline the trends towards a new configuration of labour institutions, whereby the 
previous authoritarian corporatism is being replaced by a form of democratic 
corporatism, featuring a real easing of constraints and a stronger political influence of 
the UGTT, alongside a mixed trend in substantial inducements. The UGTT’s inclusion 
in the new political system thus failed to satisfy the social justice demands that were 
at the core of the 2011 uprising. 
The UGTT, as the country’s largest civil society organisation, was central in 
the political negotiations that followed Ben Ali’s departure, especially given the 
disarray of the RCD and the weakness of all political parties, with the exception of 
Ennahda. After 14 January 2011, the revolutionary movement tried to expand the 
gains of the uprising towards radical changes in the state institutions and in the path 
of economic development, demanding the election of a constituent assembly rather 
than the presidential elections proposed by the incumbent political elite (see Gherib 
2017; Gobe 2012; Zemni 2015). However, with Ennahda’s electoral victory and the 
escalation of radical Islamist violence, the Left was cornered into an uneasy alliance 
with sections of the old regime. 
On 17 January 2011, Ben Ali’s PM Mohamed Ghannouchi announced a new 
national unity government that included three legal opposition parties (PDP, Ettakatol, 
Ettajdid) and three UGTT representatives (Houcine Dimassi, Abdeljélil Bédoui and 
Anouar Ben Gaddour). However, faced with outrage from the streets, UGTT and 
Ettakatol withdrew from the government the following day. As demonstrations 
continued daily, on 23 January 2011 protesters from all over the country started the 
First Kasbah; a permanent sit-in that demanded deep changes in the functioning and 
personnel of the state, as well as the realisation of the uprising’s social justice 
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demands. The occupation was brutally dispersed by the police on 28 January, the day 
after the ministers that had been in charge under Ben Ali were removed from office. 
On 6 February, the government suspended the RCD, which would be dissolved on 9 
March, but this did not demobilise the protests.  
In order to give a more formal representation to the revolutionary movement 
vis-à-vis the government, the Conseil National pour la Protection de la Révolution 
(CNPR) was created on 11 February 2011. The CNPR was initially dominated by the 
UGTT and it included the leftist parties, Ennahda, and independent civil society 
organisations such as the LTDH. As Yousfi (2015, p. 112) points out, many activists 
mobilising on the streets criticised the CNPR over its lack of legitimate 
representativeness. 
On 20 February 2011, the Second Kasbah started, with a more prominent role 
played by the political parties and the UGTT relative to the first. A week later, after a 
new series of demonstrations and deadly clashes, Mohamed Ghannouchi resigned and 
was replaced by the senior Destourian Beji Caïd Essebsi. Despite the continuing 
protests, Essebsi’s unelected government agreed a new package of loans from the 
international financial institutions, through the G8 initiative known as the Deauville 
Partnership, committing the country to yet another round of neoliberal reforms (see 
Fernández-Molina 2019). 
For many militants, CNPR’s inability to obtain a government with more 
revolutionary credibility than Essebsi’s was a major blow to the extension of the 
uprising’s gains.378 Under Essebsi, a new institution bearing the lengthy name Haute 
Instance pour la Réalisation des Objectifs de la Révolution, de la Réforme Politique 
et de la Transition Démocratique was put in place to substitute the dissolved 
parliament and incorporate the CNPR. Again, many activists criticised the Haute 
Instance and the UGTT’s participation therein as a co-optation of the revolutionary 
process, because it legitimated the Essebsi government and therefore encouraged 
demobilisation. 
The 23 October 2011 elections for the constitutional assembly (see Gana et al. 
2012) gave Ennahda a comfortable plurality of 37%, while the PCOT – the best 
                                                 
378 Some of the blame was laid at Jerad’s feet, as the leader of the most powerful organisation in the 
CNPR. A widespread rumour is that the Ministry of the Interior blackmailed Jerad into accepting 
Essebsi’s appointment by threatening to reveal some corruption affairs involving him (Interviews 78, 
82, 87; Yousfi 2015, pp. 127-8). As seen above, this technique did exist under Ben Ali, but it is 
nonetheless impossible to verify such claims. 
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performer among a highly fragmented radical Left – received a humiliating 1.6% of 
the votes. Moncef Marzouki – leader of Ennahda’s ally party Congrès pour la 
République (CPR) – became President of the republic and Ennahda’s Hamadi Jebali 
was made PM. The election results were a shock to the UGTT militants, who saw their 
contribution to the overthrow of Ben Ali poorly compensated. They now perceived 
the labour confederation as a whole to be under threat from a conservative and anti-
union government. 
The UGTT 22nd Congress took place on 25-28 December 2011 in Tabarka. 
Three main lists were initially concurring. The consensual list was led by Houcine 
Abbassi, while Ali Romdhane ran in alliance with the Islamist delegates. The RSDM 
had planned to present its own list but, at the last minute, it split into one list led by 
Jilani Hammami and another led by Taieb Bouaicha. The consensual list easily won 
the day. While many had expected the UGTT rank-and-file to rid the union of its 
“collaborationist” leadership, a compromise between the Left and the traditional 
leadership was reached in the name of the defence of the organisation: 
 
The Congress took place in this context [of the UGTT feeling threatened 
by the Ennahda-led government] and everybody was conscious of this, 
therefore a consensus was necessary at that time. It was a consensus 
between a section of the old leadership with all their relationships etc. and 
the rising forces of those who had opposed the dictatorship. (Interview 57) 
 
This resulted in an unprecedented share of NEC posts going to the union Left 
(see Hamzaoui 2013, pp. 1298-311), reflecting the recognition of the leftist militants’ 
role in the struggle against Ben Ali and the absence of direct state pressures on 
leadership selection. A remarkable element of continuity, however, was the absence 
of women in the new NEC. 
As the economic downturn following the uprising increased the power of the 
international financial institutions to guide economic policy, the mainstream political 
debate in Tunisian society was characterised by an escalation of tensions along the 
“modernist-Islamist” cleavage. This contributed to working-class de-composition, 
because workers became divided over such issues. Much of the opposition accused 
the government of taking steps towards a state-imposed Islamisation of society and of 
tolerating violent Islamist groups. Particularly notorious is the brutal police repression 
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of a large anti-government demonstration held in Tunis on Martyrs’ Day, 9 April 2012. 
Given the weakness of all modernist parties, the UGTT played the role of chief 
counter-weight to Ennahda.  
In parallel, protests and clashes over secure employment and local development 
continued throughout the country, while a massive strike wave gathered momentum. 
The number of workdays lost in strikes more than quadrupled between 2010 and 2011, 
and the figure remained much higher than before the uprising in the following years 
(see Graph 11, p. 221). Within industry, textiles and engineering were the most 
important sectors with regards to strikes, approximately reflecting the sectorial 
distribution of employment (Ministry of Social Affairs 2014). Sfax and Ben Arous 
stand out as the regions where strikes were most numerous (Ibidem), which also 
reflects their past traditions of labour struggles. In fact, Nabeul and the Saheli regions 
have comparable numbers of industrial workers but lower strike rates.  
Interviewees interpreted the strike wave as a “change in mentality”379 and a 
newly discovered freedom380 prompted by the uprising. Or, with the benefit of 
hindsight: “We decided to set up a workplace union because we thought that with the 
revolution everything was going to change, while in the end nothing really 
changed”.381 Several strikes and sit-ins also demanded the departure of incumbent 
managers – usually ex-RCD members – under the widespread slogan “Dégage”, the 
same that had been used to demand Ben Ali’s departure. The UGTT intermediate 
structures were often consulted over the appointment of the new managers. 
Ennahda accused the UGTT of encouraging strikes with unrealistic demands for 
“political reasons”, that is, to overthrow the government. Indeed – probably for the 
first time in Tunisia’s history – in 2012 the majority of strikes (56%) were authorised 
by the labour confederations and therefore legal, while in 2010 and 2011 authorised 
strikes were only about one third of the total (see Table 12, p. 243).  
While the UGTT NEC certainly used the strike wave as a bargaining chip in the 
political negotiations, the strikes themselves were the initiative of workers who seized 
the opportunity to improve their wages and conditions as well as to defend themselves 
from the economic downturn. The augmented endorsement of the strikes was also an 
effect of trade union pluralism and of the new UGTT NEC’s composition after the 
                                                 
379 Interview 76. 
380 Interviews 53, 54. 
381 Interview 62. 
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22nd Congress, as proven by the fact that most strikes continued to be authorised in 
2014, after the end of the Ennahda-led governments. 
 
Table 12 – Share of legal strikes in Tunisia, 2010-2014 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
31% 33% 56% 59% 53% 
Ministry of Social Affairs 2014. 
 
The strikes were accompanied by mobilisations for secure employment and 
local development by precarious workers outside of the workplace, especially in the 
marginalised regions (Feltrin 2018b). These often took the form of roadblocks outside 
the most strategic productive sites of a particular locality (phosphate extraction in 
Gafsa, oil and gas extraction in Kebili and Tataouine, phosphate processing in Gabes, 
etc.), sometimes resulting in clashes with the police. While such protests were most 
often contained locally, the mobilisations expanded nationwide in January 2016 and 
January 2018. On several occasions, UGTT Local or Regional ECs were pressured to 
call general strikes in solidarity with the demands of the precarious. For example, this 
was the case of the 2012 Siliana revolt (see Belhadj and De Facci 2015). On 27 
November 2012, the police repressed the demonstration of the regional general strike 
called by Siliana’s UGTT, shooting protesters with buckshot. This engendered days 
of violent clashes against the police, which left at least 168 protesters wounded 
(Nawaat, 20 March 2013). The regional strike was suspended only on 2 December, 
after the government and the governorate agreed to grant some concessions. 
The new wave of strikes and sit-ins was the object of a moralising campaign on 
the part of the media that was formerly allied to the regime. The strikers and the UGTT 
itself were targeted as the promoters of social chaos, undermining the urgent needs of 
stability and productivity: 
 
After the departure of the tyrant, the slogan “Dégage” should not be used 
in all circumstances but conserved on a linguistic level as a symbol of 
relief. […] [But today] the worker says “Dégage” to his boss, the clerk to 
his hierarchical superiors, the student to his professor or his director… 
These are very regrettable scenes that tarnish the image of the revolution, 
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the noble cause for which many valiant Tunisians have sacrificed.382 (La 
presse de Tunisie, 24 February 2011) 
 
Parallel to the hegemonic discourse in Morocco, this view posited a sharp 
separation between socioeconomic and political demands, but in the context of the 
democratic transition the legitimacy attributed to them was inverted. As Héla Yousfi 
wrote:  
 
This attempt to neutralise the revolutionary process is carried out through 
a meticulous distinction between political questions – seen as the priority 
– and social struggles – seen as hindering the coming of stability…383 
(Yousfi 2013) 
 
However, despite the calls for stability, tensions continued to escalate. Shortly 
after the Siliana revolt, on 4 December 2012, during the yearly commemorations for 
Farhat Hached, the pro-government Ligue pour la Protection de la Révolution stormed 
the UGTT HQ. The UGTT thus carried out a series of regional general strikes and 
threatened to stage Tunisia’s first national general strike since 26 January 1978, before 
calling it off at the last minute. The crisis finally erupted when, on 6 February 2013, 
Islamist terrorists assassinated the Watad Muahad384 SG Chokri Belaïd. The national 
general strike thus took place on 8 February, accompanied by massive demonstrations 
and clashes. 
On 25 July 2013, however, Islamist terrorists shot dead Mohamed Brahmi, the 
SG of the Nasserist party Harak Esh’ab (Popular Movement). After a second national 
general strike held on 26 July 2013, protesters poured into Bardo Square and started 
an open-ended sit-in, asking for the resignation of the government. The sit-in was 
backed by the Front de Salut National, an anti-government coalition composed of the 
leftist parties together with Essebsi’s Nidaa Tounes, a newly created modernist party 
including many ex-RCD members along with more left-leaning elements.385 
                                                 
382 Translated from French by the author. 
383 Translated from French by the author. 
384 After Ben Ali’s downfall, most tendencies of the “Watad family” unified in a legal party called Hizb 
El-Wataniyyn El-Demouqratiyyn El-Muahad (Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party), colloquially known 
as Watad Muahad. 
385 Including former UGTT SG Taïeb Baccouche, who was Nidaa Tounes SG at the time, and would 
later become Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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The stand-off between government and opposition led to the series of 
negotiations known as the National Dialogue. The bargaining between the opposed 
ranks of political parties was mediated by the so-called Quartet; the UGTT, UTICA, 
LTDH, and National Bar Association. It is generally understood that the UGTT was 
the most influential among the four. The National Dialogue was essentially a power-
sharing compromise between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, which led to an agreement 
on procedural democracy but left aside the exclusion of old-regime elites and issues 
related to social justice (Boubekeur 2016). The talks ended in January 2014, when the 
new constitution was approved, the Ennahda-led executive resigned in favour of a 
“technocratic” government, and the date for the new elections was set. 
The 26 October 2014 parliamentary elections were won by Nidaa Tounes 
(37.6%), with Ennahda in the second position (see Ben Salem 2016). Essebsi also 
carried the day at the 23 November 2014 presidential elections, while Hamma 
Hammami – the candidate backed by the new Marxist and Arab nationalist coalition 
Front Populaire (FP) – reached 7.8%. On 5 February 2015, a new government led by 
Nidaa Tounes and including Ennahda was sworn in. The “grand coalition” 
government ushered the country into a period of relative institutional stabilisation, yet 
with the continuation of mass popular mobilisations on one side and Islamist terrorism 
on the other side. 
The 2011 elections and the following political events had put the Left in a 
defensive position. The killings of the leftist leaders had increased fears that the 
Islamist-led government could turn authoritarian. This prompted the Left to accept an 
uneasy alliance with the ex-RCDists. The Bardo sit-in and the UGTT-brokered 
National Dialogue took place in the context of this alliance. Its political effects were 
extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, for the National Dialogue to succeed, the 
UGTT had to sacrifice, to a large extent, core demands of the 2011 uprising, 
particularly concerning social justice and the cleansing of the state of old regime 
incumbents. On the other hand, the bitter experiences of the other countries affected 
by the 2011 Arab uprisings signalled that the international balance of power was 
unfavourable to progressive change. The risk of an escalation of violence in which the 
jihadis and the state would have been the only players cannot be dismissed, from 
which would follow that the defence of the civil and political rights won by the 
uprising was worth a compromise. The evaluations of the union militants on the 
subject vary depending on which of the two sets of considerations are prioritised.  
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The widespread perception that the 2011 uprising failed to achieve significant 
progress towards social justice engendered strong feelings of disillusion and cynicism 
among workers, especially youths and progressive militants. The expression “we 
gained nothing” recurs over and over in interviews and real-life conversations. This 
claim is normally nuanced with the recognition that civil rights have improved, only 
to stress that they are under threat. The uprising has nonetheless torn the institutions 
of authoritarian corporatism into pieces. The conquest of civil and political rights 
inaugurated a new phase in labour institutions that is still in the making. The new 
pattern features a significant reduction of constraints, a reconfiguration of 
organisational inducements, and a mixed trend in substantial inducements. 
The main novelty is the lowering of state constraints. With the expansion of civil 
rights, the state no longer has a significant say over the selection of the UGTT 
leadership. However, the easing of repression is absorbing the polarisation between 
“militants” and “bureaucrats”. The militants have now gained representation in the 
UGTT NEC and moved from clandestine political groups persecuted by the state to 
legal parties with MPs in parliament. The most controversial faces of the old 
leadership, such Amara Abassi or Abdessalem Jerad, have been removed from their 
posts. 
For what concerns constraints in the workplace, the ten-day notice and the 
authorisation of the central labour confederation are still necessary for a strike to be 
legal, but – as seen above – the ratio of authorised strikes has increased significantly. 
The post-2011 rise in union membership also suggested that workplace union 
representatives in the private sector were less victimised than before, but reports of 
illegal anti-union behaviours are still widespread. 
Organisational inducements are transforming again. The state is no longer able 
to guarantee the UGTT’s monopoly of representation, but the latter has been further 
incorporated into the decision-making mechanisms of the former. Trade union 
pluralism is now a reality. In 2011, the state recognised two new labour 
confederations, the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT) and 
the Union des Travailleurs de Tunisie (UTT). The CGTT – led by former Gabes 
UGTT Regional SG Habib Guiza – had first attempted to obtain recognition in 2007, 
without success. In 2015, it was estimated to have about 30,000 members (European 
Commission 2015, p. 52). The UTT was founded by former UGTT SG Ismail Sahbani 
and its membership has been estimated at 100,000 (Ibidem). Additionally, in 2013, in 
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the midst of the Bardo crisis, some trade unionists close to Ennahda and the CPR 
exited the UGTT and formed the Organisation Tunisienne du Travail, but the union 
had a very limited membership. The check-off system for the public sector has now 
been extended to all labour confederations. However, the new unions do not compare 
with the UGTT in size and legitimacy, and the old confederation maintains its status 
as “most representative organisation” and therefore has exclusive membership in all 
national tripartite bodies and bargaining rounds.  
On 14 January 2013, the UGTT signed a tripartite social pact with the UTICA 
and the government, creating provisions to form a National Council for Social 
Dialogue to further institutionalise tripartism. This measure could give the UGTT 
formalised access to social and even political decision-making, but it has not yet been 
implemented.386 However, the UGTT now wields great informal power in influencing 
the composition of governments, so much so that it is often described in the news as 
the “all-powerful” union of Tunisia (e.g. Jeune Afrique, 7 June 2018). In fact, in 
summer 2016, the UGTT was included in the negotiations for the creation of a new 
national unity government (whose main parties were Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda) and, 
along with the UTICA, it signed the Carthage Pact that gave a mandate to the new 
executive. Two former UGTT NEC members became ministers: Mohamed Trabelsi 
for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Abid Briki for the Ministry of Public 
Administration (Briki, however, was dismissed in March 2017).387  
However, given Tunisia’s scarce negotiating power vis-à-vis the “international 
community”, among other things, the UGTT’s power in influencing the composition 
of governments was not accompanied by a capacity to significantly steer their policies 
away from a neoliberal framework. The stand-off between the countervailing 
pressures of workers’ mobilisations and conditionality by foreign lenders was 
aggravated by the economic downturn caused by political instability and terrorist 
attacks. However, relatively high working-class power resulted in wage rigidity and 
in the fact that the economic crisis could not be managed through overtly repressive 
and deflationary policies. Mahmoud Ben Romdhane notes that, in recent years: 
                                                 
386 In return, since 2012, the UGTT was represented in the so-called 7+7 Commission (then 4+4 
Commission), a board with an equal number of government and union representatives, in charge of 
dialogue on wages and conditions in public administration and relevant policy issues. 
387 The union was also seen as the main force behind the dismissals of Minister of Health Saïd Aïdi, 




[S]trikes and occupations were given free rein, reaching unprecedented 
levels; some vital sectors were brought to a standstill or forced to slow 
down production […]. Contrary to the former crisis [that of the 1980s], 
the current crisis is taking place in a context in which trade unionism is a 
key actor and basic freedoms are generally respected.388 (Ben Romdhane 
2018, p. 35) 
 
Employment in public administration increased from 435,487 posts in 2010 to 
591,174 in 2014 (INS 2016a), through a wave of new recruitments and the direct hiring 
– as demanded by the UGTT in 2011 – of all the outsourced employees working for 
the public administration (see King 2013). SOEs and state-sponsored employment 
schemes also increased their employees. According to Ben Romdhane, real wages in 
the formal sector overall increased faster than GDP in the 2011-2016 period (Ben 
Romdhane 2018, pp. 124-40). 
Yet inflation rates remained high and the official unemployment rate rose from 
13% in 2010 to 15.3% in 2015, despite the new public sector hires, because of low 
investment in the private sector. The quality of welfare services seems to have 
deteriorated due to the renewed fiscal crisis of the state, and the marginalisation of the 
interior regions has seen no significant improvement. This gave rise to the generalised 
judgement that the social justice demands of the 2011 uprising remained unachieved. 
Socioeconomic grievances, especially the demands for secure employment and local 
development, were again central in the widespread social unrest that took place in the 
years following the uprising and continues until today. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the cycle of struggle that began with the 2008 Gafsa 
revolt and is still ongoing was able to bring down Ben Ali’s regime and trigger a 
democratic transition, while being unable to address its very core demands, which 
revolved around secure employment, local development, and – more generally – social 
justice. 
                                                 
388 Translated from French by the author. 
 249
In the late 2000s, Tunisia’s rigid system of labour institutions encouraged an 
internal polarisation within the UGTT between “militants” and “bureaucrats”, the 
former actively supporting the precarious youth’s struggles and the latter upholding a 
policy of compromise with the regime. While during the Gafsa revolt the 
compromising line won the day, in January 2011 the politicised militants were able to 
help spread the protests, pressuring the National Administrative Commission to 
authorise regional general strikes in solidarity with the mobilisations of precarious 
workers. 
Compared to Morocco, Tunisia had both a more rigid system of labour 
institutions and stronger working-class power. Higher levels of “human development” 
and welfare provisions (e.g. education) constituted more resources for the mobilisation 
of non-unionised precarious workers in the marginalised regions. The larger size of 
industry, the public sector, and the share of workers enjoying relative job security 
allowed the secure workers to mobilise effectively in solidarity with the precarious. In 
order for this to actually happen, the initiative of activists on the ground was crucial 
in building pressure on the UGTT’s top leadership, so that the union’s associational 
power could be used to bring into existence solidarity between different working-class 
fractions. 
 These findings are in line with Beinin (2016) and Yousfi’s (2015) work, which 
show that the UGTT was an important contributor to Tunisia’s uprising, despite the 
compromising line of its top leadership. This thesis, however, compares Tunisia to 
Morocco, showing that higher working-class power and rigid institutions are relevant 
factors in understanding the different roles of the trade unions in the two countries. 
Moreover, the thesis differs from their valuable analyses mainly in terms of its 
theoretical understanding of class (see Chapter 1). This thesis adopted an autonomist-
inspired, expanded concept of the working class, which encompasses all those who 
are excluded from significant ownership and control of capital, including the 
“unemployed”, unwaged workers, and intellectual workers. The January 2011 
convergence of the struggles of precarious workers, relatively secure industrial 
workers, and intellectual workers (mostly but not solely from public administration) 
is not interpreted here as a cross-class coalition but as working-class re-composition. 
This allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the uprising as class struggle, 
despite the non-central role of manufacturing workers. It also provides a framework 
for the analysis of the relations between precarious workers’ community struggles and 
 250
the trade unions. 
 With the defeat of the 2011 Arab uprisings in the other countries of the region 
and the renewed influence of international capital on Tunisia’s economic policy, the 
Tunisian working class was, to a significant extent, de-composed along the 
“modernist-Islamist” cleavage. Precarious workers’ mobilisations continued, 
especially in the marginalised regions, but after the National Dialogue they did not 
find the same level of support from other working-class fractions. While Tunisia’s 
relatively high working-class power facilitated the achievement of democracy, the 
core demands of the current cycle of struggle remain unsatisfied.   
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A History of Power 
As conveyed by the title of this thesis, trade unions manoeuvre between the hammer 
of the working class and the anvil of the state and capital. The preceding pages 
demonstrated that it is crucial to analyse the contrasting pressures from below and 
from above, as well as the union officials’ responses to them, to understand the role of 
trade unions in struggles for social justice and democracy. In addition, it was shown 
that examinations of pressures from below can be fruitfully extended far beyond union 
members. 
 This thesis sought to understand the role of the Moroccan and Tunisian trade 
unions in the 2011 Arab uprisings and their outcomes. This task was carried out 
through a historical sociology approach, centred on how contingent social struggles 
shape and change the structures of society in time. In particular, the research focused 
on the ways in which successive rounds of class struggles transformed Morocco and 
Tunisia’s balances of class power and systems of labour institutions. In the 2011 
uprisings, the latter structures influenced, in turn, the choices of workers, trade 
unionists, activists, as well as regime elites, who once again transformed such 
structures in new directions. This historical and struggle-centred approach has thus 
brought to the fore the dialectical relationship between structure and agency, 
considering the weight of the former but assigning a constituent role to the latter. In 
order to reach its objectives, the thesis mobilised evidence collected through semi-
structured interviews, press archives, socioeconomic statistics, labour legislation, 
memoirs of labour activists, and other documents produced by the trade unions and 
the state. 
 The core argument of the thesis is that class struggles are constituent of labour 
institutions, and that the latter are grounded in specific balances of class power. 
Therefore, class struggle and class power should be given analytical primacy in the 
investigation of the trade unions’ political role. Furthermore, in detecting class 
struggles and assessing working-class power, an expanded conception of working 
class – including unwaged workers – allows one to see the relations between the 
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unions and the community struggles of precarious workers, which are an important 
element of Morocco and Tunisia’s recent history. 
 As shown throughout the thesis, both the level of working-class power 
(relatively high vs. low) and the type of labour institutions (relatively rigid vs. flexible) 
were important factors facing Moroccan and Tunisian labour actors when elaborating 
their choices during the 2011 uprisings. These two kinds of factors stand in a 
hierarchical relation with one another, in the sense that the level of working-class 
power is critical in contributing to explaining the direction and magnitude of change, 
while the institutional framework mostly contributes to understanding why this change 
happened in an abrupt and insurrectional manner or in a gradual and negotiated way. 
This stress on class power is an alternative to institution-based approaches, which had 
understood union pluralist Morocco as the country where the trade unions were best 
placed to advance democratic change, and Tunisian labour as crippled by the single-
trade union corporatist arrangement. The different roles of Moroccan and Tunisian 
trade unions, therefore, are ultimately rooted in antagonistically constructed power 
relations. 
 The outcomes under investigation do not stand in a deterministic relation to 
the level of working-class power or the type of labour institutions in place. These 
elements only tend to increase the likelihood, real or perceived, of success of some 
strategies by the relevant actors and to decrease the plausibility of others. Both sets of 
factors were historically constructed through successive rounds of social – and 
particularly class – struggles, and they can change through further struggles. Class 
power and labour institutions by themselves, thus, do not explain any outcomes. They 
merely point to a range of likelier outcomes that cannot in any case be foreseen 
beforehand. Such factors contribute to an explanation, which would however be 
uncomplete without the narrative of the contingent strategies actually adopted by the 
relevant actors.  
 In Morocco, working-class power was relatively low, and the system of labour 
institutions relatively flexible. The absence of a former populist social pact made the 
retrenchment of substantial inducements in the neoliberal phase less dramatic and 
lowered workers’ expectations. Compared to the Tunisian case, in the 2011 uprising, 
the trade unions faced weaker pressures from below to take an active role in workers’ 
protests for social justice and democracy. Furthermore, the unions themselves had less 
resources to mobilise against the regime, which made radical action in support of the 
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social movements less likely to succeed. At the same time, these struggles played out 
in a flexible institutional framework, meaning that workers’ mobilisations could be 
partially accommodated in a gradual and negotiated way. This contributes to an 
explanation of why all Moroccan labour confederations except for the CDT supported 
the constitutional reform led by the Palace, in the face of opposition from the M20Fev, 
and why no labour confederation took radical action – e.g. political general strikes – 
in support of the movement. The main confederations held this course of action despite 
their initial sympathy towards the M20Fev. The unions faced weaker pressures to 
oppose the constitutional reform and they themselves had less power to stop its 
approval. At the same time, a more flexible institutional system – particularly trade 
union pluralism, party mediation between the unions and the state, and 
institutionalised social dialogue – allowed the trade unions to channel workers’ 
grievances in a way that defused tensions. A key reason – among others – for the 
endurance of a nondemocratic and highly unequal regime in Morocco lies in the low 
power of the working class. Institutional flexibility better contributes to explain the 
endurance of this regime as opposed to its downfall and replacement with a new, 
nondemocratic one. 
 In Tunisia, working-class power was relatively high, and the system of labour 
institutions relatively rigid. The existence of a former populist social pact made the 
neoliberal retrenchment of substantial inducements more visible and frustrated 
workers’ expectations. Compared to the Moroccan case, the UGTT faced stronger 
pressures from below, especially by non-unionised precarious workers as well as 
public administration union activists, to take an active role in the uprising. 
Furthermore, the UGTT itself had more resources to mobilise in solidarity with the 
protests, as seen most notably in the regional general strikes of January 2011. 
Relatively high working-class power thus helps to explain why the UGTT’s top 
leadership, despite its policy of compromise with the regime, authorised radical action 
against that same regime. Such struggles met a rigid institutional framework, which 
was unable to accommodate them in a gradual and negotiated way. This made abrupt 
and insurrectional change more likely. The rigid institutional system in place – 
characterised by stiff repression, a single trade union, the absence of party mediation 
between the UGTT and the state, and the narrow nature of union incorporation – 
exasperated tensions rather than defusing them, encouraging the regime to resort to 
sheer violence. An important reason for the advent of representative democracy in 
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Tunisia lies in the relatively high level of working-class power that obtained in the 
country. Institutional rigidity, instead, contributes to explaining the abrupt and 
insurrectional manner in which democracy was achieved. 
 This thesis provided an analysis of the role of the Moroccan and Tunisian trade 
unions in the 2011 uprisings, however, it cannot be expected to deliver exact 
predictions of their future contributions to struggles for social justice and democracy. 
This thesis’s theoretical framework is based on the assumption that social struggles 
can change the structures of society in contingent and unpredictable ways. Factors like 
the balance of class power or the system of labour institutions only constitute the 
context that makes certain decisions by the relevant actors seemingly more or less 
likely to succeed. 
 In particular, the findings of the thesis do not exclude future democratisation 
in Morocco. In fact, working-class power in Morocco appears to be higher than in 
most other Arab countries and could increase significantly relative to its 2011 levels. 
Additionally, working-class power is only one among several factors that can facilitate 
democratisation. The Moroccan unions could be further reformed in a militant and 
democratic direction, or new oppositional labour organisations could appear. Class 
struggles will also probably develop outside of any trade union framework. This is 
indeed what happened with the more recent social movements of the Hirak Esh’aby 
of the Rif and the Hirak of Jerada, which saw once again precarious workers 
mobilising for secure employment and local development in their communities. 
Conversely, these conclusions do not idealise Tunisia as a workers’ paradise – 
far from it. Tunisian workers’ power is high relative to the standards of a staunchly 
labour-repressive region. Moreover, Tunisia has democratised in a time when 
democracy itself is undergoing a deep crisis. Today, it is widely recognised that the 
citizens of democratic countries are unable to use elected governments to reduce 
inequality and shape substantial alternatives to the dominant neoliberal trend. In other 
words, capitalist democracy is failing to deliver on social justice. This was seen clearly 
in post-2011 Tunisia, where slow economic growth and rising public debt have 
increased the power of the international financial institutions to determine economic 
policy regardless of the ideological commitments of state officials. In the first three 
years following the uprising, the political debate was thus mostly channelled towards 
cultural identity issues revolving around the place of religion in society. Since 
democratisation, Tunisian workers have faced rising unemployment and declining 
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standards of living. The UGTT’s political inclusion in the new order has failed to result 
in progress towards the aspirations of social justice that were at the core of the 
uprising, putting the union in a difficult position, especially vis-à-vis the precarious 
fractions of the working class. 
 
Precarious Workers and Trade Unions 
This thesis contributed to existing knowledge by addressing the puzzle of why labour 
institutions in Morocco and Tunisia did not have the effects envisaged by the former 
institution-based literature on North African labour – to which this thesis is in any case 
indebted (e.g. Bellin 2002; Cammett and Posusney 2010). The comparison showed 
that labour institutions, while significant, were not the only relevant factor for 
understanding the context in which the trade unions operated in the two countries, and 
that working-class power should be given a more prominent place. Working-class 
power cannot be simply evinced from the framework of trade union-state relations, 
because the working class – and therefore class struggle and class power – transcends 
its official organisations in ways that are too politically significant to be heuristically 
excluded. This means that the role of trade unionism in struggles for social justice and 
democracy can be better understood if labour institutions are analysed in their relation 
to class struggle and the balance of class power, even when establishing comparisons 
in which the institutional framework appears to be decisive at first glance. Therefore, 
this thesis has systematically disaggregated workers from trade union officials through 
the analysis of state-provided substantial inducements – in the interest of the workers 
– and organisational inducements – in the interest of trade union officials. This 
conceptualisation of the possibility of divergent interests between workers and trade 
union officials allowed to analyse the pressures from the workers – both unionised and 
non-unionised – on the trade unions and the divergences within the trade unions 
themselves. 
Furthermore, this research – different from other Marxist analyses (e.g. 
Alexander and Bassiouny 2014; Beinin 2016) – showed for the first time the 
usefulness of an autonomist-inspired, expanded, heterodox conception of the working 
class in the study of North African workers. In this thesis, phrases like “working-class 
composition”, “working-class power”, and “class struggle” refer to more than simply 
factory workers or waged employees. Avoiding the fetishisation of manual labour or 
the wage, the conception of working class espoused here encompasses all those who 
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are on the receiving end of the capital relation. This includes those who, in other 
analyses, are seen as groups external to the working-class composition, such as the 
“lumpenproletariat” (precarious workers, in the terminology of this thesis) and a 
sizable section of what is normally called the “middle class” (intellectual workers, in 
the terminology of this thesis). Dispossession from significant ownership and control 
of the means of production is the lowest common denominator among all these social 
groups. 
 Autonomist Marxism is a diverse theoretical tradition, and it can only be 
applied to Global South realities selectively. The hegemony of cooperative networks 
of immaterial labour hypothesised by Hardt and Negri (2000) and their associates 
seems scarcely appropriate to understand the struggles of – in the case of this thesis – 
North African workers. In fact, while educational levels have risen over time, 
opportunities for qualified employment have not risen at the same rate, and thus the 
influence of immaterial labour is limited – especially in the marginalised areas – and 
cannot provide the main infrastructure for mobilisation, which is rather given by 
communal solidarities (Feltrin 2018b). However, autonomist feminism – with its 
attention to subjects at the lower end of the global working-class composition – is 
better equipped to theorise the significance of unwaged workers and community-based 
mobilisations, which came to the fore in the latest cycle of struggle. The present thesis 
has demonstrated that – while this very seldom happens – autonomist Marxism can be 
fruitfully adapted to the study of workers in the Global South. 
 As seen above, the precarious fractions of the working class were actually the 
first to challenge the Tunisian regime, and their protests were crucial in securing the 
UGTT’s involvement. Beyond Tunisia, the role of precarious workers is even more 
important today than it was in the first decades after WWII. In fact, the neoliberal 
phase of capitalism has been eroding Keynesianism across the Global North and 
populism in many Global South countries. These class compromises had featured the 
extension of job security and unionisation to expanding segments of the workforce. 
Since the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, such social pacts have been suspended and 
the trend towards the expansion of job security has been inverted or weakened 
depending on the national case. This means that a conception of working class able to 
include all forms of precarious labour is increasingly valuable in the study of workers’ 
mobilisations and trade unionism today. 
Based on the ideas developed in this thesis, a compelling direction for new 
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research is the study of precarious workers’ formal and informal organising as part of 
the construction of overall working-class power. This can go from research on 
informal and everyday communal solidarities to exceptional and confrontational social 
movements or to formally structured organisations (e.g. unions of the unemployed). 
For what concerns the trade unions, this line of inquiry would be centred on the extent 
to which the trade unions can relate to these forms of precarious workers’ organising 
or, vice versa, the extent to which precarious workers can pressure the unions to act 
upon their demands. While this thesis has operated at the national level, ethnographic 
research could complement it with more in-depth accounts of how precarious workers 
engage in hidden forms of work, organise in their communities, and interact with 
official organisations. 
The unions can no longer base their strategies on the presupposition that 
capitalist development goes hand in hand with the expansion of job security and trade 
union density. Capitalist development still tends to raise some aspects of working-
class power, for example in education and health, but this is conditional upon class 
struggles over the distribution of resources. Such struggles are more effectively waged 
when precarious workers mobilise, but, due to their employment conditions, the 
precarious face major difficulties in waging successful collective action through 
traditional workplace unions, because they are normally not unified by the condition 
of working in large numbers under the same employer. A strategic site of organisation 
for the precarious is the realm of social reproduction – the community. This has been 
shown in the neighbourhood- and village-based informal organisation of the 
precarious in both Morocco and Tunisia. The precarious can thus organise 
autonomously in their communities and then pressure the trade unions to support their 
grievances. Alternatively, the trade unions can opt for a social and community 
unionism that would accompany traditional workplace unionism, although so far this 
has not happened to a significant extent in Morocco or Tunisia. In any case, the post-
2011 class struggles in the two countries provide a great wealth of understudied 
mobilisations led by the precarious, from the Hirak Esh’aby of the Rif in Morocco to 
the blockades of mineral extraction in southern Tunisia, to mention just two notable 
examples. 
Autonomist Marxism – particularly its feminist and feminist-inspired strands, 
with their theorisation of unwaged labour and the sphere of reproduction as integrated 
into the circuit of capital accumulation – provides apt conceptual tools that have never 
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been applied before to study social mobilisations in this region. 
In 1972, autonomist feminist Selma James wrote a scathing assessment of the 
relations between the trade unions and unwaged workers: 
 
It is not simply that they [the unions] don’t organize [the unwaged]; it is 
that the union prevents such organization, by following organizationally 
the way capital is organized: a fragmented class, divided into those who 
have wages and those who don’t. The unemployed, the old, the ill, the 
children, and housewives are unwaged. So the unions ignore us and 
thereby they separate us from each other and from the waged. That is, they 
structurally make a generalized struggle impossible. (James 2012, p. 66, 
italics in the original) 
 
Forty years later, James returned to her analysis, commenting that: 
 
[I]t’s clear that my critique of the unions was too absolute. It takes no 
account of the possibility of a mass takeover by members, or even people 
inside who are fighting to reclaim the unions […and] put facilities and 
even some funds at the disposal of the union’s grassroots as well as the 
community generally. (Ibid., p. 61) 
 
 The story recounted here is exactly that of the pitfalls and successes – 
sometimes abrupt and unexpected – of this contest to put the trade unions at the service 
of struggles for social justice and democracy. In such an endeavour, representative 
democracy in capitalism cannot be seen as the ultimate end, as the aftermath of the 
2011 uprisings confirmed. The inability of the Tunisian democracy to address the 
needs of most of the population by delivering on social justice poses a serious 
legitimacy problem for democracy in the region as a whole. The struggles of the future 
will tell whether this dilemma will be resolved through more democracy or a full-scale 
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Interview 81: Kasserine, 6 November 2015. Ex workplace union representative with 
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Interview 82: Sfax, 19 November 2015. Workplace union representative with the 
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Interview 88: Sidi Bouzid, 8 December 2015. Ex workplace union representative with 
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Interview 94: Tunis, 18 December 2015. Ex UGTT-FGBEF SG (Fédération Générale 








1. Article on the UMT’s Controversies390 
 
The UMT: When Struggle and ‘Mismanagement’ Coexist 
The UMT is the oldest union in Morocco and the biggest. However, as much as it is 
big and present among the workers, administrative and financial “corruption” is 
present among its ranks. A journalist from Al-Massae put himself in the workers’ shoes 
and went investigating among the walls and papers of the “great old union”, but he 
came up against a wall of silence erected by the so-called “bureaucrats” and the self-
styled “democrats” alike. […] 
 
The UMT’s assets 
In December 2010, the 10th UMT Congress, and the first in the absence of Mahjoub 
Ben Seddik, approved the mandatory resolution of appointing a committee charged 
with carrying out an audit of the UMT’s assets. A number of delegates insisted 
especially on the recovery of many resources and assets of the union that Mahjoub 
Ben Seddik had turned into his private property, by registering them under his name 
or the name of his children. Most importantly, the printing press IMPRIGEMA – 
which had an estimated value of tens of millions of dirhams and was located in the 
heart of Casablanca – used to give the union a profit of 3 million dirhams per year. 
Then Mahjoub Ben Seddik’s son sold its building to property developers and moved 
the press to an industrial estate in Casablanca. The same fate was suffered by eight 
villas in Casablanca’s Anfa neighbourhood and several agricultural lands in the 
vicinity of Berrechid – Mahjoub Ben Seddik turned them into his personal property. 
 The Congress delegates also discussed the revelations of former trade unionist 
Hassan Bazwi in his book L’UMT: Entre le rêve et la réalité, which exposed the 
deceased zaïm’s “embezzlements” of the working class’s finances. For example, in 
1985, he received 100,000 dollars from the union of Arab teachers, with the aim of 
                                                 
390 The article was translated from Arabic by Marwa Talhaoui and the author. The documents were 
abridged in order to comply with the word limit for the Appendix. 
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creating “an exemplary centre for the study of Arabic”. But “the project disappeared 
and the 100,000 dollars with it; the union of Arab teachers demanded its money back 
and threatened to bring the case to court, to no avail”. Similarly, Mahjoub Ben Seddik 
received 300,000 dollars in instalments, within the framework of a cooperation 
agreement with the Arab Labour Organisation, and nobody knows what happened to 
that sum... Additionally, a Moroccan political party paid Ben Seddik a sum of up to 
4.5 million dirhams to print electoral posters in the UMT’s press, and nobody knows 
where the money went. Moreover, no union leader knows about the 780,000 dirhams 
the zaïm had collected to relaunch one of the union’s newspapers. 
 The Congress ended, but the committee for the audit of the UMT’s assets did 
not fulfil its mission and nobody speaks anymore about the tens of millions that the 
deceased zaïm Mahjoub Ben Seddik “robbed” in terms of the workers’ “surplus value” 
and of the credibility of trade unionism in the eyes of millions of Moroccans. […] 
 
Where is the teachers’ money? 
At the beginning of February 2012, the National Brigade of the Judicial Police 
interrogated a group of directors of the MGEN, which is presided over by M’hmed 
Ghayour. This was based on a 2009 IGF report accusing Ghayour of benefiting from 
illegal refunds of up to 40,000 dirhams per month since 1987, despite the fact that the 
dahir of 1963 on the mutuelles and the law on the mutuelles state that: “Work in the 
mutuelles is voluntary [i.e. unpaid]”. Ghayour, who despite being over eighty years 
old was elected to the last UMT NEC, is also accused of the “acquisition” of 23.4 
million dirhams from the MGEN. Concerning health, the IGF report documents a 
“fraud” by the MGEN regarding the beneficiaries of medical services, in which the ill 
were obliged to pay 70 dirhams even if, according to the internal statute of the 
mutuelle, the participants do not have to pay any contribution to be treated. According 
to the report, the MGEN was able to obtain more than 3 million dirhams in this way. 
 Concerning public procurement, the IGF report accuses M’hmed Ghayour of 
having conceded most of the MGEN’s contracts to the “Unity Distribution Company” 
– which is owned by his son, Rachid Ghayour – without respecting the code on public 
procurement. […] 
 Concerning hiring, the report says that M’hmed Ghayour hired his brother, 
Abderrahman Ghayour, who has no relation to the MGEN, in the position of 
“communication officer”, for a salary of 32,500 dirhams. He also hired his son Rachid, 
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and gave him an “excellent” salary for which he does not show up to work, as well as 
his nephew Ibrahim Ghayour, in the Kenitra MGEN office. The IGF report also states 
that recruitment in the MGEN is subject to a logic of “clientelism and nepotism”. […] 
 
The FNE lacks organisation! 
All those who knew Mahjoub Ben Seddik remember he deeply hated teaching and 
teachers. […] Therefore, he appointed his friend M’hmed Ghayour as FNE SG, and 
the federation has never held a Congress since March 1995. Critics of the FNE’s 
performance affirm the union suffers from an arbitrary management that does not 
leave any space for creativity and initiative, nor prevents the spreading of corruption. 
This is caused by the absence of a financial report and by the aleatory and “opaque” 
distribution of membership cards. The federation also suffers from the lack of a 
platform of demands based on serious debate, a confused conception of the question 
of alliances, the “coups” against “disloyal” ECs, the suspension of “democratic” trade 
unionists from their positions, and the withdrawal of their benefits, such as the trade 
union secondment. […] Bechir El-Housseini is considered by the dissidents in 
M’hmed Ghayour’s union as a source of the FNE’s “backwardness”. 
 Ahmed El-Masyh, former vice-SG of Khemisset’s regional UMT, recounts: “In 
December 2004, Bechir El-Housseini declared he intended to leave his position of 
Khemisset UMT Regional SG, as he had founded, with foreign support, a 
developmental association linked to trade unionism. […] We held the Regional 
Congress and elected a Regional EC with Ahmed El-Haij as SG. I was given the 
position of vice-SG. We submitted the legal documentation to the authorities and 
started to work normally. However, we were surprised by the fact that Mahjoub Ben 
Seddik, after being visited [by Bechir El-Housseini] decided not to recognise the new 
Regional EC. Mahjoub Ben Seddik sent his aide Miloudi Moukharik to ask 
Khemisset’s governor to cancel our clearance, but the governor answered this was 
impossible because we had already received the legal authorisation. […] I still 
remember very well 19 April 2005, it was an unforgettable and dark day. The NEC 
informed us it was coming to Khemisset to open a debate on the crisis of the regional 
union. Indeed, at 8 AM, the NEC members were all present, with the exception of 
Mahjoub Ben Seddik and M’hmed Ghayour. All the SGs of the national unions were 
also at the building of the regional union, accompanied by the members of the regional 
committees, including Meknes, Sidi Slimane, Kenitra, and Casablanca. Finally, there 
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was a procession of ten vehicles full of more than a hundred baltajis [thugs], as they 
are called nowadays. Later, we would find out that the NEC had lied to most of them, 
telling them that “Amaoui’s union”, i.e. the CDT, was going to attack our union”. El-
Masyh adds: “We wanted to open a discussion about this arrival and about problems 
of internal democracy, but Miloudi Moukharik – the current UMT SG – took us to a 
corner of the old union building and told us frankly: ‘We won’t recognise you’. One 
of our comrades, agricultural engineer Awhada, tried to argue with them, so he was 
violently beaten. They held a symbolic general assembly, appointed Bechir El-




The Redal’s391 workers, clerks, and cadres that met with Al-Massae said that the 
workplace union is characterised by endless violations, because of the union’s 
“collusion” with management. This posed a threat to several rights and past 
achievements and resulted in mass layoffs, while the workplace union remained 
shamefully silent. Workers and cadres were fired, the problems of subcontracted 
clerks, poor working conditions, and the lack of transparency in yearly evaluations 
remained unresolved, and the quality of firm-level welfare declined. Concerning firm-
level welfare, the “reform movement” within Redal’s union criticises the conduct of 
its SG Rachid El-Meniary: “With the complicity of the administration, he fabricated a 
management board for the firm’s Comité d’Oeuvres Sociales (COS), depriving the 
workers of their right to run as candidates and without consulting anyone. All former 
members of the COS board were excluded because of their disagreement with the SG 
over the undemocratic and arbitrary methods used to decide the board’s composition”. 
 The “reform movement” not only accuses SG Rachid El-Meniary of 
complicity with management, it also considers him “illegitimate”, because he “has not 
been elected by a general workers’ assembly since 1997, and this is forbidden by the 
new internal regulation and by the resolutions of the last UMT Congress”. 
 The “reform movement” was not alone in criticising SG Rachid El-Meniary. A 
report by the Supreme Court of Auditors and another by a foreign NGO confirmed 
                                                 
391 Redal is the subsidiary company of the French corporation Veolia, which manages electricity and 
water distribution in Rabat. 
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that he committed violations to obtain personal gains. […] According to the report by 
France Libertés, SG Rachid El-Meniary “works in a consultancy firm linked to Redal. 
As UMT SG, El-Meniary receives a union secondment from Redal. El-Meniary also 
benefits from an accommodation paid for by the company, which he demanded from 
Redal’s management on 13 May 2003. This accommodation is a villa located in 
Temara’s neighbourhood Vieux Marocain, and the value of its rent is estimated at 
about 45,000 dirhams per month, while its total value is 23 million dirhams”. The 
report adds that El-Meniary benefits from a range of privileges, including the coverage 
of the expenditures for maintenance, security, cleaning, and gardening. For these 
expenditures, El-Meniary asked Redal’s management for 400,000 dirhams in 2004 and 
800,000 dirhams in 2010. The report also says that El-Meniary, as an assistant cadre 
in the firm, does not qualify to benefit from accommodation paid for by the company. 
[…] 
 Ksar El-Kebir’s Autonomous Agency for the Distribution of Water and 
Electricity has also witnessed numerous abuses and violations involving UMT 
officials. […] 
 
The liberation of Rabat 
“The liberation of Rabat” is the phrase used by the youths of the Jeunesse Ouvrière392 
affiliated to Ennahj Eddimouqrati. […] Abdellah Lafnatsa, a member of the Rabat EC 
and the UMT’s Administrative Commission, appeared ready to speak about “the 
blockage of the 12th Congress of the Rabat regional union”. Lafnatsa said that “some 
well-known corrupt union officials, a minority, refused to accept the results of the 11th 
Congress, boycotted the activities and the struggles of the union for six years, and 
disappeared until now, despite the fact that this period was full of working-class 
struggles against arbitrary closures and in defence of trade union rights, which were 
the object of a real war by the bosses and the Makhzen regime”. Lafnatsa continued: 
“We tried to hold the 12th Regional Congress […but s]uddenly some corrupt trade 
unionists appeared and, unfortunately, succeeded in blocking the Congress activities 
and prevented its timely conclusion. Because they are isolated and ostracised by most 
workers in the region, they are trying to make a real ‘coup’ against the legal decision-
making bodies, claiming they have the UMT NEC’s support”. Will the UMT regional 
                                                 
392 The Jeunesse Ouvrière is the UMT’s youth wing. 
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union be able to hold its Congress and “liberate Rabat”, as the brave youths of the 
Jeunesse Ouvrière put it? 
 
23 February 2012, Soulaiman Rassouni, Al-Massae, pp. 20-1 
 
2. Statement by the UMT’s Expelled Leaders393 
 
The UMT in Danger: Unprecedented Attack against the UMT’s Democratic Militants 
Since 5 March 2012, the UMT, i.e. the most important and oldest trade union 
confederation in Morocco (founded on 20 March 1955), has been undergoing a severe 
crisis following the unprecedented offensive by the corrupt and tyrannical bureaucrats 
that are well represented in the national bodies (the Administrative Commission and 
the NEC) against a number of democratic militants and officials, who are constantly 
at the service of the workers and are known for their combativity, their progressive 
commitment, and their moral integrity. We are living through a real witch-hunt, aimed 
at the eradication of the symbols of the union’s democratic current and the dismantling 
of the union structures – sectorial federations and local unions – known for their 
militant dynamism and their internal democracy. 
 
The main manifestations of this bureaucratic attack can be summarised as 
follows. 
On 5 March 2012, an ordinary meeting of the UMT’s Administrative 
Commission (AC) was manipulated by the current that dominates the NEC and 
transformed into an inquisitional tribunal against the democratic current and its 
symbols. The pretext was an article that appeared on 23 February 2012 in the Arabic-
language daily newspaper Al-Massae, which raised – backed by evidence – different 
aspects of the corrupt and bureaucratic behaviours of some UMT officials. Rather than 
making the necessary clarifications on the content of the article and, if appropriate, 
suing the author, these officials started accusing the democratic current members of 
being behind the article. They thus demanded the expulsion from the union of the 
officials belonging to the democratic current and the dissolution of the decision-
making structures of the Union Régionale de Rabat-Salé-Témara, considered to be 
                                                 
393 The statement was translated from French by the author. 
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subversive, supportive of the M20Fev, and under the influence of the party Ennahj 
Eddimouqrati (how horrible!). 
The AC meeting ended with some stunning decisions, published a few days 
later in a widely diffused, so-called “organisational resolution”, the essential content 
of which can be summarised as follows: 
 
I. Launch of the exclusion process of two officials of the Rabat regional union. 
One is a member of the UMT AC while the other is SG of the Syndicat National des 
Fonctionnaires du Ministère des Finances. 
II. Dissolution of the decision-making bodies of the Union Régionale de 
Rabat-Salé-Témara, democratically elected by the 11th Congress of the regional union. 
In particular, the Regional EC was substituted right away with a “management 
committee” (having no legal existence in the internal statute). Some members of this 
committee were not even aware of their “membership” within such prefabricated 
structure. The “management committee” was declared to the Rabat local authorities 
(as a replacement for the legal Regional EC) who, complicit in this infamy, recognised 
it. 
III. The “organisational resolution” also declared that the “management 
committee” was in charge of preparing the 12th Congress of the Union Régionale de 
Rabat-Salé-Témara, thus replacing the legal preparatory committee created one year 
before by the Regional AC. 
 
Let us point out that the 12th Congress of the Union Régionale de Rabat-Salé-
Témara was initially scheduled for 25 September 2011, then postponed to 30 October 
(when the opening session was held, but it went no further), then 13 November, then 
before the end of 2011, and finally 11 March 2012. The “coup” was kick-started on 5 
March to prevent the Congress and the re-election of a democratic leadership that the 
existing balance of power would have produced. 
To elegantly conclude this “coup” against legality – kick-started by the 
“organisational resolution” – the UMT leadership, through sheer violence, closed the 
Rabat union building (Avenue Jean Jaurès) with the pretext of some refurbishment 
works. […] 
The closure of union buildings or the banning of militants are not new 
phenomena. […] We are informed that the bans on access to union buildings for 
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democratic trade unionists are spreading. The closure of the UMT buildings for the 
trade unionists is a severe violation of trade union rights on the part of the union 
leadership. It deprives of all credibility its demand that the state and the employers 
respect labour rights. 
An irresponsible, cowardly, illegal, and illegitimate decision, taken on 22 
March 2012, expelled three NEC members and one AC member through a “discipline 
committee” controlled from above and probably inexistent – as its members and its 
president are unknown, and we do not know when, where, and if it actually convened. 
In any case, a “discipline committee” cannot decide on such a measure, which falls 
within the AC’s domain. Moreover, the internal statute delegates the determination of 
the powers of the “disciplinary council” to the internal regulation, which does not exist 
yet! […] 
The “union secondments” are manipulated, and distributed either to 
submissive trade unionists or on the bases of nepotism (to people that have no relation, 
except for family ties, to union activism). At the same time, the secondments are 
withdrawn from the democratic trade unionists, who refuse to bow down. 
The 10th FNE Congress was illegally postponed twice in a row, while its date 
had been legally fixed by the National Council for October 2011. Let us point out that 
the 9th and last Congress was held more than seventeen years ago, on 11-12 March 
1995! […] At the moment, and with the NEC’s complicity, there are two separate 
tendencies: the bureaucratic tendency, which represents a minority but has access to 
the resources of the confederation and the NEC’s support; and the democratic 
tendency, which has a large majority but is hindered by the dominant tendency of the 
UMT leadership and cannot even meet in the union buildings. The leader and symbol 
of this tendency, Abderrazak Drissi, is one of the three NEC members expelled from 
the UMT! The two tendencies will hold the 10th Congress separately on 5-6 May 2012. 
Unless the UMT NEC suddenly changes its conduct and abides by the rules, there will 
be two FNEs within the UMT! 
A secessionist conspiracy is trying to weaken the UMT-USF, the organisation 
that comprises all the federations and national unions of the civil servants from the 
various ministries and local administrations. […] 
Another “coup” was organised against the UMT-FNOFCL, a stronghold of 
democratic, progressive, and combative trade unionism within the UMT. […] 
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Some “coup” attempts were also directed against the UMT-FNSA – another 
flagship of democratic and progressive trade unionism in the UMT – to weaken this 
great federation. They failed until now, but we must expect the unexpected as we know 
these sequential “coups” could not be organised without the consent of the Makhzen 
regime, which has never liked democratic, progressive, and combative trade unionism, 
especially when it has a mass following. […] 
 The political struggles within the confederation [the UMT] were at first centred 
on the position towards the M20Fev: should the union provide the M20Fev with 
material and human, real and sincere, political support or should it restrain itself to 
theoretical support through public statements, without practical, material, and human 
support? It was the second option that prevailed. 
The political struggle intensified when it became necessary to take sides vis-à-
vis the constitutional draft presented at the 1 July 2011 referendum. While the 
dominant current within the leadership defended the draft, and pushed to call for a Yes 
vote, the democratic current defended the position that the NEC should leave freedom 
of choice to the members. […] 
The influential and tyrannical elements of the UMT leadership thus started to 
plan a “coup” against the results of the 10th UMT Congress, regarding both the posts 
of leadership and the organisational reforms. Al-Massae’s article of 23 February 2012 
provided the excuse to carry out an authoritarian “coup” against the democrats. […] 
 
-We will firmly confront, together with all democrats, the putschist plot aimed 
at cancelling the results of the 10th UMT Congress and going back to the bureaucratic 
and dictatorial management that characterised, for 55 years, Mahjoub’s reign over the 
organisation. 
-We will face, with all militants of integrity, despotism and corruption within 
our confederation (starting with recovering the union’s stolen assets), exactly as we 
struggled, in the broader society, within the M20Fev to build a Morocco of dignity, 
freedom, equality, social justice, democracy, and human rights. 
-We continue to reject the “organisational resolution”, taken by the AC in its 
5 March meeting, and its unfortunate consequences, especially the dissolution of the 
EC and the other bodies of the Rabat regional union. 
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-We will work without respite towards the official cancelling of the odious 
expulsions that hit us and to fully recover our responsibilities as established by the last 
Congress. 
-We will continue carrying our responsibilities as NEC members. […] 
-We call upon all democratic trade unionists in the UMT to unify their efforts 
and engage with determination in the battle against bureaucracy and corruption, until 
the victory of democracy and moral integrity in the organisation is achieved. 
-We call upon all militants who are disillusioned and scandalised by the 
tyranny of the corrupt and authoritarian bureaucracy to stand firm in their positions 
within the UMT, to cling to their belonging to the UMT, and to their continuous 
struggle for internal democracy and the working class. 
-We call upon all democratic trade unionists from the different militant 
confederations to join the struggle against bureaucracy and corruption and to 
coordinate their efforts to impose the militant unity that is indispensable to realising 
our common demands, from the perspective of the organisational unity of labour to 
which the working class aspires. 
-We call upon all democratic forces of the country to give importance to the 
democratisation of the unions and of the mass organisations in general, because it is 
impossible to democratise Morocco without first democratising the mass organisations 
and the political parties that work for democratic change. 
-We call upon the democratic trade unions abroad, who are friends of the real 
UMT and of Moroccan workers, to vigorously support the struggle for trade union 
democracy and against bureaucracy and corruption within the unions. We ask them to 
make their relations with the leaderships of the UMT and of the other unions 
conditional upon progress in internal democratisation and good governance. 
-Finally, we warn the corrupt bureaucracy backed by the Makhzen authorities 
in this aggressive escalation against the democratic militants: it will surely be the first 
to lose from the legitimate rage and the coming working-class insurrection against its 
retrograde practices that have nothing to do with the Spring we are living through in 
the Maghreb and in the Arab world following the Tunisian Revolution. We also warn 
the state and the employers to remain neutral in the UMT’s internal conflict and to 
stop their interventions in support of the bureaucratic and corrupt tendency at the 
expense of the democratic and anti-corruption tendency. 
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19 April 2012, Abdelhamid Amin, Abderrazak Drissi, Khadija Ghamiri 
 
3. Statement by the RSDM on the UGTT394 
 
Trade Union Platform: For a Democratic, Independent, and Militant UGTT 
Day by day, the economic crisis of the global capitalist system is getting deeper, wider, 
and filthier, and its devastating results are threatening all countries of the world. […] 
To address its crisis and defend its rates of profit, capitalism can only rely on the 
intensification of the rates of exploitation, the plundering of people's wealth and the 
escalation of war, sectarianism, repression, abuse, and the offensive against the 
relative gains that have been achieved through a long and arduous path of struggles 
and sacrifices. […] 
Today, under the dominance of a bureaucratic leadership and with the decline, 
weakening, and fragmentation of the militant movement, the UGTT is ignoring the 
material and social losses incurred by the workers, as well as the threats caused by the 
new reform projects. All this despite the growth of unemployment, mass layoffs, 
closures of enterprises, the propagation of poverty on a large scale, the deterioration 
of purchasing power, the poor quality of health services, education, and all other public 
services. The leadership is also endorsing the general economic, social, and political 
choices of the regime, on the pretext of containing the negative effects of globalisation. 
In order to support these policies, the leadership maintains the same old forms of 
organisation and control – the same methods and regulations, the same activities and 
tasks – thus making the UGTT merely a huge machine that works with obsolete 
administrative and hierarchical means, lacking the dynamism of the masses. This 
explains to a large extent the UGTT’s general reluctance to engage in the struggle and 
to fulfil its trade union responsibilities; it may also explain its limited 
representativeness among the workers, particularly in the private sector (no more than 
10% in the best-case scenario). 
The characteristics and effects of the tribal-bureaucratic leadership’s 
dominance on the union can be summarised as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
394 The statement was translated from Arabic by Marwa Talhaoui, Inel Tarfa, and the author. 
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1-Regarding the UGTT’s independence: 
-The UGTT endorses the regime’s policy framework and the union’s decisions 
must be in line with it. 
-The UGTT abandoned the defence of public and individual freedoms. 
-The UGTT is negligent in defending trade union freedoms. 
-The relations between the UGTT, on the one hand, and civil society groups 
and the democratic public opinion, on the other, have deteriorated. 
 
2-Regarding the militancy of the organisation: 
-Vital trade union, social, economic, and political issues (taxes, employment, 
education, health insurance, retirement, trade union rights...) are managed through a 
strategy of appeasement, gradual withdrawal, and double speak (a discourse of loyalty 
towards the regime and a bogus mobilisational discourse towards the trade unionists). 
-The leadership abandoned all [militant] decisions and watchwords, such as: 
•The elimination of labour outsourcing; 
•The indexing of wages to prices; 
•The opposition to SOE privatisations; 
•The creation of workplace unions in all firms and the expansion of the 
UGTT’s membership; 
•The creation of a trade union solidarity fund; 
•Turnover in union responsibilities and the presence of women in all union 
structures, etc. 
-The leadership insists in following a sterile collective bargaining system, 
which lacks a militant framework, is under the control of the regime and its 
institutions, and thus contributes to the deterioration of purchasing power and lays the 
foundations for a collaborationist trade unionism and social peace at the workers’ 
expense. 
-The leadership is complicit, through its conspicuous silence, with the price 
hikes. 
-The leadership neglects the private sector and lacks seriousness in the defence 





3-Regarding internal democracy: 
-The right to internal difference was confiscated and freedom of speech within 
the organisation restricted. 
-There was a series of paranoid reactions and reprisals since the 2002 Djerba 
Congress (campaigns of suspensions of trade unionists from different sectors and 
regions, failed “coup attempts” against a number of trade union officials in different 
sectors and regions by fabricating false documents with the aim of settling accounts 
on trade union divergences and conflicts...). 
-The two most important resolutions of the 2002 Djerba Congress were 
circumvented: the two-hour general strike in support of the Palestinian resistance, and 
the disputes on Article 10 of the internal regulation (which limits the bearing of union 
responsibilities in the NEC to two mandates) followed by the attempted “coup” [to 
change Article 10] during the 2006 Monastir Congress. There is also the persistence 
in adopting a centralised and improvised negotiating policy that resulted in internal 
union divisions and revealed an authoritarian tendency that disregards the role of the 
rank-and-file and sectorial structures, in the absence of clear strategic plans and 
militant programmes to defend the legitimate demands of the workers. 
 
Today the UGTT is going through a phase of severe convulsion that threatens 
its unity and credibility, revealing the exacerbation of dangerous symptoms and 
behaviours that represent a real obstacle to its work and diminish its credibility, such 
as: 
 
1-The adoption of double speak as a way of dealing with trade unionists and 
other parties, which originates from an opportunistic mentality that hinders the natural 
evolution of the organisation and weakens internal dialogue, making it lose all 
credibility and encouraging the growth of suspicion, distrust, and lack of confidence 
among the trade unionists. 
2-The lack of respect for the periodicity of the meetings of decision-making 
bodies such as the National Council (twice per NEC mandate), the National 
Administrative Commission (once every three months), and some sectorial and 
regional structures, in order to avoid accountability and continue complying with a 
system that sanctifies and deepens the bureaucratic approach. 
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3-The attempts to circumvent the decisions of a number of structures, such as 
the decision not to enter the Chamber of Advisors and the restructuring of the UGTT… 
4-The decline of democracy within the organisation through the promulgation 
of restrictive internal regulations that limit the democratic and militant nature of union 
activism; the manipulation of representation during Congresses; the robbery of power 
from the workplace and sectorial structures; the spread of a mentality of conspiracy 
and treachery; the reliance on exclusion as a method, on flattery and favouritism as a 
standard behaviour, and on all forms of personal, regional, and tribal loyalties, in 
addition to the use of financial and professional resources to buy people’s dignity and 
diffuse a culture of greed and corruption. 
5-The harnessing of the Esh’aab newspaper and of all trade union media 
platforms for the promotion of the union leadership’s views and positions, to impose 
them on the trade unionists and on public opinion. 
6-The use of the Financial Control Commission and the Internal Regulation 
Commission to settle accounts with democratically elected trade union opponents, 
each time the leadership fails to get rid of them through the ballot box. 
7-The persistence of non-transparent financial practices despite the slogans 
adopted and the formal mechanisms in place, in the absence of any real inspection 
independent from the administrative and bureaucratic influence. Such an inspection 
should deliver the required transparency, safeguard the UGTT's financial resources, 
and provide the means necessary for the activity of all trade union structures. 
8-The circumvention of all forms of rank-and-file expression, particularly 
public meetings, rallies, sit-ins, etc. 
9-The marginalisation of the role and status of working-class youths and 
women in the promotion of union activism. 
10-Dealing with the mining basin struggles in a devious fashion, and the 
submission of the union’s independence and militancy to negotiations and calculations 
that are external to trade unionism. 
11-The passive, and sometimes complicit, position regarding the layoffs of 
trade unionists in different enterprises and regions. 
 
In this context, we must recall the campaign of internal purges – from the 
suspensions of trade unionists in different sectors and regions, including Tunis, Gafsa, 
Kasserine, Bizerte, Beja, Sfax, Zaghouan, etc., to the unmotivated revocations of 
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union secondments, culminating with the fabrication of false cases against a number 
of sectorial and regional structures (Bizerte, Nabeul, Tunis, etc.) – with which the 
bureaucracy aimed at tightening its grip on the organisation and at withdrawing the 
partial democratic achievements conquered by the trade unionists. Such democratic 
achievements under threat include the principle of turnover in union responsibilities 
and the limitation of permanence in the NEC to two mandates, as stated in Article 10 
of the UGTT’s internal regulation. 
Based on our commitment to militant principles and foundations, and on our 
loyalty to the historical legacy and the sacrifices of the pioneers, the leaders, and the 
militants, we, the undersigned trade unionists, affirm our tenacity in clinging to an 
independent, militant, and democratic UGTT, aligned to the causes of the working 
class, the people, the nation, and the universal causes of a just humanity, for 
democracy, national liberation, and social emancipation. […] 
 
7 September 2010, Rencontre Syndicale Démocratique Militante 
 
4. Article on UGTT SG Jerad's Meeting with Ben Ali395 
 
Repudiation of All Forms of Violence and Continuation of the National Effort for 
Development and Employment 
President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali received, on Wednesday afternoon, Mr. 
Abdessalem Jerad, UGTT SG, who, at the end of the meeting, made the following 
declaration: “I have had the honour of meeting the Head of State and it was the 
occasion of a very important discussion, in which we tackled the painful situation of 
some regions of the country and some ideas and proposals by the UGTT. I have found 
that the President of the Republic has a deep vision of the main problems and of their 
causes, and he is willing to solve them”. 
After having affirmed the satisfaction of the workers’ organisation concerning 
the Head of State’s decision to liberate the people who were arrested, Mr. Jerad added: 
“The UGTT is sorry for the victims but in the same way it rejects all forms of violence 
and all attacks on the public and private assets and on the achievements of the country. 
I have shared with the President of the Republic our support for the creation of an 
                                                 
395 The article was translated from French by the author. 
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investigative committee on the violations and of another committee to examine 
corruption cases and the mistakes made by some officials”. 
The UGTT SG, on the union’s behalf, reasserted the imperative of overcoming 
this difficult and delicate situation, in order to return to normality, and to allow all 
parties to engage in the application of the measures decided by the Head of State, 
particularly those concerning employment and the situation of the unemployed and of 
those who have lost their job, and this will be done through appropriate mechanisms 
that will be examined. 
Mr. Jerad concluded as follows: “I have found that the Head of State has a high 
consideration of the workers and of their organisation, and he pays much attention to 
this category as well as to all persons in need”. 
The Head of State declared he will give instructions to invite UGTT 
representatives to the regional and local councils and to contribute to the national 
effort for development and employment. 
 
14 January 2011, La presse de Tunisie, p. 4 
 
